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Introduction 
Where are you from? A seemingly simple question asked in a London pub. However, as a 
Basque citizen born in Spain and living in France, it provoked a certain difficulty. My first reply 
would be intuitive, non-problematic: Basque. It is how I feel. But the response is lacking 
something and requires a bit more: from Spain? Or France? Here the difficulty arises. In a 
normal conversation, this is an ice-breaking question. It is about politeness, a means to open a 
conversation. In reply, I can simply be polite and say France, or Spain. I can choose between 
where I see my children grow or where my mother comes from. But whichever I choose, I will 
deny something of myself because I feel I belong to neither of them. If I decide not to elaborate, 
I will feel compelled to explain why, account for how I feel about my country, what my political 
convictions are… all of which is too fast, and too deep for small talk. We are no longer simply 
talking about where I come from, but who I am. Yet suddenly, I become only Basque. Neither 
philosophy teacher, nor a fan of Sonic Youth, or someone struggling to end his PhD… just 
Basque, only Basque.  
Indeed, something similar may well be occurring the other way around. Either they are 
sympathetic to the ‘Basque cause’ and intend to express, usually too emphatically, their support 
for ‘us.’ Or, equally over-zealously, reject my way to define myself and intend to convince me 
I am wrong about what I think I am, or how I feel about it. In short, the other is either with ‘us’ 
or against ‘me.’ All the while I wonder what ‘us’ actually means, and how this person knows 
nothing at all about me. So instead of a polite introduction, what happens from the very 
beginning is a rigid mutual categorization that leaves little room for a ‘cross-fertilization’ of 
meaning. I guess something similar occurs to a liberal that meets a conservative, or a socialist 
that meets a capitalist. But you simply never begin a conversation with a stranger asking, are 
you in favour of global capitalism? While it is strikingly common to begin a conversation 
asking, where are you from? 
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It may be for this reason that identity is one of the main topics of discussion in the Basque 
Country. In several fields, the thread that runs through any debate within the Basque speaking 
community, is how the Basque national identity is defined. For a long time, controversy has 
bedevilled the different ways of defining its main character: Is it the language? History? 
Territory? However, during the last decade, it seems that a paradigm shift is occurring.  
In the introduction to her recent book, Laura Mintegi, a prominent Basque writer, summarises 
this change as follows:  
Liburu hau irakurri ostean zerbait argi geratu bazait, zera da, euskal bideak “bide” 
izan nahi badu, “euskal” izateari utzi beharko diola1 (Olariaga et al. 2015, 14).  
She refers to a collection of essays written by four ‘young’ Basque philosophers. What they 
suggest, according to Mintegi, is that debates should withdraw from a focus upon difference 
and the identity of the Basque people, to ones of political equality, human rights, or justice… 
in the Basque Country. Put another way, when I respond with, ‘I am Basque’, what it says about 
me, speaks only about me and we can have a polite conversation about how I feel it, live it, love 
it, or hate it. But it is not under discussion. My identity is mine. By contrast, when it comes to 
‘us’, the who should be non-problematic, collectively ‘banal’ and individually diverse. The 
question is rather what do we want to become, and how are we going to make it together. 
This dissertation follows, and contributes to, that direction of travel. The main topics are 
identity and democracy, and the main case study is located in the Basque Country. This is not 
however, a detailed approximation to this debate within the Basque community. The case study 
case is not intended to resolve the local controversy, on the contrary, the case study serves to 
illustrate, a more general debate on the controversial relationship between identity and 
democracy, and more concretely, between political identity and deliberative democracy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 English translation: After reading this book if something is clear to me, it is that the Basque way if it wants to be a “way” it 
can no longer be “Basque”. 
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In academic terms, the standard departure point for discussion begins with the dichotomy 
between two types of national identity. On the one hand, national identity is romantic. It 
references a glorious past commonly grounded in a future vision of their ethnic communities. 
On the other, it is resolutely cosmopolitan. This type has a broader conception of identity where 
world citizens are sheltered in their path towards a future held in common. Both appear to share, 
albeit differently, expressions of a basic human need to embrace others, yet they are 
categorically opposed in their definition of who is the ‘we’ that needs to stand together. Besides 
which, there is a wide consensus regarding the standard in accordance to which one may assess 
the contribution either of them make to the prosperity of our societies.  
In the European context at least, democracy is generally uncontested. It could be inspired by 
contradictory principles, shaped by a wide variety of procedures, and even contested with 
regard to its outcomes. But the basic idea that only the people hold power over legitimate 
political institutions remains intact.  
Indeed, the last two decades have witnessed the end of violent conflicts within the territory of 
the EU and both involved a ‘national question’. The path initiated by the Good Friday 
Agreement in Northern Ireland, and followed in the Basque Country with the Aiete Declaration, 
indicated a paradigm shift that underlined the incontestability of democracy as the means 
though which political disputes are channelled. Neither in the North of Ireland, nor in the 
Basque Country, has the national issue been settled, but the respective parties acknowledged 
that claims should be pursued by democratic means only. If independence was the goal, the 
only legitimate pursuance of that can only from the consent of the people, and the people 
endorse a political project only by democratic means.  
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This paradigm shift could be illustrated by a shift of attention from the North of Ireland to 
Scotland, in the case of the UK, and from the Basque Country to Catalonia, in Spain. In both 
cases, the absence of a violent conflict in the background, facilitated ‘rational’ debate and 
contributed to a more creative search for solutions. But their differences reveal a tricky paradox 
once the cases are compared. At the same time, as violent conflict over national disputes faded 
away, nations themselves returned to political arena more forcefully than ever before in the 
recent past: only now on behalf of established nation states. In the Scottish case, the government 
held a referendum in September 2014. Citizens were asked to respond ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to a clear 
question: Should Scotland be an independent state? The ‘No’ side won with a 55.3% of the 
vote, after a turnout of 84.6% percent of those eligible to vote - the highest recorded for any 
electoral process in the country’s history. The UK government transferred the powers to the 
Scottish government to hold a referendum. Scottish citizens expressed their preferences 
democratically. Alex Salmond “accepted the verdict of the people” and called Scotland “to 
follow suit in accepting the democratic verdict of the people of Scotland”2 (The Guardian, 
2014/09/19).  
Salmond himself acknowledged a referendum is a “once in a generation opportunity”3 and 
rejected the possibility of a second referendum for at least 18 years (The Telegraph, 
2014/09/14). However, two years later, in an unexpected sequence of events, it is not Scotland 
but the UK that voted “Yes”, in a referendum in favour of separating, not from Scotland, but 
the EU.  
Brexit, also unprecedented, was won by the Vote Leave campaign in a referendum held in the 
UK in 2016, by advocating the restoration of its own borders controls, and withdrawal from the 
European Union. The historical relevance of this event was unprecedented, insofar as it was the 
first time a member state had decided to leave the Union, and one of its side-effects could be a 
second independence referendum in Scotland. Indeed, on the 28th of March 2017, the Scottish 
Parliament voted in favour of a formal request to the UK government for the powers to hold a 
new referendum, and Nicola Sturgeon, the First Minister of Scotland, argued this requirement 
is grounded in the expressed preference of Scottish voters to remain in the EU. In other words, 
they want to separate from the UK to remain in the EU. 
                                                 
2 Source: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/19/alex-salmond-accepts-scotland-independence-defeat-holyrood-
powers (Consulted: 2017-08-12). 
3Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scottish-independence/11095188/Alex-Salmond-pledges-no-second-
Scottish-referendum.html (Consulted: 2017-08-12). 
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In Catalonia, a much more turbulent political process has taken place over the last decade. 
Almost all parties arguing for the right to hold a referendum on Catalan independence, 
recognised the political process. Between 2004 and 2006 the Catalan Parliament discussed and 
agreed a proposal to reform its Estatut d’Autonomia. The proposal gained the support of a 
73.9% of voters via a referendum. Although, in comparison to the Scottish case, turnout was 
lower, with 50% of voters abstaining. The approved text stated in its preamble that: “[t]he 
Catalan nation has been building itself…” a phrase that Spanish political parties found 
unacceptable. The proposal followed its procedural course, but inspired fierce opposition. For 
example, Mariano Rajoy, the current Prime Minister of Spain declared the Estatut was a 
‘disaster’ and stated: 
... what a minimal sense of patriotism and common sense requires us is to stop this 
operation to liquidate the Spanish nation4 (ElPaís, 2006/06/19).  
 
This fierce opposition manifested itself in 187 amendments to the 223 dispositions of the 
original text in front of the Constitutional Court. The process ended with a decision 
(Constitutional Court, 31/2010) underscoring that “the Constitution does not recognise other 
than the Spanish nation” (ElPaís, 2010/07/09). Several articles of the Estatut were either 
rewritten or erased, and large sections of Catalan society took this decision as a betrayal of the 
promise made by Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, “to support the reform of the Estatuto that the 
Catalan Parliament approves”5 (Elpaís, 2003/11/14). In the aftermath of this decision, the 
debate on independence gained support, and the controversy shifted toward the right of Catalan 
institutions to legitimately call for a referendum – a power denied, and even legally proscribed, 
by the Spanish authorities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Source:  http://elpais.com/diario/2006/06/19/espana/1150668010_850215.html (Consulted: 2017-08-12). 
5 Source : https://elpais.com/diario/2003/11/14/espana/1068764421_850215.html (Consulted: 2017-08-12). 
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In sum, both cases reflected the limitations of a dichotomic opposition between ethnic and civic 
nations, but especially their corresponding assignation to state or stateless nations. In the 
Scottish case, the appeal for a second referendum was claimed on the basis that the majority of 
Scottish citizens voted to remain a member of the EU. Whilst in the Catalan case, the Estatut 
stated the willingness of Catalan institutions to remain in the Spanish state in the exercise of 
their political sovereignty as a free nation, but the Constitutional Court rejected the implicit 
claim that they were free to take such a decision. In neither case was the argument for 
independence presented as an ethnic movement; no more at least than the argument against it. 
The diagnostic becomes different if, instead of trying to explain this situation from the 
contraposition between ethnic and civic nations, we face it from their corresponding 
understanding of democratic rules. In the Catalan case, the will of Catalan citizens to express 
their opinion by casting a vote for independence, defined a democratic mandate for political 
institutions. The government in Madrid however, argued that the law should prevail so far as it 
is the law, and in particular, that the Spanish Constitution, is the expression of the general will 
of the Spanish people. On the other hand, the UK government argued that a referendum was 
held and lost, and that there was no room for another for at least a generation. The UK voted, 
including Scottish UK citizens, and Brexit was the result, and the change will be enacted. 
Therefore, given that the law applies to UK, it equally compels Scotland, even though a majority 
of Scottish citizens voted not to leave the EU. 
From this perspective, the second call for a referendum in Scotland, and the Catalan call for a 
consultation, exemplify a special case of an old and venerable paradox of modern constitutional 
democracies: the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ (Berlin 1959; Constant 1988). As the first chapter will 
explain, the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ defines an essential contradiction between the two basic 
principles of modern constitutional democracies: what prevails law or democracy? Individual 
rights or popular sovereignty? If this dilemma is considered through the lens of political theory, 
all seems to depend on the conception of the person, the people, and the institutions of law. 
Each theoretical tradition provides a specific account of each of these concepts, and suggests a 
solution on the basis of the weight given to each accordingly. The aim, in each case, is to 
guarantee the legitimacy of political institutions in the eyes of citizens. But two centuries of 
theoretical debate are testament to the difficulties of how agreement is reached to achieve this 
objective. 
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The second chapter explains how, according to Jürgen Habermas, no one is to blame because 
it is nearly impossible to find consensus between different theoretical traditions, especially if 
they do not share a common ontology. Their definitions of subjectivity and society differ, so if 
we depart from those definitions, establish principles on that basis, and consequently shape 
ideal institutions in the light of them, there will be no agreement. The strategy should change, 
and his proposal is simple: if we are not able to agree, let the focus be on the conditions making 
agreement possible. Translated as a response to the 'Liberties Dilemma', this change of 
perspective entails that neither popular sovereignty, nor rights take priority; either we have both 
on equal footing or none at all (Habermas 1996). The issue is how to make both function in 
parallel; namely a question of procedures.  
Let’s take a look at the Catalan case from this point of view. The legitimacy of the law is 
grounded in the Constitutional act, which gives Catalan institutions the power to rule, and 
Catalan citizens the capacity to govern themselves. Therefore, both Catalan Institutions and the 
Spanish Constitution, share a constitution that legitimates their corresponding legal systems, 
but they receive contradictory democratic mandates from their corresponding constituencies. It 
is axiomatic that any decision taken in a democratic state will face the challenge of not 
representing all in society; it is equally true that the opposite is impossible.  However, the 
particularity of this case, is that what is at stake is whether their corresponding constituencies 
do indeed constitute a unique society.  
Will Kymlicka plainly explained this problem by saying that,  
... democracy is rule by the people but this requires an agreement that citizens of a 
state do indeed form a single ‘people’ (Kymlicka 2011, 285).  
In my view, it is at this point that the Scottish and Catalan cases differ. In the Scottish case, 
there were differences of opinion regarding the appropriateness of holding a second 
referendum, and controversy arose regarding the political will of the respective parties in the 
case of disagreement. But, nobody questioned that both parties existed, and further, have the 
right to decide whatever they want to be in the future. Therefore, the problem is not ontological 
but procedural, and the procedural approach then, remains valid in assisting the constructive 
search for solutions. 
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In contrast, the Catalan case revealed that the very existence of the parties in dispute is denied. 
From the Spanish point of view, the Spanish Constitution defines the Spanish nation as the only 
sovereign political entity. Moreover, the Spanish constitution gave birth to Catalan Institutions 
as legitimate political entities. Therefore, there is no legitimacy for Catalan institutions outside 
of Spanish Law. For Catalan institutions however, it was the free will of Catalan people that 
legitimated, via a referendum, the ruling of the Spanish Constitution in Catalonia. Thus, there 
is no legitimacy for the law in Catalonia if it is contrary to the democratic mandate of Catalan 
citizens. In this case, the procedural approach defined by Habermas becomes controversial. 
The third chapter explains this in more detail, showing how Habermas departs from a clear 
distinction between ethnic or conventional, and civic or post-conventional identities. In a 
modern constitutional democracy, national identity belongs to the constitution of law and 
outside of that there is only conventional morality. Therefore, we should interpret the Catalan 
claim for self-determination as a nostalgic glance to a glorious past of a conventional identity. 
But, the Spanish state is a case of constitutional patriotism, and the identity of the Spanish 
nation is not conventional, but reflexive and rational. Therefore, according to Habermas, since 
Spain settled its Constitution, the law is the language of popular sovereignty, and if the law 
does not speak Catalan in Madrid, it is a problem not for the law but for Catalans. 
It is questionable whether or not the Spanish nation fits the definition of constitutional 
patriotism (Payero 2012).  But notwithstanding this, the potential inadequacy of the procedural 
model in this particular case, shows that the Habermasian solution requires acknowledging a 
dichotomic distinction of identity that I have already discarded. In my view, when considering 
the case of multinational societies in constitutional states, the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ is 
intertwined with another old and venerable philosophical paradox; in short, what came first the 
chicken or the egg? (Honig 2007). According to the ‘Constitutional Paradox’ (Habermas 
2001a), when the constitution settles the legitimacy of law, the question is no longer whether 
the law or democracy is best, but rather, what is first.  
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If we adopt a philosophical line of enquiry, then several renowned philosophers and scientists 
have provided responses to this thorny question. The argument I follow in this dissertation 
however, is inspired by the evolutionary response. This solution, arrived at by an expert panel 
including philosophers, geneticists, a chicken farmer6 (The Guardian, 2016/05/26), and was 
defended by Dr David Papineau, Philosopher of Science at King’s College London. He 
maintains that based on recent works inspired by evolutionary theory, the egg was first because 
the species came from genetic changes in other species, and not from their parents (Bhullar et 
al. 2015). In other words, the first chicken egg had no chicken parents.  
What I will argue with this ‘philosophical’ example, is that we decide first what a chicken is 
defined by; in other words, the categorization of a species is not a natural process - not from 
the perspective of the first chicken egg at least. And, second, how changes occur. One thing 
becomes another, and no one is to blame for it. As Charles Darwin (1859) explained, two main 
impulses track the evolution of species: adaptation and hazard. Both respond to the most basic 
need: survival. But, no survival is possible outside a milieu (Von Uexküll 1965), and this 
relational interaction of each organism to its environment is normative (Canguilhem 2006)7. 
Indeed, it is in these terms that I will reply to the dilemma posed by the constitutional paradox 
in multi-national states.  
During this dissertation, I maintain that identities are not pre-given categories in the light of 
which we could distribute legitimacy, but complex practices that evolve in particular 
circumstances closely tied to their context; in other words, in their particular institutional, 
social, and cultural milieu. In more philosophical terms, identity is an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ (Connolly 1983). Identities are not only vehicles for the best, or the worst of human 
beings, they become the site of controversy. The challenge is not to avoid controversy, but to 
guarantee it by democratic means. And the only rule is the assumption that the chicken will 
never go back into the egg. The focus thus shifts from the critical analysis of identity to a critical 
analysis of the processes through which collective identities cohabit and shape each other. In 
my view, it is by focusing on these processes that unnecessary conceptual deadlocks fade away, 
and political theory reveals its heuristic value. The basic hypothesis is that contesting identity 
requires more, not less, democratic participation, and the critical question becomes how to make 
it possible; meaning procedures. 
                                                 
6 Source: https://www.theguardian.com/science/2006/may/26/uknews (Consulted: 2017-08-12). 
7 I want to thank Gil Arrocena for these references. 
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The fourth chapter develops this trajectory by first focusing on conflict to understand identity, 
as opposed to focusing on identity to understand conflict. Secondly, I defend that position from 
a conflict resolution perspective, where identities are regarded as resources of perspectival 
richness, instead of a burden to overcome. Finally, I argue that deliberative forms of democracy, 
provide an invaluable toolkit of theoretical and practical resources to make it possible. 
Moreover, on the basis that diversity enhances the epistemic capacity of deliberative systems, 
the central hypothesis elaborated here could be considered an extension of the idea explored in  
Hélène Landemore's Democratic Reason (2013), and defined as simply: the many are smarter 
than the few, no matter how diverse the many is. 
Landemore follows Habermas in understanding democracy to be a problem-solving task and, 
is further guided by the ‘diversity trumps ability theorem’ (Hong and Page 2004), in defending 
the thesis that the collective intelligence of the many is more likely to solve complex problems, 
than an elite. Therefore, due to the simple reason that the many tend to be smarter than the few, 
even by chance, she maintains that there is an epistemic benefit associated with greater 
participation in decision-making. This is not however just a question of numbers, as in the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet 1976), but because, 
 it is often better to have a group of cognitively diverse people than a group of very 
smart people who think alike (Landemore 2013, 103). 
Consequently, she rejects the methodological individualism of contemporary political science, 
because the depth of reason operating beneath democratic decision making is collective, and it 
is ‘distributed’ (Landemore 2013, 27–53). This ‘democratic reason’ emerges from 
environments where citizens, institutions, customs and even artefacts, interact and constitute 
efficient cognitive devices. Thus, when controversy involves contested identities, the focus 
should be placed less in separated units, and more in the complex relations established between 
citizens, and within the institutions that those relations are procedurally regulated.  
In other words, critical analysis should pay attention to what the systemic approach to 
deliberative democracy refers to as 'deliberative ecologies’ (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 
6). It is in the context of complex sets of relations between identities and procedures, that 
provides the analytical space to assess whether their interactions facilitate the operation of 
democratic reason or not. So how might that be done?  
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At the systemic level, the epistemic approach values diversity. As James Bohman wrote,  
[t]he benefits of diversity in improving deliberation only accrue in systems that 
institutionalise diverse forms of deliberation in different types of forums at various 
levels of organisation (Bohman 2006, 186).  
‘Multi-perspectival deliberation’ manifests as the political equality of citizens in the expression 
of their opinions,  
it enables democratic authority to be distributed among collective agents and the 
publics with which they interact [And the epistemic benefits of this sort of 
distributed process take advantage] of the diverse circumstances and competencies 
of variously composed publics and collective agents (Bohman 2006, 186).  
In short, the many are smarter than the few, even when speaking about collective bodies at the 
systemic level. 
At each site, across variant levels of the system, the picture gets necessarily a bit more complex. 
The problem of differentiating the role of each site is that the systemic approach to deliberation 
may,  
... result in judging a system as deliberative with little, or even nothing, in the way 
of actual democratic deliberation between citizens taking place (D. Owen and Smith 
2015, 218).  
To avoid this problem, Owen and Smith suggest a ‘deliberative minimum’ ruling deliberation 
at every site of the system. This minimum requires  
... a relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual exchange of reasons as if to 
reaching a shared practical judgment (2015, 228).  
From the epistemic point of view, the most problematic part of this minimum is the aspiration 
to reaching a shared practical judgment based on reason. But, is this aspect central to 
deliberation if we expect social integration? Maybe not. If we assume for example, that public 
reason itself is plural, why might we expect anything else? 
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For example, Hélène Landemore begins her book by explaining her own contradiction when 
she realised French voters had rejected the European Union Constitution in 2005. According to 
her, the constitutional project was perhaps imperfect, but could have been considered as a 
reasonable compromise between different political conceptions of the EU. Thus, either French 
citizens, or herself, was wrong. However, when talking about political decisions, according to 
which standards do we differentiate what is right and what is wrong? She suggests that being 
wrong or not was not the point. The decision that French citizens took needs to be considered 
legitimate because it fulfilled the requirements of procedural justice. Thus, disagreement on the 
substantive result of the referendum is unjustified in trying to sustain an argument about the 
inappropriateness of the referendum itself. This raises arguably a more fundamental question. 
Is any decision legitimate just because it is democratic?  
The obvious response is that democratically taken decisions are at least more legitimate than 
non-democratic decisions. In other words, democracy is the least worst. But, this is too weak 
for an argument aimed at sustaining the legitimacy of institutions ruling our lives. In this regard, 
the epistemic argument suggests not only that democratic decisions are fair, but they are smarter 
than non-democratic ones. Nonetheless, taking an epistemic standpoint, instead of overcoming 
the dilemma, we transfer it. The question is not now whether decisions are right or wrong but 
whether their outcomes are true or not. The empirical experience accumulated over recent 
decades in the field of deliberative democracy, suggests that we are not, in general, especially 
good in the search for truth. It is because of this that Landemore suggests, if human reasoning 
is so bad at figuring out the truth it may be that, “figuring out the truth cannot be its main 
function” (Landemore 2013, 126). 
To retain normative standards, she suggests we should rethink deliberation from the perspective 
of argumentation theory (2013, 118–44). First, Landemore suggests that instead of searching 
for the truth, and improving its status through ratiocination, the main function of reasoning is,  
... to find and evaluate reasons, so that individuals can convince other people and 
evaluate their arguments in dialogic contexts (2013, 126).  
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In other words, mutual exchange of reasons is the epistemic value, of which the diversity of 
cognitive perspectives is crucial. Secondly, this exchange does not refer to counterfactual others 
in Habermas’ sense; it is not about ideal role taking. As Landemore put it, “the ‘normal’ 
conditions for reasoning are deliberative and social” (2013, 127). Put another way, reasoning 
is an argumentative device and its function is social, but deliberation requires the mutual 
exchange of reasons with at least one other human being.  
From this perspective, the ‘deliberative minimum’ requires at each site of the deliberative 
system, a relation to real others as equals engaged in the mutual exchange of reason for the 
epistemic benefit, of which the diversity of cognitive perspectives that emerges is crucial. The 
theory of argumentation then, describes how this process of mutual exchange of reasons can 
provide epistemic benefits, without judging the validity of the input or the output of the 
deliberative process. As Landemore put it, claims made by the theory of argumentation,  
... are descriptive - that is true or false - but they have no implications in terms of 
what is morally wrong... [indeed] the argumentative theory of reasoning is 
compatible with many normative views of politics and does not carry a normative 
agenda by itself (Landemore 2013, 129).   
In my case, I retain what I take to be foundational for the normative agenda of deliberative 
democracy: its aspiration towards social integration. The deliberative minimum is the aspiration 
that participants will establish a relation to real others, engaged with as equals in the mutual 
exchange of reasons, as if to reach a shared practical judgment. This aspiration is not at odds 
with the epistemic argument for democracy, nor the assumption that public reason is plural. 
The epistemic argument for democracy rules out the idea that in the effort to realise ideals we 
should be concessive to the second best while holding them fixed (Bohman 2009, 31). In my 
case, after months considering Habermas, I especially value his effort to provide a viable route 
towards social integration. I think it is worth retaining with the caveat Bohman rightfully 
underlined, that these ideals need to be open to change, and to develop as our practices evolve. 
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In sum, I defend deliberative democracy because it provides a viable path to enhance the role 
of citizens in societies with contested identities. The aim of deliberation in these cases is 
epistemic, it assists in creating a positive environment which enables a collaborative search for 
solutions. It can be measured by considering the extent to which deliberative exercises 
contribute to the diversity of cognitive resources involved in the deliberative system. I would 
argue that the identity of participants is not the necessary condition for deliberation to take 
place, but rather facing the other is the pre-condition for deliberative reasoning to take place, 
and is crucial in enhancing its epistemic benefits. Finally, I retain the normative aspiration 
towards social integration; the idea that citizens should treat each other with mutual respect and 
as if they could reach a shared practical judgment. But this ideal is aspirational, and deviations 
from this ideal should account for similar deviations in the light of the same ideal at the level 
of the deliberative system as a whole. 
As James Bohman has elegantly summarised, 
... realist theories without aspirational ideals are empty, but aspirational ideals 
without empirical inquiry and testing are blind (Bohman 2009, 28). 
Consequently, the fifth and final chapters empirically test the argument on a concrete 
deliberative exercise, before summarising the main conclusion, generalise the implications, and 
suggest future research trajectories. These suggestions are predicated upon retaining the most 
important tenets of its normative core, namely deliberative democracy, and instead of moving 
forward from discourse ethics to deliberative practice, movement must be backwards from 
discourse ethics to the underlying theory of argumentation. 
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Finally, the case study explored by this thesis is The Konpondu Initiative (CICR 2007, 2009). 
This initiative, pursued by the Basque Government between 2007 and 2009, was aimed at 
responding to the challenge of peace by moving citizens into the equation. The context was less 
than appropriate for this kind of move. The Basque case harbours almost all of the classical 
challenges that militate against the success of deliberation. Different national sensibilities are 
intertwined with different linguistic communities, who in turn are ruled by different 
administrative bodies, at different institutional levels, and all in a country that barely extends 
over 200 km with less than three million inhabitants. More painfully, the Basque country was 
witness to the last armed conflict within the EU. Indeed, just before the initiative began, peace 
talks ended dramatically and violence resumed. Nonetheless, in the following two years, almost 
1500 people took part in 182 fora aimed at making their voices heard as a part of the solution.  
The material collected is far from ideal for the analysis of deliberative discourse, but it does 
however, tell the story from a uniquely different perspective; that of the Basque citizens. In the 
end, it has been civil society that has made the difference in the Basque case. Several civil 
society organisations, such as The Basque Social Forum, Bake Bidean or Les Artisans de la 
Paix, testify to the stubbornness of Basque citizens to ensure the success of the peace process. 
Their desire, not only to tells their own particular story, but also changed history. In particular, 
the images of ETA decommissioning its armaments to civil society volunteers, against the 
explicit mandate of the Spanish state, and the reluctant and factual acknowledgement of French 
authorities, is history. A passage of Basque history that tells another story about ‘us.’ A story I 
will be happy to share in a pub in London in response to anyone asking me, where are you 
from? 
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Chapter I 
‘Liberties Dilemma’: The Liberal Approach 
 
Democracy stands almost uncontested as the appropriate procedure to conduct public life in 
contemporary societies. But the concept ‘democracy’ is far from consensually attached to a 
single clear-cut definition. A core issue is the long-standing controversy over the principles 
which democratic institutions would better guarantee liberty and equality. In other words, 
whether democratic regimes should better guarantee what Benjamin Constant named the 
‘Liberty of the Ancients’ or the ‘Liberty of the Moderns’ (Constant 1988). Broadly speaking, 
the ‘Liberty of the Ancients’ refers to popular sovereignty; the right of citizens to master 
themselves as a people. While the ‘Liberty of the Moderns’ refers to the system of individual 
rights; the right that each person holds for freedom of speech, conscience and the like.  
Several attempts have been made to reconcile basic elements of both traditions. Among them, 
two remarkable examples are John Rawls’s political conception of ‘justice as fairness’ in 
Political Liberalism (2005) and Philip Pettit’s idea of ‘freedom as non-domination’ in 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997). Nonetheless, according to 
Jürgen Habermas (1994b), neither liberalism nor republicanism8 is capable of accommodating 
both, because negative rights and political liberties are ends by themselves, not the means to 
each other.  
This introductory chapter unpicks the different aspects of the so-called ‘Liberties Dilemma’ to 
underline the novelty of Habermas’ procedural understanding of democracy. As a default 
position, I will review the solution proposed by John Rawls’s through a political definition of 
‘justice as fairness’ (1971, 2005). Drawing on critiques by Charles Taylor (1992, 1994), Herbert 
Hart (1973) and Philip Pettit (1997, 2005, 2006, 2012), I will problematize Rawls’s proposal 
with regard to three respects: the ideal of persons and society, the priority rule and the idea of 
liberty. Finally, I will follow Jürgen Habermas’ procedural critique to Rawls (1994b, 1995, 
1996) outlining basic ideas that underpin the deliberative response to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’  
 
                                                 
8 Pettit defends Habermas rejects a particular conception Franco German republicanism he exemplifies with the conceptions 
of the state and individual of Kant and Rousseau  (Pettit 2013, 196). Indeed Habermas constraint his critique of republicanism 
to a communitarian reading of contemporary republican scholars (Habermas 1994b, 4). 
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1 Political Liberalism: John Rawls’s Fundamental Ideas 
Political Liberalism (2005) (hereafter, PL) grounds Rawls’s solution to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ 
on the concept of ‘justice as fairness’ introduced in his earlier book A Theory of Justice (1971). 
In Rawls terms, “justice as fairness tries to adjudicate between these contending traditions.” 
(2005, 5) Two basic principles are defined to guarantee liberty and equality. The first principle 
refers to political rights and liberties, while the second to equality of opportunity and the so-
called ‘difference principle’. Both principles together “with the first given priority over the 
second” (2005, 6) are considered better than alternatives to realise values of liberty and equality; 
and, therefore, to solve the liberties dilemma.  
The novelty of Rawls’s contribution rests in the claim that giving priority to rights over goods, 
does not mean that “a liberal political conception of justice cannot use any idea of the good at 
all” (2005, 173). True, the principles of justice chosen in this light set limits to permissible ways 
of life9. However, those limits are not arbitrary constraints, but necessary regulations. They 
specify certain basic needs required for any conception of the good, without violating equal 
rights for others to do the same freely.10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 He presents his argument after reviewing five uses of the idea of good in justice as fairness, in particular, the limits of the 
conception of the good, its definition as rationality, the notion of primary goods, political virtues and fairness (2005, 173–211). 
Rawls’ conception of the good appears limited by a political conception of justice as fairness that, different to justice as fairness 
as a comprehensive doctrine, is defined for a specific subject, meaning the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime. 
In other words, accepting the political conception of justice as fairness should not presuppose accepting any comprehensive 
doctrine, and its associated good, but a reasonable conception of the good for the basic structure of society conformed by ideas 
latent in the public political culture of any democratic society and, therefore, compatible with the good of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. 
10 Rawls justifies that in this way political liberalism does not contradict classical republicanism that, in his reading, gives 
special weight to the need of certain degree of ‘political virtues’, along with the willingness to take part in the public life, in 
order to ensure that citizens of a democratic society preserve their basic freedoms and liberties (2005, 205). On the contrary, 
locates political liberalism in sharp opposition to civic humanism because civic humanism does not consider participation 
necessary for the protection of the basic liberties of democratic citizenship, rather participation in democratic politics is the 
locus of good life. And this represents, according to Rawls, “a return to giving a central place to what Constant called “the 
liberties of ancients” and has all the defects of that” (2005, 206). 
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Thus, political liberalism, based on a political conception of ‘justice as fairness’, provides an 
appropriate basis to sustain the argument that rights and goods can find accommodation, 
without violating the priority of the former over the latter. The argument in response to the 
‘Liberties Dilemma’ involves two major questions. First, political liberalism should provide a 
‘political conception of justice’ for free and equal citizens that will override available 
alternatives. Secondly, it should justify its appropriateness for securing liberty and equality, 
given that the political culture of contemporary democratic societies is marked by the 
unavoidable fact of ‘reasonable pluralism’. 
 
1.1 Political Conception of Justice as Fairness 
Political liberalism is grounded in the notion of ‘justice as fairness’ (Rawls 1971) and specifies 
two principles11 according to which a constitutional democracy is to realise liberty and equality. 
The first principle entails the need for equal basic rights and liberties for everyone. The second 
refers to equality of opportunity and defines inequalities as acceptable only on the benefit of 
the less advantaged. In short, ‘justice as fairness’ represents a moral conception of justice 
worked out for the basic structure of society in a modern constitutional democracy.  
Further, ‘justice as fairness’ provides a perspective from which these principles must be seen 
as “more appropriate than other familiar principles of justice” to the idea of citizens as free and 
equal (Rawls 2005, 5). This point of view seeks a ‘reflective equilibrium’. It starts from 
asserting that the public culture is “the shared fund of implicitly recognised basic ideas and 
principles” (2005, 8). Next, it proceeds back and forth, narrowing down points of disagreement 
toward higher levels of generality. By this method, Rawls defines justice as a ‘free-standing 
view’; meaning it is independent from political, religious, or metaphysical doctrines citizens 
may otherwise affirm.  
                                                 
11 The two principles are defined as follows: “a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights 
and liberties, this scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all, and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only 
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.  b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are 
to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls 2005, 5–6).  Rawls asserts that these two 
principles exemplify the basic content of the liberal political conception of justice that in turn is given by three main features: 
(i) a specification of basic rights, liberties and opportunities; (ii) a priority of (i) over claims the general good; and (iii) measures 
ensuring that citizens make adequate use of (i) and (ii). In addition, the two principles express an egalitarian form of liberalism 
due: (i) they guarantee the fair value of the political liberties; (ii) fair equality of opportunity; and (iii) the difference principle. 
  
30 
Therefore, justice as fairness finds a ‘reflective equilibrium’ by organising its basic principles 
into a ‘political’ conception of justice. Moreover, the ‘political conception of justice as 
fairness’, is organised around the idea of society as,  
... a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as 
fully cooperating members of society over a complete life (2005, 9). 
If ‘justice as fairness’ is to succeed in defining a ‘political’ conception of justice, it needs to 
provide a publicly recognisable perspective, from which all citizens are able to examine, 
whether or not their institutions are just in realising the values of freedom and equality.  
However, the decision over the most appropriate principles of justice must be worked out under 
appropriate conditions; namely, ones in which citizen’s regard society as a ‘fair system’ of 
social cooperation. To specify the terms under which social cooperation among free and equal 
citizens is fair, political liberalism recasts the doctrine of the social contract. Fair terms of social 
cooperation are agreed by,  
... free and equal citizens who are born into the society in which they lead their lives 
(2005, 25). 
This sort of agreement requires the appropriate conditions to be valid. To that end, Rawls 
defines a ‘device of representation’. The conditions of which make it possible to decide which 
principles may be accepted as better alternatives to secure liberty and equality.  
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1.2 The Original Position 
The original position is a mechanism whereby rationally autonomous deliberations among 
parties enable a reasonable selection of fair terms of cooperation (2005, 304–10). The central 
idea is that  
... the original position connects the conceptions of the person12 and its companion 
conception of social cooperation13 with certain specific principles of justice (2005, 
304).  
Conceptions of both the person and social cooperation, collectively define the idea of ‘society 
as a fair system of cooperation’. Moreover, Rawls contends that under these conditions the two 
principles of justice proposed by him will override alternatives. 
Regarding the conception of the person, he describes the parties in the original position as 
rationally autonomous representatives of citizens in society. They aim at doing their best for 
those represented by them. However, “the parties as rationally autonomous representatives of 
persons in society represent only the rational” (2005, 305). They agree on principles that they 
believe best for those represented by them, from the perspective of their conception of the good 
(rationality), without considering the sense of justice (reasonableness). With these limitations, 
Rawls intends to ensure the autonomy of parties in the original position in two respects. On the 
one hand, they are not required to apply any prior principles of right and justice. On the other 
hand, they are guided solely by what they think is good for the represented (2005, 307).  
 
                                                 
12 Rawls makes an important distinction between the two moral powers ascribed to citizens, namely reasonableness or the 
capacity for a sense of justice and rationality the capacity to pursue one’s advantage: “To elaborate: since persons can be full 
participants in a fair system of cooperation, we ascribe to them the two moral powers connected with the elements in the idea 
for social cooperation noted above [see next note] (…) A sense of justice [reasonableness] is the capacity to understand, to 
apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation (…) The capacity 
for a conception of the good [rationality] is the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s 
rational advantage or good.” (Rawls 2005, 19) 
13 Rawls specifies the idea of social cooperation stressing three characteristics: (i) It is distinct from mere social coordination 
in that it is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures accepted by those cooperating; (ii) It involves the idea that 
cooperation should be fair, meaning that its terms will be accepted by each considering everyone else will likewise accept 
them; and (iii) It requires each having an idea of rational advantage or good (Rawls 2005, 16). 
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Nevertheless, even though parties are exempt from the obligation to behave reasonably, the 
sense of justice cannot be absent in deliberations among parties. This contradiction is solved by 
subjecting parties in the original position to restrictions in design that constrain departures from 
reasonableness. First, parties in the original position, and behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, are 
symmetrically located in relation to one another ensuring that they have no access to the 
particular social position of those they represent (2005, 305). In other words, when parties 
deliberate on the appropriate principles of justice they are not aware of the social position in 
which they are to be ruled. Given parties in the original position are behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ so as to behave reasonably, a further question is how can we expect them to behave 
rationally; after all, they have no knowledge of the social position, nor the conception of the 
good, of those they represent.   
To solve this paradox, Rawls introduced the notion of primary goods (2005, 178–87). Primary 
goods provide a workable list of basic conditions that all persons want regardless of position, 
and it is this that provides the moral basis of rationality. Independent of each conception of the 
good, and its corresponding comprehensive doctrine, primary goods allow interpersonal 
comparison and do not compromise the rationality of parties in the original position.  
Finally, this ‘device of representation’ allows, according to Rawls, fair terms for social 
cooperation among free and equal parties aimed at choosing principles for the basic structure 
of society. Deliberations take place under fair conditions allowing reasonable and rational 
decisions, while the division of roles and restrictions in design, guarantee the autonomy of 
parties. At this point, it only remains unclear how this hypothetical and non-historical decision 
may have any significance once parties leave the original position and become citizens in a 
well-ordered society holding their own equally reasonable doctrines. Put another way, it is not 
clear how the political conception of justice as fairness in the core of political liberalism will 
reach an overlapping consensus in conditions of reasonable pluralism. 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
 
1.3 Reasonable Pluralism and Overlapping Consensus 
The fact of ‘reasonable pluralism’ arises from Rawls’s conceptions of ‘public reason’14 and 
democratic citizenship in a constitutional democracy (Rawls 1997). In short, citizenship defines 
a political relation of citizens to the basic structure of society,  
... a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death [and it is composed of] 
free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body 
(1997, 769).  
Nonetheless, when discussion affects constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, 
differences between citizens “may be irreconcilable”. (1997, 770) Thus, the challenge is to 
demonstrate how it is that a particular political conception of justice as fairness is, not only 
independent of any comprehensive doctrine, but able to establish and preserve the unity and 
stability of a constitutional regime, given the unavoidable plurality of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines of contemporary democratic societies (Rawls 2005, 133–72).  
In the face of ‘reasonable pluralism’, Rawls defends the capacity of the basic principles of 
justice as fairness to represent this impartial standpoint, because the political conception of 
justice as fairness is independent of comprehensive doctrines. The latter belong to what Rawls 
called ‘background culture,’ or the culture of daily life (2005, 14). While the former is a rational 
reconstruction of proven institutions based on intuitions already present in the shared fund of 
practices and traditions in democratic societies (2005, 8). On this basis, Rawls believes a 
political conception of justice as fairness “can gain the support of an overlapping consensus” 
(2005, 15).  
                                                 
14 According to Rawls: “The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic moral and political values that are to 
determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns 
how the political relation is to be understood.” (Rawls 1997, 766) It has a definite structure specified in relation to five aspects: 
“(1) the fundamental questions to which it applies; (2) the persons to whom it applies (government officials and candidates for 
public office); (3) its content as given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice; (4) the application of these 
conceptions in discussion of coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people; and (5) 
citizens’ checking that the principles derived from their conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of reciprocity” (1997, 767). 
And it is public in three ways: “as the reason of free and equal citizens, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the public 
good concerning questions of fundamental political justice, which questions are of two kinds, constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice; and its nature and content are public, being expressed in public reasoning by a family of reasonable 
conceptions of political justice reasonably thought to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity” (Ibid.). 
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For Rawls, overlapping consensus refers to matters that one might reasonably expect to be 
accepted by all rational, free, and equal persons (Rawls 2005, 133–72). He appeals to this as a 
justification for the political conception of justice, abandoning the hope of responding to a 
political community with a complete conception of the good shared by all its members. This 
task is left to reasonable comprehensive doctrines: different conceptions of the good, but not in 
contradiction with a general sense of justice. Moreover, this model is not considered a mere 
association. It provides unity and stability because persons born under just institutions “acquire 
a normally sufficient sense of justice so that they comply with them” (2005, 141).  
Thus, the political conception of justice as fairness is not sceptical or indifferent towards the 
truth content of comprehensive doctrines, rather, it is tolerant of them: its focus is on how they 
operate within the burdens of practical reason, the conditions whereby they express their 
reasonableness. Moreover, if conditions were in place – a well-ordered society – and persons –
not parties in the original position, but citizens – hold both moral powers of personality and 
their comprehensive doctrines – now reasonable – there will be no contradiction with the 
political conception of justice as fairness. If so, then the political conception of justice as 
fairness is the basis of an overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines. If not, either 
doctrine, or the political conception justice must be unreasonable.  
In the end, what is accounted for is a political ideal of justice that gives credence to the capacity 
of political liberalism to solve the liberties dilemma in conditions of pluralism. Negative 
liberties and political rights, with the first given priority over the second, cohabit in a well-
ordered constitutional democracy, and provide a standpoint form which one may assess whether 
institutions treat persons as free and equal citizens.
2 Some Limits to Political Liberalism: Priority Rule, Freedom, and Society  
The measure of Rawls’ influence is the extent of the critique that his ideas have engendered. 
Overall, it remains questionable whether the political conception of justice as fairness does 
represent a neutral standpoint for citizens. In other words, it is debateable whether each of us 
in the original position will choose the same principles. Rawls justifies this with reference to 
the connection between justice as fairness and the conceptions of the person and society. 
However, at this level too, these definitions are open to dispute. This is the basic idea that 
underlines the novelty of the procedural approach presented by Habermas. If we depart from 
definitions, on their basis, setting valid principles and shaping institutions in the light of 
agreement is difficult.  
In the following section, three critiques are explored that highlight how different definitions of 
the person and society and the principles of democracy, challenge Rawls’ intention to define 
political liberalism as a ‘free standing view.’ First, Charles Taylor  (1992, 1994) and Herbert 
Hart (Hart 1973), both question the neutrality of the conception of the person and society in 
liberal doctrine. Secondly, Philip Pettit (2012), who provides a detailed account of why 
different principles may also be reasonable to the basic aims of political liberalism, without the 
necessity to acknowledging the priority of liberty over equality.  It is not my aim here, nor is 
their space, to give a full exposition of their respective theoretical proposals, rather to show, in 
the three critical dimensions of morality, law, and politics, how each of them illustrate the limits 
of political liberalism in providing a lasting solution to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’. 
 
2.1 The Neutrality of Liberalism and the Ideal of Society 
Rawls solution to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ holds that the two principles of political liberalism 
provide an impartial standpoint whereby citizens can judge whether constitutional democracies 
treat them equally as free persons (Rawls 2005, 19). Citizens are free because they can exercise 
their two moral powers of personality; meaning, they can pursue their own rational conception 
of the good in the light of a reasonable sense of justice. Therefore, the two principles of justice 
provide a valid reference point to assess whether we can freely and equally exercise our two 
moral powers of personality.  
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Moreover, both principles are valid no matter what moral doctrine each citizen holds to, because 
to choose them, persons are now parties in the original position, and are subjected to special 
conditions. They are symmetrically situated and behind the ‘veil of ignorance’. In particular, 
this second condition departs from the conviction, as Rawls put it,  
... the fact that we affirm a particular, religious, philosophical or moral 
comprehensive doctrine with its associated conception of the good is not a reason 
for us to presuppose, or to expect others to accept, a conception of justice that 
favours those of that persuasion (Rawls 2005, 24).  
As already noted, Rawls is not sceptical about the truth content of comprehensive doctrines. He 
is tolerant of them.  
Charles Taylor by contrast, argues that the moral subjectivism underlying Rawls tolerant 
disposition assumes that “moral positions are not in any way grounded in reason” (Taylor 1992, 
18). It is a facile relativism, based on the simple idea that “everyone has his or her own ‘values,’ 
and about these, it is impossible to argue” (1992, 13). People are called, 
 ... to be true to themselves [seeking] their own fulfilment [and] [n]o one else can 
or should try to dictate its content (1992, 14).  
Thus, in theory, vigorous defence of any moral ideal is off limits and society must be neutral 
on questions of the good life.  
Indeed, liberal doctrines stepping on the idea of an overlapping consensus assume, “a liberal 
society must be neutral on questions of what constitutes a good life” (1992, 18). However, 
according to Taylor, the culture of self-fulfilment does, indeed, entail that certain modes of life 
are ‘higher’ or ‘better’ than others, 
 ... not in terms of what people happen to desire or need  [but, in the light of] a 
standard of what people ought to desire (1992, 16). 
In Rawls’s case, a liberal standard of the good life is individual self-fulfilment. However, the 
fact of pluralism entails freedom of choice cannot be detached from the significance of choice 
(1992, 13–23).  
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For example, in my first weeks in Brussels, I attended a seminar on Presentation Skills in 
English at the VuB. As usual, the seminar began with an introduction round. Each participant 
tells her name and surname, basic info from her bio, and the topic of her PhD. I do not remember 
her name, but the first one to introduce herself was an Arabic girl. She looked terribly self-
confident and not in need of any training for presentations skills at all. Her English was fluent 
and correct, at least as far as I could realise at that time. The topic of her PhD was something 
like ‘Gender Patterns in Modern Architecture.’ She explained that she was studying how the 
fact that men plan the organisation of cities, affects how women experience public space.  
The striking point was that she was wearing a hijab. In the light of the topic of her PhD, this 
woman was concerned about gender equality. However, from a white, male, petit bourgeois 
like me, both acts were apparently contradictory. According to Taylor, the choice is inescapably 
intertwined with a diversity of horizons of meaning endowing it with significance (1992, 31–
42). In this case, the choice made by the woman to wear a hijab made no sense from my 
perspective. However, there are several potential explanations from her perspective. It can be 
that she thinks the hijab signals no contradiction between her simultaneously being Muslim and 
a feminist. Alternatively, it can be a way of reclaiming her cultural roots as part of her feminist 
consciousness without having any religious content at all. Or, even simply that she likes it, as 
others might like a cap or a bonnet. 
In any case, what Charles Taylor’s critique suggests is that the solution is not forbidding any 
hat or similar cloth that covers the head in public spaces. Even less for the sake of gender 
equality. According to Taylor, to reach a meaningful life, citizens and peoples require the 
recognition, rather than the toleration, of their differences and worth (1992, 43–70). 
Recognition entails we should accept her choice as worthy, without prejudging what she 
allegedly really means by choosing it.  Even if we disagree with her choice, recognition means 
engagement. It is possible to argue about her decision. Indeed, this is the only way to understand 
her choice and acknowledge its worthiness for the sake of gender equality, or not. However, I 
would have never been able to understand her choice if she had never chosen to wear that hijab 
in the seminar. This vignette illustrates, not simply that my position was not neutral, but the 
salience of Taylor’s critique. 
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In short, what Taylor criticised is not that a conception of the good should be accepted because 
it belongs to a comprehensive doctrine, but that the opposite is true, that there is a neutral 
standpoint towards comprehensive doctrines that could be fair to the diversity of meanings of 
choice. 
 
2.2 The Priority Rule and the Conception of the Person 
Herbert Hart’s critique is somewhat different. He is primarily concerned with, “Rawls’s account 
of the relationship between justice and liberty” (Hart 1973, 534) as a consequence of the 
‘priority rule’ whereby 
... liberty is only to be restricted for the sake of liberty itself and not for any other 
social or economic advantage (1973, 536).  
Underlying this view is a challenge to the definition of the person in accounts of liberal 
neutrality. In particular, the idea that persons in a well-ordered society, if reasonable and 
rational, will not choose to give up parts of their freedom for other goods. 
Hart revises several problems of interpretation and application of Rawls theory of justice (1973, 
534–42). His central claim is that Rawls fails to recognize that the implementation of principles 
of justice demands, 
 ... a weighing of advantage and disadvantage must always be required to determine 
whether the general distribution of any specific liberty is in a man’s interest (1973, 
550–51).  
Thus, considerations regarding the exercise of liberty by oneself, could differ once others are 
entitled to exercise the very same liberties. Moreover, in some cases, renunciation may 
outweigh advantages.  
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A clear example can be illustrated when controversy arises regarding the application of different 
basic liberties; so far as resolution of the conflict will correspond to different interests of people 
“who will diverge over the relative value, they set on the conflicting liberties” (1973, 545). 
Moreover, considerations over the problematic implementation of basic principles may not be 
necessary, once principles of justice have been chosen. It also challenges the idea that,  
... the parties would in the conditions of the original position, as rational self-
interested persons, choose the basic liberties which Rawls enumerates (1973, 551).  
In particular, Hart found problematic the argument in accordance to which, 
 ... the priority of liberty prohibiting exchanges of liberty for economic or other 
social advantages must be included among the requirements of justice (1973, 552).  
Rawls’s main argument for this prohibition, is that if conditions are in place and basic rights 
and wants are guaranteed, then there would be no rational appeal to sacrifice liberties for the 
sake of other goods. According to Hart’s lecture on Rawls’ proposal, until the point is reached 
that a general conception of justice governs society “men may give up liberties for social gains 
if they wish” (1973, 552). Indeed, at any stage, there may be people willing to surrender rights 
for goods because, on the contrary, the rule may be misplaced; so far as “there would be nothing 
for it to rule out” (Ibid.). In this case, if the very existence of the rule entails the sacrifice of 
liberties for other material goods, it is justified by the fact that they will not have done so in the 
original position?  
To Hart, according to Rawls, as general conditions improve, civilisations may reach a point 
when it is irrational “from the standpoint of the original position” (1973, 553) to give up 
liberties for the sake of material or other goods.  In other words, it seems it is rational for parties 
in the original position to impose this restriction on themselves because, “in the development 
of society the desire for liberty will actually come to have a greater attraction for them” (73, 
553). However, to Hart, this ‘apparently dogmatic course’ regarding the prohibition to exchange 
liberties for material goods entails a very concrete idea of the person. While “Rawls's argument 
for the priority of liberty purports to rest on interests, not on ideals” (1973, 555).  
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In his reply, Rawls (1982) argued that Hart was right noticing, “the priority of liberty cannot be 
argued for by imputing this ideal of person to the parties in the original position” (1982, 87). 
His conception is sustained from a liberal point of view. The argument remains valid because 
“citizens are regarded as having certain natural political virtue without which the hopes for a 
regime of liberty may be unrealistic” (1982, 87). Thus, Hart is right in considering that the ideal 
of the person cannot be imposed on the parties in the original position. Moreover, he is also 
right in asserting that this liberal ideal underlies the argument for the priority rule. However, 
this ideal of a person demands fundamental conditions for social cooperation to be possible; 
namely persons must be free and equal.    
Contra Rawls, this transition from basic ideals of freedom and equality to principles of justice 
and their priority may be debatable if, for example, we take a non-liberal point of view. Indeed, 
this is the case for Philip Pettit in his recent book On the People’s Terms (2012). He critically 
reviews Rawls understanding of the relation between freedom and justice from a republican 
point of view. Moreover, at this point, it remains unclear on which grounds Pettit’s Republican 
view on freedom and equality may be less free-standing than Rawls’s liberal account for any 
citizen holding a ‘reasonably’ republican point of view. 
 
2.3 Political Liberalism and Republican Freedom 
Pettit criticised the two principles of Rawls’s theory of justice in two respects. First, he argued 
that Rawls’ principles do not require “full resourcing of basic liberties” (Pettit 2012, 107). In 
Rawls’s view, people are free because they have a legally protected right to choose ‘without 
interference’ from authorities. However, the liberty to choose is consistent with the inability to 
act on behalf of the right to choose. Indeed, “having that ability is not required for the liberty 
as such only for its worth or value” (2012, 108). Therefore, liberalism fails substantively when 
‘resourcing’15 legally expressed basic rights to choose.  
 
 
                                                 
15 In his words: “First, we would have to resource or facilitate the choice in the sense of ensuring that any of the required 
resources you happen to lack – these may be personal, natural, or social – are made available to you; we would have to 
compensate, in other words, for any vitiation of the choice.” (2012, 69) 
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Secondly, Rawls’ first principle falls short of the Republican requirement for an equal level of 
protection for basic liberties (2012, 109). Pettit underlined Rawls inclusion of penalties for 
those violating the legal duty not to interfere with others’ basic liberties. While his ‘ideal theory’ 
assumes sanctions may never need to be imposed due to the general compliance of citizens with 
their ‘political obligations’. So, Pettit does not suggest citizens will not be willing to comply, 
but that the powerful will not be obliged to it, and weak protection “may leave them able to 
interfere at a relatively low cost” (2012, 109). 
In short, the ideal comes to depend on the goodwill of those with the actual capacity to decide 
not to comply. Together, according to Pettit, “this makes clear that for Rawls domination is not 
a problem as such” (2012, 108). Because:  
Not guaranteeing resources required for exercising the relevant basic liberties, it 
may leave some people in a position where they are unable to exercise those choices 
(2012, 109). 
In other words, the two principles of political liberalism leave ‘intuitively unjust inequalities’ 
untouched.  
Moreover, according to Pettit, the second principle of political liberalism is called upon seeking 
to fit “the reflective equilibrium with the judgements of justice that his methodology requires” 
(2012, 109). However, on the Republican side, the enemy of freedom is not interference but 
power. While “on the liberal understanding asymmetries in interpersonal power are not in 
themselves objectionable” (2012, 11). Thus, according to Pettit, the problem with Rawls 
solution to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ is not that the two principles of liberalism will override 
alternatives that advance the values of freedom and equality, but that they do not share the same 
conception of those very basic values, for example, the same conception of liberty. 
Pettit distinguished three theories of freedom: freedom as non-frustration, freedom as non-
interference, and freedom as non-domination (2012, 64). Freedom as non-frustration would say 
that  
... freedom of choice consists in the absence of invasive obstruction to your actually 
preferred option (2012, 64). 
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Freedom as non-interference, on the other hand, consists in “the absence of invasive obstruction 
to any option, preferred or un-preferred” (2012, 64). He rejects both arguing that both entail 
“adaptation is a possible means of liberation” (2012, 65). Freedom as non-frustration entails 
“that adapting your preferences can give you freedom of choice” (2012, 64). While, non-
interference entails understanding ‘ingratiation’ – seeking the favour of the powerful by 
adapting your preference to those not interfered with – as means for liberation. Both represent 
rational responses to frustration, or another’s power of interference. However, both are at odds 
with a Republican sense of freedom as non-domination.  
Pettit draws on Isaiah Berlin’s ‘open doors metaphor’ to explain his position. Against the 
freedom as non-frustration ideal, the metaphor suggests that, if one is choosing between two 
options, to be considered as free, both ‘doors’ need to be open – not the only open one, that is 
simply chosen to avoid frustration. Moreover, “[w]hat freedom ideally requires is not just that 
the doors be open but that there be no door-keeper who has the power of closing a door” (2012, 
66).  This is the strongest argument against the non-interference ideal. For choice to be free, in 
the republican sense of non-domination, the problem is not actual interference – a closed door 
– but, the power to interfere – a doorkeeper that makes a choice dependent on the goodwill of 
those with the capacity to close the door.  
Freedom as non-domination, therefore, overcomes the non-frustration and non-interference 
paradigms, because ‘resourcing’ facilitates the actual exercise of choice, without being 
subjected to the will of another. Of course, the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination 
also implies egalitarian constraints. Resourcing, not only protection, becomes central to the 
republican ideal of freedom. The appropriateness of protection is measured by the so-called 
‘eyeball test’16. Moreover, protected choices should fulfil the criteria of co-exercisability and 
co-satisfaction17. However, according to Pettit, a simple principle stating the right to equal 
respect for freedom, as non-domination for citizens living under the ruling of a democratic 
republic, “will come close to providing for what must of us will be happy to think of as justice” 
(2012, 110). 
                                                 
16 In Pettit’s words: “The lesson suggests that people should securely enjoy resources and protections to the point where they 
satisfy what we might call the eye-ball test. They can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a 
power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal 
in this regard with the best.” (2012, 84) 
17 In Pettit’s words: “First, the choices to be entrenched ought to be capable of being exercised by each, consistently with being 
exercised by all. And second, they ought to be capable of satisfying or fulfilling each, consistently with satisfying all (see 
Anderson 1999). I call the first criterion of co-exercisability and the second the criterion of co-satisfaction.” (2012, 93) 
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To sum up, regarding either the basic definitions of citizens, and society, or the basic values of 
freedom and equality, the neutrality of the basic principles of political liberalism defined by 
Rawls has not gone unchallenged. The problem is not that the principles follow from 
definitions, and the proposed institutions fit with requirements in the light of basic principles, 
it is the lack of clarity on the grounds which we should accept his definitions as a neutral 
standpoint to begin the discussion. In this sense, Rawls replies seem vague, and the validity of 
the methodological device whereby principles are chosen, is questionable. It is in this sense that 
Habermas challenged Rawls’ proposal. In the light of the above critiques, it seems that in the 
end citizens should acknowledge not what they would have chosen if conditions were in place, 
but what Rawls expects them to choose if conditions are in place for a liberal society to be at 
least possible. 
3 Procedural’ Critique and ‘Deliberative’ Solution: Jürgen Habermas 
Jürgen Habermas rejected Charles Taylor’s appeal for authenticity and recognition on the basis 
that democratic integration requires ‘loyalty to the common political culture’, a common 
political culture that he identified with a kind of ‘constitutional patriotism.’ (Habermas 1994a, 
134). Regarding, Philip Pettit’s republican approach, It is likely that he would have been 
sympathetic, in so far as both reject a ‘communitarian’ (Habermas 1994b, 4) or ‘continental’ 
(Habermas 1994b, 18) interpretation of republicanism. Nevertheless, the debate between Jürgen 
Habermas and John Rawls has been the most fruitful (Habermas 1995; Rawls 1995); despite 
the fact that their controversies have only recently became the focus of academic debate 
(Fynlayson and Freyenhagen 2011).  
Habermas’ critique is more methodological than substantive. He focuses on the ‘device of 
representation’ that Rawls chooses to justify the selection of the basic principles of justice. 
However, his conclusion is substantive. He concludes that Rawls fails to align rights and goods 
in the ideal of political liberalism. Indeed, his approach to Rawls work reveals the sympathetic 
standpoint from where Habermas initially receives Rawls intention. Therefore, his reply 
provides a more viable route to reach the same objective. This route focuses less on the 
substantive content of principles than on the appropriate procedures to make an agreement on 
them possible. 
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3.1 Contra Rawls 
Habermas highlights several problems in Rawls’ proposal. For example, he found that the 
design choices for the original position would be unlikely to secure impartial judgement. 
Equally, he criticised Rawls flattened questions of acceptability to justification based on the 
neutrality of his political conception of justice. Finally, he is reluctant to accept the result of 
these two theoretical decisions; the construction of,  
... a constitutional state that accords liberal basic rights primacy over the democratic 
principle of legitimation [therefore failing] to achieve his goal of bringing the 
liberties of the moderns into harmony with the liberties of the ancients (Habermas 
1995, 111). 
First, he is unconvinced about the capacity of the original position to secure an independent 
standpoint for judgement regarding principles of justice (Habermas 1995, 111–19). As already 
noted, Rawls defence is that the principles of justice of political liberalism involve no reference 
to more comprehensive or metaphysical doctrines. Moreover, he suggests that under fair 
conditions, in the original position, these principles will be chosen over available alternatives.  
Contra Rawls, Habermas suggests that, “the potential gains of this turn are dissipated by the 
systematic deprivation of information” (Habermas 1995, 116). In particular, the division of 
labour effected in the original position disqualifies the capacity of parties to understand the 
interest of their ‘clients’.  For Habermas, to understand the meaning of the principles they are 
seeking, and take account of their clients’ interest in justice,  
they must be equipped with cognitive competencies that extend further than the 
capacities sufficient to rationally choosing actors who are blind to issues of justice 
(1995, 113).18  
Thus, the constraints of information that led Rawls to a final characterization of the parties in 
the original position as ones that share nothing more than, precisely, what they have been given 
in advance, is systematically rejected by Habermas. 
                                                 
18 Moreover, a workable list of primary goods entails an assimilation of basic rights to a list of goods unacceptable, according 
to Habermas, due “rights in the first instance regulate relations between actors: they cannot be “possessed” like things.” (1995, 
114)  
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Second, stressing the ambivalence in the justificatory mechanism chosen by Rawls, Habermas 
challenged the notion that a political conception of justice as fairness can be the basis of an 
overlapping consensus. For Habermas, referring to either a list of primary goods, the definition 
of which requires a previous knowledge of basic needs of persons, or by setting the moral 
psychology of the person, means that Rawls has introduced normative assumptions whose 
validity, “stand in need of prior justification” (Habermas 1995, 119).  
For example, Rawls justifies normative assumptions via reflective equilibrium, so that the 
validity of the theory requires the capacity of the philosopher alone to conduct a rational 
reconstruction of intuitions that operate in the practices and traditions of a democratic society.  
However, if practices and traditions belong to the extant political culture of a democratic 
society, it seems reasonable to conclude that they belong to the particular political culture that 
is derived from this particular democratic society (1995, 120). Therefore, they will be ill-suited 
to operate at the level of generality needed to be neutral in the face of pluralism.  
Indeed, Rawls himself noted that we should not misunderstand that the assertion of the 
institutional framework, does not favour one doctrine over the other with the affirmation of its 
neutrality. Justice as fairness is not neutral by reference to a procedure that is justified without 
appealing to any moral value at all (Rawls 2005, 190–200). Principles of justice are substantive, 
as well as the political conception of the person and society represented in the original position. 
However, they are neutral in aim19, meaning that basic institutions are not designed to favour 
a particular doctrine. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Neutrality in aim (…) In addition, although the political understanding of justice as fairness seeks common ground and 
neutrality in aim it also endorses a division of responsibility: citizens are regarded as having the capacity to assume the 
responsibility for their own ends and to moderate their claims in accordance to what reasonably could be expected by others. 
Accordingly, it “still affirms the superiority of certain forms of moral character and moral virtues.” (Rawls 2005, 195) These 
values relate to those doctrines that facilitate fair social cooperation via civility, tolerance, reasonableness, and fairness. The 
basic structure of society encourages and discourages comprehensive doctrines in accordance to these values and it does so 
fairly discouraging only those that either go against principles of justice or fail to gain adherents under conditions of a fair 
constitutional regime. 
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On the contrary, according to Habermas, by setting the content of the principles in advance, in 
the light of which the discrimination between reasonable and non-reasonable doctrines is 
enacted,  
... the overlapping consensus merely expresses the functional contribution that the 
theory of justice can make to the peaceful institutionalization of social co-operation 
[while] the intrinsic value of a justified theory must already be presupposed 
(Habermas 1995, 121).  
In other words, due to the two-stage design of justification principles, defined in advance of 
citizens’ participation, left them no other choice than making their doctrines on the good life fit 
with the pre-given political conception of justice; or to be rejected as non-reasonable.  
Finally, with reference to the problem of the two liberties, Habermas concluded that the priority 
of liberal rights over the democratic process, defended by Rawls (Rawls 2005, 289–371), was 
not consistently justified (Habermas 1995, 110). Furthermore, it contradicted “the Republican 
intuition that popular sovereignty and human rights are nourished by the same root" (1995, 
128–29). Rawls intends to provide a procedure to ground the recognition of the normative 
authority of democratic institutions from within the different conceptions of the good life held 
by citizens cohabiting in a well-ordered society. Indeed, Habermas recognised Rawls’ intent to 
bring the concept of political autonomy into the original position by asserting a common root 
for rights and goods.  
However, with regard to the priority of the former over the latter, he contends that Rawls ought 
to have made a clearer distinction between acceptability on the one hand, and acceptance on 
the other. The acceptability of the priority of rights, regarding different conceptions of the good 
life, does not, in theory, justify their actual acceptance. Quite the opposite, the more real citizens 
become,  
... the more deeply they find themselves subject to principles and norms that have 
been anticipated in theory and have already become institutionalised beyond their 
control (Habermas 1995, 128).  
Therefore, Habermas maintains that substantive content introduced in the definition of primary 
goods, or the moral powers of personality, is unnecessary, and challenges the impartiality of 
the political conception of justice as fairness.  
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3.2 Procedural Response: Preliminary Notes 
Habermas rejects Rawls’ justification of the priority of rights over goods (Habermas 1995, 113–
14). He further argues, that the constitution of a legal community, does not require the 
demonstration that persons as bearers of subjective rights are preceded by acceptable principles. 
This, according to him, either happen both together, or do not happen at all. Thus, the challenge 
is redefined around the necessity to figure out conditions whereby both rights and goods, can 
be justified when consensus is absent, and controversy affects the coordination of action over 
moral or legal norms. Moreover, from a normative point of view, the challenge equally affects 
moral and legal norms insofar as both intend to respond to the same problem: the possibility of 
ordering legitimately interpersonal relations and actions through justified norms.  
The following chapter, shows that the ‘Discourse Principle’ (hereafter D) (Habermas 1990, 
1996, 104–31) expresses these conditions formally. D does not provide a departure point 
acceptable by all, but standard conditions for the acceptability of norms by citizens themselves. 
D formalises presuppositions,  
... already implicit in the socio-ontological constitution of the public practices of 
argumentation, comprising the complex relations of mutual recognition that 
participants in rational discourse ‘must accept’ (Habermas 1995, 127).  
On the basis of action coordination meets ‘the moral point of view’ sought for by Rawls and, 
according to Habermas, due rights and goods, individual liberties and self-governance, morality 
and law stand on equal footing towards the same principle; the problem of the liberties is solved.  
First, if democracy retains its normative binding force, law ought to derive its authority from 
more than mere de facto acceptance. Therefore, the rule of law begins from private rights of 
individuals to withdraw, on behalf of their interest, from obligations and toward processes of 
social integration. The system of rights in the core of modern constitutional democracies meets 
this first requirement by guaranteeing private rights to the exercise of negative liberties.  
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Secondly, from the vantage point of the D, private rights are not justified simply because their 
holders are moral individuals endowed with the capacity to behave rationally. However, as 
Habermas put it,  
... as participants in rational discourses, consociates under the law must be able to 
examine whether a contested norm meets with, or could meet with the agreement 
of all those possibly affected (Habermas 1996, 104).  
Thus, starting from liberal rights, the fact that the system of rights is justified on the basis of 
conditions that allow agreement among all those possibly affected, means that the system of 
rights represents a justified expression of a common will.  
Thirdly, it is indeed by the application of the D to the legal form as such that impartial 
justification of private rights overburdens the moral individual. Moreover,  
... [o]nce law has been clarified in this way it becomes clear that the normative 
substance of basic liberal rights is already contained in the indispensable medium 
for the legal institutionalisation of the public use of reason of sovereign citizens 
(Habermas 1995, 130).  
Alternatively, it can be considered the other way around, in this sense, citizens practice of self-
determination, meaning their capacity to govern themselves, represents the exercise of a 
common will that cannot come about without citizens being able to freely accept or reject the 
validity of a norm of action. For, as Habermas put it, 
 ... [n]othing is prior to the citizen’s practice of self-determination other than the 
discourse principle, which is built into the conditions of communicative association 
in general, and the legal medium as such (1996, 128).  
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In sum, neither good nor rights can come first, because both necessarily presuppose each other. 
Therefore, the dilemma of the liberties, reflects a misunderstanding either of the status of 
private rights and their justification, or of the community of those who speak to one another 
and agree to govern themselves freely. Thus, grounding the justification of norms requires, in 
either case, a cooperative effort: conflicts over norms can only be settled by consensual means, 
namely guaranteeing that the interest of all those potentially affected will be taken into 
consideration. Moreover, that conditions are necessary allowing an argumentative exchange 
among participants, in which case, the D entails nothing more and nothing less, than conditions 
necessary for the more or less enlightened engagement of participants.  
 
4 Conclusions 
According to Rawls, Political Liberalism accommodates both liberties because of the political 
character of justice as fairness, meaning that it is neutral in the process of discovering principles 
in the face of competing conceptions of the good. Basic rights hold priority over goods, but the 
latter is not constrained by the former, because rights endow citizens with equal liberty to pursue 
their conception of the good life. Furthermore, it is in the light of those principles that citizens 
can judge whether or not their institutions are just. Democratic institutions recover the 
normative binding force of legitimate law because citizens recognise both basic principles in 
them. 
The justification of principles with regard to available alternatives is nevertheless explored and 
clarified as a free-standing view and settled in the original position. This representational device 
allows for the shared basis already present in contemporary democratic societies to be captured, 
and once principles are chosen, to regulate life in society. However, as seen in this short review, 
neither the conception of the person, the definition of society, and correspondingly, nor the 
desirability of the principles of political liberalism, is free from controversy from the 
perspective of several equally reasonable doctrines. 
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Among the critiques reviewed in this chapter, the most compelling is that provided by 
Habermas. He is sceptical that the justification built from the context of theory formation, could 
rule democratic institutions, and justify the normative binding force of democratic institutions 
once the burdens of the theory are over and real citizens are the theorised parties. However, he 
does not suggest an alternative definition of principles. Rather, he considers an alternative 
procedure whereby, in principle, we as citizens of a democratic society, could come to agree 
which proposals we consider most appropriate to regulate our life together.  
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Chapter II 
Deliberative Democracy: A Procedural Response to the ‘Liberties Dilemma' 
 
In response to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’, Habermas makes the central claim that the moral point 
of view which Rawls designed the original position to discover,  
... is already implicit in the socio-ontological constitution of the public practices of 
argumentation, comprising the complex relations of mutual recognition that 
participants in rational discourse “must” accept (Habermas 1995, 127).  
Thus, the task of democratic theory is only to clarify the presuppositions and procedures under 
which public debate among real citizens takes place. Because “we could say that precisely those 
principles are valid which meet with the un-coerced inter-subjective recognition under 
conditions of rational discourse” (Habermas 1995, 127). 
This very basic idea traverses the entire range of Habermasian concept building, beginning with 
his understanding of social theory (Habermas 1990d, 1990c), and up to, and including, his ideas 
about rationality (Habermas 1989c, 1989d), morality (Habermas 1990a, 1990b, 1993), and law 
(Habermas 1996). Habermas’ theoretical innovation, is that he does not define an alternative 
set of substantive principles, rather, he outlines a procedure whereby agreement over principles 
is at least possible when opting for them is better than the alternatives. It is in this sense that he 
places citizens in the driving seat of democratic theory. The acceptability of Rawls’ definitions 
of persons as citizens, primary goods, and corresponding principles of justice, finds justification 
in the context of theory formation. Moreover, the substantive content of his theory is not the 
contribution of a participant in the process of collective will formation but, as Habermas put it, 
“the outcome of a ‘theory of justice’ which he as an expert is qualified to construct” (Habermas 
1990a, 66).  
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Nonetheless, the legitimacy of institutions and their normative binding force cannot find secure 
grounds in a theory of justice defined by a qualified expert. It is in this sense that the procedural 
approach to democracy is interesting, and far more relevant, to societies with deep identity 
divides. Arguably then, a set of common moral principles as a departure point is not what is 
necessary, in its place attention ought to be focussed on certain procedural rules that regulate 
communication among citizens from different communities. Moreover, according to Habermas, 
these rules are not a theoretical artifice, such that political scientists or philosophers could 
clarify, but rules that citizens acknowledge in their daily life and communicative interactions. 
Therefore, in principle, there is an explicit departure from what different communities have in 
common, but this basic assumption provides space to justify procedures for reaching agreement 
over more substantive matters.  
In other words, the procedural approach solves the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ because it subordinates 
neither law nor democracy to each other, or both to a moral principle. Both are co-original, and 
their source of justification is the presuppositions already ruling citizen’s interactions in their 
daily life. 
To explain this idea, this chapter is structured in two stages. First, in societies regulated by 
modern constitutional regimes, citizens experience law from the outside; that is to say, the law 
needs to be enacted to be effective. The challenge is to justify the law in ways that are valid for 
all, because only in these conditions can any justification retain its normative binding force. 
Thus, free choice and common good need to find commonality if the legitimate law is to retain 
its normative binding force. On the other hand, Habermas’ reply to the internal tension between 
the facticity of law and its validity reflects a reconstructive effort aimed at building up the 
normative justification of the legitimacy of a discursive approach to democracy. What is at 
stake is whether this model responds appropriately, not in the supposition of an ideal 
communication community, but in the face of the complexity characterising contemporary 
societies.  
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1 The Internal Tension: Moral Validity and the Facticity of Law 
As already noted, the main idea underlying Habermas’ solution to the ‘Liberties Dilemma’ is 
that both liberties are co-original, and controversies between them are handled through rational 
discourse. Habermas leaves aside the idea that “there exist individuals with innate rights prior 
to all socialisation” and, also its counterpart, giving “priority to the claims of a community over 
the legal claims of individuals” (Habermas 2003c, 292). In his words:  
... we incorporate the unity of processes of individualization and socialisation into 
the core concepts of an intersubjective approach to legal theory: legal persons, in 
general, become individuals only through socialisation (Habermas 2003c, 292). 
Moreover, the legitimacy law, as a fact imposed to citizens from the outside, retains its 
normative binding force because the system of rights in modern constitutional democracies 
embody the conditions for discursively redeeming universal claims to validity over norms of 
action.  
To unpack the different steps involved in this claim, demands consideration of the notion that 
first, moral disputes could be solved rationally, and in the light of a moral principle, understood 
as a rule of argumentation. Secondly, that success or agreement, acquires political significance 
as the driving force of legislation, because Habermas asserts that the basic system of rights that 
are consistent with modern law, fits adequately with requirements that procedural rules are 
drawn from within the socio-ontological constitution of public practices of argumentation. 
Thirdly, that the internal tension between the facticity and the validity of law, is solved by 
bringing together processes of individuation and socialisation: a procedural exercise of popular 
sovereignty that evolves from within the margins of a self-constituting legal community. 
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1.1 The Discourse Principle: Moral Validity, Normative Rightness and Impartiality 
Habermas’ proposal requires justification if social integration is expected to be sustained on a 
rational basis. However, justification cannot be forced. On the contrary, it should be grounded 
on participants more or less enlightened participation. Participants will dissent and, especially 
in the context of a complex society, a plurality of views are likely to cohabit; while common 
ground, regarding basic values, remain absent. Thus, in the absence of common grounds, 
agreement is only possible over appropriate conditions to construct a common will. Democratic 
procedures should thus ensure that conditions respect the concerns of all, and all participants 
will be equally considered. Their interactions will exclude force as an argument, and all will 
orient their position, taking into consideration the concerns of others.  
In short, theories of justice that illuminate correct decisions are out of place. Moreover, 
Habermas’ trajectory comes from the perspective of participants in the democratic game. He 
asserts that,  
... as soon as they seek to privilege a universal binding system of rules without the 
backing of a worldview, the only way to open them is that of a discursively 
produced agreement (Habermas 2003b, 274).  
When dissent affects not claims in the light of norms, but norms themselves, we enter into the 
realm of discourse and solve our disputes by argumentation.  
However, disputes over the rightness of a norm cannot be settled as a controversy over facts in 
the objective world. True, society proceeds whilst aiming for a cooperative search for truth. 
Though, “[i]t is not up to us to choose to code moral judgments binarily and conceive of 
rightness as a validity claim analogous to truth” (2003b, 275). Thus, demarcating whether 
decisions are just or unjust, mirroring true or false assertions about a state of affairs, is not 
possible. In other words, a controversy affecting action coordination on moral norms is not 
resolved by judging the goodness or badness of the norm, but the rationality of the 
argumentation underneath.  
 
 
56 
Therefore, the moral dispute should rest on the assumption that controversy can be solved 
rationally in the light of a moral principle understood as a rule of argumentation. The central 
concept of Habermas’ translation of justification for moral and legal norms regarding rational 
argumentation is encapsulated in the (D). In Between Facts and Norms (1996) (D) is defined 
as follows: “[j]ust those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses” (1996, 107). This principle only expresses the 
meaning of a post-conventional, or rational, justification and it applies in the context of a self-
constituting legal community.  
However, post-conventional justifications of legal norms assume that the rational justification 
of moral norms is already possible. Indeed, from Habermas’ Discourse Ethics, (D) finds further 
justification in a universalization maxim that, as a rule of argumentation, plays a function 
“equivalent to the principle of induction in the discourse of empirical sciences” (1990a, 63). In 
other words, it is the bridging principle, allowing the gap between general hypothesis and 
particular observations regarding judgment on the rationality of action coordination over moral 
norms, to be overcome.  
Before I continue, some basic concepts in Habermas’ way of thinking need to be clarified. 
First, Habermas calls interactions communicative, “when the participants coordinate their plans 
of action consensually” (1990a, 58). To coordinate action plans consensually, participants in 
communicative interactions reach an intersubjective recognition of validity claims. Validity 
claims are claims to truth, rightness and truthfulness raised in every speech act aimed at 
communication. A claim to truth entails that the speaker refers to something in the objective 
world. Yet equally, a claim to rightness also refers to a legitimately regulated interpersonal 
relationship. Finally, a claim to truthfulness refers to something in the subjective world of the 
speaker. So, let me illustrate this with an everyday scenario. If I invite you for coffee tomorrow 
morning at 10:00, in the bar on the corner, we both need to accept as valid that the bar exists, 
that we both like coffee, that our relationship allows me to invite you for a coffee, and I sincerely 
intend to meet you tomorrow and have this coffee with you. 
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Secondly, when Habermas asserts that participants reach an intersubjective recognition of 
validity claims, he means that the speaker could motivate a hearer to accept his offer on the 
basis of his guarantee that “he will if necessary make efforts to redeem the claim that the speaker 
has accepted” (1990a, 58). Namely, by adducing reasons in the case of claims to truth or 
rightness, or demonstrating a consistent behaviour in the case of claims to truthfulness. 
Moreover, in using the disposition of the speaker to guarantee he will redeem a criticisable 
validity claim so that “he creates a binding/bonding effect between speaker and hearer that 
makes the continuation of their interaction possible” (1990a, 59). 
Following the above example, the binding bonding/effect of speech acts cannot depend on 
hypothesis testing. Meaning, it is not simply dependent on previous experiences; there has to 
be some mechanism that allows you to accept my invitation and comply with it, without you 
waiting until tomorrow to test the validity of my claims. According to Habermas, this 
mechanism is your disposition to adduce reasons in favour of my claims. For example, 
explaining to you where the bar is if you do not know. Indeed, it is not the very fact of giving 
reasons that grounds the binding/bonding effect of speech acts, it is the disposition to accept 
them.  
Finally, there are several asymmetries between redeeming claims to truth and claims to 
normative rightness. In particular, unlike claims to truth, the conditions for the validity of claims 
to rightness not only reside in speech acts. The locus of normative claims to validity is equally 
in norms, because “the orders of society, which either conform to or deviate from, are not 
constituted independent of validity, as are the orders of nature” (1990a, 60). The social reality 
then, is linked to normative validity claims in so far as “norms are dependent upon the continual 
re-establishment of legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships” (1990a, 61). 
In other words, there are asymmetries between my claim about the bar on the corner, and my 
embedded claim, that my invitation to you to take a coffee is an appropriate one based on my 
understanding of our relationship. The bar will always be there, but depending on whether we 
both consider it appropriate or not, my invitation can change. Therefore, the question of the 
validity of this claim resides in our relationship, a relationship whose norms we establish and 
re-establish each time we meet to have a coffee. 
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It is in this sense then, that Habermas claims the moral principle as a rule of argumentation as 
equivalent to the principle of induction in the discourse of empirical sciences. In the case of 
claims that truth determines the conditions of validity, he directs us to “analysis in terms of 
epistemology and the philosophy of science” (1990a, 62). To know what makes valid moral 
judgments possible, we are by contrast, “compelled to proceed directly to a logic of practical 
discourse” (1990a, 62), in particular, when defining a moral principle as a rule of 
argumentation. Moreover, according to Habermas, almost every attempt to define a moral 
principle as a rule of argumentation, ends referring in one way or another, to the Kantian 
‘Categorical Imperative20’ (Kant 1999b).  
First, the moral principle is conceived to “exclude as invalid any norm that could not meet with 
the qualified assent of all who are or might be affected by it” (Habermas 1990a, 62). Therefore, 
the only valid norms are those that express a general will and deserve recognition by all 
concerned. In other words, norms should express a universal assent. In Habermas view, a 
universal assent requires participants to overcome their particular position in society and taking 
an ‘ideal role’ (Mead 2015). Thus, 
the impartiality of judgment is expressed in a principle that constrains all affected 
to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of interests (Habermas 
1990a, 65). 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Kant specified the CI in the preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). In this prolegomena to the 
Doctrine of Right (1797) and the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) that together conform The Metaphysics of Morals (1798), Kant was 
aimed at studying the rational part of ethics, called morals, from the perspective of pure philosophy, namely concerned only 
with a priori principles of the understanding. In particular, it was aimed at identifying the ground for a moral law according to 
which ‘obligation’ could be sought a priori in concepts of pure reason. The final formula, a central concept that will later be 
rescued by Habermas, is the Principle of the Autonomy of the will. According to Kant, for a morally worth action, every 
rational human being acts in accordance to maxims as if they were going to become a universal law of nature and, each person 
being a source of universal laws, represents an end for itself and for others. Therefore, the systematic union of various rational 
beings through common laws represents a kingdom ends. In a kingdom of ends, all rational beings under the law treats oneself 
and all other as ends, namely, each person gives universal laws in this kingdom. But, as far as each person is also subjected to 
the same laws, this person belongs to the kingdom as a sovereign, meaning that “is not subjected to the will of any other” (Kant 
1999a, 83). 
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Second, the maxim precludes a monological interpretation. Indeed, the justification of (D) could 
itself be understood as a dialogic reinterpretation of the generalisation maxim introduced by 
Immanuel Kant (1990a, 63). In the Kantian version, the generalisation maxim involves ideal 
roles to be taken, allowing each morally autonomous individual to consider contested norms as 
if they were going to become a general law. As Kant put it, moral individuals make use of 
public reason, not as a priest speaking to a congregation, but as “a scholar before the entire 
public of the world of readers” (Kant 1999a, 18).  
However, as in the case of Rawls, Habermas found that this maxim could be no longer be 
supported, if embodied in the rational capacities of individual subjects alone. Though different 
to Rawls, the impartiality of judgment cannot be ensured by putting the moral judge into a 
fictitious position. Problems that are to be solved, when action coordination on moral norms is 
concerned, not only requires a cooperative effort, but also needs “a ‘real’ process of 
argumentation in which the individuals concerned cooperate” (Habermas 1990a, 67).  
With regard to the Categorical Imperative (hereafter CI), Habermas shifts the focus from what 
is acceptable without contradiction to be a general law, to “what all can will in agreement to be 
a universal norm” (1990a, 67). It is not that Habermas assumes the entire communication 
community accepts a norm to become universal valid, without actually being there, it is that the 
dialogic translation of the CI changes the conceptual grounds of its justification. If Kant 
assumed the coherence between what I think and what you think was derived from the fact we 
both share a rationality that transcends our individuality, Habermas that relationship is possible 
because we are part of the same communication community. In this way, Habermas avoids the 
problematic assumption of the metaphysical status of a transcendental subjectivity.  
According to Habermas, the dialogic translation of the Principle of Universalization (hereafter 
(U) is defined as follows: 
[A] contested norm cannot meet with the consent of the participants in a practical 
discourse unless (U) holds, that is, unless all affected can freely accept the 
consequences and side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm 
can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interest of each individual (1990a, 
93). 
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Significantly, (U) should not be mistaken with (D)21, because the principle of discourse ethics 
(D) “already presupposes that we can justify our choices of a norm” (Ibid.). It states that norms 
to claim validity could meet the approval of all affected while (U) only requires their 
consequences to be freely accepted. Moreover, (U) is defined as a rule of argumentation 
meaning that “the principle of universalization (…) is implied by the presuppositions of 
argumentation in general” (1990a, 86). These general presuppositions of argumentative speech 
are elicited by reconstructing the universal pragmatic conditions of possible communicative 
understanding (Habermas 1979d). 
In short22, every argumentative speech responds to a set of presuppositions defined at three 
levels: the logical level of products, the dialectical level of procedures, and the rhetorical level 
of processes (Habermas 1990a, 87–90, 1989c, 1:25). In the first level, argumentation is 
designed to produce cogent arguments, and rules are requirements of minimal logic or 
consistency. In the second level, argumentation is conceived to enable the testing of validity 
claims that became problematic, and also includes rules of jurisdiction and relevance, the later 
regulating themes for discussion. Finally, at the rhetorical level, communication is organised 
so that no other external or internal coercion other than “the force of the better argument” is 
allowed to influence communication (Habermas 1990a, 89). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 (D) is defined in Discourse Ethics as follows: “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.” (Habermas 1990a, 66) 
22 I will come back in deep to this point in the final section of this dissertation. 
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 Rule 
1. Logical 
 
1.1 No speaker may contradict itself. 
1.2 Every speaker who applies predicate F to object A must be prepared 
to apply F to all other objects resembling A in all relevant aspects. 
1.3 Different speakers may not use the same expression with different 
meanings. 
 
1. Dialectical 
 
2.1 Every speaker may assert only what he really believes. 
2.2 A person who disputes a proposition or norm not under discussion 
must provide a reason for wanting to do so. 
 
2. Rhetorical 
 
3.1 Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take 
part in a discourse. 
3.2 (a.) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
      (b.) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into 
discourse 
      (c.) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. 
3.3 No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion from 
exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2) 
 
Table 1: Ethical Principles of Discourse (Habermas 1990a) 
 
These conditions are not conventions but inescapable presuppositions for argumentative 
speech. Of course, discourses “take place in particular social contexts and are subjected to 
limitations of time and space” (1990a, 92). However, according to Habermas, 
... everyone who seriously tries to discursively redeem normative claims to validity 
intuitively accepts procedural conditions that amount to implicitly acknowledging 
(U) (1990a, 93).  
Thus, if the rules outlined above are accepted - in particular rules 3.1 and 3.3 -  and what it 
means to discuss whether a norm of action ought to be adopted is understood, then claims to 
validity can be recognised.  
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In sum, in Discourse Ethics (1990a) (D) is presented as a principle for moral discourses, one 
that borrows its justificatory force from a dialogic reinterpretation of the generalisation Maxim 
grounded in (U) (Rehg 1991). Reached through the reconstruction of the universal pragmatic 
conditions of communicative action, (U) provides (D) with an independent source of 
justification, so that (D) stands as the rule of argumentation for moral discourses. In this way, 
Habermas provides a principle of morality deployed from any substantive content that every 
participant in rational discourses would be able to find acceptable for the regulation of conflict 
over moral action norms.  
However, in Between Facts and Norms (1996), Habermas detached (D) from moral discourses 
and positioned it at a higher level of generality. In this reading, (D) is no longer limited to the 
justification of moral norms: it does not demarcate a difference between the moral and 
democratic principles. In contrast, it represents the specification of their common root, on the 
one hand, in the principle of morality “for those norms that can be justified if and only if equal 
consideration is given to the interests of all those who are possibly involved” (Habermas 1996, 
108), and on the other, the principle of democracy that represents the corresponding 
specification of (D) “for those action norms that appear in the legal form” (Habermas 1996, 
108).  
This is the central step of this argumentative sequence. To solve the ‘Liberties dilemma’ 
Habermas defends both public and private autonomy, individual’s rights and popular 
sovereignty are co-original. In other words, either we have both on equal footing or not at all. 
(D) provides an impartial ground for the justification of moral norms without making any 
assumption about the priority of the moral individual over the democratic process. However, 
(D) is articulated differently in both elements, because the democratic principle affects a wider 
scope of reasons than the moral. Therefore, Habermas should clarify how (D) provides 
justification to the democratic principle and both the democratic and moral principles which 
meet in the self-constitution of a legal community. 
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Unlike a moral controversy, the challenge here is that democracy involves argumentation 
sustained by ethical and pragmatic reasons, along with moral reasons. Therefore, “we might 
say that these various rules of argumentation are so many ways of operationalizing the discourse 
principle” (1996, 109). However, the assertion that (D) represents the common ground for 
moral and democratic principles, while the latter also involves moral reasons along with ethical 
and pragmatic ones, seems a bit confusing. In other words, the difference between norm 
regulation in the light of the moral principle, or regarding moral reasons in the light of the 
principle of democracy, it is not clear.  
Habermas, solved this ambivalence by no longer distinguishing both principles by their roots, 
what will violate his intention of eliciting their co-originality, but “by their different levels of 
reference” and “the difference between legal norms and other action norms” (1996, 111).  
First, he suggests that the moral principle operates “at the level at which a specific form of 
argumentation is internally constituted” (1996, 110), while the democratic principle 
simultaneously appeals “to the level at which interpenetrating forms of argumentation are 
externally institutionalised” (1996, 110). The moral principle then, functions as a rule of 
argumentation in the light of which it is possible to decide rationally over particular moral 
questions, whilst the principle of democracy establishes the procedure of legitimate law-making 
-  presupposing the possibility of all types of valid practical judgments supplying legitimacy to 
law, including moral ones.  
Second, he argues that legal norms of action are different to other action norms. Unlike moral 
norms “for whose justification moral arguments are both necessary and sufficient” (1996, 111), 
legal norms call rules for whose justification a particular type of discourse will be necessary 
but, certainly not sufficient. Furthermore, legal norms “constitute an intentionally produced 
layer of action norms that are reflexive” (1996, 110). Indeed, according to Habermas, one of 
the consequences of the modernization of law is that the norms of interaction are increasingly 
the issue under discussion. Thus, legal norms acquire an artificial character absent in 
conventional moral practices.  
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In other words, (D) provides, according to Habermas, impartial grounds whereby the co-
originality of the principles of morality and democracy could be sustained, without one 
subordinating the other. (D) then, specifies the requirements that individual rights need to 
satisfy if they are to be part of the constitution of a legal community. In its foundation, the 
principle of morality allows rational judgment on moral action norms. In short, controversy is 
solved referring to basic rights. The same logic holds for the democratic principle on legal 
action norms. However, the latter should be able to also provide the medium for its self-
organization; namely “the language in which a community can understand itself as a voluntary 
association of free and equal consociates under the law” (1996, 110).  
The first task is fulfilled, according to Habermas, through the institutionalisation of the system 
of rights. It represents the materialisation of “the communicative framework for a rational will-
formation” (1996, 110). The second task is fulfilled as a consequence of the capacity to provide 
the medium for the self-organization of the communication community, whereby it “can 
express itself as the common will of freely associated legal persons” (1996, 110). In other 
words, the principle of morality, or private autonomy, and democracy, or public autonomy, find 
accommodation on the impartial grounds of the discourse principle and evolve in the language 
of the law of a self-constituting legal community. 
 
1.2 ‘Legal Validity’ and the Principles of the Constitutional State 
The key idea for Habermas here, is that the principle of democracy emerges from the 
interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal form so that “the rule of law, or the 
constitutional state, is internally related to deliberative democracy” (Rehg 1996, xxiv). The 
argument for the validity of law began with (D) whereby the internal connection between moral 
and democratic principles, are justified in such a way that one cannot subordinate the other. The 
system of rights enacts the impartiality of (D) defining a departure point within which the co-
originality of public and private autonomy grounds equal weight for human rights and popular 
sovereignty. However, as explained before, this internal relation sustaining legitimate grounds 
for the genesis of law, also entails that “the idea of self-legislation must be realised in the 
medium of law” (Habermas 1996, 129).  
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This formulation has two initial virtues. First, it provides a medium for the institutionalisation 
of law-making procedures grounded on an impartial basis. Secondly, it provides the means 
whereby framers of laws can author their rights. However, the fact that the language of law, is 
the medium through which deliberation and decision making on the legal regulation of action 
norms necessarily take place, it follows that participants in the law-making process can no 
longer choose the medium through which they express their autonomy. In other words, the legal 
code is already there when they begin to deliberate.  
This constraint for participants seems paradoxical, especially with regard to the particular aim 
of Habermas to ground the normative binding force of law within the participation of those 
subjected to it. Because the legal system could be seen as a circular process that recursively 
feeds back into and legitimates itself (1996, 130), Habermas, asserts that this paradox fades 
away as soon as the exercise of communicative action meets halfway with the process of legal 
regulation. Indeed,  
... citizens become those who deliberate and acting as a constitutional assembly 
decide how they must fashion the rights that give the discourse principle legal shape 
as a principle of democracy (1996, 127).  
The reflective character of the language of modern law offers an impartial medium whereby 
this specification of (D) for legal norms takes place, not only in the light of the legitimacy 
provided by the system of rights, but by legitimately enacted law. This is taken to mean here, 
as a process of self-legislation that, due to its procedural structure, allows the operation of 
practical reason. In other words, the structure of the process lends itself to procedures of self-
legislation as the presumption of rationality. James Bohman explained this shift as the 
difference between the validity of the law, that affects the legitimate basis of law, and ‘legal 
validity’ whereby legitimacy is not only generated, but regenerates itself over the 
institutionalisation of law-making processes (Bohman 1994, 910).  
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First, the metaphorical shape of the self-referential act, the institutionalising of civic autonomy 
within the system of rights, gains the stability needed to sustain a constitutional democracy, 
once the enforcement of the law by the state makes its binding character socially effective 
(Habermas 1996, 132–33). Habermas describes the functional relationship between law and 
power as reciprocal because, as well as the state making effective the normative binding force 
of legitimate law, it also profits from its capacity to stabilise behavioural expectations: the latter 
“increasingly serv[ing] to organise and regulate state power” (1996, 144). It serves as a system 
of rules guaranteeing private and public autonomy, but also one that generates, for example, 
governmental institutions. 
Second, in the democratic rule of law, political power is not limited to the already constituted 
power of the state’s administration, according to Habermas, “political power is differentiated 
into communicative power and administrative power” (1996, 136). Thus, the law does not only 
steer political power through state administration, it also, “represents at the same time the 
medium for transforming communicative power into administrative power” (1996, 169). 
Communicative power refers broadly to opinion upon which many people publicly agree, and 
it has the motivating force of discursively produced, and inter-subjectively shared, beliefs 
(1996, 147). Those beliefs emerge from the mobilisation of citizens’ communicative freedom 
and carry on the capacity to influence the production of legitimate law.  
Third, political participation, or the legal institutionalisation of public opinion and will 
formation ending in decisions about policy and law, takes place in the form of communication 
(1996, 151). (D) regulates this communication process in two respects. First, in a cognitive 
sense by filtering reasons and information, it endows outcomes of the discursive process with 
the presumption of acceptability. Secondly, in a practical sense, it provides the capacity to 
establish relations of mutual understanding, or acceptance, by unleashing the generative force 
of communicative freedom.  
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In sum, a reciprocal relation between power and law makes the normative binding force of law 
socially effective, while law endows the use of power with the legitimacy required for its 
operation in a constitutional democracy. This reciprocity is nevertheless dependent on its 
communicative form whereby communicative power, regenerating the validity of the genesis 
of law through legitimately enacted laws, empowers citizens with the capacity to effect 
influence on the production of law. This dependency of law and administrative power from 
communicative power is what ensures that law is not instrumental to administrative power 
(1996, 137).  
Nonetheless, the operation of communicative power should be based upon the exercise of 
practical reason. In other words, we should be able to differentiate communicative power 
emerging from the legitimate exercise of communicative freedom by citizens, from the social 
power of another sub-system, for example, the market, attempting to exert illegitimate influence 
over the legislation process (1996, 150). For Habermas, this is achieved in two stages. 
First, practical reason, that aims to offer a rational justification for the coordination of legal 
action norms, differs from the justification of moral norms described above, in that it is no 
longer effected within an infinitely expanded audience of an ideal communication community. 
Legal norms ought to allow action coordination with regard to political questions affecting 
particular communities in their social environment, as well as their concrete historical 
conditions (1996, 151–52). In other words, the exercise of political autonomy is not merely the 
application of (D) in place of morality, to law, but a process of discursive self-legislation that 
issues from a self-determining political will. Moreover, political will responds to each particular 
community with its own pre-given identity. 
Secondly, the interpenetration between communicative power and discursive law-making is 
possible, because reasons and not just identities, have a motivational force. Practical reason 
then, when regulating action coordination for legal norms, provides the rational conditions and 
procedures for the exercise of moral autonomy at the individual level, and political autonomy, 
manifest as the expression of political will formation, at the collective level (1996, 157). 
However, as noted before, unlike morality, the legal regulation of action norms in the light of 
the principle of democracy involves a wide scope of reasons operating around the same 
problems.  
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Along with moral reasons, discourses aimed at action coordination of legal norms, mobilise 
pragmatic and ethical-political reasons that differ in the content and meaning of their validity 
claim, as well as in their mode of legislation (1996, 153–57). The specification of the different 
logics underlying discourses and aimed at responding to pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral 
questions, correspondingly gives rise to the operation of purposive rationality and critical 
hermeneutics in pragmatic and ethical-political discourses. In the end “[a]n adequate 
justification of policies and laws must, however, consider yet a further aspect, that of justice” 
(1996, 161).  
In other words, what is good for us (ethical-political) and the means to achieve this good 
(pragmatic), should pass the filter of (D) so that what is equally good for all, acquires the 
normative binding force of discursive self-legislation.  
In the context of a discursively structured process of opinion and will formation, “law-making 
is interwoven with the formation of communicative power” (1996, 162). Communicative power 
evolves in parallel to the sequence whereby, changes in the illocutionary meaning of the moral 
‘ought’, advance through the process of justification of legal norms. Therefore, the ‘moral 
ought’, the central question to which action coordination of legal norms should respond, and 
the will of the collective body of citizens involved in the law-making process, are transformed 
due to the very process of self-legislation.  
The pragmatic ‘ought’, departing from given ends and values, is directed to the free choice of 
actors. The ethical-political ‘ought’, relative to our conception of the good life, brings about a 
hermeneutic self-clarification, affirmed in the light of a critical appropriation of traditions. 
Finally, the categorical ‘ought’ of moral norms is directed to the autonomous will of the 
rationally bound actors (1996, 162). 
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The resulting procedural understanding of rational political will formation,23 permits Habermas 
to justify the principles of government by the law that regulates the exercise of popular 
sovereignty, the legal protection of individuals, the subjection to the law of administration, and 
the separation of powers between state and society (1996, 162–69). These principles are the 
result of a law-making process in which the legitimacy of the genesis of law, justified in the 
common ground that morality and democracy both find in (D), also justifies an internal 
connection between democracy and law.  
Finally, this common ground, for the different logics and discourses through which practical 
reason operates within the political process of rational will formation, gives coherence to the 
process of action coordination through legal norms, without violating the moral autonomy of 
individuals and their democratic mandate.  
The rationality entailed by (D) is procedural, and “reason is embodied solely in the formal-
pragmatic conditions that facilitate deliberative politics” (1996, 285). Deliberative politics is 
the process whereby, the local motivations of real actors, and their capacity to rationally figure 
out their claims in the face of a universal audience, speak to each other in the language of the 
law. (D) grounds this double requirement by liberating the normative binding force of 
democratic decision making from previously settled conventions and, at the same time, 
rationally sustaining its capacity to act in the name of the equality of all, without embodying 
practical reason in the isolation of the moral individual.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Recall that in Habermas model of the deliberative practice of self-legislation will formation operates at the level of formal 
communication taking place in institutional bodies and institutionalized in legal procedures aimed at decisions while, 
political opinion formation refers to communication taking place through informal channels (Habermas 1996, 275). 
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In sum, self-legislation brings the normative binding force of a discursive understanding of 
democracy, through the operation of communicative action that bridges the gap left between a 
positivist understanding of the legitimacy of law, and its reclusion in the normative self-
understanding of a pre-established ethical-political community. The motivation generated by 
the communicative action, results not only from citizens shared beliefs, but also from reasons 
steering the exercise of communicative freedom towards legitimately enacted laws. Therefore, 
practical reason circulates around a flexible path, involving a complex network of discourses, 
deliberations and, even bargaining, as part of the law-making process; but, necessarily 
guaranteeing that in the end, directly or indirectly, “the discourse principle has been thoroughly 
applied” (1996, 167).  
 
1.3 Procedural Response: Neither Moral nor Political  
Habermas differs from previous attempts to bring normativity back into democratic politics, in 
that it requires no previous commitment other than those exemplified in equal conditions for 
each, free agreement by all, and the medium to make it possible. The substantive vacuum in 
which he defines the discourse principle marks a breakthrough in antecedent strategies to justify 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Among them the doctrine of private rights and social 
contract theories represent two major examples. Therefore, to close this section I will review 
the basic differences between those previous schemes, and the procedural proposal embedded 
in Habermas view, to show more clearly why his procedural approach is capable of 
accommodating basic tenets of both traditions without establishing a hierarchy among them. 
Private law theory, or the doctrine of subjective rights, for example, explicitly asserts the notion 
that in universal and abstract laws, all subjects have the same rights, and individual freedom 
can have no other limit than the same freedom exercised by others (Habermas 1996, 83–89). In 
accordance with this basic premise, subjective rights naturally belonging to human beings, are 
given moral authority over democratic law-making, or popular sovereignty, with no need for 
further justification. In other words, the legitimate law was the institutionalisation of equal 
treatment, and consequent upon the recognition of natural rights for each citizen.  
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Conversely, Social Contract theories do not justify the normative force of private rights as 
dependent on the moral individual, but the other way around. Following Habermas lecture on 
this theoretical perspective:  
... the sovereign will of the people can express itself only in the language of general 
and abstract laws, [so that] the exercise of political autonomy no longer stands 
under the proviso of human rights (1996, 101).  
For Habermas, the normative content of human rights, “enters into the very mode of carrying 
out popular sovereignty” (1996, 101). 
It ought to be clear, why both proposals have severe limitations. Regarding the doctrine of 
private rights, Habermas agrees that the legitimacy of positive law, hanging on the private and 
equal rights of citizens, fulfilled the necessities of decentralised economic societies. However, 
“law must do more than simply meet functional requirements of complex societies” (1996, 83). 
To counter direct fragmentation in democratic constitutional regimes, the legitimacy of law 
should account for patterns of social integration of active subjects who accept the duty to obey 
the law by its normative binding force.  
Similarly, social contract theories endow citizens with certain civic virtues whereby the 
common good represents a motivation to think and act publicly, and not only on behalf of 
private interest. However, according to Habermas, these political virtues are rooted in the 
assumption of the existence of an almost homogeneous ethical community, integrated through 
shared cultural traditions settled before their legal constitution. Moreover, on these bases, social 
contract theories “cannot explain how the normatively construed common will can, without 
repression, be mediated with the free choice of individuals” (1996, 102).  
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Habermas found a potential solution to this dilemma in Kant’s definition of popular 
sovereignty. Addresses of law are to be understood simultaneously as the authors of their rights 
(1996, 92–94). Here, Kant begins with the right of equal individual liberties belonging by its 
very nature to each human being. Accordingly, the social contract serves primarily to 
institutionalise the innate right that all persons have, to equal liberties. This human right, 
following the rationale of the CI, is grounded in the autonomous will of the individual. 
However, it is not in contradiction with the exercise of political autonomy, as far as the 
individual moral person, as a rational human being, “is subject only to laws given by himself 
but still universal24” (Kant 1999a, 82).  
The universality of laws given by each to himself is rooted in Kant’s understanding of practical 
reason, and this argument is one of the most elegant chapters written is the history of 
philosophy. However, what interests us here are not the specificities of the operation of the CI, 
but that Kant grounded the co-originality of private and public autonomy on the rational 
capacities of the moral individual. On these bases, private rights are legitimated on moral 
grounds, and its companion conception of the social contract is unique as it has no specific 
content. It is different to other contracts in that it is not agreed to a specific end, but it is an end 
in itself: “it provides instead the model for a kind of sociation ruled by the principle of law” 
(Habermas 1996, 93).  
However, the basic innate right embodied in the social contract should differentiate itself into 
a system of rights that, in turn, is enacted by public laws that “claim legitimacy only as acts of 
the public will of autonomous and united citizens” (Habermas 1996, 93). In other words, unlike 
subjective rights grounded in natural-law, public laws are established “through no other will 
than that belonging to the people collectively (because all decide for all, hence each for 
himself)” (Habermas 1996, 93). Thus, the legitimacy of the system of rights finds an answer in 
binding political will formation through a democratic procedure.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Emphasis added. 
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The consequence is that “the morally grounded primordial human right to equal liberties is 
intertwined in the social contract with the principle of popular sovereignty” (1996, 94). 
Habermas suggests that in following this path, Kant constrained the sovereignty of the 
collective will by morally grounded human rights, that subordinates law to morality. He argues 
that Kant underlines the central position of private rights to the social contract, “in following a 
path that progresses from morality to law” (1996, 101). The consequence of this sequence is 
that the principles of private law enjoy the validity of moral rights “already in the state of 
nature” preceding “the will of the sovereign lawgiver” (1996, 101).  
To summarise, after rejecting the idea that private rights alone could underpin the legitimacy 
of law, Habermas turns to a philosophical tradition that, going back to Kant and Rousseau, 
sought to ground the compatibility of human rights and popular sovereignty in a defence of the 
notion that private and public autonomy are co-original.  
In Habermas view, Rousseau (1762) maintains that the very idea of the social contract, and the 
exercise of popular sovereignty, demand requirements that are embedded in the doctrine of 
human rights. In this case, it is political autonomy that involves the equality of private rights in 
its mode of proceeding. However, according to Habermas, this understanding of popular 
sovereignty recalls its normative basis from a pre-established ethical community, and as such 
cannot account for the legitimacy of law, if the free choice of autonomous individuals is to be 
taken into consideration (Habermas 1996, 102).  
By contrast, Kant grounded his co-originality in the rational capacities of individual 
autonomous subjects as moral persons. However, progressing from morality to law, Kant 
subordinates law to morality, and in so doing, establishes a hierarchy between human rights 
and popular sovereignty. 
In such a construction, it is impossible to assert equal weight for both liberties. Both, Kant and 
Rousseau, intended to show that popular sovereignty and human rights reflect each other by 
“the notion of autonomy as unifying practical reason and sovereign will” (1996, 100).  
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Habermas’ thesis, is that both Rousseau and Kant failed, because neither of them could account 
for the legitimating force of the discursive processes of opinion - and will - formation. The 
difference that Habermas’ approximation makes, is that neither the system of rights, nor popular 
sovereignty, or private and public autonomy, depend for their justification on the private rights 
of moral persons, nor do they rely upon on normative conventions of a pre-settled ethical 
community. Habermas convincingly sets it out in the following way:  
... the legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as 
participants in rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine 
whether a contested norm meets with, or could meet with, the agreement of all those 
possibly affected. Consequently, the sought-for internal relation between popular 
sovereignty and human rights consists in the fact that the system of rights states 
precisely the conditions under which the forms of communication necessary for the 
genesis of legitimate law can be legally institutionalised (Habermas 1996, 104). 
The main argument explored in this section was that the only thing prior to citizens’ 
engagement, are the conditions to make this communicative arrangement possible and the 
language to proceed. The former is provided by (D), which formalises pragmatic requirements 
already intuitively accepted by citizens in their daily life communications. The latter, rests upon 
the idea that (D) is embodied in the basic formulation of the system of rights, that in turn are 
the consequence of the constitutional development of modern law. Together, they define a set 
of procedural rules whereby practical reason, in the form of deliberative politics, could steer 
society towards social integration. 
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2 The External Tension: From Pluralism to Social Complexity 
 
The argument in the previous section, makes claims for the legitimacy of a discursive approach 
to democracy focused on its normative justification. What is still arguable, is whether this 
model responds appropriately, not in an ideal communication community, but in the face of the 
complexity that characterises contemporary societies in the western world. Indeed, it is several 
aspects of this dimension to his theory that is subjected to critique in the next chapter. In short, 
my argument is that Habermas provides an interesting alternative to deal with social 
complexity, but he does not take into consideration the diversity of complexities that are faced 
by contemporary societies.    
This section considers Habermas’ argument, of how to deal with the challenge that social 
complexity entails for democracy, in particular when the external tension between the validity 
of the law and the facticity of the political process running in parallel. The purpose here, is not 
the justification of the normative binding force of deliberative politics all the way through to 
the institutionalisation process of modern law. Instead, the focus shifts to the empirical 
relationship between democratic institutions, and the capacity to sustain their normative force 
in the context of a wider society in which they are embedded, but not regulated by them 
(Habermas 1996, 287).  
Moreover, as described contra Rawls, this tension can no longer be elucidated in the realm of 
theoretical thinking. The normative binding force of democratically enacted constitutional laws 
requires considering the place of law, and its authors in their particular habitat. This habitat is 
complex, and complexity entails a significant challenge to justify the potential of deliberative 
democracy to steer society towards social integration.  
According to Habermas, the locus of this debate is the unfinished controversy over the project 
of modernity, and the desirability to resume it or not. In his view, the rationalisation resulting 
from the project of modernity demonstrates the capacity, and virtue, of moving society away 
from conventional patterns of justification, with science being the paradigmatic example. 
However, it finds difficulties in replacing the coherence and unity provided previously by 
comprehensive doctrines. Therefore, the challenge is how citizens will tend towards social 
integration in the absence of an authoritative source which establishes a common direction and 
provide the appropriate route through complex questions.  
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Habermas advocates resuming the project of modernity and taking citizens capacity for mutual 
understanding as its driving force. Deliberative politics represents an appropriate vehicle for 
this because it can be called on to resolve problems that resemble the ones menacing social 
integrations in the wider context of the lifeworld. Finally, it is on these bases that the 
sociological translation of Habermas’ discursive and procedural definition of democracy is 
defined. 
 
2.1 The Emancipatory Potential of Modern Rationalisation 
Habermas intended to provide reliable grounds, upon which the normative force of deliberative 
democracy can steer society towards integration in conditions of social complexity, that results 
from the differentiation of value spheres in the modern world. The paradigmatic example of its 
success is the development of modern science during this period. However, the side effect has 
been the progressive differentiation of value spheres, each with a specific type of rationality. 
The process results in the weakening capacity to define common objectives. In short, the 
challenge is about finding reasons that are equally compelling for the market, institutions, and 
society, without denying each of them answers to different values, needs and objectives. For 
that, he needs standards that, although weak, will be able to provide normative guidance based 
on the proper conduct of practical reason.  
In the context of his extensive analysis of modern rationalisation, he found that “[i]n structurally 
differentiated lifeworlds a potential for reason is marked out that cannot be conceptualized as a 
heightening of system complexity” (Habermas 1989c, 1:xli). By this potential for reason, 
Habermas seeks to provide a renewed account of the virtues of modern rationalisation and its 
corresponding differentiation of value spheres. However, he intends to advance this defence 
without renouncing the universal justification of normative principles that sustains the kind of 
authority deliberative democracy needs to steer society towards social integration. This attempt 
to overcome the challenges of social complexity is presented by Habermas as a reinterpretation 
of Max Weber’s diagnostic of western modernization (Habermas 1989d, 2:318–31).  
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According to Weber (1993), modernity provokes the differentiation of the value spheres of 
science, morality and art, and that following their inner logics are free from any subordination. 
This project, inspired by the success of modern science, intended to release the cognitive 
potentials of each of these domains, and utilise the accumulated knowledge for the enrichment 
of everyday life. In other words, the rational organisation of everyday social life. However, the 
differentiation of value spheres, simply resulted in the division of traditional problems in 
accordance to their internal logics. Each corresponding sphere of action evolved in a growing 
professionalization. Therefore, each specialised in dealing with problems from the rational 
viewpoint of their corresponding value sphere. Accordingly, the distance between expert 
cultures and the broader public only tended to grow. 
To offer an alternative account of the same process, without renouncing what he considered 
useful,25 Habermas introduced a distinction between the system and the lifeworld (Habermas 
1989d, 2:306–12). The problem of modernization was not, according to Habermas, the 
rationalisation it entails. Indeed, the rationalisation of the lifeworld, challenging conventional 
as well as transcendental sources of justification, permitted a further step to a level whereby 
“[t]he procedures and presuppositions of justification are themselves now the legitimating 
grounds on which the validity of legitimacy is based” (Habermas 1979a, 185). On the contrary, 
the problem was the particular type of rationalisation taking place in advanced capitalist 
societies26: the subordination of the life-world under systemic imperatives resulting in a 
distortion of the communicative infrastructure of everyday life (Habermas 1989d, 2:330).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In his words: “I believe that we should learn from the aberrations which have accompanied the project of modernity and 
from the mistakes of those extravagant proposals of sublation, rather than abandoning modernity and its project.” (Habermas 
1997, 55) 
26 In his own words: “Neither the secularization of worldviews nor the structural differentiation of society has unavoidable 
pathological side effects per se. It is not the differentiation and independent development of cultural value spheres that lead to 
the cultural impoverishments of everyday communicative practice, but an elitist splitting-off of expert cultures from contexts 
of communicative action in daily life.” (Habermas 1989d, 2:330) 
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In advanced capitalist economies,27 this distortion was considered a side-effect of the expansion 
of a technocratic rationality which, although beginning as the rational logic of a specific value 
sphere, the market, expanded its ‘scope of influence’ to the lifeworld. Furthermore, the 
rationalisation of value spheres, steered by purposive-instrumental rationality, evolved in a 
progressive bureaucratization of a money and power oriented subsystem, namely 
administration and the market. Finally, this process accompanied a progressive impoverishment 
of the lifeworld that had no grounds to fulfil its social integrative function, after splitting-off 
from a tradition whose credibility fade away.  
In sum, a double-edged process runs in parallel to the modernization of society leading to a 
‘system induced reification’ of bureaucratic administration and a progressive ‘cultural 
impoverishment’ of the lifeworld (Habermas 1989d, 2:327). To turn this process around 
Habermas argues that, 
... the life-world has to become able to develop institutions out of itself which set 
limits to the internal dynamics and imperatives of an almost autonomous economic 
system and its administrative complements (Habermas 1981, 131).  
In other words, the sort of social integration he advocates for is aimed at reconnecting modernity 
with ‘every-day’ praxis, but steering societal rationalisation in a different direction: in the 
direction of communicative action aimed at mutual understanding.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 a. the legitimation problems of the state consists in “representing the accomplishments of the capitalist economy as, 
comparatively speaking, the best possible satisfaction of generalizable interests – or at least insinuating that this is so  
b. In this context “the state can prove itself as an aid to legitimation only if it successfully manages the tasks it has 
programmatically taken on; and to a considerable extent this can be checked. The legitimation theme that is today in the 
foreground can this be located on the line between technocracy theories and participation models.  
c. If under these restrictive conditions the state does not succeed in keeping the dysfunctional side effects of the capitalist 
economic process within bounds acceptable to the voting public, it is also unsuccessful in lowering the threshold of 
acceptability itself, the manifestations of de-legitimation are unavoidable (Habermas 1979a, 195–96). 
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Indeed, following Bernard Peters’ (1993) understanding of social integration, Habermas 
classified the standards to assess problems of social integration, along the lines of the different 
aspects of validity (Habermas 1996, 318–20). What is required from the political process is to 
provide means for: (i) functional coordination: cognitive orientation to the objective world; (ii) 
moral regulation of conflicts: a balance over conflicting claims through a normative orientation 
to legitimate orders in the social world; and (iii) ethical safeguarding of identities and forms of 
life: orientation to shared conceptions of the good and interpretations of needs. Therefore,  
... if we adopt this conception (which goes back to Karl Deutsch and others), then 
we see that democratic procedure and the discursive mode of sociation found in the 
legal community are simply reflexive refinements and specializations of a general 
mode of operation of social systems (1996, 319).  
The logic underlying deliberative politics does not represent an action system among others, 
because its bases are universal presuppositions that every participant in communicative action, 
intuitively accepts.  
A first virtue of building up justification on the basis of this, is that it fits with the specific type 
of legitimacy required for law in modern states28 (Habermas 1979c). Moreover, by the 
universality of its presuppositions, the problems for social integration taking place in the 
lifeworld reflect the very same structure of those identified for the conduct of communicative 
action in the formal public sphere. Societies are considered problem-solving systems “in which 
success or failure is measured against criteria of rationality.” (Habermas 1996, 318) Therefore, 
in Habermas words, “in filling in for social processes whose problem-solving capacities are 
overtaxed, the political process solves the same kind of problems as the processes it replaces” 
(Habermas 1996, 318). 
Therefore, the ‘centrepiece of deliberative politics’, consists of a network of discourses, that 
facilitates a rational solution for problems of action coordination when other mechanisms fail.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Reviewing the legitimacy problems of modern state Habermas asserts that “[a]t the new level of justification only an order 
of state and society organized along universalistic lines could be defended.” (Habermas 1979a, 192) 
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In the context of legal institutions, deliberative politics, shaped by the ideal procedure of 
deliberation, provide the conditions for communication aimed at mutual understanding. In 
particular, this ideal provides a mirror whereby it is possible to identify how far the ideal is 
implemented in a particular context, as well as the means to identify whether it deviates from 
the rule. Thus, in theory, the ideal does not constrain the normal conduct of deliberative politics, 
it offers a reference point to specify its conditions of possibility. In other words, a 
‘methodological fiction’ (1996, 323) in the light of which we could measure whether legal 
institutions fit or not.  
In turn, in the wider context of the lifeworld, the ‘methodological fiction’, explains the 
counterfactual presuppositions through which participants engaged in dialogical interactions 
can “go beyond their local practices of justification and to transcend the provinciality of the 
spatiotemporal contexts that are inescapable in action and experience” (1996, 323). Thus, it is 
through communicatively mediated social relations that the discursive translation of democracy 
no longer deals with a “disembodied, omniscient being who exists beyond the empirical realm 
and capable of context-free actions” (1996, 324). By losing its fictive character in the self-
organization of the legal community, the discursive translation of democracy demonstrates its 
capacity to respond to problems of action coordination in complex societies. 
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To summarise, Habermas defined social complexity as a matter of differentiation of value 
spheres resulting from western modernization. In response, he sought to provide an account of 
rationalisation whereby the lifeworld could develop its institutions so as to bridge the gap 
between systemic value spheres. To that end, the desired unity of the project of modernity, finds 
a set of standards in his critical reconstruction of pragmatic rules of argumentation, that gives 
citizens the capacity to agree at the forefront of democratic politics. On this basis, the ideal 
procedure of deliberation provides a methodological fiction enabling an impartial judgment. 
Moreover, procedural rules can claim to be universal and rational, because they are not the 
expression of the operation of the rational logic of a particular value sphere. What the 
procedural rules reflect then, are conditions of possibility for rational agreement, that are 
already accepted by citizens in their daily lives. The ideal provides a standard for measuring 
how far the discourse principle is implemented in the system of rights in concrete constitutional 
regimes. It also provides a mechanism whereby citizens can transcend local practices of 
justification. The ideal, thus secures a common rationale whereby deliberative politics can 
move society towards integration, not only affecting the institutions of law and the process of 
legal institutionalisation, but also citizens in the lifeworld; the wider context in which the 
institutions of law are embedded, but which they do not directly regulate. 
 
2.2 From the Ideal Procedure to the Two-Track Model 
Habermas introduced the two-track model of deliberative democracy to account for the 
common patterns, but differing contexts, through which deliberative politics operates in the 
interactions between legally institutionalised will formation and culturally mobilised publics. 
The way institutionalised will formation operates, and the means by which political will 
formation depends on the supply of information arising from communication in informal 
arenas, has already been reviewed. The role of the latter was argued to be crucial in avoiding 
state administration being governed by illegitimate uses of social power, as well guarding 
against its isolation from its societal basis. Therefore, the proper operation of the informal 
public sphere arguably requires a considerable normative responsibility to be carried on its 
back.  
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The informal public sphere involves informal channels of communication, mass media, 
informal associations and the like (1996, 359–87). Deliberative standards do not regulate these 
channels themselves. However, the conditions to be accomplished by the informal public 
sphere, that is to be heard by formally institutionalised deliberation and decision making, seem 
to depend on the operation of deliberative politics in the formal public sphere. Therefore, it is 
through the compound operation of formal and informal public spheres that Habermas specifies 
the role and structure of deliberative politics in modern constitutional regimes.  
To explain this particularity of his definition of deliberative democracy, Habermas contrasts his 
two-track model of deliberative democracy with the ideal deliberative procedure presented by 
Joshua Cohen (Habermas 1996, 305). Cohen defends Rawls’ understanding of democracy, as 
that which seeks to accommodate three conditions of democratic politics; namely, a focus on 
the common good, to manifest equality, and the capacity of its procedures to shape participants’ 
preferences towards the common good. However, “[w]hat I find less plausible is that the three 
conditions are natural sequences of the ideal of fairness” (Joshua Cohen 2003, 345). On the 
contrary, what actual social and political institutions should mirror, is not the ideal of fairness, 
but the system of ideal deliberation itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
83 
According to him, following the regulative ideal embodied in the original position, deliberative 
democracy endows citizens with the capacity to act as a political body; in other words, 
constitute a political community29 (Joshua Cohen 1997). Moreover, their decisions will provide 
greater epistemic quality to democratic outcomes in comparison with the aggregative model of 
democratic politics, based on the deliberative process conducted before voting30 (Joshua Cohen 
1986).  Indeed, Habermas grounds his exemplification of the proper conduct of deliberative 
politics in Cohen’s ideal procedure of deliberation. However, while Cohen maintains that in 
following the ideal we will find the procedure whereby a political community constitutes itself, 
Habermas rejects the notion that this relationship between state and society, as a whole and the 
sum of its parts, is sustainable in conditions of social complexity (Habermas 1996, 301).  
What Habermas finds plausible from Cohen’s ideal procedure of deliberation, is his 
characterization of the procedure itself (1996, 305). The formal ideal of deliberative democracy 
presented by Cohen assumes that the democracy is: (i) an independent and on-going association 
whose (ii) members share a commitment to free deliberation among equals as the basis for 
legitimacy, while (iii) holding diverse preferences, convictions, and ideals about their own 
lives. The (iv) basic terms of their association not only underpin deliberation, but are manifest 
to them. Moreover, (v) they recognise one another as having deliberative capacities (Joshua 
Cohen 2003, 346).  
                                                 
29 Cohen challenges the idea that in the absence of an initial comprehensive consensus on values, reasonable pluralism leads 
one to think on a purely procedural account of democracy. First, if citizens are free no comprehensive doctrine should be 
allowed to provide the defining conditions of membership in a democratic society. Second, fundamental to the idea of 
democratic legitimacy is that authorization of state´s power depends on collective decisions taken by citizens subjected to that 
power. To take collective decisions means that citizens can behave as a body. Altogether, the lack of a comprehensive initial 
consensus refers to a situation where the conditions of freedom and equality of citizens, given the reasonable pluralism in their 
initial positions, challenges the very idea of acting as body. Contrarily, the deliberative conception of democracy presented by 
Cohen connects the deliberative view to the value of the community. Locating the acceptability by reasonable others at the core 
of his notion of political justification, Cohen argues that deliberative democracy provides a form of political autonomy 
enhancing the sense of membership to a political community. In other words, justifies its account on the stability of the decision 
making process: “This is so not because collective decisions crystallize a shared ethical outlook that informs all social life, nor 
because the collective good takes precedence over the liberties of members, but because the requirement of providing 
acceptable reasons for the exercise of political power to those who are governed by it—a requirement absent from the 
aggregative view—expresses the equal membership of all in the sovereign body responsible for authorizing the exercise of that 
power.” (Joshua Cohen 1997, 416) 
30 His epistemic interpretation of the decision-making process involves several components: (i) an independent standard of 
correctness, (ii) a cognitive account of voting and (iii) an account of the decision-making process as a process of adjustments 
of beliefs.  The general will play the role of the independent standard of correctness without violating the procedural logic if 
members of the deliberating group: (i) share a conception of the common good, (ii) consider that institutions advance towards 
the general will as a reason to support them, (iii) have full knowledge that this commitment is shared and (iv) this commitment 
is consistent with members of the society regarding themselves as free and equal. When these conditions are fulfilled, Cohen 
suggests that the general provides a standard of correct decisions independent from both, current consensus and the outcome 
of votes. This shared conception of the common good is embodied in the ideal procedure of deliberation, which, if followed, 
shapes parties’ positions via acceptability requirement towards consensus. So, the standard depends on the ideal, but its 
epistemic claims survive cause the standard is independent to the deliberative procedure. When these conditions are fulfilled: 
“[t]he decisions of majorities about which policies to pursue can provide good evidence about which policies are in fact best.” 
(Joshua Cohen 1986, 34)  
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This formal ideal provides a basic schema where from the start, substantively characterising the 
conditions for a social order is regulated by deliberative forms of democratic decision making. 
However, further specifications are needed to define both the procedure, and the basic set of 
guidelines, that ought to be mirrored by social and political institutions. In other words, the 
ideal deliberative procedure is the formal skeleton from which the substantive content of a 
democratic society should be built upon. Alternatively, in the case of Habermas, the ideal 
procedure is one that legal institutions conducted by deliberative politics should mirror.  
Its basic components31 are interpreted by Habermas as follows: (a) it takes place in 
argumentative form; (b) it is inclusive and public; (c) free from any external coercion; (d) free 
from any internal coercion menacing equality of participants; (e) aimed at rationally motivated 
agreement; (f) extended to any matter that can be regulated in the equal interest of all; and (g) 
including interpretations (needs / wants) and change in pre-political attitudes and preferences 
(Habermas 1996, 305–6). 
As already noted, the ideal offers a mirror for democratic procedures that take place in the 
context of a legally constituted communication community, and affect the procedures whereby 
formal debate takes place. Indeed, the normative self-understanding of deliberative politics 
requires this discursive mode of sociation for the legal community. However, this model, first, 
harbours the assumption that deliberative procedures could constitute the political community 
as a whole. Secondly, it does not consider important internal differentiations within legally 
institutionalised will formation; and, third, it overlooks the necessity that deliberative politics 
proceeds through legally constituted institutions embedded in contexts “it cannot itself 
regulate” (1996, 305). In other words, the ideal model by itself is not useful to feature the role 
of deliberative democracy in complex societies. 
 
                                                 
31 The ideal procedure of deliberation are defined by Cohen as follows (2003, 347–48):  
 
1. Ideal deliberation should be free: participants are bound by results and preconditions of their deliberation and 
they can act from results with the outcome of deliberation as a sufficient reason to comply. 
2. Deliberation is reasoned: argumentation follows the maxim that ‘no force except that of the better argument is 
exercised’. Therefore, proposals should be backed by reasons expecting others acceptance. 
3. Parties are formally and substantively equal: Formally equal because the rules regulating the procedure do not 
consider single individuals and substantively equal because existing distribution of power and resources does 
not shape the opportunities to contribute nor plays any authoritative role. 
4. Aim to arrive at rationally motivated consensus: To find reasons that are persuasive to all committed but without 
discarding that in the case of disagreement deliberation could end in voting. 
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The differentiation between informal and formal public spheres suggested above seeks to 
respond to this problem. On the one hand, there are decision-oriented deliberations, regulated 
by democratic procedures, and involving the institutions of a legally constituted communication 
community. This formal dimension of the public sphere plays the role of a ‘context of 
justification’, and it is where decisions are made, and democratically institutionalised processes 
of will formation take place. On the other hand, informal processes of opinion formation occur 
in an “open and inclusive network of overlapping, sub cultural publics having fluid temporal, 
social and substantive boundaries” (1996, 307). This weak public sphere plays the role of a 
‘context of discovery’ and is the vehicle of public opinion. 
Nevertheless, the success of deliberative politics depends on the institutionalisation of the 
corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, but also on the interplay of 
institutionalised deliberative processes with informally developed publics. Albeit only the 
political system can act, the communicative structure of the public sphere can only influence 
the direction of the use of power (1996, 300). This communicative power exercises this 
influence through properly conducted interactions between legally institutionalised will 
formation and culturally mobilised publics, because  
... [d]iscourse theory reckons with the higher-level intersubjectivity of processes of 
reaching an understanding that takes place through democratic procedures or in the 
communicative network of public spheres (1996, 299).  
Therefore, success, according to Habermas, depends also on a proper conduct of a vibrant civil 
society to which deliberative politics provides a channel to proceed.  
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2.3 Sociological Translation: Neither Liberal nor Republican  
In his critique of Rawls, Habermas highlighted that his proposal leaves substantial questions in 
the hands of more or less enlightened participants in rational discourses. The idea behind this 
assertion was that Rawls said too much about citizens and their rights before citizens were even 
allowed to enter the game. On the contrary, Habermas’ discursive and procedural translation of 
democracy leaves substantial issues to the end. Accordingly, it is only at the end of Between 
Facts and Norms (1996) that, illustrating the requirements established in his discursive and 
procedural definition of democracy, he provides a sociological translation of basic concepts of 
his theory of democracy. In short, procedures come the first and definition at the end.  
With regard to definitions, discursive democracy is different from both liberal and republican 
traditions; it presents a novel understanding of basic concepts as legitimacy, sovereignty, state 
or society (Habermas 1996, 295–302, 1994b). In one sense, Habermas rejects the liberal 
conception of the state “as guardian of an economic society” (Habermas 1996, 296). In the 
liberal view, citizens hold negative rights vis-à-vis the state, and the legal order is defined to 
make possible this determination of citizens and their subjective rights (Habermas 1994b, 2). 
From this point of view, sovereignty is understood as the capacity of individual citizens to act 
without being affected by potential disruptions of an administrative power interfering the self-
regulation of society (1994b, 7). Moreover, the democratic will formation “has the exclusive 
function of legitimating the exercise of political power” (Habermas 1996, 299).  
But equally, he also rejects the republican idea of democratic will formation as the expression 
of the needs of “an ethical community institutionalised in the state” (1996, 296). In the 
Republican view, citizens’ political opinion, and will formation, is the medium whereby society 
constitutes itself, and its legitimating force rests on conditions for the exercise of popular 
sovereignty (Habermas 1994b, 6). The status of ‘citizen’ is not determined by negative liberties 
of citizens like private persons, but by positive liberties: rights to political participation and 
communication (1994b, 2). Thus, in the Republican view, “subjective rights owe their existence 
to an ‘objective’ legal order that both enables and guarantees the integrity of an autonomous 
life in common based on mutual respect” (1994b, 3). 
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Despite their differences, Habermas found a crucial link in both theories through their 
corresponding understandings of society and the state; in particular that of a society centred in 
the state (Habermas 1996, 298). In the Republican view, society constitutes itself as a political 
whole through citizens’ opinion and will formation that, becoming conscious of itself, acts to 
re-appropriate a “bureaucratically alienated state power” (1996, 297). Liberalism, on the other 
hand, assumes that the gap between state and society can only be bridged. However, focusing 
on the output side of the democratic process, asserts a central role for the state, ensuring that 
private rights are not savaged by potential disruptions of an administrative power hampering 
“the spontaneous social commerce of private persons” (1996, 298).  
For Habermas’, either the “offensive understanding of politics directed against the state 
apparatus” (1996, 297) of republicanism. Or due to the thin normative grounds on which 
liberalism rests (1996, 295), lead him to reject the notion that a relation between state and 
society, as the whole and its parts, exhaust available options (1996, 301). The discourse theory 
of democracy grounds the role of the democratic process, either in the practice of self-
determination ascribed to a macro social subject, or in the anonymous rule of law regulating 
interactions among competing individuals. The discourse theory of democracy thus 
“corresponds to the image of a decentered society” (1996, 301). 
In fleshing out this claim, Habermas first argues that practical reason resides neither in universal 
human rights, nor the ethics of a particular community, but “in the rules of discourse and forms 
of argumentation” whose normative content emerges “from the structure of linguistic 
communication and the communicative mode of sociation” (1996, 296–97).  Secondly, he 
asserts that discourse theory, in agreement with republicanism, gives central importance to 
political will and opinion formation, without devaluing the role of the Constitution. However, 
the success of social integration, depends on “the institutionalisation of the corresponding 
procedures and conditions of communication”, as well as the interplay of institutions with 
“informally developed public opinion” (1996, 298). Third, discourse theory rejects all remnants 
of the philosophy of consciousness and its understanding of subjectivity. On the contrary, it 
grounds its understanding of subjective action, in a subjectless communication, that forms 
arenas, inside and outside institutions, whereby processes of reaching an understanding take 
place (1996, 299).  
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As a consequence of this procedural understanding of practical reason, a decentred image of 
society and anonymous dissemination of subjectivity and the definition of legitimacy and 
popular sovereignty, also depart from their roots in either the republican or liberal traditions. 
Habermas proceeds to explain this in two ways. 
First, democratic will formation responds neither to the exclusive function of legitimating 
political power, nor does it constitute society as a political community. The procedures of 
democratic opinion and will formation represent the main conduit whereby administrative 
decisions are rationalized (1996, 299–300). Second, this understanding of legitimacy as the 
rationalisation of administrative power, demands a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty 
that fits with a definition of subjectivity in which “the self of the self-organizing legal 
community disappears in the subject less forms of communication” (1996, 299–300), regulating 
the flow of discursive opinion and will formation. In short, popular sovereignty “retreats into 
democratic procedures and the legal implementation of their corresponding presuppositions” to 
make itself felt as the communicative power that comes into being through “interactions among 
legally institutionalised will formation and culturally mobilised publics” (1996, 301). 
In sum, the discourse principle is an acquisition of a rational reconstruction of practical reason 
beneath communicative interactions among citizens in their daily life. This follows from the 
reconstructive path that Habermas presents in Between Facts and Norms, where the system of 
rights evolves through the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal medium. 
Thus, it brings private and public autonomy into a relation of mutual presupposition (Habermas 
1996, 128). Furthermore, although different interpretations of the system of rights take shape 
in historical constitutions “we can understand the catalogue of human and civil rights found in 
our historical constitutions as context-dependent readings of the same32 system of rights” (1996, 
129).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Emphasis added. 
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The development of institutions of government by law to become socially effective is as an 
implication already contained in the system of rights. Law receives its full normative sense 
“neither through its legal form per se, nor through an a priori moral content, but through a 
procedure of law-making” (1996, 135). Moreover, according to the discourse theoretic 
understanding of government by law, the latter finds an entry point in the “material concept of 
the legal statute found in the early liberal constitutionalism”33 (1996, 135). This departure point 
is, nonetheless, insufficient to ground the legitimate basis of law, it needs to account for 
legitimately enacted law; that which shifts the emphasis to the civic exercise of political 
autonomy and popular sovereignty.  
In this context, the exercise of popular sovereignty should fit with the procedural understanding 
of practical reason defended by Habermas, so that “popular sovereignty is no longer embodied 
in a visible, identifiable gathering of autonomous citizens”, but in “subjectless forms of 
communication circulating through forums and legislative bodies” (1996, 136). The virtue of 
this procedural translation of popular sovereignty relies on the fact that it “frees itself of overly 
concrete notions of ‘the people’” on behalf of “a structuralist approach to the manner in which 
institutionalized opinion - and will - formation is linked with informal opinion building in 
culturally mobilized public spheres” (1996, 185–86).  
Moreover, this move is crucial as far as, indeed, “[d]eliberative politics lives off the interplay 
between institutionalised will-formation and informal opinion-formation.” (1996, 308) 
However, to be heard as communicative power by formally institutionalised will-formation, 
informal opinion-formation can only develop first, “in the context of a liberal political culture34 
and its corresponding patterns of socialisation”, second where “actors can acquire only 
influence, not political power”, and third, where “civil society can directly transform only itself, 
and it can only indirectly effect on the self-transformation of the political system” (1996, 371–
72).  
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Emphasis added. 
34 Emphasis added 
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If my interpretation is correct, and I suggest that it is, Habermas’ model of democracy deploys 
its full normative potential in conditions of social complexity only through the interplay 
between formal and informal public spheres, operating within the legal framework of liberal 
constitutional regimes, and against the background of a liberal political culture. According to 
Habermas, this justification of liberal constitutionalism does not represent a theoretical premise. 
Rather, it is an acquisition of a critical and reconstructive social theory that  
provides a critical standard against which actual practices – the opaque and 
perplexing reality of the constitutional state – could be evaluated (1996, 6).  
However, the remaining question is whether the justification that universal and rational bases 
of justification provides, is no more, and no less, than a rational and universal justification of 
liberal constitutionalism.  
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3 Conclusions 
Habermas’ response to the problem of the liberties brings the justification of substantive 
principles regulating life in society to the hands of real citizens, but not completely. Nothing is 
prior to peoples’ exercise of popular sovereignty than discourse and law, whose own 
justification is rational and universal. The discourse principle provides nothing more and 
nothing less than the expression of the necessary conditions for citizens, holding different 
conceptions of the good, to be able to understand each other. Furthermore, the interpenetration 
of the discourse principle and law, as reflected in modern constitutional regimes, defines law 
as the language whereby, not only the impartial basis, but the neutrality of the procedure, is 
sustained. Thus, when procedural conditions are in place, deliberative democracy provides the 
means, not only for mutual understanding but to a rational agreement.  
In this way, Habermas provides an alternative path for the justification of the co-originality of 
public and private autonomy, and with an equal weight afforded to basic rights and popular 
sovereignty. Moreover, this justification is conceptually sustained, and procedurally deployed 
with no need for further substantive specification. Its basic tenets can only reflect what is 
already contained in the socio-ontological constitution of public practices of argumentation. So, 
what is elevated through rational reconstruction to perform the role of a universal standard, are 
the basic grounds on which the discursive and procedural translation of democracy rests, and 
nothing more than what is intuitively accepted by citizens in their daily life communicative 
interactions. Furthermore, it is by their universal and rational character that procedural rules 
sustain the normative binding force of democracy in the face of social complexity. 
Finally, from this perspective, it is not the moral philosopher in a ‘free standing view’, one who 
decides what citizens could accept as reasonable and rational grounds for their living together. 
Standards reflect what is already accepted beneath citizens practices themselves. However, as 
will become clear, critiques have suggested that standards, however rational and universal, 
cannot be freed from the critical scrutiny of those participating in actual practices of 
argumentation. In other words, to remain true to Habermas who claimed philosophical modesty, 
the critical scrutiny of those participating should be brought to the very end of the justificatory 
chain; the procedural rules are regulating life in society in liberal constitutional democracies.  
In the absence of this possibility, what deliberative democracy provides is a rational and 
universal justification of liberal constitutionalism. 
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Chapter III 
The Limits of Deliberative Democracy: From Social Complexity to Complex Diversity 
 
 
The influence of Habermas has been deep and diverse. His works are reference in sociology, 
communication studies, political theory… thus, unsurprisingly he also widely criticised. 
Among them, the higher degree of emphasis has fallen on the universal and rational dimension 
of justification. As the previous chapter showed, the universality and rationality of pragmatic 
rules of argumentation, are what defines the common basis on which almost all the conceptual 
building rests. In other words, nothing is prior to discourse and law, and all else is defined to 
fit those conditions. The discourse principle justifies the basic definition of the system of rights, 
that intertwined with law, provides the language for the exercise of popular sovereignty. In turn, 
it requires a subject-less definition of civil society and everything that follows from that. 
 
Habermas claims that this sequence is not a theoretical construct, but a careful reconstruction 
of the operation of practical reason in observable political processes, conducted by a critical 
social theory concerned to validate its standards (Habermas 1990d). Its results are rational and 
universally valid in so far as standards are pluralistic and hypothetical, and their substantive 
content is not defined by the philosopher in isolation, but by citizens themselves. However, 
although turning the attention of political theory to citizens casts fresh light onto a debate so far 
confined to intellectual and political elites, critiques suggest it falls short in both respects. Either 
the recognition of citizens’ capacity to become the main driving force of democratic integration 
or the recognition that the contribution their diversity represents under conditions of social 
complexity. 
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In particular, the universal and rational justification of Habermas’ critical standards is 
controversial, because it precludes alternative sources of justification. Alternative sources of 
justification may not fit within normative requirements shaped by patterns of legal validity. 
However, they give expression to a diversity of subjectivities that elude generalisations, are 
limited in their capacity to influence decision making, and subsist when subjected to patterns 
of exclusion. Indeed, as I will explain in this chapter, contemporary identities can neither be 
generalised under the heading of conventional identities, nor as actual liberal constitutional 
democracies that are discursively settled self-constituting legal communities. The main 
hypothesis in what follows is that although Habermas’ conceptual architecture is well suited to 
deal with social complexity, it is limited to respond the challenge of complex diversity.  
 
As a working definition, I follow Peter Kraus (2012) and take complex diversity to mean the 
“constellation in which cultural identities and social cleavages overlap and intertwine in 
manifold ways” (2012, 13). This definition stresses the importance of recognition in struggles, 
not only over equality, but also “over what equality means” and challenges “the historical role 
of the nation state in amalgamating a political community, democratic legitimacy, and the rule 
of law in its one institutional frame” (2012, 13). From this point of view,  
no identity should be regarded as pre-given and be politically taken for granted... 
[On the contrary] ... [t]o tackle the issue in a productive way, we will have to move 
from the realm of discussing general concepts to the realm of analysing concrete 
politics (2012, 13). 
This chapter will ground the general hypothesis by showing first, how according to critiques, 
deliberative democracy is ill suited to gather the allegiance of citizens who co-habit in societies 
characterised by their complex diversity. Secondly, how the latter relates to his conception of 
social identity, and the implications it has for his model of integration in the context of a modern 
liberal constitutional democracy. Finally, I will elaborate why overcoming the challenge posed 
by complex diversity to the paradigm of deliberative democracy, requires opening up to critical 
scrutiny the very core of Habermas’ concept building; namely, the discourse principle and its 
impartiality towards the principles of morality, law and democracy.  
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1 Complex Diversity (I): Universal Validity and Communication 
 
Habermas’ conception of identity is characterised by the kind of dichotomic distinctions he 
makes between rational, or post-conventional, and non-rational, or conventional, identities. The 
most immediate issue that presents itself is that he is not very clear what is precisely required 
to be identified as “a rational identity” (Habermas 1974). The contraposition is sustained on the 
supposition that modern societies feature an identity, that is neither fixed to a territory, nor 
articulated around coherent world images, or retrospectively oriented to traditional values. 
What in mundane terms we will call a ‘citizen of the world’. Indeed, with regard to their 
foundations, universalistic moral systems, like ones embodied in modern liberal constitutions, 
should conform to the core of citizens’ allegiances, and is opposed to conventional sources of 
loyalty. 
 
The problem is not the definition per se, but their dichotomic opposition. With regard to post-
conventional or rational identities, James Tully for example, speculates whether the proclaimed 
neutrality of constitutional liberalism between different conceptions of identity, does not 
neutralise contemporary expressions of diversity and difference (Tully 2002). Equally, Ernesto 
Laclau suggests that this idea of rational identities is inappropriate to deal with the 
“proliferation of particularistic political identities, none of which tries to ground its legitimacy 
and its action in a mission predetermined by universal history” (Laclau 1994, 1). 
  
In short, both are sceptical about the materialisation of post-conventional identities in the 
context of liberal constitutional democracies. Accordingly, they wonder about the impact it will 
have on the model of deliberative politics. Especially, given the crucial role communicative 
interactions play in deliberation between the institutions of law and the civil society; or as 
Habermas call the formal and informal public spheres.  
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These concerns can be easily explained by considering two filters, conceived by Habermas, to 
guarantee the rationality of communicative practices both inside, and outside, the institutions 
of law. First, the universality of the rule of argumentation guarantees the rationality of 
communicative interactions, but it precludes the operation of alternative practices of validity; 
at least regarding their capacity to be heard as legitimate expressions of the civil society. 
Moreover, applied in real contexts, these requirements may well end up perpetuating patterns 
of exclusion, instead of leading towards social integration. While in the face of ‘legitimate’ 
expression from civil society, the openness of institutions appears to be presumed rather than 
guaranteed. Both meet in the agonistic critique of consensual models of democracy. In short, it 
is not just the feasibility of Habermas model that is at stake, but even its desirability. 
 
1.1 Universal Validity as a Rule of Argumentation 
Habermas’ description of the universality of practices of validity has been substantially 
criticised. For example, in her afterword to the compilation on The Communicative Ethics 
Controversy (Benhabib 1990, 330–69), Seyla Benhabib focused on the role of Habermas’ 
principles as “universal and necessary communicative presuppositions of argumentative 
speech” (1990, 337). Her position is that the principle of universalization (U) makes no real 
contribution once the principle of discourse (D) is in place35. The main difference between her 
and Habermas’ proposals appeared to be that Habermas thinks (U) guarantees consensus (1990, 
345). On the contrary, Benhabib suggests that it is a considerably deeper problem, that brings 
us back to the classical problem of consent theories based upon the capacity of normatively 
grounded legitimacy to justify either actual consent, or the duty to obey36.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Recall, that the Discourse Principle (D) in Discourse Ethics  (Habermas 1990a) states that only those norms that can meet 
with the approval of all concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse can claim to be valid. On the other 
hand, the Universalization principle (U) further generalizes this requirement by linking the justification of norms to rational 
presuppositions of communication of a counterfactual sort instead of individual subjects and their dialogic interaction.   
36 For a recent review of problems regarding consent theory see (Estlund 2009, 117–35). 
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Intriguingly, in the post-script to Between Facts and Norms (1996), Habermas left open the 
question of whether “the discourse principle does not already exhaust the content of the 
discourse-ethical principle of universalization (U)” (Habermas 1996, 459). However, as noted 
before, it could be argued that instead of abandoning (U), what Habermas did in Between Facts 
and Norms, was to upgrade (D) to play the role previously assigned to (U) (Bohman and Rehg 
2014). In fact, this is one of the critiques pointed out by Tully regarding Habermas’ definition 
of validity and justification (Tully 2008, 1:47–70). According to him, (D) provides a rational 
and universal justification for the priority of rightness over goodness, that frees the principle of 
discourse ethics from the critical scrutiny of those subjected to it. Tully agrees that turning to 
communication, on the basis that it takes place in the daily life of citizens, justification based 
on redeeming validity claims (truthfulness, rightness, and sincerity) is a valid mechanism for 
justification. However, he rejects the claim that it is the only one.  
 
Tully suggests that, according to Habermas, practical discourses of validation proceed by 
argumentation where the latter plays the role of a ‘court of appeal’, thus allowing the 
justification or rejection of the rationality of arguments (2008, 1:45). Participants engaged in 
argumentation therefore suspend their conventional assent over validity claims, and exchange 
reasons in favour or against the normative rightness, propositional truth, or sincerity of other 
speakers in the light of how far they facilitate agreement or consensus. In other words, against 
the background of a communicative telos of reaching agreement aimed at mutual 
understanding.  
 
Habermas’ definition of this telos involves sets of universal rules of two kinds: three 
conventional rules of logical-semantic consistency, mutual recognition, and reciprocity; and 
three post-conventional rules based, first, on the principle of universal moral respect, second, 
the principle of egalitarian reciprocity and, finally, the principle of non-coercion. Bringing in 
conventional and post-conventional rules of argumentation, Habermas ensures that any taken 
for granted consensus in conventional practices is not allowed to proceed without critical 
assessment. However, post-conventional rules of argumentation also refer to practices of 
argumentation that emerge from conventional forms of communication, and not from 
“rationalised forms of activity colonised from the lifeworld by processes of modernisation” 
(2008, 1:47).  
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In other words, calling into question validity claims to truth and rightness, 
... enables the ensuing, reflective agreement to transcend taken-for-granted horizons 
of the lifeworld to be unconditional and universal (2008, 1:46).  
Moreover, as a consequence, the practice of argumentation serves to validate or invalidate taken 
for granted certainties, due to the operation of self-regulating action subsystems such as the 
market.  
 
Nonetheless, Tully is not convinced that Habermas’ account of practices of validation still work 
when this communicative telos, linking understanding and agreement, is not in place, and 
further, that mutual understanding for example, results from disagreement. In particular, Tully 
is reticent about whether Habermas’ justification, based on redeeming validity claims, can 
account successfully for “every-day speech-acts in reflectively validating reasons 
unconditionally37 (rather than conditionally)” (2008, 1:48). He exemplifies his critical position 
departing from the expression “I am Jürgen Habermas and I think that the workplace ought to 
be organized democratically” raised, metaphorically, by Habermas in a public conference.  
 
Regarding the first half of the sentence, Tully stresses that to validate this assertion, against for 
example the criterion of sincerity, it requires reasons whose justification falls out of the scope 
of argumentative practices (asking for his ID, asking others if he is indeed Habermas or using 
a lie-detector, for example). Thus, they require further validation (the ID is authentic, this 
other’s testimony is authoritative, is the lie-detector working properly?) and so on. On the 
contrary, if the speaker in question is indeed Habermas, it seems that acknowledging without 
critical reflection that he is sincere about it, seems more reasonable than questioning it (2008, 
1:48–49).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Emphasis added 
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Departing from this simple example Tully suggests first, that in practices of argumentation, 
something is always taken for granted (there are reasons to hesitate on Habermas identity or 
not). Secondly, as a matter of course, practices of argumentation tend to refer to conventional 
common ground (e.g. a lie detector detects lies). Thirdly, the acceptance of the common ground 
moreover, depends not necessarily on good arguments, but also for example, on trustworthiness 
(the reliability of the lie detector) (2008, 1:49–54). On these bases, Tully queries whether the 
distinction Habermas made between conventional and post-conventional, is “fixed beyond 
question” and further, whether reasonableness represents an appropriate demarcation criteria 
for this distinction (2008, 1:54). 
 
With regard to the claim that we ought to organise the workplace democratically, Tully notes 
that initially, this kind of assertion takes for granted mutually accepted conventional meanings 
of terms like ‘democracy’ or ‘workplace’. Because in the absence of common meanings, 
argumentation will bring back once and again to conventional forms of justification. In other 
words, before entering in argumentation, the meaning of these words is fixed conventionally. 
However, and more importantly, Tully questions the appropriateness of the criteria of 
normative rightness: the fact that in the end (D) rules the entire process, to justify norms 
affecting participants in their living together (2008, 1:55–59).  
 
Habermas, as noted above, locates the discursive filter at the very end of the justificatory chain, 
so that any argument that is considered valid about other criteria, is finally subjected to it. 
However, (D) itself falls out of the scope of critical scrutiny by those participating in rational 
discourses. It is given in advance, according to Habermas, because it represents the basic 
conditions for communication aimed at mutual understanding to be possible. Further, whose 
justification is independent to actual discourses; it is universal and rational. Tully, by contrast, 
suggests that justification in which the priority of (D) over any other validity claim is asserted, 
demands a priority of rightness over goodness that is not justified (2008, 1:57–59)38.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Recall that as noted previously and bit later on in this chapter this lack of clarity regarding the exact role the discourse 
principle plays in Habermas conceptual architecture was already highlighted by James Bohman and William Rehg (Bohman 
and Rehg 2014) or Seyla Benhabib (Benhabib 1990). 
  
100 
Thus, in Tully’s view, Habermas makes a significant error by leaving (D) free from critical 
scrutiny by participants in rational discourses. Because, no matter how we name it, what (U) 
demands in discourse ethics, or (D) in Between Facts and Norms, is the assessment of claims 
by passing the universalization test; in the case of (D) a dialogic assessment of universal 
rightness based on counterfactual idealisations. However, given the operation of legal validity, 
that is to say one internally tied to normative rightness according to Habermas, cannot be 
considered the only source of justification. The assumption that law enjoys the same priority of 
discourse, because both are intertwined in the genesis of modern constitutional law, requires an 
“acceptance of juridical ways of thought and action as hegemonic” (2008, 1:59). 
 
Indeed, Habermas defends that the underlying logic of deliberative politics does not represent 
an action system, because among other things its bases are universal presuppositions that every 
participant in communicative action aimed at mutual understanding intuitively accepts. Tully, 
by contrast, suggests that by accepting juridical ways of thought as hegemonic, Habermas may 
have succeeded in freeing law from morality, but ended up by subordinating democracy to both 
law and morality. In response, Tully advocates for more openness to the “plurality of 
perspectives provided by congeries of types available to us as participants in our complex 
modern political practices” (2008, 1:59). Moreover, he stresses the need “to temper its 
comprehensive aspirations, point out its limits and restore it to its proper place in our diverse 
polity, as one conditional form of critical reflection among the many”39 (2008, 1:62). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Emphasis added 
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1.2 Subject-less Communication, Diversity, and Citizenship 
According to Habermas, the normative criteria whereby citizens’ participation gains empirical 
relevance, also draws attention to limitations of his understanding of subjectivity as an 
anonymous network of communicative interactions. For Iris Marion Young, this definition 
means that the collective dimension of social groups is diluted in an anonymous network of 
communicative practices. She argues that,  
... to deny reality to social groupings both devalues processes of cultural and social 
affinities and makes political actors unable to analyse patterns of oppression, 
inequality, and exclusion that are nevertheless sources of conflict and claims for 
redress (Young 1996, 389).  
The argument for the difference principle raised by Young points in two directions. On the one 
hand, collective forms of identification play a role in the capacity of individuals to socialise 
with others, and therefore are worthy to be taken into consideration as far as social integration 
is concerned. On the other, it notes the epistemic gap left by failing to account for the collective 
dimension of groups once, social theory for example, describes, and takes into account, patterns 
of exclusion that affect members of particular social or cultural groups. For example, the 
consensus is considered in deliberative politics as the outcome of deliberative interactions ruled 
by the ‘unforced force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1996, 306). However, as Lynn M. 
Sanders has underlined, to be considered equally, reasons given by persons belonging to groups 
of different social strata, should be regarded as holding an equal epistemic authority (Sanders 
1997). This assertion contradicts the most basic insights of the manner of functioning of 
testimony (Coady 1992; Fricker 2007; Adler 2015).  
 
In the context of the public exchange of arguments among citizens, the exercise of taking yes/no 
positions on validity claims raised by others, does not only proceed on a rational basis; it relies 
on trustworthiness in oneself and others. Furthermore, the perception of unequal epistemic 
authority, for example by the lesser educated towards the better educated, could motivate those 
lesser educated to withdraw the social practice in question and delegate to those perceived more 
capable of expressing their concerns through rational argumentation.  
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Indeed, according to Miranda Fricker, withdrawing not necessarily entails a voluntary self-
exclusion but could reflect deeper structural identity prejudices (Fricker 2007, 147–75). In this 
case, the lesson for deliberative politics is that consensus achieved without taking into 
consideration inequalities of epistemic authority among participants, could strengthen unjust 
situations of exclusion. Rather than solve inequalities through greater social integration, that 
becomes diluted in an anonymous network of communicative practices, groups with special 
claims could neither be demarcated as ontologically differentiated entities, nor their particular 
claim adequately tackled by institutional means.  
 
Therefore, normative requirements for citizens to become empirically relevant in the context of 
a subjectless civil society can produce limitations, with regard to the diversity of perspectives 
involved, with the risk of perpetuating patterns of exclusion.  
 
Habermas maintains, the normative content entailed by his definition of deliberative politics is 
appropriate, because it “arises from the structure of linguistic communication and the 
communicative mode of sociation” (Habermas 1996, 297). Therefore, as a common ground, 
normative requirements entail no more than what citizens intuitively accept in their daily lives. 
Indeed, Habermas proceeds to the sociological translation of civil society, or the public sphere, 
by these normative requirements. Only within these margins can civil society,  
...acquire influence in the public sphere, have an effect on the parliamentary 
complex (and the courts) through its own public opinions, and compel the political 
system to switch over to the official circulation of power (1996, 373).  
However, according to critiques, it is not clear how such an anonymous network of 
communicative interactions will make itself heard against institutions. Craig Calhoun, for 
example, underlined this difficulty when commenting on the evolution of Habermas’ thought. 
In the The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere (1992b), Calhoun argues that 
Habermas, 
... located the basis for the application of practical reason to politics in the 
historically specific social institutions of the public sphere, the theory of 
communicative action located them in transhistorical, evolving communicative 
capacities or capacities of reason conceived intersubjectively as in its essence a 
matter of communication (Calhoun 1992, 31–32).  
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In previous works, Habermas identified the emergence of a vibrant, dynamic, and autonomous 
public sphere as the main conduit of both the exercise and the expression of popular 
sovereignty. In Between Facts and Norms (1996) situating the public sphere in a unitary, 
counterfactual, and trans-historical territory, he underestimated the emancipatory potential of 
contemporary expressions of civil society. In Calhoun words, while Habermas judged the 
eighteenth century through the lens of Locke and Kant, and the nineteenth century through a 
Marxian and Millian one, he focuses on the twentieth century through the lens of a “typical 
suburban television viewer” (Calhoun 1992, 33). In short, he overestimates the openness and 
porosity of the institutions of the law in contemporary liberal constitutionalism.  
 
In response, Habermas acknowledged that his narrative on the transformation of the public 
sphere from a “culture-debating to a ‘culture-consuming public’, is too simplistic” (Habermas 
1992a, 438), and also recognised the relevance of transformations that, on behalf of the 
contemporary expression of civil society, the public sphere was experimenting. For example, 
he recognised that The Structural Transformations (1992b) reflected his lack of awareness at 
the time of the implications of gender discrimination for his universalistic conception of civil 
society. As noted by Seyla Benhabib, feminist theories that challenged the private/public 
dichotomy, endowed certain activities hitherto confined to the “domestic/reproductive” and 
“private” spheres, with presence and legitimacy in the public life (Benhabib 1997, 33). In short, 
they challenged the definition of public issues, as those in the interest of all, by bringing to 
public debate concerns that were not generalizable, therefore in the interest of some, but not 
necessarily all.  
 
Habermas responded that his deliberative model indeed recommended that all issues should be 
able to be publicly discussed. Thus, they should be allowed to raise claims to validity that, if 
accepted by others, provide justification, and become capable of being translated into 
communicative power and having an influence over decision making (Habermas 1996, 312–
14). However, given liberals’ concern that blurring the line between private/public risks 
illegitimate intrusions of public institutions in the private sphere, Habermas specified that every 
matter in need of political regulation should be publicly discussed, though not politically 
regulated.  
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In short, it is through channels of communication not regulated by democratic procedures that 
the struggle for recognition takes place, before the issue is taken up by political authorities. 
However, as James Bohman noted, in practice the constitutional state, and its institutions, are 
not necessarily “as open or ‘porous’ as the two-track model seems to suggest” (Bohman 1994, 
927). Rather, it was the historical experience accumulated by civil rights movements that 
revealed “the process of inclusion and reform has been much more difficult than mere 
legislative success” (Bohman 1994, 928). Thus, both, Calhoun and Bohman are sceptical about 
the capacity of a civil society defined along universal lines and acting in a public sphere located 
in a trans-historical territory, to make effective the political influence of citizens’ exercise of 
popular sovereignty in the face of the institutions of law.  
 
The above incapacity to influence political power, is also underscored in criticisms of 
Habermas’ model of civil society and citizenship, and its problematic integration of diversity. 
According to Habermas identity is a matter of private concern, worthy of respect by public 
institutions, but different to citizenship. Both identity and citizenship are relevant for 
individuals, and indeed, each person handles her contradictions, but has the duty of proceeding 
rationally. Therefore, a clear path is established: the transition whereby a person becomes a 
citizen is a process of rationalisation. However, as Susan Bickford claims, we cannot simply 
overlook “how the language of commonality can actively exclude” (Bickford 1997, 117). 
 
For Bickford, simply reasserting ‘citizenship’ as “a public identity that transcends or integrates 
other commitments is to evade the question” (1997, 117). James Clifford, on the other hand, 
underlined the negative consequences of uncritically asserting the universal value of 
citizenship. This position reflects that “we risk being left with a narrowly foreshortened view 
of contemporary social movements around culture and identity, missing their complex 
volatility, ambivalent potential and historical necessity” (Clifford 2000, 95). Therefore, the 
question should be more like: “in a context of inequality and oppression, how are multiple 
‘we’s’ to be democratically part of the same public thing?” (Bickford 1997, 117).  
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Regarding diversity, the departure point is a clear non-essentialist agenda that frames identity 
as multiple allegiances, the priorities of which are neither given, nor perpetually established, 
but dynamic (Tully 1995; Benhabib 1997; Connolly 2002; Parekh 2008). For example, Seyla 
Benhabib, suggests that Tully’s model of identity as ‘Strange Multiplicities’ is an appropriate 
response to the limitations of Habermas’ definition of citizenship. Moreover, it profits from the 
virtues of contemporary claims by identity politics (Benhabib 1997, 31; Tully 1995, 2008, 1:1–
25). In short, the definition intends to highlight that identity could find accommodation in 
contemporary constitutional democracies by its ‘aspectival’ character, reflecting the fact that 
citizens hold diverse identities that overlap, interact, and are negotiated over time. 
 
Therefore, the question is not about rationalising identities, but how these contradictory 
assertions are handled in a democratic society. We are no longer talking over mutually 
competing claims for authenticity that arise with regard to their legitimacy in the light of a set 
of universal values. Rather, as Scott Lash and Michael Featherston summarised, the starting 
point is “how difference and multiculturalism take on the arguments of universalistic humanism 
than the inverse” (Lash and Featherstone 2001, 2). This alternative problem agenda on 
citizenship takes the form of a weak cosmopolitanism, that problematizes the possibility of 
citizenship in the context of a democratic society (Hall 2002; Archibugi 2004; Benhabib et al. 
2006).  
 
In other words, critical problematization targets the definition of citizenship and its 
materialisation in the constitutional state, not citizens’ identity in a multicultural or 
multinational society. Stuart Hall for example, suggests that this shift establishes two 
requirements. First, citizens have to decide “what is the framework in which society is going to 
negotiate the compromises between difference and equality” (Hall 2002, 30). Secondly, citizens 
must have “access to this process of democratic negotiation” (2002, 31). These requirements 
thus reflect the need for an ‘existential political position’, modelled on individual experiences 
that resembles how “for most of us cosmopolitanism has involved and has a continued 
relationship to our family cultures” (2002, 30).  
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However, to ensure that this becomes politically meaningful, it is essential to retain not only 
identities open to critical reflection, but institutional processes open to contestation. Political 
significance requires  
... not only the freedom to participate in accord with one’s cultural and national 
identities when they are publicly recognised (as I stressed in Strange Multiplicity) 
but also to participate in the ongoing contests over how these are to be 
acknowledged, recognised and accommodated (Tully 2008, 1:160).  
Recognition may not only affect how identities are constituted for those holding multiple 
allegiances, but also the framework through which their interactions are regulated. Because in 
its absence, democratic integration risks becoming assimilation, and diversity becomes valuable 
only to the extent that minorities “remain politically toothless and do not matter much anyway” 
(Kraus 2012, 21). 
 
Therefore, the underlying idea is that the politicisation of identity in contemporary democratic 
societies requires participation, not rationalisation. In comparison to Habermas, the framework 
is not given, but has to be negotiated. It is not an issue of recognising authenticity, but rather a 
question of negotiation and compromise among differences, and their capacity to organise 
living together democratically. Neither identity is essentially worthy and fixed, nor does it elude 
its sense of unity and need for stability in the face of others: the challenge is about how to 
conduct those mutually contradictory affirmations of the self democratically (Calhoun 1994, 
17; Benhabib 1997, 19–22; Kraus 2012, 24).  
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1.3 The Agonistic Critique 
Among the several lines of criticism opposing Habermas’ model, the most articulated and sound 
is the agonistic critique (Connolly 1983, 1995, 2002, Honig 2007, 2009, Mouffe 2000b, 2005, 
2013). Besides its interest, Habermas versus Mouffe refers to a debate that never took place 
echoing, in its basic contents, another debate that also did not ‘took place’; in this case, between 
Habermas and Foucault (Schmidt 1996; Habermas 1989a; Foucault 2007). Therefore, the 
controversy refers more directly to commentators on both traditions, rather than to the concrete 
protagonists. To date [as far as I know] there is no direct reference from Habermas to Mouffe, 
although Mouffe has extensively explicated her position on Habermas (Mouffe 2000a, 2000b, 
80–107). Notwithstanding how the argument is constructed, the terms of debate that have been 
outlined by Mouffe, pose a significant challenge to Habermas’ central theoretical claims about 
the relationship between liberalism and democracy, and demands critical attention here.   
  
The agonistic perspective regards the evolutionary understanding of democracy as a collective 
learning process, that involves the transition of participants from conventional to post-
conventional forms of self-identification, reflecting a profound misunderstanding on the 
conjoint operation of identity, democracy, and the institutions of law in contemporary 
democracies. It considers that conventional identities cannot be defined as irrational, nor does 
it agree that by passing the discursive filter, identities are validated to take part in the democratic 
game. On the contrary, it suggests that contestation, disagreement, and conflict are the game 
that democracy should be able to conduct to avoid conflict by non-democratic means.  
 
In general, according to Mouffe, deliberative democracy, by reconciling the logics of liberalism 
and democracy, overlooks the essential antagonism of ‘the political’ (Mouffe 2005). Moreover, 
this assimilation comes at the cost of deactivating the creative potential, the tension of value 
pluralism enacted at the very core of democratic politics (Mouffe 2000b). In short, deliberative 
democracy accommodates liberal institutions, provides them with a rational, and therefore a 
universal source of justification that erases all traces of conflict, antagonism, and disagreement. 
For Mouffe, it is from its conflictive nature that democracy acquires its transformative potential. 
Therefore, instead of providing a neutral channel to conduct public life towards social 
integration, deliberative democracy neutralises the transformative potential of democratic 
politics.  
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She blames deliberative democracy for intending to reconcile, at all costs, liberalism with the 
moral credentials absent in aggregative accounts of democratic politics; exemplified, for 
example, by Schumpeter’s rejection of the common good40, or empiricist accounts of pluralist 
democracies41 (2000b, 80–82). The normative need responds to the conviction that the “future 
of liberal democracy, in their view, depends on recovering its moral dimension” (2000b, 83). 
Indeed, notwithstanding their divergences, Mouffe considers both Rawls and Habermas to 
constitute the two main schools of deliberative democracy. For her, they both share the common 
aim of reconciling both liberties, by grounding the authority and legitimacy of democratic 
institutions on the normative force of rationality. They also share their ideal, embodied in liberal 
institutions, with the intention of to steering society toward generalizable concerns without 
overlooking the plurality of values and interest (2000b, 82–90).  
 
Mouffe identifies the main shortcomings of deliberative democracy in either version, as the 
alleged capacity of deliberative democracy to provide a reliable path to reconcile private and 
public autonomy, or the capacity to advance towards consensus on what is good for all, without 
renouncing what is good for each (2000b, 90–94). Mouffe finds that this aim constitutes, 
... another attempt at insulating politics from the effects of the pluralism of value, 
this time by trying to fix once and for all the meaning and hierarchy of the central 
liberal democratic values (Mouffe 2000a, 754).  
                                                 
40 According to Schumpeter “[t]here is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree 
on.” (Schumpeter 1942) Furthermore, in the absence of an idea on the common good there cannot be a common will because 
the will of the citizens needs to be more than “an indeterminate bundle of vague impulses loosely playing about given slogans 
and mistaken impressions” (Schumpeter 1942). In particular, Schumpeter argued that in the absence of an idea of the common 
good on which citizens could rationally agree on, the common will, understood as the outcome of aggregating individual wills, 
lacks rational unity and rational sanction. It lacks rational unity because a general will that is the outcome of democratically 
gathering the will of each citizen cannot be meaningful by itself. On the other hand, it lacks rational sanction because being the 
outcome of such a process the general will no longer represents a particular ‘good’.  Furthermore, Schumpeter argued that he 
was unconfident on participatory conceptions of the democratic process because not even the assumption of independence and 
rationality of the will of each individual could be taken for granted. The consequence is that the attribution of ethical value to 
the outcome of aggregating individual wills should rely on an unqualified confidence in the democratic process. 
41 Robert Dahl (Dahl 1991) pointed to a procedural definition of democracy where competition among multiple centres of 
political power interacts shaping what he later named ‘polyarchies’. In order to achieve this decentred ideal, contemporary 
democracies should ensure effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control on the agenda and 
inclusiveness. But, these procedural mechanisms of democratic politics ask for a particular set of social conditions to be 
possible.  In particular, Dahl’s longitudinal sample, looking for indicators of modern, pluralist, and dynamic democracies, listed 
societies with high per capita income, long-run growth, or market-based mode of production. He interpreted the statistical 
correlation among these different indicators as a sign of favourable social conditions for the domestication of social power and 
institutional channelling of state power. Habermas rejected this account of democracy because Dahl falls short integrating the 
normative arguments that justify democratic procedures with the empirical analysis of their implementation: by resorting to a 
background political culture that is already there, Dahl renders his sociology blind regarding normativity at work (Habermas 
1996, 318). 
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Although accepting that pluralism should acknowledge certain limits, those limits are to be 
defined as what they are, namely political and therefore contestable, rather than moral or 
rational and, therefore, universal. 
 
Thus, democratic citizenship is not a question of consent based on rational acceptance of 
validity claims, on the contrary, it is the continuous acknowledgement of available institutions, 
discourses, and forms of life that enhance identification. As James Connolly noted, “[t]he 
recurrent need for critical responsiveness exceeds the reach of any fixed code, an austere set of 
procedures, or settled interpretation of moral universals.” (Connolly 2002, xxx)  In short, from 
Mouffe’s perspective, the problem with deliberative democracy regarding pluralism, is that it 
takes subjectivity as given, when subjectivity is not previous to society, or abstracted from 
social relations, power, language, or culture; it evolves embedded in those practices.  
 
Indeed, “procedures only exist as a complex ensemble of practices” (Mouffe 2000b, 68) in the 
context of which allegiances evolve, drawing limitations to consensus, or not. Allegiances to 
rules reflect different forms of life towards which rules are not independent and in the context 
of which rational consensus entails “the fantasy that we could escape from our human form of 
life” (2000b, 98). Furthermore, the problem with Rawls’ ‘original position’ or Habermas’ 
‘methodological fiction’ is not only, as Tully noted, that they are conditional to a specific telos 
for which alternatives are available, but that this telos is ontologically a conceptual 
impossibility “since the particular forms of life, which are presented as its ‘impediments’ are 
its very condition of possibility” (2000b, 98). 
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Her proposal for agonistic democracy relies on the concepts of hegemony, developed in 
Hegemony and The Socialist Strategy (1985), written with Ernesto Laclau. The notion of the 
political is explained in full in the later work On the Political (2005). Both combined in the 
form of a theory of democracy in the Democratic Paradox (2000b). On the one hand, the 
concept of hegemony serves to elicit the idea that power and objectivity are intertwined, so that 
there is no such thing as social objectivity, or identity, that is free from power relations. 
Hegemony represents the point of convergence where objectivity and power meet and 
constitute the social and its identities. Therefore, the equation is not the more democratic society 
is, the less power determines social relations, but “to constitute forms of power more compatible 
with democratic values” (2000b, 100).  On the other hand, the notion of the political helps to 
differentiate politics as the set of practices, institutions and discourses that “seek to establish a 
certain order and organise human coexistence” and the political whereby the inherent antagonist 
nature of human relations is underlined (2000b, 101). 
 
On these bases, agonistic democracy allows the pursuance of a type of antagonism that can 
reframe, in the face of pluralism, the enemy into an adversary. Antagonists share the “adhesion 
to the ethical-political principles of liberal democracy (…) disagree on the meaning and 
implementation of those principles, and such disagreement is not one that could be resolved 
through deliberation and rational discussion” (2000b, 102).  
 
In short, the task of democratic politics is to “transform antagonism into agonism”, enemies 
into legitimate adversaries, but refusing to dilute them into any rational identity (2000b, 117). 
Indeed, according to Mouffe, this is the major difference between agonistic and consensual 
models. While the former intends to foreclose debate by rational consensus, “we have to accept 
that consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a provisional 
stabilisation of power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion” (2000b, 104–5). 
Therefore, agonistic pluralism “forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive” (2000b, 
104–5). 
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2 Complex Diversity (II): Rationalization  
 
Critiques suggest that Habermas’ definition is inadequate in three key respects. First, the failure 
to deal with the internal tension between facts and norms, without stating the hegemonic 
position of legal forms of argumentation over other forms of validity, for example, those 
regarding democratic authority. Secondly, it is limited in dealing with the external tension 
between the validity of the law and the political process running in parallel. Because, while 
citizens can only act within the margins established by normative requirements to be 
empirically relevant, institutions hold their sources of legitimacy to be guaranteed as universal 
and rational, so that even though they could not be as open and porous as expected in theory, 
there are no means to make them accountable. Finally, as a corollary to the previous point, the 
agonistic critique rejects the desirability of the alleged potential of deliberative democracy for 
social integration. The driving force of democracy is not rationality or consensus, but diversity, 
disagreement, and contest. 
 
Among the agonistic critique’s, Mouffe provides an alternative account of democracy that has 
been very influential in the field of contemporary deliberative theory. Her proposal however, is 
not free from adversaries. For example, one of the commonly underlined weaknesses of the 
agonistic model is that due to its ambiguous conceptualization of the institutionalisation of 
legitimating procedures, it is unable to provide the means for a critical account of the role of 
the state (Kapoor 2002). Mouffe asserts that liberal institutions should not be taken for granted 
(2002, 469), however, while rejecting any reference to standards of rationality, she cannot 
defend democratic practices against non-democratic ones (2002, 475). Nevertheless, in my 
view, the agonistic critique raises one point that, as I will sustain in this section, potentially 
undermines Habermas proposal for the case of complex diversity. The idea that pluralism in 
conditions of complex diversity is not only necessarily the expression of a contradiction 
between moral doctrines, but equally between political identities.  
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In Between Facts and Norms Habermas frames the problem with diversity and difference 
around the communitarian critique (Habermas 1996, 308–15). On this basis, the argument 
suggests that the communitarian critique is misplaced because, on the one hand, deliberative 
democracy provides enough room for different interpretations of the moral norm in particular 
circumstances (Habermas 1993), and on the other, members of different cultural communities 
are not required to bracket off their identities, but to further them as a legal person (Habermas 
1994a). However, this solution becomes problematic when identities do not reveal difficulties 
only for action coordination of moral norms, but also for legal norms. In this case, diversity 
brings about a constitutional paradox whereby the political identity of those who are subjected 
to the rule of law, is different to those who make and apply it, thus challenging the idea that 
they constitute a legal community. In short, I suggest that Habermas is able to sustain the first 
two critiques, but fails to allay the third. 
 
 
2.1 Conventional Identity: Action Coordination and Moral Norms 
In Between Facts and Norms Habermas frames the problem with diversity and difference 
around the dispute with the communitarians (Habermas 1996, 308–15). Charles Taylor for 
example, suggested that diversity reflects the cohabitation of different cultural traditions in the 
same democratic society, which liberalism cannot claim as a reflection of its cultural neutrality 
because it is not “difference-blind”42, but “it is also a fighting creed” (Taylor 1994, 62). 
According to Habermas, the argument is relevant for deliberative democratic theory. In its most 
stringent version, it suggests that even tracing back justification to procedural rules of 
argumentation, as he did, their reconstruction is always from the perspective of the participant, 
whose intuitive knowledge on the ideal conditions under which a validity claim is justified 
could differ. For example, Taylor is sceptical that publicity could be considered universally 
valid as a rule of argumentation, because different cultural traditions hold different conceptions 
on the distinction private/public (Taylor 1994, 62).  
 
 
                                                 
42
 John Rawls, for example, revisiting the idea of public reason noted that in public reason “ideas of truth or right based on 
comprehensive doctrines are replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. This assigns to 
each person the same basic political position.” (Rawls 2005, 481) Namely, at least when talking about the exercise of public 
reason persons neither are socially situated nor rooted in particular doctrines but reasonable and rational as free and equal 
citizens. 
113 
According to Charles Taylor, identities express “cultures that have provided the horizon of 
meaning for large numbers of human being, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a 
long period of time –that have, in other words, articulated their sense of good, the holy, the 
admirable” and, therefore, they deserve admiration and respect (Taylor 1994, 72). He articulates 
his understanding of identity, by contrasting the Kantian idea of equal dignity with 
‘authenticity’; the conviction that each person, as well as people, has its own “measure” (1994, 
30–31). In agreement with Habermas, Taylor stresses that identity evolves dialogically, 
therefore in close relation to recognition by significant others, so that linguistically mediated 
relations are “the key loci of self-discovery and self-affirmation” (1994, 36). However, in 
contrast to Habermas, recognition is not meant for all to be considered universally the same, 
but “to recognise the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctiveness from 
everyone else” (1994, 38).  
Habermas takes a sceptical stance in the face of this critique on the basis that considering 
identities as different sets of moral norms, and their integration as a matter of action 
coordination, universal rules of argumentation provide common grounds for different 
interpretations without challenging the rational justification of the system of norms as a whole. 
Habermas differentiates between discourses of justification and application, associated 
correspondingly with the principles of universality and appropriateness, to justify the capacity 
of the discourse principle to provide impartial grounds for action coordination (Habermas 1996, 
109). The argument, is explained in full in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics (Habermas 1993, 35–39), and sought to rebut the critique raised by Albrecht Wellmer 
(1991) on the capacity of Habermas’ discourse ethics to regulate moral concerns on action 
norms in particular circumstances.  
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In short, Wellmer suggests that the rule of argumentation (U) does not facilitate a clear response 
when what is at stake “is the right way of acting under the given circumstances”, meaning when 
norms should provide regulation for me, here and now. Accordingly, he considers that 
universalism, associated with the capacity of individual citizens to decide on moral norms, 
overtaxes their rational capacities (Wellmer 1991, 155; Habermas 1993, 35). Habermas replied 
considering that “[t]his characterization misrepresents the role of the principle of 
argumentation” that “belongs properly to justificatory discourses in which we test the validity 
of universal precepts” (Habermas 1993, 35). However, unlike Kant, discourse ethics takes into 
account the problem of application because, analytically, the question over the right thing to do 
in particular circumstances entails a “two stage process of argument consisting of justification 
followed by application of norms” (1993, 36). 
  
First, moral rules do claim validity for abstract situations. However, their meaning can be 
differentiated about “the rationally motivated assent of all potentially affected” and “in terms 
of the totality of possible situations” (1993, 36). Therefore, the idea of impartiality “demands 
that we take into account a norm’s moral rational acceptance among all those possibly affected 
with reference to all situations of application appropriate to it” (1993, 36). Nevertheless, to 
remain operative, the principle refers to “all situations actually used by participants, on the basis 
of their state of knowledge” (1993, 36). This reservation attaches a “time and knowledge index” 
to the universalization principle. It avoids impossible demands for participants and implies that 
“justificatory discourses cannot completely exhaust the notion of impartiality” so that the 
question on whether valid norms in the light of exemplary situations are valid currently is left 
unanswered and requires “the changed perspective of a discourse of application” (1993, 37).  
Second, in discourses of application, the principle of appropriateness replaces the principle of 
universalization. In the application, the relevant aspect is whether the norm is valid about all of 
the features of the situation and not “for each individual and his interest” (1993, 37). The 
problem, in this case, is how to discriminate among possibilities when norms are in conflict 
and, according to Habermas, this is made possible from the standpoint of coherence. When 
norms conflict, the particular features of the situation at hand determine the appropriateness of 
one over the other. Thus, the decision could be different if the problem’s features are different. 
However, this assumption does not entail that norms, when inappropriate for a particular 
situation, lose their validity, they “form a coherent normative order together with all other valid 
rules” (1993, 38). 
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Finally, according to Habermas, this form of proceeding reveals a difference between the 
treatment of moral-practical questions and empirical-theoretical ones. Regarding the latter, “we 
cannot know definitively whether the assertion taken to be true will withstand all future 
objections” (1993, 38). However, the justification of “valid empirical knowledge is not logically 
contingent on the resolution of questions of application” (1993, 38). On the contrary, the 
validity of moral norms cannot be resolved without considering the question of application 
because practical knowledge “is of its very nature related to action” (1993, 38).  
 
Indeed, the fallibility of all knowledge “amounts to the acknowledgement of the critical 
potential superior future knowledge” (1993, 38). However, in the case of moral-practical 
questions, the relation to the objective world differs. The social world has, according to 
Habermas, a different ontological constitution. Our assessment of actual moral norms as valid 
in the social world, is not only provisionally well-grounded, but also “a function of existential 
provinciality resulting from historical transformations in the objects themselves and thus in the 
contexts in which future actions will be determined by the rules accepted at present” (1993, 39).  
 
The justification of the rational and universal basis of the system of norms entails then, not only 
the rational assent of all possibly affected, but also the totality of possible situations; that makes 
the system of norms unworkable. Recalling the universalization principles requires acceptance 
by all possibly affected, but regarding moral norms, actual acceptance affects future actions. 
Thus, the knowledge and time index attached to the universalization principle entails that it 
reflects impartially the rational assent of all affected regarding their actual knowledge on 
possible situations in which norms may have to be applied.  
 
However, to remain impartial with regard to their application to unforeseeable circumstances, 
norms depend on their appropriateness, and in the latter case, what is required is not the rational 
assent of all possibly affected, but the appropriateness of moral norms in the light of specific 
circumstances; meaning for us, here and now. Accepted norms should cohere with the system 
as a whole, but they are not however subjected to the same test. Moreover, universal and 
rationally valid moral norms guide action coordination in particular circumstances, but their 
validity is neither independent of their application, nor defeated due to their inappropriateness 
in a particular situation. The system of norms evolves, embedded in historical time in the light 
of a relation of mutual dependence, and between discourses of justification and application 
whereby the social world constitutes itself. 
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Looking back to the communitarian critique with these lenses, the universal validity of moral 
norms does not require citizens to bracket off their commitments in the light of what is rationally 
acceptable by all. In Habermas words,  
[d]eontological ethical conceptions assume in the final analysis only the moral point 
of view remains identical; but neither our understanding of this fundamental 
intuition nor the interpretations we give morally valid rules in applying them to 
unforeseeable cases, remains invariant (Habermas 1993, 39).  
Action coordination regarding moral norms depends on what is appropriate for us, here and 
now, but decisions on moral norms should remain coherent with the system of norms as a whole. 
This relation of mutual dependence between what is rationally acceptable by all in general, and 
what is appropriate for us in particular, evolves in time in a relation of mutual dependence by 
which the impartiality of the system of rights remains. 
 
Finally, not only does the system of rights evolve, but the identities of citizens engaged in it 
change too. The identity of citizens holding contradictory moral doctrines in the light of their 
cultural traditions, evolves within the margins of the constitution making process as members 
of a self-constituted legal community. The moral point of view beneath the system of rights 
provides them with a justified reference point in the light of which citizens could coordinate 
their actions rationally, engage in a collective learning process, but not for a particular cultural 
community, for a self-constituted legal community of citizens holding a rational identity. 
 
Therefore, up to this point, Habermas provides a convincing reply to the communitarian 
critique. At least to the point of suggesting that deliberative democracy requires citizens to 
bracket their identities for the sake of social integration in liberal democratic regimes. 
Nonetheless, it remains unclear why the outcome of this process of mutual adaptation between 
the system of rights and the identities of those subjected to its ruling, results in something 
different. In other words, Habermas should still clarify not only that conventional identities are 
not excluded from the process, but what exactly does it mean that they become rational, and 
why is this rationalisation worthy for the sake of social integration.  
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2.2 The Rationalisation of Identity: From Moral to Legal Communities 
Habermas considers identity in response to the following question: “Can complex societies 
form a rational identity?” (Habermas 1974, 92). He responds positively, with the proviso that 
the following conditions are fulfilled. First, the identity of society is neither related to a specific 
territory, nor does it rest under specific organisations. Second, it does not find articulation in 
world images, but presupposes the validity of universalistic moral systems. Third, it is neither 
retrospectively fixed to traditional values, nor merely means orientated to task planning (1974, 
99–102). In short, identity results from a future oriented engagement of those involved in “the 
discursive and experimental formation of an identity-related knowledge on the basis of a critical 
appropriation of tradition” (1974, 102–3). This critical appropriation of tradition allows “the 
formation of universalistic ego structures”, because “every position can come to agreement with 
other positions it is confronted with in the present precisely in its partisanship for a universality 
to be realized in the future” (1974, 102–3). 
 
As in the case of the rules of argumentation or legal validity, Habermas defends this definition 
of identity not as a substantive appropriation of the concept, but as a rational acquisition of a 
reconstructive social theory. Indeed, identity, as usually understood in political theory, is left 
behind as an expression of a traditionalist nostalgia. On the contrary, rational identity, inspired 
by the cognitive developmental psychology of Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg 1981), is 
defended as the expression of historical development that evolved from archaic societies until 
modernity leads to a final stage whereby universalistic ego structures are possible in conditions 
of social complexity. Indeed, they are possible not only at the level of the socialised individuals 
(Habermas 1990b), but also at the level of societal world-views whereby group identities evolve 
(Habermas 1979b, 106). 
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Nevertheless, Charles Taylor for example, does not only deny that identity could evolve 
rationally in reference to a universal set of moral norms, but also that liberalism could represent 
such a point of view. Recognition of cultural diversity cannot remain true to ‘difference-blind’ 
liberalism on the grounds of which “peoples of all cultures can meet and coexist” (Taylor 1994, 
62), because “blind liberalisms are themselves the reflection of particular cultures” (1994, 44). 
What is needed is more than a curt recognition of rights aimed at letting minority cultures 
survive. Social integration, as a fusion of different horizons of meaning, will result only from 
an explicit universal recognition of equal worth for each as it is, not as it should be (1994, 64). 
Taylor’s definition of identity then, and his programmatic claim for recognition, challenges not 
only the possibility of a universal horizon about which identities evolve, but also the capacity 
of liberal constitutionalism to represent it neutrally in the face of cultural diversity.  
 
In this regard, Habermas reacts to Taylor’s critique by suggesting that he focus less on the 
neutrality of liberal constitutionalism, and more on the procedural conduct of democratic 
politics (Habermas 1994a, 112). He stresses that deliberative democracy is aware of the ethical 
content imbued in any system of basic rights. Indeed, “every legal system is also the expression 
of a particular form of life not merely a reflection of the universal content of basic rights” and 
that this form of life depends, both empirically and normatively, “on the composition of the 
citizenry of the nation-state” (1994a, 125–26). However, Habermas recognises that the 
population of a nation-state is bounded “by the decision of the founding fathers to order their 
life together legitimately by means of positive law” and “their descendants have implicitly (and 
as naturalised citizens even explicitly) agreed to continue to pursue a pre-existing constitutional 
project” (1994a, 125–26).  Therefore, the composition of the citizenry is contingent, and the 
system of rights needs to be actualized correspondingly.  
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In this sense, the theory of rights that underpins liberal constitutionalism, requires recognition 
and protection of the integrity of the individual in the context where identity is formed because 
“[p]ersons, and legal persons as well, become individualised only through a process of 
socialisation” (Habermas 1994a, 113). However, this requires that citizens neither bracket off 
their cultural commitments, nor as the communitarian critique suggests, seek an alternative 
normative model to challenge the individualistic design of the system of rights. Following the 
lines of Kymlicka’s ‘group differentiated rights’43 (Kymlicka 1995, 47–48), political rights to 
recognition belong to individual members of cultural groups as legal persons. Thus, not to 
another kind of collective entity because “these and similar obligations arise from legal claims 
and not from a general assessment of the value of  the culture in question” (Habermas 1994a, 
129). Legal claims are coordinated impartially through deliberative procedures internally, that 
is through the conceptually necessary connection between private and public autonomy44, so 
that, at the end “[a]ll that is required is the consistent actualization of the system of rights” 
(1994a, 113).  
 
To clarify, “once we take this internal connection between democracy and the constitutional 
state seriously, it becomes clear that the system of rights is blind neither to unequal social 
conditions nor to cultural differences” (1994a, 113). On the contrary, communitarian claims to 
authenticity regarding cultural diversity are misplaced because “the ecological perspective on 
species conservation cannot be transferred to cultures” (1994a, 130–31).  Indeed, “[w]hen a 
culture has become reflexive, the only traditions and forms of life that can sustain themselves 
are those that bind their members while at the same time subjecting themselves to critical 
examination.” (1994a, 130–31) Reflexive cultures assume that in complex societies the 
citizenry as a whole can no longer be held together by a substantive consensus on values. The 
unifying force of democratic rules of a constitutional state rests on the universalism of a 
procedural consensus on legal rules for legitimately enacting laws.  
 
                                                 
43 According to Kymlicka these rights are differentiated according to the specific features of groups: (i) national minorities 
accommodate through self-government rights, (ii) ethnic minorities accommodate through poli-ethnic rights and (iii) social 
minorities through special representation rights, in the form of quotas. 
44 In Habermas’ words: “The co-originality of private and public autonomy first reveals itself when we decipher, in discourse-
theoretic terms, the motif of self-legislation according to which the addressees of law are simultaneously 
the authors of their rights. The substance of human rights then resides in the formal conditions for the legal institutionalization 
of those discursive processes of opinion- and will-formation in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a binding character. 
” (Habermas 1996, 104)  
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Furthermore, the exercise of power is “embedded in the context of a historically specific 
political culture through a kind of constitutional patriotism” (1994a, 135). The concept of 
‘Constitutional Patriotism’ does not maintain that national identities of states are better than 
other collective identities, but the fact that in already established constitutional regimes the 
majority culture should be understood as decoupled from its identification with a general 
political culture (Habermas 2001b).  
 
In this way, cultural rights to identity belonging to individual citizens do not contradict a 
political culture in which “the solidarity of citizens is shifted onto the more abstract foundation 
of a “constitutional patriotism” (2001b, 74). Against this background, the claim for identity and 
recognition of minority nations, for example, is framed as the “delayed consequences of a 
history of nation-building that has generated historical fault lines” (2001b, 72). Because, 
although states “still form a collective identity” (2001b, 107), this collective identity that is 
embedded in “the actual historical trajectory of the European nation-states”, is the identity of a 
civic nation that “exists neither independent of nor prior to the democratic process from which 
it springs” (Habermas 2006, 15–16). 
  
This is the basic idea that underlies Habermas’ controversial advocacy of the need to rationalise 
identity. Once the system of rights is established, the legitimacy of positive law is sustained, in 
that law-making respects procedural rules and its normative binding force, in those very same 
procedural rules that represent the conditions of possibility for the exercise of popular 
sovereignty; both are internally connected by the principle of autonomy and enacted through 
deliberative democracy. Identity evolves within those margins, because if it rejects the 
legitimacy of law, it is not democratic in so far as there is no procedural rule supporting its 
legitimacy. On the contrary, if it rejects its normative binding force it is irrational, precisely 
because it violates the presumption of public reason that law endows to its addresses in a 
modern constitutional regime.  
 
Therefore, if we take the internal connection between private and public autonomy, democracy, 
and the constitutional state seriously, citizens rejecting the legitimacy and normative binding 
force of the system of rights and deliberative democracy on behalf of their particular identity, 
can only be considered either irrational or illegitimate.  
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My understanding is that the entire scheme depends on considering identities as fixed sets of 
moral norms, that compete with the universal moral point of view to provide justification for 
action coordination. However, in the case of action coordination regarding legal norms, “the 
positivity of law necessitates an interesting split in autonomy to which there is nothing 
analogous in the moral sphere” (Habermas 2001a, 779). In the moral sphere, there is no 
institutional mediation between universal rules and the moral individual. Each citizen 
experiences the internal connection between private and public autonomy, her conception of 
the good life and the perspective of all those affected by it, coherently and by virtue of her 
rational capacity.  
 
In the legal sphere, the binding character of legal norms not only depends on insights regarding 
what is of equal interest for all, but also from “collectively binding decisions of authorities who 
make and apply the law” (Habermas 2001a, 779). Therefore, in the case when what is at stake 
is no controversy over moral norms of action on behalf of different cultural identities, but rather, 
a controversy over legal norms of action among different institutional bodies, the scheme has 
serious problems. 
 
2.3 The Constitutional Paradox: Action Coordination and Legal Norms 
Bonnie Honig, quoting Thomas Jefferson, beautifully summarised the constitutional paradox 
in one simple question: Should the dead have rights? (Honig 2007, 9). She presents three 
versions of the constitutional paradox whereby the legitimacy of law is challenged by the fact 
that addresses of law and its authors are different. The first, as already noted in Thomas 
Jefferson’s quote, reflects that the binding force of law embodied in the Constitution unfolds 
its legitimacy diachronically, so that a generational divide arises among those that made the law 
and its addresses. The second is a spatial version of the same problem, however, in this case, 
referring for example to geographical alienness, experimented by colonies ruled by laws of 
foreign nations. Finally, there is procedural version stressing the impossibility of justifying the 
legitimacy of laws, in relation to the process whereby they were enacted by procedural rules 
that have to be agreed, but when they themselves are unable to fulfil their own requirements.  
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The temporal version finds a possible solution by bringing in mechanisms to update the 
constitutional mandate and adapt it to needs raised by future generations (2007, 10). This 
solution according to Honig, and sustained by Habermas45, embeds “temporal distance in 
national time” so that the founding fathers of the Constitution, although, may have lived a long 
ago, took decisions binding for later generations because “they are our founders” (2007, 10). 
Indeed, Honig suggests that this solution even results in a further benefit, because by the 
passage of time “the people in the present might experience without conflict freedom [in 
present] and rule [by virtue of the past]” (2007, 10).  
 
However, Habermas underlined the claim, by asserting that although a beginning in time is 
marked out for constitutions “later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped 
normative substance of the system of rights laid down in the original document of the 
Constitution” (Habermas 2001a, 774). From this point of view, democratic constitutionalism 
should be understood in the long run as a self-correcting learning process, not as an uncritical 
loyalty to a glorious common past. The interpretation of constitutional history as a learning 
process, entails that “later generations will start with the same standards as did the founders” 
so that “participants must be able to recognise the project as the same throughout history and 
to judge it from the same perspective” (2001a, 775). The unifying bond consists of a shared 
practice established in the constitutional act, but remains dependent “on an ongoing explication 
that is carried out in the course of applying, interpreting, and supplementing constitutional 
norms” (2001a, 775).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 In his words: “the allegedly paradoxical relation between democracy and the rule of law resolves itself in the dimension of 
historical time, provided one conceives the constitution as a project that makes the founding act into an ongoing process of 
constitution making that continues across generations” (Habermas 2001a, 768). 
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This procedural response to the constitutional paradox still has a problem: the legitimacy of the 
constitution making process relies on procedures whereby the project evolves in time. However, 
the same procedures cannot account for the legitimacy of its origin. Frank Michelman 
formulated this paradox when he wrote of the impossibility of reconstructing constitution 
making practices by discourse theory (Michelman 1998). The paradox referred to the fact that 
“[i]f procedural legitimacy is the standard, the outcome of political elections, the decision of 
parliaments, or the content of court decisions are in principle subject to the suspicion that it 
came about in the wrong way.” (Habermas 2001a, 774) He follows, “[t]his chain of 
presuppositions reaches back even beyond the constitution making practice” so that, for 
example, “the constitutional assembly cannot itself vouch for the legitimacy of the rules 
according to which it was constituted” (Habermas 2001a, 774). In short, it is the old question 
of the chicken or the egg. 
 
Habermas does not reply to this paradox arguing the “transparent objectivity of ultimate moral 
insights” (Habermas 2001a, 774). He refers to a two-stage process whereby, before the 
constitutions of the system of rights actually takes place, discourse theory simulates an original 
condition (not a position). In this original condition, an arbitrary number of people meet, 
“whose ‘yes’ or ‘no’ counts equally” (2001a, 776), and are “united in a common resolution to 
legitimately regulate their future life together by means of positive law” and “ready and able to 
take part in rational discourses and thus to satisfy the demanding pragmatic presuppositions of 
a practice of argumentation.” (2001a, 776) In these conditions they philosophically clarify “in 
mente” (2001a, 777), meaning from “behind the empirical veil of ignorance” (2001a, 778), “the 
conceptual explication of the language of individual rights in which the shared practice of a 
self-determining association of free and equal citizens can express itself” (2001a, 778).  
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In sum, the constitutional paradox entails a particular asymmetry that legal norms do not share 
with moral norms. Whilst for moral norms, the internal connection between private and public 
autonomy could be traced back to the same individual, in the case of legal norms autonomy 
splits between those who make and apply the law, and those subjected to their ruling. This 
division is a pressing challenge consequent upon the central role endowed by Habermas to the 
principle of autonomy for the legitimacy of the constitutional regime and the normative binding 
force of the law. Habermas’ solution rests on the idea that by common procedural rules and 
presumption of rationality for both, authors and addresses, the internal connection between 
private and public autonomy, popular sovereignty and system of rights could be sustained. What 
is needed is that those in charge of guaranteeing that the interest of all is considered, as well as 
those acting on behalf of their conception of the good life, remain “in the same boat” (2001a, 
775).  
 
Citizens should thus coordinate their actions by recognising that they belong to the same 
project, and judge it from the same perspective, in the light of the same standards. In other 
words, they should share a common constitutional practice in the context of which, the 
institutions of law and popular sovereignty will represent different mandates from the same 
people. However, as Will Kymlicka recently noted, “democracy is rule by ‘the people’, but this 
requires an agreement that citizens of a state do indeed form a single ‘people’” (Kymlicka 2011, 
285). When conflict over identity reflects disagreement, not on universal moral norms, or their 
validity in the light of different cultural traditions, but on whether a legal community conforms 
to a single people or not, there is any easy solution for the constitutional paradox.  
 
In short, the legitimacy of law is challenged on the basis that the system of rights and popular 
sovereignty represents two different peoples with contradictory democratic mandates under the 
ruling of the same law, which both accept in general but not in its application to the particular 
circumstances.  
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In this context, with regard to the temporal version of the paradox, the fact that the system of 
rights results from the free and sovereign decision of the founding fathers to constitute 
themselves as a legal community, loses its binding character because it could be counter-argued 
that they are not our founding fathers. In response to the procedural version, Habermas 
acknowledges that the transparent objectivity of ultimate moral insights is not sufficient to halt 
the type of infinite regress Michelman underlined. Therefore, the justification of basic rights as 
a whole, so as to constitute the process of self-legislation, is sustained on an original condition 
exercised in mente by participants from behind the veil of empirical ignorance. However, I do 
not see how this original condition reflects the philosophical modesty that Habermas 
emphatically stressed when critiquing Rawls’ original position.  
 
Finally, the case could be considered an example of the spatial version of the constitutional 
paradox, initially defined for the ruling of colonies by foreign nations. The problem with this 
analogy is that unlike colonies in already constituted liberal democracies, the historical 
argument works poorly as a source of legitimacy, as for example, in the case of minority 
nations. Habermas states, that in constitutional democracies, collective identities exist neither 
independent from, nor a priori of, the democratic process from which they spring. On this basis, 
the fact that a given territory holds a collective identity prior to the constitution of the nation-
state, is meaningless in the absence of a democratic process testifying to its legitimacy. 
Furthermore, in the context of the nation-state, it will be impossible, as Habermas explicitly 
rejects the claim that rational identities constitute around a territory other than that of the self-
constituting legal community.  
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The only exception is the legal community, because Habermas himself recognised that the 
community of speakers is not an abstract gathering of world citizens, but a particular ethical-
political community that decides to self-constitute as a legal community, in a particular 
historical moment and its circumstances. The rationale behind this assertion makes sense, 
because in the absence of procedures to exercise a democratic mandate, and legal procedures 
which sustain their legitimacy, the only source of justification for this type of collective 
identities will remain a moral one. However, morality is either universal, in which case there is 
no need for its territorial demarcation, because deliberative democracy in the context of a liberal 
constitutional regime, provides the necessary means for its integration. Alternatively, it is 
exclusive to its community, in which case its territorial demarcation in the form of a state, will 
provide it with dangerous means to ascertain its exclusivity in the face of other cultural 
communities in the same territory.  
 
However, Habermas does not take into consideration, for example, the case of national 
minorities that sustain their claim through procedures that arose from the democratic mandate 
of institutions and were legitimated in the context of contemporary constitutional democracies. 
A recent study of this type of identity conflicts revealed that what these cases have in common, 
is that they evolve in the context of liberal democracies. They also share the characteristic of 
not being part of the majority culture in which they are located, and they all hold a certain 
degree of institutional administration resulting from decentralisation processes of constitutional 
regimes (López, Sanjaume, and Serrano 2010, 164). Therefore, they hold a democratic mandate 
procedurally enacted under the ruling of legitimate institutions that are nonetheless not 
recognised by the constitutional state; but it is not a moral issue.  
 
In this context, the constitutional paradox leads to an ‘either/or’ dilemma which is difficult to 
resolve. From the perspective of the constitutional regime, claims of minority nations are 
irrational. The legitimacy of the rule of law overrides the democratic mandate of popular 
sovereignty, because minority nations find no valid procedure outside the law to sustain the 
normative binding force of decisions taken by democratic means for the rest of the population. 
In contrast, the minority nation asserts that the claims of the constitutional regime are 
illegitimate. For them, popular sovereignty clearly overrides the legitimacy of the rule of law, 
because in the absence of legal means to exercise their sovereignty, the legitimacy of the rule 
of law is justified a priori in the absence of an explicit democratic mandate.  
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The solution requires choosing between the priority of the principles of law over democracy, 
or the principle of democracy over the rule of law; either will violate the equal weight on which 
underpins Habermas’ solution to the problem of the liberties.  
 
However, Bonnie Honig suggested a solution that could be sought, if we intend to leave aside 
either or dilemmas. If this cannot be done, then the debate remains “frozen into a binary 
paradoxical structure in which each term not only opposes the other but also props it up, and 
between the vast, complicated and subtle terrain of politics is excluded” (Honig 2007, 15). But 
it can if we acknowledge that the “infinite sequence is46 the condition in which we find ourselves 
when we think and act politically” (Honig 2007, 15). In other words, a democratic constitution 
ought to be able to provide procedural means to navigate through controversy, if both the 
principles of democracy and law have an equal weight, even when they contradict each other.  
 
Thus, the main task of a procedural understanding of democracy, is to ensure that conflict can 
proceed without violating a common allegiance of its different constituencies to a moral point 
of view. A moral point of view, being the only one that remains identical to itself, brings the 
notion that citizens have the capacity to agree on whether they constitute a community or not, 
to the forefront of democratic politics. 
 
To summarise, Habermas frames complex diversity like social complexity, in the light of the 
desired rational unity sought for by the project of modernity. In this context, identity is a set of 
moral norms bringing citizens back to conventional forms of justification that, lacking the 
reflexive component needed for social integration in modern constitutional regimes, either have 
enough room to develop within the margins of the constitutional state, or were to be rejected as 
illegitimate or irrational. The weak premise of this scheme is not whether citizens can advance 
in this direction, but whether states do indeed let them, and who is then irrational if they do not. 
  
                                                 
46 Emphasis added 
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3 Concrete Politics (I): National ‘Minorities’ in Constitutional Liberal Democracies 
 
Minority nations in contemporary liberal constitutional democracies represent a paradigmatic 
case of identities, whose members share the universality and rational validity of the moral point 
of view underpinning liberal constitutionalism, but do not find the means to further the 
democratic mandate of their constituencies in the language of the law. The case is interesting 
by itself, but it is relevant in the context of this dissertation because it brings into focus the 
difficulties of the procedural approach to democracy defended by Habermas, in retaining the 
neutrality of deliberative democracy in the face of complex diversity.  
 
In a recent interview made by the French magazine L’Express, Habermas was questioned about 
the recent wave of European minority nations articulating claims to hold a referendum on 
independence. The ‘right to decide’, successfully articulated in Scotland, but not so in 
Catalonia, was not a new phenomenon, but it gained much attention because there is no 
reference to similar processes involving liberal democracies integrated into the European Union 
(López, Sanjaume, and Serrano 2010). Habermas replied as follows: 
 
“Quand, du fait d'une inégalité sociale croissante, l'angoisse et l'insécurité montent 
au sein d'une population, la tentation existe de se replier derrière des frontières 
familières auxquelles on croit pouvoir se fier, et de s'accrocher à des entités 
"natales", qu'elles aient été naturalisées ou qu'on en ait hérité, telles que la nation, 
la langue, l'histoire. Dès lors, le regain de la flamme régionaliste en Ecosse, en 
Catalogne ou en Flandre n'est guère, selon moi, qu'un équivalent fonctionnel du 
succès du Front national en France...” (L’Express 2014).47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Source: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/jurgen-habermas-en-europe-les-nationalismes-sont-de-
retour_1621409.html (Consulted: 2015-04-03). 
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Habermas, therefore, framed regional claims for self-determination in Catalonia and Scotland 
as a reaction to growing social inequalities. In the face of adversity, people tend toward 
naturalised or inherited allegiances, which provide certainties. However, no matter how sound 
their claims seem to be, there is no functional difference between them and the neo-fascist 
claims of the Front Nationale. In both cases, their incapacity to find accommodation in their 
corresponding constitutional regimes brings into light their return to conventional identities that 
have little to offer regarding social integration to contemporary liberal constitutional 
democracies. 
 
Among them, the case of Scotland may be less revealing with regard to Habermas’ scheme, 
because the UK lacks a proper written constitution. Indeed, it could be precisely because it lacks 
a written constitution that the UK has been more reasonable than Spain. Moreover, the Spanish 
case is more useful to illustrate the problematic of complex diversity because it is, in theory, a 
paradigmatic example of constitutional patriotism (Payero 2012; 2016).  
 
The identity of the Spanish state is defined as a paradigmatic case of constitutional patriotism 
due to its capacity, in the aftermath of the dictatorship, to engage the two Spain’s in the same 
democratic project. The Spanish transition faced the challenge of bringing together those who 
lost the civil war with those who won it and who had remained in power for almost 40 years. 
The transition process was undoubtedly a success. The fact that Spain remains a political unit, 
ruled by democratic procedures is testament to that success. However, the transition was not 
made without costs. For example, Stephanie Golob defined the transition as a paradigmatic case 
of “reconciliation without truth, a transition without transitional justice” (Golob 2008, 127). 
She noted that a consensus that was reached through bargaining among representatives of the 
dictatorship and political parties’ elites, designed a transition with impunity and without 
prioritising the broader societal inclusion of victims of the dictatorial regime48.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 The consequences of this transition without transitional justice were recently made visible on the rude confrontation and 
the facto derogation by the PP following the initiative of former Spanish President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero regarding a 
“Law of Historical Memory” aimed at facing crimes committed by the dictatorship regime and restore the memory of its 
victims. 
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Indeed, from the perspective of Habermas’ definition of the basic tenets of constitutional 
patriotism, it could be argued that the Spanish Constitution lacked in its origin, the self-critical 
appropriation of the past it requires. According to Richard Wolin, this feature is what grounds 
Habermas’ distinction between conventional and post-conventional identities, and it was “[o]ne 
of the key theoretical arguments Habermas mobilises in his refutation of the revisionist 
position49” (Wolin 1989, xviii), indeed he defended this aspect fiercely in the German case 
regarding its Nazi past (Habermas 1989b). Therefore, it challenges the idea that Spain 
represents a case of constitutional patriotism, while Spanish authorities maintain this 
argumentation as a means to reject claims asserting the ‘right to decide.’ 
 
Indeed, according to Lucia Payero (Payero 2012), the Spanish constitutional identity does not 
resemble what Habermas defined as constitutional patriotism in most of its aspects. Along with 
the attitude towards the past, she underlines Spanish concerns on its national matter, which is 
absent in the model. Its understanding of the Constitution differs, because “whereas Habermas 
gives an instrumental meaning to it, Spanish constitutional patriots see the norm in a 
fundamentalist sense” (Payero 2012, 18). Finally, she underlines the minor role given to 
political will, while liberty is a central feature of Habermas’ model of constitutional patriotism. 
Altogether she concludes:  
Constitutional patriotism was a theory, firstly advanced by Habermas during the 
course of the historians’ dispute. He tried to provide a kind of political attachment 
centred on the norms and values of a liberal democratic constitution, instead of on 
pre-political ties which bind people regardless their will. Yet in Spain, the theory 
was imported and “misused as part of a wide-ranging debate on regional autonomy 
and asymmetrical federalism” (Payero 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 The revisionist position refers to the so called ‘historians debate’ that attempted to avoid a critical revision of Germany’s 
Nazi past and against which Habermas took a clear position rejecting amnesia and in favour of the necessity not to proceed as, 
precisely, Spain did. 
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Some of the limitations may well have been justified in the specific historical circumstances, 
and the needs of the ethical-political community that decided to self-constitute as a legal 
community. Indeed, the argument is reasonable insofar as a transition from a 40-year 
dictatorship to democracy is not an easy task, and guaranteeing basic rights is a worthy objective 
in comparison with other necessities. Nonetheless, in this case, Habermas’ model requires a 
consistent path of constitutional reform. The Constitution evolves together with changing needs 
of a society that, in the case of Spain, is currently very different in comparison to what it was. 
Amongst other things, later generations have enjoyed the benefits of developing their lives 
together in the context of a well-ordered European liberal democracy. 
 
However, if we compare the Spanish case with for example, Belgium, the multinational nature 
of its society resulted in six constitutional reforms between 1970 and 2011 all related to the 
institutional organisation of the state, its regions, and communities (Brans et al. 2010). This 
trajectory of reforms is singularly absent in the Spanish case. With the exception of the 
introduction of a limitation to public debt approved in August 2015 by a mandate of the 
European Institutions, and without consultation to the citizenry, there has been no substantive 
constitutional recognition of nationalities questions. Indeed, although constitutional reform is 
currently an open debate in Spanish politics,50, Javier Perez Royo, a renowned Spanish scholar 
of Spanish Constitutionalism, suggests that it is not a matter of political will; the Spanish 
constitution was defined to make impossible its reform (Perez Royo 2015).  
 
Therefore, Spanish constitutionalism fails to fulfil, neither in origin, nor in process, the 
characteristics Habermas’ endows to liberal constitutional democracies holding an identity 
modelled by a constitutional patriotism. However, could the minority claiming for its right to 
decide also be critically examined? In other words, does the Catalan claim for the ‘right to 
decide’ equally constitute a harping back to conventional forms of justification? In this case, 
the procedural component is crucial and, as Habermas quoted about John Dewey, “[t]he means 
by which a majority comes to be a majority is the more important thing” (Habermas 1996, 304). 
  
 
 
                                                 
50 Source: http://elpais.com/tag/reforma_constitucional/a/ (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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Considering the process whereby this majority came about, the first clarification is that we 
cannot know whether Catalan citizens support an independent state or not, because what is 
forbidden is the consultation itself. An attempt to hold such a consultation passed in the regional 
parliament twice in the last five years. The next is previewed for the 10th of October 2017. The 
last was planned for the 9th of November 2014. The Constitutional Court outlawed it, and 
although an informal consultation took place, it lacked the guarantees of an official referendum. 
Regarding opinion polls, results have been consistent for almost a decade according to the 
Centre d’ Estudis d´Opinió51 (CEO). In all of them, the picture reflects a society divided toward 
independence, although there is a slight skew towards those in favour of remain.  
 
With regard to the process, there is a wide consensus that the current situation results from the 
revision of the Catalan Estatut d´Autonomia in 2006 (Gagnon 2015, 101–4). The proposal was 
approved with the support of 120 out of 135 representatives in the Catalan Parliament. Next, 
the Spanish Deputy Congress passed it with the agreement of all political parties, except for the 
PP. Finally, it reached the support of the 73,90% of votes among Catalan citizens via 
referendum. However, despite the strength of its democratic mandate in both chambers, Catalan 
and Spanish parliaments, and strong support by civil society, the Spanish Constitutional Court 
issued its decision after a long deliberation, declaring the new Estatut d´Autonomia 
unconstitutional by most of its parts under the Spanish law in 201052.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51Source: 
http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages/home/fitxaEstudi.html?colId=6288&lastTitle=Bar%F2metre+d%27Opini%F3+Pol
%EDtica.+2a+onada+2017 (Consulted: 2017-08-20). 
52
 In a recent book published by Alain G. Gagnon, one of the leading scholars on multinational federalism, the last 
contribution is an editorial written in 2009 and published simultaneously in 5 different newspapers from Catalonia while the 
Constitutional Court was evaluating the constitutional validity of the new proposal for a Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In his 
editorial Alain G. Gagnon ended claiming: “Catalans respect the law, of course, without renouncing to their dignity. This is 
worth keeping in mind. We are on the brink of a very important ruling. We hope that when the Constitutional Tribunal makes 
their decision, they heed the specific circumstances of the matter at hand –which is nothing but the demand for improved 
self-government by an ancient European people. They must remember that there is no absolute justice, only the justice of the 
concrete case, which is why caution is the supreme legal virtue. Let us remember: the Statute is the result of a double 
political pact supported by the people through a referendum.” (Gagnon 2015, 103) 
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The initiative was sent to the Constitutional Court by the PP, allegedly on behalf of its 
interpretation of the better interest of Spain, although a majority of Spanish representatives in 
the parliament supported the Estatut d´Autonomia in its original form. However, this reaction 
of the PP, later backed by the Constitutional Court, rendered both the near unanimous consensus 
among parties, and the largely majoritarian support by citizens, meaningless in legal terms. 
Indeed, the decision of the court has been interpreted by several scholars belonging to Catalan 
civil society, as an imposition that although a legitimate act by the Constitutional Court under 
Spanish law, was manifestly in opposition to the democratic mandate of Catalan citizens and 
their institutions.53 
 
In short, both parties accepted the universal rationality of the need to acknowledge the equal 
weight of law and democracy in its entirety, and it was not refuted by any other means than 
those provided by law and democratic institutions. Therefore, it does not represent two different 
interpretations of the moral point of view under the system of rights of the Spanish Constitution, 
or any other. Indeed, if the motivations behind each position regarding the independence of 
Catalonia are considered only 8% of those who would vote for independence if a referendum 
takes place, supported the decision on identity claims, while the majority of them justify their 
position on the possibility to gain greater autonomy (26,2%). In the case of those that will vote 
against, 51,1% of respondents justify their position on the grounds of preserving Spanish unity 
(CEO 2017, 66-67)54. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 The reaction of Catalan citizens on the ruling of the Constitutional Court could be exemplified in an opinion article 
published in the Catalan newspaper La Vanguardia in the aftermath of the resolution of the Constitutional Court and written 
by another leading scholar that, being Catalan in origin, dedicated most of his academic life to defend multinational 
federalism as the appropriate system of institutional organization for Catalonia inside Spain. Ferran Requejo wrote: “Desde 
una perspectiva práctica, la perspectiva de la secesión puede evitarse si se establecen modelos de carácter “consociacional” o 
de federalismo plurinacional. En el caso español, sin embargo, todo apunta a que ya han pasado los tiempos en que se creía 
posible llegar a acuerdos que acomodaran constitucionalmente a los diversos colectivos nacionales que conviven en el estado. 
El estado autonómico constituye un flagrante fracaso en términos de pluralismo. Hoy estamos sumidos en una profunda crisis 
económica y política. La primera acabará por pasar; la segunda está por quedarse durante más tiempo. Frente a este 
panorama, en Cataluña y el País Vasco la independencia deviene un objetivo cada vez más plausible.” (La Vanguardia 
2010/05/02) Source: http://www.ferranrequejo.cat/Blocdenotes/tabid/704/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/56/language/ca-
ES/Article-a-La-Vanguardia-maig-2010--2-Hacia-la-independencia.aspx (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
54Source: 
http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages/home/fitxaEstudi.html?colId=6288&lastTitle=Bar%F2metre+d%27Opini%F3+Pol
%EDtica.+2a+onada+2017 (Consulted: 2017-08-20). 
  
134 
In other words, it may not be about morality and law, but between the principle of law 
underlining the ruling of the Constitutional Court, and its legitimacy to override popular 
sovereignty underpinned by the democratic mandate of Catalan institutions. The consequences 
of this either/or dilemma have lead the Catalan parliament to recently declare its willingness to 
disobey the ruling of the Constitutional Court on behalf of the democratic mandate of Catalan 
citizens. The reaction of the Constitutional Court, in response to an appeal made by the Spanish 
government, outlawed the eviction of the Catalan government, and indicated that the Court will, 
if necessary, enforce its ruling. Finally, a statement of the Spanish Government ensured that it 
would guarantee the unity of the Spanish State by all means. Therefore, it is the lack of 
mechanisms, and the inadequate procedures to deal with disagreement, that has led to the 
escalation of a conflict that has little to do with social integration by democratic means under 
the rule of law.  
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4 Conclusions 
 
Habermas explained his contribution as an attempt to resume the project of modernity. In 
departing from Weber’s definition, he defended the need to overcome the side-effects of 
modern rationalisation, whilst simultaneously retaining its project of rational unity. To counter 
direct fragmentation, and elitist trends undermining the prospects for social integration, the 
lifeworld, the common root for each value sphere, needs to develop its own institutions. These 
institutions find in the communicative telos of mutual understanding their own common root, 
in the discourse principle as its formal expression, in the institutions of law its materialisation, 
and through deliberative politics, the channel whereby practical reason is restored to the 
forefront of democratic politics. However, in this case, not on behalf of the enlightened 
philosopher but citizens themselves. 
 
The conceptual apparatus deployed by Habermas to justify each step in this trajectory is 
extraordinarily complex. However, it is precisely this extraordinariness that becomes its main 
limitation once the burdens of the theory are over. Referring either to the discourse principle, 
the institutions of law, or his reconstructive social theory, the critiques reveal similar concerns: 
limitations are justified to make his contribution conceptually consistent, but reveal difficulties 
of empirical adequacy; and this elicits a challenge for its normative requirements. Rather than 
the rationality requirement, his contribution is challenged as a consequence of its universal 
aspirations. Standards allow for the functioning of alternative understandings of justification, 
different ways to forward participation in the public sphere, or expressions of civil society, are 
limited when disagreements involve those subject to the law, and those that make the law.   
 
These limits become terminal once attention is turned to complex diversity. The common 
background of different value spheres differs from Habermas’ definition of the lifeworld, in so 
far as diversity cannot be reduced to moral values to overcome a set of basic and common 
procedural assumptions. In other words, the agreement cannot proceed on procedures defined 
a priori as universally and rationally valid, and assuming what they have in common in 
advance. Because when procedures themselves are the source of disagreement, there is no room 
for deliberative discussion. In this case, the philosophical modesty proclaimed for the role of 
theory may have done better providing legal means, and establishing democratic requirements 
instead of precluding disagreement by fencing off certain positions as irrational or illegitimate 
before any actual deliberation has taken place. 
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Chapter IV 
Deliberative Democracy for Complex Diversity 
 
 
The previous chapter developed the argument that Habermas’ model finds its limits when 
certain expressions of complex diversity are revealed. The case of minority nations in multi-
national states reflected the difficulty that the model has, when dealing with forms of diversity 
that do not represent conflict among moral doctrines, but relate to democratically justified 
political projects in the same legal community. Put simply, problems arise for Habermas when 
deliberative democracy is confronted with, and cannot respond to, complex diversity. The 
agonistic critique generalises this conclusion. It suggests that, not only the nature of diversity 
and difference is political, but also that the nature of the political is antagonistic. In this sense, 
contra Habermas, the role of democracy is to provide the means to transform antagonistic 
enemies into agonist adversaries, when the aspiration to social integration on the rational and 
universal bases of discourse fades away. 
 
However, the agonistic model is not without weaknesses. The main issue is that having rejected 
Habermas’ bases for discourse, it does not provide an alternative route towards social 
integration. In other words, it is not clear how antagonistic conflict will be transformed into 
agonist relations. 
 
In contemporary deliberative democratic theory, the conceptual debate between the agonistic 
and consensual models of democracy ran in parallel to what James Bohman called ‘the coming 
of age of deliberative democracy’ (Bohman 1998). After an initial period that focused on 
controversies over Habermas’ normative ideal, deliberative democrats turned their attention to 
the process of deliberation itself: the study of how to democratise real institutions (1998, 401). 
The aim was no longer the search for a comprehensive alternative to aggregative forms of 
democracy, but how approximate this ideal could be, to finding solutions in increasingly 
complex societies characterised by deep disagreements and mistrust of institutions.  
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The result of this ‘coming of age’ resulted in two different views on deliberative democracy. 
Andre Bächtiguer and his colleagues (2010) have elegantly summarised basic tenets of both 
visions as two types. Type I deliberative democracy embodies ideals of rational discourse, 
focuses on deliberative intent and the distinction between communicative and strategic action, 
involves a strong procedural component, and establishes a consensus as for its goal. In contrast, 
type II deliberative democracy, inspired by the blind spots of the former, involves a more 
flexible understanding of forms of discourse, a greater emphasis on outcomes, and closer 
attention to ‘real world’ constraints over normative ideals. 
 
More interestingly, these two types implicitly suggest a Middle Ground Theory that is attentive 
to the challenge of complex diversity at both levels: namely the precarious position of 
normative standards in the face of pluralism, and the problematic location of deliberation within 
liberal constitutionalism. Regarding the former, normative standards are relaxed, but 
nevertheless retained to ground the integrative social traction of deliberation. The latter, 
suggests a sequential approach whereby deliberation is detached from its close connection to 
liberal constitutionalism, and is reconsidered in the context of the system. 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the Middle Ground Theory provides both the analytical, and ‘real 
world’ toolkits, to deal with complex diversity. First, the distinction between type I and type II 
deliberative democracy and basic tenets of the Middle Ground Theory is presented. Next, I 
analyse the strengths and weaknesses of this model in the case of identity conflict at both levels. 
Finally, I outline conclusions, from which the conceptual ground necessary for the empirical 
analysis of the central case study is subsequently developed, and then employed in the following 
chapter. 
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1 Middle Ground Theory 
 
André Bächtiger and his colleagues, usefully summarised the different understandings of 
deliberative democracy in two basic types (Bächtiger et al. 2010). Type I deliberative 
democracy was defined around Habermas’ procedural standards. First, truthfulness or 
authenticity means that participants express their true preferences openly. Secondly, normative 
rightness entails the willingness of participants to change their preferences in the light of the 
“unforced force of the better argument” (Habermas 1996, 306); and where the ‘better 
argument’, “must be searched for in common discourses” (Steiner 2008a, 187). Third, 
theoretical truth refers to the assumption that claims should be based on justifications that 
provide logical reasons and supporting evidence (2008a, 188).  
 
Taken together, they constitute the universal pragmatic presuppositions on which the validity 
basis of speech acts rest (Habermas 1979d), through which communicative action is 
successfully enacted (Habermas 1989c, 1989d), and by the route which channels legitimate 
interpersonal relations if they are aimed at mutual understanding in an ethical society 
(Habermas 1990a). Rational consensus follows these conditions, providing liberal 
constitutionalism with the legitimacy required for both the law, and the normative traction 
expected from democracy, in the core of the self-constituting legal community (Habermas 
1996). 
 
With regard to normative standards, Jürg Steiner rightly notes that nowadays it is widely 
accepted that real politics “hardly ever corresponds fully” to this ideal (Steiner 2008a, 188). 
Controversy surrounds the rationality assumption (Sanders 1997), restricted forms of 
communication (Young 1996), or the understanding of the public sphere (Calhoun 1992). For 
example, Steiner advocates for the necessity to keep the criteria of truthfulness among the basic 
core normative standards of deliberative democracy (Steiner 2008b). However, this standard is 
challenged by more empirically oriented studies due to the evident difficulty in measuring how 
far someone is sincere in her statements (Steenbergen et al. 2003).  
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The main drawback of this flexibility with standards underlines the risks of ‘concept stretching’, 
namely that “[i]f the concept is stretched too far it begins to mean everything and therefore 
nothing” (Steiner 2008a, 186). Indeed, accounting for a clear and widely acknowledged set of 
normative standards is a positive thing for empirical research insofar as they provide coherence 
and enhance the robustness of results (Neblo 2007). This may be the reason underlying the fact 
that even actually Habermas’ procedural standards are still considered the basic normative 
grounds of deliberative democracy to follow or to strive toward.  
 
In contrast, the main contributions that challenge Habermas’ model are summarised by 
Bächtiger and his colleagues as Type II deliberative democracy (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 36). The 
basic tenets of Type II deliberative democracy include sensitivity towards other forms of 
communication, a closer attention to contextual variables and functional relations between 
contextual variables and forms of communication, as well as a more comprehensive overview 
of the deliberative process.  
 
On the one hand, concerns over forms of communication underline the stringent rationality 
standards that could result in the exclusion of other forms of communication vital for 
communities. Storytelling, for example, is considered an important cognitive device for groups, 
because stories provide groups with the common reference points necessary to create a sense 
of a moral community (Ryfe 2005, 58–59). Moreover, the exclusion of these forms of 
communication, as non-rational, fails to sufficiently take into consideration extant inequalities 
and worse still, may strengthen them. Yet, on the other hand, the focus on context steps, is the 
conviction that we cannot treat citizens as if ideal conditions were guaranteed. For example, 
Archon Fung analysed the different features of five deliberative initiatives that tried to connect 
outcomes and design choices (Fung 2003). He concluded that a general defence, or critique on 
the role of these kind of deliberative exercises is not possible in advance. In his words “the 
proper realm of dispute concerns what kind of mini-public to have, rather than whether mini-
publics generally advance some particular view of democratic governance” (2003, 365).  
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Finally, the combination of concerns over other forms of communication and institutional 
determinants of deliberative behaviour, demands that our attention is focused on their 
interactions. Discourse may be structured following different standards, depending on the 
specific community of citizens involved, and also how it is functionally related to the 
institutional conditions in which deliberative dialogue evolves. Moreover, different sites of 
deliberation may fulfil different roles if they are assessed in the context of the deliberative 
process.  
 
Against this dual picture of state of the art, or indeed building on it, Bächtiger and his colleagues 
suggest a Middle Ground Theory able to retain, at least in theory, the virtues of each while 
overcoming their respective pitfalls (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 54). They defend a ‘sequential 
approach’ that involves other forms of communication while retaining a certain sensitivity to 
potential distortions in the light of normative standards. The theoretical bases of this approach 
refer a to a ‘working agreement’ (Eriksen 2007), ‘sequential approach’ (Goodin 2005), 
‘deliberative capacity’ (Dryzek 2009), and ‘deliberative drifts’ (McLaverty and Halpin 2008). 
 
First, ‘working agreement’ refers to “an agreement which testifies to some movements of 
positions and normative learning, which does not result in a rational consensus” (Eriksen 2007, 
111). Rational consensus requires agreement based on the same premises to claim the validity 
of decisions and sustain their capacity to provide stability to political orders. By contrast, 
working agreement assumes there are different degrees of agreement. Thus, the conclusion of 
deliberation can rest on ‘mutually acceptable grounds’ (Sunstein 1995, 19),  as “incompletely 
theorised as they depict agreement at a certain level leaving the deeper principled question un-
clarified” (Eriksen 2007, 111). 
 
Second, the sequential approach follows Robert E. Goodin’s (2005) notion of distributed 
deliberation. According to him, to be able to assert that ‘good enough deliberation’ takes place, 
one has to consider deliberation a staged process that might add up by sequencing the standards 
applied to each stage (2005, 194). He suggests that this kind of distributed deliberation would 
be useful to figure out, “how group deliberation might proceed among a group not unified by a 
common ‘purpose’” (2005, 187). A sequential understanding of the deliberative process will 
allow, for example, different standards in its primary stages and more exigent conditions later.  
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Third, and different to Goodin, Middle Ground Theory states that the process of deliberation 
should become integrative and promote deliberative drifts at some point. The general idea is 
that the more authentic, inclusive, and consequential political deliberation, the more democratic 
the political system is (Dryzek 2009). Authenticity denotes the quality of deliberation to induce, 
“reflection in a non-coercive fashion, connect particular claims to more general principles and 
exhibit reciprocity” 55 (2009, 4). Inclusiveness refers to the range of perspectives involved in 
the deliberative process, without which deliberation may be undemocratic. Consequentiality 
entails “deliberative processes must have an impact upon collective decisions or social 
outcomes” (2009, 5).  
 
Finally, when a democratic state includes a healthy deliberative system, it foments ‘deliberative 
drifts’ (McLaverty and Halpin 2008). If participants show certain a disposition, expressing 
reciprocity and real commitment in companion with deliberative capacities at the system level, 
then “it is logical that the growth of trust can “transform” negotiations around fixed positions 
to deliberation” (2008, 204). 
 
In sum, leaving aside consensus in favour of working agreement the Middle Ground Theory 
allows a certain amount of disagreement and different forms of communication to play a role. 
The sequential approach relocates them at different sites of the deliberative system so that each 
can play a role from the perspective of the deliberative process. Finally, the transformation from 
strategic action into communicative action depends on both, a set of deliberative capacities 
provided by the deliberative system and certain disposition by participants to act with 
reciprocity. In the end, deliberation provides democratic means to steer society towards 
integration.  
 
  
                                                 
55 Dryzek, following Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson (1996) defines reciprocity as the capacity to make arguments that 
others can accept.  
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2 Middle Ground Theory and Deep Divide 
 
Deliberative mechanisms have largely been considered problematic to conduct within deeply 
divided societies, especially when division lines draw upon different identities. Despite this, 
Dryzek for example, suggests that discursive engagement across different identities might 
represent an opportunity to overcome fragmented communication and improve democracy. On 
the one hand, he asserts that deliberation is not necessarily focused on consensus based on 
common values, coherent belief systems, and an agreement on preferences, but instead seeks 
to contribute to the mutual recognition of legitimacy among parties in dispute. On the other 
hand, it is not aimed at legitimate decisions in the short term. Deliberation is located at a 
distance from decision making, and might contribute to social learning, creating possibilities 
for different identities to reflect on particular needs and concrete problems (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer 2006, 639; Dryzek 2009, 11).  
 
His proposal echoes basic tenets of the Middle Ground Theory. Regarding the former, his 
proposal reframes consensus as meta-consensus, and rationality as inter-subjectivity, relaxing 
both with regard to the normative core of deliberative theory, in order to sustain its applicability 
in the context of identity conflict. Regarding the latter, deliberation is relocated at the macro 
level and uncoupled for decision-making institutions. The focus therefore rests on the informal 
public sphere, the context of which being a less heated environment, might facilitate 
engagement and distance, and avoid the risk of elite manipulation. Indeed, Dryzek follows ideas 
defended by Niemeyer and Goodin, and provides an interesting and comprehensive account on 
the application of the Middle Ground Theory to identity conflict.  
 
From the perspective of complex diversity, this model overcomes the problems identified in 
Habermas’, because ‘conventional’ identities are detached from their reclusion in a pre-given 
set of moral values, and reconsidered at the level of discourse. However, certain specific 
requirements for the application of the Middle Ground Theory to identity conflict, cast into 
doubt whether this application can make a difference to public engagement. In short, regarding 
the sequential approach, we end up where we began; the formal public sphere takes decisions 
and citizens remain none the wiser.  
 
 
  
144 
In the following sections, I analyse both aspects in detail. First, the definition of the normative 
bases, and the role deliberation is called in to play in societies with deep divisions. Second, a 
consideration of the implications at the systemic level of a sequential approach to the 
deliberative process. In both cases, limitations will be grounded on two concrete examples 
whereby the role of mini-publics becomes controversial when dealing with the deep divide and 
integrating citizens’ concerns into the deliberative process.  
 
2.1 Coping with Deep Divide (I): Outcomes of Deliberation 
Regarding the first task, the general idea is that to relax the normative requirement, but without 
renouncing to what is considered essential, the Middle Ground Theory provides a viable path 
towards integration in societies with deep divides. Indeed, Dryzek and Niemeyer consider that 
deliberative democracy could overcome debates confronting ideals of pluralism and consensus 
by translating the outcomes of deliberation as meta-consensus and inter-subjectivity (Dryzek 
and Niemeyer 2006; Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007).  
 
In unpicking this, normative meta-consensus and intersubjective rationality are defined to 
clarify the terms over which it overcomes the debate between agonist and consensual models. 
This is followed by a short review of the contribution this kind of intervention can make in 
societies coping with deep division from the perspective of conflict resolution theories, Finally, 
I will point to some of the limitations, illustrated by an example of a mini-public, that the main 
requirements of the Middle Ground Theory face when confronted with deep divisions leading 
to ambivalent results.  
 
2.1.1 Meta-Consensus and Inter-Subjective Rationality 
Consensus at the meta level means recognition across different normative commitments: a 
mutual recognition that facilitates the cooperative search for mutually acceptable solutions. It 
could also entail the creation of problem-solving publics capable of integrating a diversity of 
epistemic frames. In addition, agreement on the relevant dimensions of choice over preferences, 
must result in a reduction of the number of available options too (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006, 
642–46). Whether normative, epistemic, or preference, meta-consensus as the most desirable 
outcome will depend on the types of issue deliberative exercises face.  
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Normative meta-consensus is considered especially well-suited for conflict resolution in cases 
where deep divisions affect basic societal values (2006, 639). Conversely, epistemic meta-
consensus mediates the contested credibility of beliefs, and can accommodate “the multiplicity 
of perspectives required by epistemic arguments for the political rationality of pluralism” (2006, 
640), that is especially necessary in the face of growing complexity and uncertainty. However, 
it is also useful insofar as it facilitates conditions for the emergence of normative meta-
consensus. Finally, preference meta-consensus is especially adequate to face strategic 
manipulation of choice, without resorting to legal constraints on available options, because 
“deliberation could produce consensus on the range of acceptable alternatives” (2006, 641).  
 
Nonetheless, meta-consensus still allows considerable space for disagreement on the positions 
of deliberating actors regarding preferences, beliefs, and values whilst at the same time steering 
towards greater integration by virtue of the mutual recognition of corresponding legitimacies, 
the credibility of belief systems, or by reducing the scope of available preferences. However, 
for the special case of identity conflicts, two forms of meta-consensus appear to be crucial: 
normative and epistemic; the latter, insofar as it facilitates the emergence of its normative 
counterpart.  
 
Moreover, normative meta-consensus is further advocated depending on the type of issue at 
hand (2006, 644): three are commonly specified.  First, when issues involve identity clashes in 
a divided society, the key would be a normative meta-consensus that remains open to 
contestation. Secondly, when the division involves deep moral conflicts, stability will be 
necessary. Thirdly, when interest, and not identity or moral values, is what is at stake, the key 
is unveiling an existing normative meta-consensus that is obscured by the strategic behaviour 
of partisans. Niemeyer and Dryzek point out that this type of meta-consensus can reconcile the 
concerns of agonist and consensual democrats, but both pluralism and meta-consensus needs to 
acknowledge some limits too.  
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Agonist democrats reject the claim that a universal frame of reference can serve as a mirror to 
judge political perspectives regarding their moral grounds or cognitive frames. Although, even 
agonistic democrats assume that the recognition of another’s point of view entails certain basic 
grounds, allowing a shift from taking the other as an ‘enemy’ to consider her an ‘adversary’ 
(2006, 644). For example, participants ought not deny the identity of others, neither should they 
be dogmatic, nor fuelled by resentment. Equally, they should neither be guided solely by self-
interest nor search for other’s subordination, or refuse the recognition of a constitutive other, 
for example, by appealing to their superior rationality.  
 
Conversely, inter-subjectivity entails agreement is rational if it reflects inter-subjective 
coherence, namely, if the resulting individual positions reflect the integration of all concerns 
present in the meta-consensus in a consistent manner (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 507). In 
other words, the idea of rationality that underpins inter-subjectivity, involves the assumption 
that to be rational, each pair of deliberators with similar subjective positions ought to agree on 
preferences. However, if they disagree on values and beliefs, it is reasonable to expect that their 
preferences will also diverge. Moreover, the virtue of inter-subjectivity is that in its ‘purest 
form’ “it precludes incompletely theorised agreements, involving a working agreement or a 
modus vivendi” (2007, 507).  
 
This final assertion may seem to contradict the central role that ‘working agreement’ plays in 
the Middle Ground Theory presented above. However, a closer look reveals this to not be the 
case. For example, Erik O. Eriksen differentiated working agreement from modus vivendi, 
arguing that working agreements rest “on mutual respect for conflicting interests, as it is 
stabilised with normative arguments – with non-egoistic justifications” (Eriksen 2007, 112). 
This assertion does not mean that his argument belongs to a method of avoidance; excluding 
unreasonable comprehensive world-views as in, for example, Rawls’ idea of an overlapping 
consensus56. It simply means that ‘working agreement’ builds on public reason, but a public 
reason that is also plural. Thus, working agreement, “on the basis of existent plural value 
systems, manages to establish a cooperative scheme that compels compliance and support” 
(2007, 112).  
 
                                                 
56 I have already explained the meaning of an overlapping consensus in Chapter 1 Section 1.3 
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In a similar vein, Niemeyer and Dryzek do not suggest that inter-subjective rationality is more 
likely to be more deliberative in the ideal sense. Rather, they suggest that when deliberation 
meets inter-subjective rationality standards, vulnerabilities would be better assessed than in 
other workable alternatives. In other words, although agreement on outcomes without 
agreement on reasons is a feature of real world deliberation, inter-subjective rationality is more 
desirable from a normative deliberative perspective (Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 507).  
 
Qua Erikson, desirability does not necessarily rule out the possibility of different levels of 
agreement in practice. However, according to Dryzek and Niemeyer, the search for 
intersubjective rationality is worth it, insofar as it may also be desirable for agonistic democrats.  
 
The underlying reason is that meta-consensus produced by “relatively un-coerced dialogue”, 
and “recognition across differences”, facilitates a “cooperative search for mutually acceptable 
solutions to joint problems while respecting deep and irreconcilable value differences that can 
remain deep and irreconcilable” (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006, 647). However, meta-consensus 
is not necessarily the outcome of mutual recognition but, can also be “produced by symbolic 
politics in the service of partisans or (worse) hegemonic actors” (2006, 647). In this case, 
“[e]lites can manipulate public opinion using arguments that invoke “symbolic” values and 
beliefs” (2006, 646).  
 
Therefore, according to Dryzek and Niemeyer, agonist scholars would also accept that “we 
need to introduce some procedural norms for the evaluation of particular instances of meta-
consensus” (2006, 647). In other words, the desirability of inter-subjectivity does not deny 
normative meta-consensus should remain open to contestation, and establish a settled ground 
on the basis of its rationality. The alternative means that inter-subjectivity seeks to reach 
common ground, and avoid elite manipulation assuming rational consensus among parties is, 
at best, unlikely. 
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On this basis, Dryzek suggests deliberation is a workable alternative in the face of deep divide 
on two bases. It acknowledges diversity so far as it departs from the assumption that different 
normative frames do operate in contemporary complex societies. However, it does provide 
avenues toward integration, because of the mutual recognition of their corresponding 
legitimacy. Indeed, the agreement remains open to contestation; recognition is facilitated by the 
visualisation of the multiplicity of perspectives, and the risk of elite symbolic manipulation 
overcome, which underlines the desirability of intersubjective coherence among values, beliefs, 
and preferences under the proviso that public reason itself is plural. 
 
2.1.2 Deep Divide: Mutual Recognition and Social Learning 
In Dryzek’s view, the focus on identity conflict is necessary because, “[t]he same decade that 
saw the rise and rise of deliberative democracy also saw identity politics prominent, sometimes 
in murderous form” (Dryzek 2005, 218). Identity politics, according to him, may involve 
nationalism, religious or ethnic conflicts, and religious versus secular forces. However, 
common to all of these, is the potential for the identity of one, to be validated or constituted by 
the suppression of the other. Therefore, the challenge for deliberation is to provide the means 
for each to affirm itself, without having to, or seeking to, deny the other.  
 
Indeed, he defends deliberation is an interesting alternative to agonism and ‘analgesia’, as far 
as it takes both identity and democracy seriously (Dryzek 2005). First, identities are “means 
allowing different communicative forms that can accompany particular identities” (2005, 224). 
These different forms of communication may not strictly refer to taken for granted cultural 
aspects. On the contrary, identities could be better understood as bound up by discourses in 
terms of ‘imagined communities’57 (2005, 225). Moreover, attending to the discursive 
dimension of identity, it is possible to shift their focus from values to needs. The assumption 
underpinning this is that once the focus is on needs, common general values obscured by 
confrontation could emerge.  
 
 
 
                                                 
57 This concept was introduced by Benedict Anderson in his seminal book Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin 
and spread of nationalism (2006). 
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Second, it is also an alternative to ‘analgesia’. Analgesia refers to the strategy to deal with the 
deep divide of consociational models. In brief, consociationalism involves segmental 
communication keeping conflicting identities separate and mediating among them through their 
corresponding elites (Lijphart 1969). Deliberative democracy takes democracy more seriously, 
insofar as it accounts for the risk of elite manipulation, and brings back citizens to the core of 
the democratic equation. Moreover, according to Dryzek, consociational solutions preclude any 
possibility for social learning that might play an important role in conflict resolution processes 
(Dryzek 2005, 222).  
 
Both aspects meet in contemporary theories of conflict resolution where deep divisions 
involving contested identities, deteriorate into open conflict; and what directly connects this 
debate to the case study of this dissertation. Indeed, according to Dryzek, a large body of the 
literature on conflict resolution, “emphasises the effectiveness of deliberation among key 
parties to a dispute in producing durable solutions to conflicts, especially in mediation and 
through ‘consensus-building’ exercises” (Dryzek 2009, 11). The consensus is not interpreted 
as a universal agreement, but in the sense of meta-consensus, agreement by which all sides 
could reflectively assent. 
 
Classical theories of conflict resolution design interventions for a peace settlement and focus 
on bargaining among empowered elites in line with the consociational model (Ramsbotham 
2011, 60). The basic assumption is that the main actors are states, and main drivers 
contradictory interests either within or between states (Malone and Berdal 2000). In these cases, 
when disagreement involves positional politics, or adversarial debate, engagement tends to be 
dismissed until conditions are in place for ‘true’ dialogue, and claims by contending parties do 
not challenge the legitimacy of the state as the appropriate framework for resolution.  
 
However, recent contributions suggest that the emphasis should shift from resolution to 
transformation of conflict, and this change in perspective reframes both the role of identity and 
elitist shape.  
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The role of the state is diminished in the light of the progressive deterioration of its position, 
both externally and internally, consequent upon pressures from above and below the nation 
state (Münkler 2005). The resulting complexity requires a more comprehensive approach to the 
multidimensional structure of contemporary conflicts including closer attention to conflict 
behaviour; meaning cooperative and coercive attitudes and beliefs in addition to classical 
concerns on values (Galtung 1996). Thus, there is greater attention to the different levels of 
intervention and their interactions (Lederach 1997), and careful analysis of the different stages 
in the sequence either of resolution or conflict escalation (Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse 
2011). 
 
There are different applications of these general guidelines for dealing with deep identity 
divides, among which John P. Lederach’s Little Book of Conflict Transformation58 (2003) and 
Jay Rothman’s Antagonism, Resonance, Invention and Action (ARIA)59 (1997) represent two 
insightful examples. In both cases, proposals pay attention to the narrative dimension of 
identity, its relational nature, and the complexity of its assessment. In short, identities are not 
taken for granted sets of pre-given moral norms. On the contrary, they are considered important 
for both conflict, and its resolution. Indeed, in conditions of intractability where the positions 
of contenders are reasonable, even if their means are not, is not a question that could be 
demarcated in advance, neither taking states or identity claims for granted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 John P. Lederach’s model (Lederach 2003) departs from the assumption that two central roots of social conflict belong to 
identity and relationship. Identity refers to a relational dynamic that is constantly redefined in relationship to others. This 
narrative dimension of identity, whereby peoples respond questions on who they are, where they come from and so on, is, 
nonetheless, closely related to power and the structure governing those relations, so that, when addressing identity-based 
concerns attention should be paid to both. 
59 Jay Rothman presents ARIA (Antagonism, Resonance, Invention and Action) (Rothman 1997) as a framework specially 
designed to transform identity conflicts. Rothman differentiates among interest based and identity based conflicts. The former 
are conflicts more clearly defined and the potential for win-win outcomes is greater, while identity based conflicts, based in 
people’s psychology, culture, basic values, beliefs and so on, ask for more complex assessment. In particular, Rothman 
highlights the importance that in these cases have to focus interactions in needs and values instead of positions of participants.  
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On the contrary, complexity requires intervention, if not aimed at resolution, then with the goal 
to explore possible patterns for conflict transformation emerging from dialogue among and 
within contending parties. This is the main idea underlying the inclusion of ‘linguistic 
intractability’ as a relevant case for intervention and analysis aimed at conflict transformation. 
Ramsbotham refers to ‘linguistic intractability as a “singularity in the universe of discourse”, 
confronting hegemonic positions with resources to control public discourse and contenders 
resisting from the margins (Ramsbotham 2010, xii). The challenge for him, is to occupy the 
sum of discursive space, leaving no room for the coexistence of contending belief systems and 
discourses. This lack of capacity to share ‘discursive space’ is the core of ‘linguistic 
intractability’, and its chief manifestation is ‘radical disagreement’ (Ramsbotham 2011, 58).  
 
Radical disagreement can be traced back to “embedded discourses within the dynamic conflict 
system in question” that, in turn, are defined as “inherently inter-relational” and involve not 
individual beliefs, or belief systems in isolation, “but relations of belief” among contending 
parties (2011, 59). Overall, this phenomenon contributes to the reinforcement of “cognitive, 
emotive, conative, and behavioural mechanisms that feed attractors for destructive conflict”; 
therefore, enhancing the escalatory “process dynamics” (2011, 59). Indeed, Ramsbotham 
suggests, to transform this dynamic when there is no condition for mutual understanding, 
‘agonistic dialogue’ within and between contending parties, reveals much about conflict 
dynamics and could supplement “attempts to conflict transformation in the communicative 
sphere when these do not yet succeed” (2011, 65).  
 
Therefore, his recommendation is not to look to one side when the radical disagreement is in 
place, but rather to investigate the ‘agonistic dialogue’ as a mechanism which is revealing about 
the conflict dynamics and relevant identities at play. In short, it is not an identity that explains 
conflict but conflict that explains identity.  
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Moreover, it is in this context where the contribution of deliberative democracy meets real 
concerns about identity conflict. The agonistic dialogue might enhance our understanding of 
conflict dynamics but, the middle ground theory approach provides the added value: namely, 
the means to advance towards social integration. Dryzek maintains that the contribution of 
deliberation to these cases is to facilitate the emergence of a normative meta-consensus: the 
mutual recognition of legitimacy by conflicting parties. Identities could thus be better 
understood as bound by particular discourses and therefore elitist claims can be avoided by the 
need to disclose social learning. 
  
The idea that deliberation might play a role in coping with deep divisions is also grounded to a 
certain extent on empirical findings (Luskin et al. 2014; Caluwaerts and Deschouwer 2013). 
For example, following the model that James Fishkin and his colleagues termed ‘Deliberative 
Polls’ (Fishkin and Luskin 2005) experiments have shown that, contrary to what the theory 
predicted, deliberative democracy involving ordinary citizens in deeply divided societies could 
result in high-quality deliberations.  
 
 
Luskin and Fishkin tested whether as the law of group polarisation predicts, “members of a 
deliberating group usually end up at a more extreme position in the same general direction as 
their inclination before deliberation began” (Sunstein 2009, 3). They brought together 
Protestant and Catholic citizens, from an area in the North of Ireland that had only recently 
emerged from protracted violence, to discuss controversial policy issues. Results showed that 
participants were able to conduct meaningful and constructive deliberation, emerged better 
informed about the policies in discussion, and their attitudes changed towards positions closer 
to the interests of society as a whole (Luskin et al. 2014).  
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In a similar vein, a recent deliberative experiment in Belgium included citizens from both sides 
of the linguistic border, to deliberate over highly controversial issues. The experiment tested 
between two variables, first, group composition – linguistically homogeneous or 
heterogeneous; and second decision-making rules – majority, supermajority, or unanimity; to 
see which one was more closely related to the deliberative quality of standards according to 
Type I deliberative democracy. The results showed that the decision-making rules had more 
influence on the quality of deliberations. However, in the case of group composition 
linguistically heterogeneous groups scored higher than homogeneous groups (Caluwaerts 2012; 
Caluwaerts and Deschouwer 2013). Thus, the experiment suggests that in these cases, facing 
the out-group might enhance rather than damage deliberation. 
 
In general, both experiments suggest deliberation between ordinary citizens, in societies marked 
by deep divisions and characterised by identity conflicts, is not only possible but can also have 
positive outcomes. On this basis, it could be that deliberation facilitates productive interactions 
among citizens. The specific role for exercises of this kind may not be consensus with regard 
to agreed preferences based on mutual understanding, but the clarification of conflict terms, 
and the emergence of common grounds that allow for the mutual recognition of differences. 
Moreover, common grounds may contribute positively to conflict resolution by building 
capacities of citizens to engage democratically.  
 
Despite this, it remains unclear to me how this kind of deliberative exercise can contribute in 
the wider context of the deliberative system. Let me explain this idea with an example, before 
going into details in the next section.   
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2.1.3 Concrete Politics II: The g1000 
In parallel to the exercise referred to above, a more politically ambitious exercise took place in 
Belgium. The g1000 was a civil society initiative, involving ordinary citizens, that took place 
in the middle of a political deadlock in government negotiations after 2010 elections 
(Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014). Electoral results had led to difficult negotiations, that in 
combination with the specific requirements for a government agreement, lead Belgium to 
achieve a curious record: became the country that lasted the longest in the world without a 
government. On the 21st of February, after 253 days, The TIMES reported this with a 
provocative headline: Belgian Waffling: who needs government, anyway?60  
 
In the face of the difficulty that political elites were having to reach agreement, the g1000 
seemed to be trying to respond to the question posed by the TIMES: if elites cannot agree, give 
citizens an opportunity. The initiative itself was sponsored by 25 Belgian intellectuals and 
encouraged 704 Belgian citizens from both linguistic communities to come together and 
discuss. The exercise was an attempt to show that the problems in Belgium were not related to 
lingual divisions, or community differences, and that members of both linguistic communities 
were able to deliberate together. Furthermore, the success of the experiment illustrated how the 
elitist orientation of contemporary Belgian politics, was an obstacle to the development of 
mechanisms that could facilitate this kind participation. Indeed, the experiment provided a very 
different perspective, relative to the explanations commonly articulated, for the characterization 
of identity conflict in Belgium.  
 
The problem of constituting a government could be one of the side effects of the consociational, 
or consensual model, that Belgium employed to manage the linguistic divide. The model was 
designed to deal with a country federalized by disaggregation (Swenden, Brans, and De Winter 
2009, 2). Moreover, it established strong guarantees with regard to minorities, for whom 
“proportional representation, executive power sharing and grand coalitions, and minority vetoes 
are key elements” (Mnookin and Verbeke 2009, 168). Therefore, communities remained 
separate, parties became the main representative channels at the level of both linguistic 
communities, stringent rules avoided unilateral solutions, and elites mediated conflict at the 
federal level. 
 
                                                 
60 Source: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052843,00.html (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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The side effect of this, is that politics at the federal level becomes an elite phenomenon and in 
the absence of agreement between parties, deadlock is unavoidable (Deschouwer and Van Parijs 
2013). Indeed, the g1000 could be interpreted as an attempt by citizens to challenge some of 
the most basic assumptions that underpin this model. In other words, the exercise could be 
understood as a claim that the solution designed to overcome the linguistic divide, had become 
the problem itself.  
 
The g1000 intended to demonstrate that dialogue among citizens belonging to different 
linguistic groups was not the problem, but that “[t]here is an ever growing gap between politics 
and citizens, and the public and political agendas no longer coincide.” (Caluwaerts and 
Reuchamps 2014, 3) Indeed the agenda setting exercise suggested that, in the current moment, 
the linguistic divide was not the main issue for those participating.  
 
The exercise brought participation until the very end of the deadlock, and established a 
participatory process to set the issue agenda for discussion. Surprisingly enough the question 
of the linguistic divide, or that of constitutional reform, did not appear to be a priority among 
citizens. Instead, they opted for social security, welfare in times of economic crisis, and 
immigration (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014, 5). It was surprising because the issue was 
central to political debate in Belgium; and certainly, a key element to the rise of Flemish 
nationalism.  
 
In the 2010 federal elections, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) became the first party, 
called to form a government. Negotiations had ended with the so-called butterfly agreement, a 
wide coalition of forces that excluded the N-VA. However, the N-VA kept growing, winning 
federal elections again in 2014, and this time constituting a government coalition. The fact that 
a nationalist political formation, having very little history in the Belgian political arena, grew 
from scoring 3.2% of votes in 2003 to 17.4% in 201061, suggested the federal reform issue 
would have been the central issue of interest for citizens.  
 
 
 
                                                 
61 In 2007, it was in cartel with CD&V and together reached an 18,5% of the votes. Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ 
(Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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It may be that voters chose N-VA for reasons other than its position regarding the federal 
reform. Indeed, the newness of N-VA proposals seem to be multidimensional (Beyens et al. 
2015). Moreover, N-VA itself used this distinctiveness as an argument to identify its proposal 
in the electoral campaign. For example, the main slogan in 2010 was “Nu durven veranderen” 
what means Now dare to change, and positioned the party against politics as usual. The point 
here is not a conversation about party politics, but to illustrate that the long government crisis 
and heated political controversy, was punctuated by the g1000 which shifted the dominant 
political narrative, by suggesting some premises of the debate may have be controversial.  
 
In one sense, the initiative itself suggests citizens from both linguistic communities do indeed 
have the capacity to meet each other, deliberate and take decisions. Thus, the lack of agreement 
at the federal level may be a response to other factors, though not necessarily an unavoidable 
effect of the linguistic divide. In a different sense, by taking the initiative, citizen participation 
also constituted a threat to the elitist character of Belgian democracy. What might be tentatively 
concluded, is that a different perspective on the same problem, questions some of the taken for 
granted assumptions that may in fact be mistaken for, or at least, more complex than, the 
impression that first sight suggests.  
 
From the perspective of Middle Ground Theory, the initiative fits in well with the requirements 
noted above (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2012). For example, much emphasis was placed on 
inclusiveness, facilitating the integration of different perspectives, as well as their actual 
expression during the discussion. We cannot know with any certainty that inter-subjectivity was 
achieved, but the design-choices certainly facilitated a more reflective attitude, projected 
citizens’ proposals to the plenary, and allowed participants to reflect on their position in front 
of the group. A sequential design allowed different objectives to be met at each phase, therefore 
rules were adapted, and facilitators trained to that end. Finally, citizens conducted the process, 
and in so doing uncoupled it from institutional decision making.  
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Indeed, outcomes suggested that design choices were adequate, and permitted the sustained 
adequacy of certain theoretical suggestions of the Middle Ground Theory. In the first instance, 
the initiative showed that deliberation can be successful in deeply divided societies (Caluwaerts 
and Deschouwer 2014), but also, that the initiative represented a kind of meta-consensus of 
citizens from different linguistic communities and with different political preferences regarding 
citizens’ participation. For example, the analysis of crowd-funders for the g1000 revealed 
funding came from socially advantaged groups, but involved people who holding very 
divergent preferences towards democracy itself (Jacquet and Reuchamps 2016).  
 
Nonetheless, there were certain limitations. The initiative was held at a distance, but not isolated 
from, the wider political debate. Assessing the internal legitimacy of the initiative, for example, 
the influence of the wider context was analysed (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015), and among 
others, two aspects were underlined. First, the fact that the initiative itself did not meet strong 
public endorsement throws up the limitation of its impact on the wider political agenda. Second, 
this impact may be unexpected and dependent on external factors. 
  
For example, Jean-Pierre Rondas62, emphatically underlined that the exercise was an artificial 
picture of the problem agenda, that focused on its Francophone frame at the expenses of Flemish 
concerns63. Therefore, in this case, the legitimacy of the event was questioned by critiques 
coming from the north of the country regarding the Belgian flavour of the initiative.  
 
The relationship between the initiative itself then, and the context in which it was implemented, 
suggests ambivalent conclusions. With regard to social learning, the level of satisfaction 
amongst participants suggested it had a positive effect. The heuristic value of the initiative could 
be defended on the grounds of its capacity to provide evidence for certain assumptions about 
the Belgian issue that may otherwise have been overlooked. Indeed, it pointed to a different 
aspect that could enhance the search for solutions from a problem-solving perspective. Finally, 
as the organisers underlined, design choices played a crucial role to these outcomes, and in this 
sense, the assumptions that coalesce around Middle Ground Theory seem to work in line with 
findings from real world experiences. 
                                                 
62 Jean Pierre Rondas participated in the event organized by the Re-Bel Thinking initiative in Brussels to discuss on the 
background paper on behalf of Flemish critiques on the g1000. Source: http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-
events/seventh-public-event-g1000-european-citizens-initiative-malaise-democracy (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
63 Source: http://www.doorbraak.be/nl/nieuws/content/rondas-over-de-g1000-en-het-democratisch-verdriet-van-
belgi%C3%AB (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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Nonetheless, the ambivalent lecture regarding location and role in the wider context also raises 
some doubts. On the one hand, the lack of influence over the political agenda. places a question 
mark over the objectives of this kind of exercise. On the other hand, the lack of impact could 
even be misinterpreted, or worse still used to fuel already present controversy; by endowing the 
initiative with an intentionality that seems not to be on the agenda of its organisers. In this case, 
the unexpected side effect of high-quality deliberation among citizens can be growing mistrust 
and even hesitation on the legitimacy of the event.  
 
In my view, these findings highlight certain contradictory elements that undermine the 
application of Middle Ground Theory to identity conflict in the case of citizens’ engagement, 
and point to the next step; the location and function of this kind of exercises in the wider context 
of the deliberative system. 
 
2.2 Coping with Deep Divide (II): Process of Deliberation 
The controversy over the impact of deliberative initiatives is closely intertwined with the 
question of their location, which connects this discussion to the role deliberation is called to 
play in societies coping with deep divisions, from the perspective of the deliberative process. 
In this regard, Middle Ground Theory underlines the sequential character of deliberation as a 
process, meaning that each site of the deliberative process could play a different role, and that 
standards may differ from one to another.  
 
Dryzek provides an account of this sequential process of deliberation as capacity building 
(Dryzek 2009). This model is adapted to transnational settings, and thus defines a set of 
constitutive elements, including: a relatively unrestricted public sphere, an empowered space 
for actors who are ‘recognisably part of institutions’, the means through which either critical or 
supportive relationship between the two are channelled, and the means whereby “the 
empowered space is made accountable to public space” (2009, 7). 
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The criteria to evaluate how far this system is deliberative, and therefore one which makes a 
contribution to democratisation are the already mentioned deliberative capacities: authenticity, 
inclusivity and consequentiality (2009, 5). A system with high deliberative capacity will feature 
‘authentic deliberation’ in all spaces as well as all means, inclusivity in both empowered and 
public spaces, and will be decisive. However, the kind of deliberations present can be more or 
less deliberative for each and does not require a particular set of institutions. In the case of 
societies coping with a deep divide, Dryzek suggests the appropriateness of locating ‘interactive 
forums’, where parties in dispute deliberate at a distance from institutional decision making. 
The distance may allow mutual recognition of legitimacy among parties, and facilitate the 
structuration of political interactions across them if the outcomes are reflectively accepted by 
key political actors (2009, 11).  
 
However, I suggest below, that this distance might be counterproductive, when in place of key 
parties, citizens are called to engage in deliberative initiatives aimed at conflict transformation 
in societies coping with deep divisions. Following Niemeyer and Goodin amongst others, I will 
first review the assumptions that underpin Dryzek’s understanding of the sequential approach, 
and the role of deliberation among citizens. On this basis, I will then revisit several pathologies 
of deliberation to highlight the multifaceted challenge of elite manipulation. Finally, concrete 
examples of citizens’ participation at EU level will enable the negative consequences of 
deliberation taking place at a distance from decision making, to be clearly underlined.  
 
 
2.2.1 From Micro to Macro Deliberation 
According to Dryzek, in the case of deep division, deliberation “can play a part healing 
division” (2009, 11). It is however desirable, he argues, to keep deliberators at a distance from 
institutional decision making, because  
... face to face variety connected tightly to state authority, can only ever be for the 
few [and] ... in a politics of mass voting tightly connected to the definition of the 
sovereign state they can all too easily be overwhelmed by demagogues (2005, 228).  
A certain distance from institutional decision making then, is a positive aspect for Dryzek 
because, “changing minds in common” is more likely to occur with “a space for exploratory 
interchange across differences” (Dryzek 2005, 230).  
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The systemic interpretation of this idea necessitates that deliberation contributes in two ways. 
By social learning, thus helping to “determine how different segments live together, without 
necessarily being validated in explicit policy decisions” (Dryzek 2009, 11). In addition, “mutual 
recognition of the legitimacy of disputed values and identities”, the absence of which means a 
contest becomes “a fight to eradicate the values of the other side”; deliberation “has force in 
structuring political interactions across division to the degree it is reflectively accepted by key 
political actors” (2009, 12). 
 
Dryzek defines these deliberative encounters as ‘interactive forums’. However, it is not clear 
whether, consonant with the distance from decision making, these forums are for ‘key political 
actors’, or that elites should simply give assent (or not) to the outcomes of citizens’ 
deliberations. If ‘interactive forums’ are defined as a means to enhance public engagement, we 
may have to suppose citizens take part. But in this case, the question is glaringly obvious: how 
do we justify the transition from normative meta-consensus and social learning among citizens, 
to reflective assent by key political actors? 
 
In response to this question, Niemeyer and Dryzek place the accent on the ‘deliberative self’ 
(Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 500–502). The influence at the more collective level is justified 
in terms of enhanced public debate that suggests a priority of ‘deliberation within’ over 
‘deliberation with others’ (Goodin 2000). This apparently contradictory response to the 
problem, demands a more detailed explanation. 
 
According to Niemeyer and Dryzek, meta-consensus, or the agreement on the nature of the 
issue at hand, “requires individuals transcend private concerns” (2007, 500). In other words, 
meta-consensus provides the ‘deliberating self’ with greater “intersubjective understanding of 
competing perspectives and consistency in subjective position and preference positions” 
(Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007, 501). The arguments raised by deliberating individuals in support 
of their preferences, will be less prone to contestation by others, because the perspective of the 
other is already part of the outcome. Moreover, it is not crucial to meet ‘others’ physically, 
because this change occurs in the course of deliberative reflexion within.  
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Conversely, ‘deliberation within’ (Goodin 2000, 2005), means deliberation values the ‘internal-
reflective’ dimension, over its ‘external collective’ aspects. It does so to adapt the deliberative 
ideal to large scale societies, where direct deliberation among all those concerned with a 
particular issue, is an extremely unrealistic assumption (Goodin 2000, 81). Thus, deliberation 
within, is something that happens inside individual minds: it is the outcome of an internal-
reflective attitude of an individual towards the other. Goodin and Niemeyer sustain this line of 
argumentation based on empirical research (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003).  
 
The example to which they refer is a citizen’s jury. At the end of the project, participants were 
questioned over what helped to change their mind, and were asked, from different options, to 
select the factors that had proven to be decisive. For example, learning, listening to witnesses, 
a shift in perspective, and group discussion (2003, 635). A positive response to the first two 
options was interpreted as corroboration that a shift had occurred in the informational phase. 
But, if the last option was selected, it was interpreted to mean that group discussion was 
important. Based on the results, they concluded that,  
... internal-reflective processes of ‘democratic deliberation within’ are more central 
to the process of democratic deliberation [than external-collective ones, and 
moreover that] attitudes really do seem to have changed substantially before the 
formal discussion actually began, and much less substantially during formal 
discussion (2003, 632).  
Regarding the problem placed at the beginning of this section, this proposal is interesting 
insofar as the consequential impact of deliberative dialogue is considered to be an indirect 
effect, linked only to the robustness of arguments raised in favour of a position. Deliberation is 
an internal reflective dialogue, conducted by each individual to consider her position in contrast 
to other’s perspectives. This reflective process provides her position with robustness, and the 
decision-making process equally benefits, because more robust perspectives enrich public 
debate at the collective level.  
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In sum, this social learning aspect of deliberation entails, albeit indirectly, that deliberation does 
indeed have an impact on the political decision-making process. In Habermas’ terms, citizens’ 
deliberation at a distance from decision making, has the effect of enhancing robustness to their 
positions. In this way, citizens are better prepared to transform their communicative freedom 
into communicative power, and also be heard in the formal public sphere, because on this basis, 
those in charge of taking decisions could reflectively assent on their position. In this way, the 
dilemma between consequentialism and distance is solved. Indeed, several deliberative scholars 
take this position regarding public engagement and the function of mini-publics.  
 
Fishkin and Luskin (2005), for example, consider that the relevant context, against which 
deliberative experiments should be evaluated, is not that of the political process, but the wider 
context of a theory of the political process. They defend that 
[l]ike Rawls’ ‘original position,’ Deliberative Polling, in gauging what people 
would have think if they thought, knew, and talked more about the issues, has some 
recommending force – to policy makers and, at least conditionally, to the public 
itself (2005, 294).  
Therefore, as underlined by Dryzek, deliberation is not mainly64 about the impact on policy 
making. It is about the investigation of public opinion and the appropriate institutional means 
to make its conduct possible. Impact is possible, but it is indirect, and depends on the robustness 
of claims raised in the battle for recognition in the informal public sphere. 
 
In sum, what these deliberative exercises represent, is an attempt to bring empirical 
investigation ‘beyond armchair empiricism’ by locating ‘thought experiments’ into real 
circumstances (Fishkin and Luskin 2005, 294). In short, they are considered ‘a poll with a 
human face’ aimed at getting “a maximally reliable picture of a counterfactual public forming 
and revising its opinions under normatively desirable conditions” (2005, 295).  
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Commenting of a Deliberative Pool that took place in Australia before the 1999 referendum, for example, Fishkin asserts 
that if broadcasted and due appropriate media coverage deliberative pools can have a significant effect in mass public (Fishkin 
2003, 131).  
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This perspective has several virtues. Empirical testing can serve to unlock conceptual dead 
ends, deeply ingrained in theoretical thinking, and facilitate a more creative approach to 
problem-solving. Indeed, the very fact of integrating citizens in the theoretical discussion is 
positive, and the possibility to influence policy-making reliable. In short, this position has the 
virtue of being intellectually modest and politically sincere. However, even from the 
perspective of research this division between theory and practice is questionable, and if we take 
a more ambitious stance, and seek to sustain the contribution of deliberation to conflict 
transformation in societies coping with deep divisions, it is naïve and, at worst, can become 
counterproductive.  
 
The contribution of experimental exercises in theoretical thinking, for example, prompted 
Caluwaerts to note, that even the outcomes derived from this approach should be taken 
cautiously. He highlights that this kind of experiments tend to enhance the conditions that allow 
high internal validity to the experimental setting, and the interpretation of its results, reliable; 
but this comes at the cost of having low ecologic validity (Caluwaerts 2012, 191). For example, 
results of the experiment conducted in Belgium, suggested that discursive encounters between 
members of opposed groups should not necessarily exacerbate political conflict. However, he 
noted: “in such cold deliberative setting, participants might be tempted to give in and betray 
their own group identities just for the sake of getting the discussion over with, and going to 
lunch” (2012, 192).  
 
Regarding counterproductive effects, more crudely, John Parkinson, for example, openly 
rejects “the tendency to reduce deliberative democracy to a consultants’ toolkit of trademarked 
techniques” (Parkinson 2012, 171). Moreover, he raises concerns that on this view,  
... deliberation becomes just another tool of depoliticization, the attempt to take the 
politics out of politics and replace it with impersonal analysis, treating people as 
mere bearers of values with an uncertain grasp of facts rather than citizens with the 
agency and cognitive abilities that allow them to practise self-government 
(Parkinson 2012, 171). 
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Nonetheless, Dryzek, Niemeyer and Goodin all maintain that, even though it is indirect, public 
engagement does have an impact on policy making. Indeed, I might be inclined to assume, that 
distance is positive when engagement involves key political actors. However, if public 
engagement intends to unite citizens, distance only distances citizens from decision-making. 
Indeed, it casts doubts the potentialities of their proposal at the levels of both the underlying 
conception of identity and the locus of citizens’ deliberation in the sequential process. 
 
Mutual engagement may well unveil common ground, by which growing coherence among 
belief systems might facilitate a more reasonable debate over preferences, and for example, 
reduce the scope of negative possibilities. However, if there is no mechanism that guarantees 
the consequential character of this process; meaning institutional decision-making echoes this 
structuration of conflict dynamics; we might end up assuming conflict is mainly a matter of 
discourse.  
 
However, even from the perspective of classical theories of conflict resolution (Galtung 1990; 
E. E. Azar 1990), this is not sustainable. Attention to identity, and in particular to the discourse 
dimension of identity in its different forms, does not rule out other concerns associated with the 
protracted nature of identity conflicts as, for example, power asymmetries65 and the role these 
different dimensions of conflict dynamics play in the search for a durable resolution66.  
 
In sum, the main problem is that deliberation among citizens at a distance, relies on either the 
willingness of key political actors to give reflective assent to citizens’ concerns, or they need 
to provide a clear account of how this assent can be made effective. However, in either case, 
citizens remain reliant on others to act on their decisions. Therefore, the challenge is the 
function and location of ‘interactive forums’ so as to involve citizens in the wider context of 
the sequential process of deliberation. 
 
                                                 
65 Conflicts in societies with deep identity divides tend to be considered as ‘Protracted Social Conflicts’ (E. E. Azar 1990). 
This type of conflicts reflects certain unbalance between state’s behaviour and the role and status of nations and communities 
under its rule (Holsti 1996, 20–21). Power asymmetries play an important role and evolve towards violent confrontation “when 
communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity” (E. E. Azar 1990, 12). 
Analysis of this kind of conflict requires attention to genesis and process because PSCs tend to be particularly pervasive. 
66 In this case, each vertex of the Galtung’s triangle plays a role in conflict and its transformation towards a stable peaceful 
settlement requires transforming the conflict structure as a whole. In addition to direct violence, attention is recommended to 
structural violence -the hidden suppression of basic needs for survival, well-being, identity and freedom- and cultural violence 
or “the symbolic sphere of our existence (…) that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence” (1990, 291).  
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2.2.2 From Macro to Micro Deliberation 
The role that deliberative exercises play in involving citizens in the wider political process is a 
contested issue among deliberative democrats, not only in cases of identity conflict. Goodin 
and Dryzek offered a consistent review of possibilities by focusing on ‘mini-publics’ (Goodin 
and Dryzek 2006). Following Archon Fung (2003), ‘mini-publics’ are artificial devices 
employed by scholars, activists, or foundations, that seek to improve the quality of the public 
sphere. They are modest projects of ‘reformist thinking’ that gather representative samples of 
the citizenry to experiment with a democratic ideal. They are interesting because they represent, 
“the most promising actual constructive effort for public engagement,” and a viable alternative, 
“given the fragmentation of political and cultural life”, to efforts that try to recreate the one big 
public, and inform in detail about possibilities for “institutional design for effective public 
deliberation” (2003, 338).  
 
They are interesting for my purposes here, insofar as they are the chosen mechanism when the 
goal of deliberation is to integrate citizens’ concerns, and the optimal option whereby different 
trade-offs linking location and function, can be assessed. 
 
In their review, Goodin and Dryzek noted that when considering impact in decision making, 
the academic literature tends to focus on failures in one of those possible pathways, namely, 
that which has a direct influence on the content of policy. Indeed, deliberative mini-publics at 
best, and very rarely, “have a politically (but not constitutionally) guaranteed place in policy 
making on a particular issue” (2006, 223). However, they argued that through several other 
routes, the influence of mini-publics’ could extend well beyond the boundaries of the exercise 
itself. In particular, they enumerate several possibilities (2006, 225–36): direct influence in 
actually policy making, being taken up by the policy process, informing public debates, shaping 
policy by means similar to market testing pools, legitimating policy, building confidence in a 
constituency, forcing accountability, and co-opting opponents to proposed policies.  
 
However, the review reveals that in almost all cases, their having any actual influence on the 
political process, largely depended on the disposition of those in power taking these exercises 
into consideration. The review also pays no attention to the potential pathologies of 
deliberation, thus overlooking how the process affects citizens’ in deliberative systems. 
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Regarding the first option, influence is guaranteed if the deliberative initiative is already part 
of the policy making process. However, as noted before, even Goodin and Dryzek recognise 
that this ‘rarely’ happens. With regard to the second, by informing public debate, mini-publics 
can influence, not only officials, but also public opinion; through which they might gain 
influence over the actual political debate. Nevertheless, this influence will for example, be 
dependent on media coverage, and access to media coverage is not equally distributed among 
different social strata. The third option moots the possibility of participants rejecting policy 
proposals in the context of mini-publics following the market testing model. In this case, 
Goodin and Dryzek argue that influence can still be effected, assuming that legislators 
acknowledge that when the opinion of the public is previewed to be negative, “it is good for the 
macro-political system – in terms of its functionality, its legitimacy, and its democratic 
responsiveness – not to try to force wildly unacceptable proposal down citizens’ throats” (2006, 
234). This is possibile, but questionable for example,without the option to set the issue agenda 
of the mini-public. 
 
Finally, through participation in deliberative mini-publics aimed at confidence building, 
mobilised groups could position themselves against the policy process, and such forms of 
popular oversight may increase pressure on officials to become accountable to the public. In 
these cases, rather than ‘one-off micro-deliberations’, ‘on-going or recurring mini-publics’ are 
recommended (2006, 235–36). However, as Adam Przeworksi crudely stated, “deliberation can 
occur only if someone pays for it” (Przeworski, in  Elster, 1998: 148), consequently, this is not 
the most common occurence. 
 
Most of these mechanisms appear to be well suited to the consideration of outcomes where the 
policy making process is taken as a given. It can however, widen the informational base 
(Goodin and Dryzek 2006, 228), preview reluctant positions in time (2006, 231), make its 
outcomes more legitimate (2006, 232), decrease the level of scepticism among the public, 
increase the level of psychological confidence (2006, 235) and even deactivate opposition by 
co-opting opponents for the policy process (2006, 36).  
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In short, they are well suited to framing political debate among citizens, but not making political 
decisions at the institutional level. Indeed, Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes documented 
several ways in which this kind of malfunctioning could occur in deliberative exercises, and 
result in people holding induced preferences (Stokes 1998) and beliefs “that are not in their best 
interest” (Przeworski 1998).  
 
Both depart from acknowledging that deliberation “is a form of discussion intended to change 
the preferences on the basis of which people decide how to act” (1998, 140). They suggest that 
preference change is largely dependent on beliefs, because preferences are endogenous to the 
political process. In other words, “most public discussion concerns, not aims but means” (1998, 
141). Beliefs, in turn, depend on “the causal models we have in our minds about the effect of a 
given course of action on our well-being and that of others” (Stokes 1998, 123).  
 
Following Przeworski, beliefs are classified into two categories: technical beliefs refer to 
“models of causal relations between policies and outcomes”, and “equilibrium beliefs, that is, 
belief’s about other peoples’ beliefs” (Przeworski 1998, 143). The first source of inequality 
depends on technical beliefs: information pooling or the symmetrical presentation of arguments 
preceding deliberation. In this case, the use of reasons to discriminate about goals in the light 
of consistent beliefs is inherently unequal, certainly in so far as neither access to information, 
nor the capacity of participants to adequately handle technical beliefs, is equally distributed 
amongst all participants.  
 
Moreover, unequal distribution is exacerbated according to Stokes, because the external 
dimension of this process is highly dependent on public communication. She describes different 
sequences, whereby the transition from people’s preferences to politicians’ proposals and then 
to government policy (Sequence I) could be manipulated, resulting in induced preferences 
(Stokes 1998, 125). Sequences include: the capacity of economic interests to influence the cause 
of government decisions when elite debate precedes public opinion (Sequence II) (1998, 126), 
the capacity of special interests to change perception of legislators on public preferences 
inducing change in public preferences (Sequence III) (1998, 128) or inducing misperception of 
public opinion by legislators (Sequence IV-V) (1998, 130, 132).  
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Indeed, some of these pathological sequences seem to be especially acute for the case of identity 
conflict. Insofar as Stokes is concerned, “public communication may change not only 
preferences but indeed identity” (1998, 134). The creation of pseudo-preferences refers to 
“preferences falsely imputed to electorally significant segments of the public” (1998, 127) in 
their grounding of decisions. Moreover, on these bases, pseudo-identities “seem to work against 
the needs, interests, or character that their bearers would express if left to their own devices” 
(1998, 134). Abstract narratives concerning the category of people, and tailored for political 
ends, for example, “are believed by people whom the narrative is about” (1998, 134), even 
against their own experience, and it is these narratives that entail how we think about the world, 
our capacities, and those of others.  
 
This possibility should be taken into consideration because if we bear in mind that deliberation 
tends to be mostly about means rather than ends, and technical beliefs call for validation that 
usually is not available to ordinary people, then as noticed by Przeworski; the resulting picture 
reveals the prominent role that equilibrium beliefs play in the final decision. In other words, the 
crucial component of deliberation is the reliability, adjudicated by each, to the beliefs of others. 
If preferences were a given, and the capacity to question the validity of technical beliefs 
supporting them depends on unequal access, what deliberation mainly does is lock individuals’ 
capacity to deviate from dominant beliefs by accommodating equilibrium beliefs to already 
given preferences. The outcome is that deliberation fixes identities, through which we identify 
with others and adjudicate, or reject their reliability. Following Stokes, if we also consider that 
pseudo-preferences could result from manipulations in the sequence of the policy making 
process, and identities externally adjudicated to their bearers; the outcome is that deliberation 
will serve to enhance the process of fixing pseudo-identities.  
 
Deliberative democratic theorists will argue against this sequence, suggesting that deliberation 
bypasses this closure, because it is not about uncritically holding already given beliefs and 
associated preferences. On the contrary, it is about moving away from what is given, 
reflectively turning against it using counterfactual idealisations based on a reason that is by 
definition public, and sustained by capacities, that are by definition universal to all human 
beings.  
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However, as Przeworski commented, “endogenous beliefs cannot be used to make normative 
evaluations of counterfactual states of the world” (Przeworski 1998, 155). For example, in the 
case of technical controversies, this capacity to evade from deeply held beliefs will depend 
largely on access, not to a generic public reason, but to reliable information. Moreover, although 
in the last two decades this problem may have been diminished by the evolution of the internet, 
access to reliable information and criteria to discriminate between trustful and non-trustful 
information, remains far from being accessible for all equally. 
 
In sum, the operation of pathologies in deliberative systems is complex and multifaceted. Of 
course, all these possibilities are based upon a caricature of politicians, public officials, and 
institutions. Goodwill for citizens should be equally assumed for politicians as well as for public 
officials. Moreover, institutions are, for better or worse, equipped with checks-and-balances 
aimed to preclude the misuse of power. Moreover, representative institutions are subjected to 
the verdict of the public that did, or did not, vote for them, and ultimately exercise control over 
what their representatives do.  
 
However, if we think about the contribution that deliberative initiatives aimed at enhancing 
public engagement make in this context, a clear conclusion is diffcult to draw. The proposals 
presented by Dryzek, Niemeyer, and Goodin for example, do not rule out the possibility of 
citizens acting against decision-making at the institutional level, either through deliberative 
forums, or other devices located in the public sphere. However, potential benefits rely far too 
heavily on the disposition of those already in power to either make, or change a decision, that 
takes their opinion into consideration. They also overlook the potential negative consequences 
that can arise when authentic deliberation among citizens takes place, and the substance of that 
deliberation remains, in political terms, meaningless.  
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2.2.3 Concrete Politics III: EuroPolis Project 
The ‘democratic deficit’ (Marquand 1979) has been a longstanding dilemma affecting the EU 
integration process: the transference of competencies from nation-states to supranational 
institutions, has seen classical mechanisms that ensured democratic control appear to be 
exhausted, thus affecting the legitimacy of the political decision-making process negatively. 
Academic debates on the democratic deficit (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2008) present a two-
sided picture about the optimal way to sustain the legitimacy of the EU Integration process. On 
the one hand, legitimacy is defended as an outcome of the effectiveness of EU institutions to 
deliver their functions. On the other hand, legitimacy depends on inputs linked to the 
democratic process and its representative institutions embodied in member-states. However, 
more contemporary contributions (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Jensen 2009) consider this two side 
picture of the ‘democratic deficit’ too limited. 
 
A standard formula of the ‘democratic deficit’ includes five claims. First, that European 
integration has decreased the capacity of national parliaments to control the increasing 
executive power of EU institutions. Second, the weakness of the European Parliament, the only 
directly elected institution, enhances this deficit, relative to the Council and the Commission. 
Third, this weakness is even stronger considering that, strictly speaking, there are no ‘European’ 
elections. Elections to the European Parliament are ‘second order national contests’ (Follesdal 
and Hix 2006, 536) in which neither EU issues, nor EU personalities and parties, are the core 
of the electoral agenda. Fourth, the distance between EU institutions and voters is deepening: 
citizens do not understand the EU, cannot assess it, and accordingly are not able identify with 
it. Moreover, fifth, due to this distance between voters and institutions, the integration process 
produces a ‘policy drift’ between voters’ ideal policy preferences and the political process by 
which they are supposed to be represented (2006, 536).  
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Recently, and in the light of the limitations to so called grand narratives to successfully confront 
the democratic deficit, the deliberative turn has gained the attention of scholars (Neyer 2006). 
However, interest has overlapped with the burdens of the theory to be acknowledged by the 
European Commission. Indeed, several programs have been implemented among which certain 
attention was given to the role that citizens initiatives, following the lines of deliberative 
democracy, could play in overcoming the democratic deficit. Mundo Yang, for example, 
identified 23 projects funded by the EU focusing on citizens involvement in EU policy 
processes from 2001 to 2010 (Yang 2013, 26). One of them was the EuroPolis Project67, and 
among its promoters, we find prominent names in Deliberative Democratic Theory, such as 
Jürg Steiner and James Fishkin (Isernia et al. 2013).   
 
The EuroPolis Project was presented as a Deliberative Citizens Involvement Project (DCIP), 
founded and implemented by the European Commission (EC) with the aim of facing the widely 
debated issue affecting the legitimacy of EU institutions; namely, the democratic deficit (Jensen 
2009). In the foreword, Viviane Reading, Vice-President of the EC, highlighted the importance 
of these initiatives for the Europe 2020 strategy. She stated: 
when it comes to defining the European project for the twenty-first century we need 
a Europe strengthened by widespread participation, a Europe looking to co-operate 
for the common good, a Europe stimulated by ideas and sustained by reflection68 
(Kies and Nanz 2013, xviii). 
The reference to participation, common good and reflection help to figure out how important 
the deliberative paradigm seems to be in the Europe 2020 strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Source: http://www.circap.org/europolis.html (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
68 Emphasis added. 
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In the particular case of the Europolis Project, the aims of the DCIP were to promote a properly 
European public sphere by exposing “a microcosm of European citizens to an ideal democratic 
setting” (Isernia et al. 2013, 79). Indeed, it represented a highly ambitious project69: divided 
into four phases, it involved a random selection of participants, informational input about the 
issues in discussion, and moderated small group discussion and plenary sessions.  
 
Results were, according to reports, successful. For example, “Europolis attests that through 
public deliberation, we can reduce the EU’s democratic deficit” (2013, 106). In particular, 
“identification with the EU rose 37 percent among participants right at the beginning of the 
event and to 53 percent after deliberation” and the percentage of those who think it is their duty 
to vote increased “from 48 percent before to 56 after the event” (2013, 105). Results included 
a change in policy preferences, knowledge gain and interesting correlations between voting and 
debate. More significantly, it demonstrated that when “Europeans deliberate together, they 
become a bit more like ideal citizens” reflecting “what the European project could evolve into 
if the barriers of language and nationality are overcome” (2013, 106).  
 
Legitimate questions would be first, does it matter whether or not languages and nationalities 
are something to be ‘overcome’. Is feeling more European and Belgian, than say more Belgian 
and Flemish, but not European, questionable?  Or, does feeling only Bruxellois, therefore 
neither Belgian, Flemish, nor European have nothing to do with ‘ideal citizenship’? 
Furthermore, it is also highly questionable that asserting the acceptance of the duty to vote or 
change one’s preferences, reflects any better what the ‘ideal citizen’ looks like, than refusing 
to vote, or restating one’s own opinion on a particular issue, for example.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 For example, in order to ensure that efforts randomly selecting participants were not conditioned by other factors participants 
got travel expenses and accommodation funded as well as an additional financial incentive (80 euro) for their participation. 
Each participant was also allowed to speak in his or her own language due to more than 150 translators that made it 
simultaneously in the 21 languages involved. Previous to the exercise 4300 citizens were interviewed, from them 3000 invited 
and finally 348 actually participated in the event. Participants expend a weekend in Brussels to discuss public issues, in 
particular immigration and environmental issues, in small groups and later shared their opinions in the panel where politicians 
and experts also took part (Isernia et al. 2013, 82–88). 
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In recent research on indifference towards integration, Virginie Van Inglegom suggests that 
indifference could be indeed interpreted in several ways, and not necessarily by noticing 
weakness or abnormality, but, more precisely as meaning that integration is becoming ‘normal 
politics’ (Van Ingelgom 2014, 180). She argued that “greater visibility of European issues and 
more direct experience of the EU may, in fact, lead to ambivalence”, but, according to her 
results, ambivalence “is not a non-attitude”. On the contrary, it is rational, pragmatic and stable 
and can be qualified as “assent or pragmatic acquiescence” (Van Ingelgom 2014, 180).  
 
Her approach suggests that along with consenters and dissenters, ‘assenters’ may lack “any 
commitment, participation and/or interest in political activities” (2014, 183). Though, 
“indifference or hesitancy about the EU is not a sign of principled opposition to further 
integration but, an inclination to make a pragmatic judgment of a proposal” (Rose 2013, 155 
cited in (Van Ingelgom 2014, 185). Therefore, abstinence from actual participation should not 
be taken as a non-position, but rather a position in the face of the integration process and 
therefore taken into consideration as what it is, and not judged as abnormal in the light of what 
it should be.  
 
Furthermore, not taking the position of assenters into account, may amount to another large and 
venerable tradition regarding the disposition of European institutions in considering inputs 
coming from citizens as regardless. Van Ingelgom notes that when called to express their 
opinion, citizens indeed, “judged the European democracy and the European economy harshly” 
(Van Ingelgom 2014, 185). However, taking Europeans seriously means taking them seriously 
when they make a pragmatic judgement too. Moreover, she adds: “Not taking ‘no’ for an answer 
and pushing forward the integration process lead citizens to believe that European Integration 
will go on regardless of what they do or whom they vote for” (2014, 185).  
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Thus, from this perspective, it is not that citizens are incapable of engagement in European 
policy making because, either it is complex, or too distant from their daily lives. It is, on the 
contrary, because assenters are distant, that they are conscious that the possibilities to be taken 
seriously. In addition, instances when the answer does not fit with expectations, are no greater 
now than they were before. Moreover, on these bases, “politicisation (I would be tempted to 
add: and the daily experience of European integration) may give rise to expectations that cannot 
be satisfied” (2014, 181). In short, this either means to consider citizens’ preferences as 
implemented or, in the absence of a disposition to take citizens seriously, at least their assent 
needs to be taken into consideration.  
 
From this perspective, the evaluation of DCIPs like EuroPolis Project can be controversial. 
They account for effective influence on citizens’ preferences, and even have a positive impact 
regarding how citizens frame the integration process, and their role in it. However, in the 
concluding chapter of the compilation on the referred DCIPSs Graham Smith noticed that, 
overall, the most striking finding was that in the course review “we cannot point to one case 
where citizens engagement has had any noticeable effect on the formal decision-making 
process” (Smith 2013, 214). This is arguably the same concern that was amplified by Virginie 
van Ingelgom, who underlined the risk of generating expectations that cannot be satisfied. 
 
Taking part in such participatory exercises, requires that citizens are able to give time, effort, 
and embrace the openness necessary to challenge their own positions. Personal benefits do 
count with regard to learning and self-clarification, however, this disposition needs to be 
reciprocal, vis a vis the institutions holding deliberative exercises with ordinary citizens. If not, 
a legitimate question emerges over the intention that the initiative taking place sought to 
achieve. Moreover, if Van Ingelgom is right, it is precisely this kind of mistrustful interaction 
what can lead citizens to shift their positions from assent, ambivalence, and indifference, to 
opposition. 
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3 Systemic Approach, Identity Conflict, and Public Engagement 
I have suggested that Middle Ground Theory, on the basis that it takes both identity and 
democracy seriously, can provide a solution for deliberation in societies with deep identity 
divisions. I reviewed this proposal at two levels: the level of expected outcomes and the level 
of the deliberative process. The baseline is defined following Dryzek, Niemeyer, and Goodin. 
The reason behind this choice is that they provide a comprehensive account of the application 
of Middle Ground Theory to societies coping with deep divisions. 
 
With regard to normative requirements, deliberation can acknowledge different degrees of 
agreement, and therefore departs from a relaxed set of normative standards. Equally, its 
application to identity conflict, gives rise to a consensus that is not expected in agreements 
based on mutual understanding, but on mutual recognition of differences (meta-consensus), and 
coherent frames of values, beliefs, and preferences (inter-subjective rationality). Nevertheless, 
following Erik O. Eriksen (2007), I have underlined that this second aspect should be 
considered as an acknowledgment that similar values may lead toward different preferences, 
because public reason itself is plural.  
 
The second aspect brings about the sequential character of the deliberative process and the idea 
that deliberative exercises are part of wider systems. According to the Middle Ground Theory, 
deliberative systems are characterised by authenticity, inclusiveness, and consequentiality 
(deliberative capacities). The fact that normative standards affect the system as whole frees 
each site from the obligation to mirror ideal conditions. In consequence, different sites of the 
deliberative system might play different roles.  
 
On these grounds, deliberation values social learning on behalf of participants in deliberative 
exercises, and conflict resolution prospers from the clarification of underlying terms of 
controversy. However, coping with deep divisions, requires distance from institutional decision 
making in order to provide the necessary conditions for mutual recognition, and the potential 
structuration of conflict dynamics towards more ambitious objectives later in time, or at another 
site of the system.  
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The problem is that distance from decision making at the institutional level might provide more 
detached settings in conflictual environments. However, in the absence of involvement by key 
actors, and without specific requirements to assure the consequential requirement, deliberative 
initiatives become at best, less attractive to engage, and at worst, a process whose objective 
remains unclear, and where mistrust can fester and legitimacy can be called into question. This 
could be logically assumed if expectations on the effect of this kind deliberative initiative are 
assessed in the long term, as well as indirectly, as the model of deliberation within suggests. 
However, as shown in the previous chapter, it is problematic because, deliberation within is not 
free from manipulation and equally, the lack of impact is not innocuous.  
 
In the following section, I ground the theoretical debate of the previous pages in order to provide 
the set of guidelines that structure the assessment of the central case study of this dissertation. 
In particular, I draw on recent debates surrounding the systemic turn (Parkinson and 
Mansbridge 2012), to suggest that instead of distance, mini-publics in societies coping with 
deep divisions require institutional coupling. The rationale for this assertion is that mini-publics 
are not only devices whereby citizens learn from each other, but ones where they learn from 
each other to make better decisions. Finally, I suggest better decisions require deliberation with 
real others, thus overcoming the burdens of the deliberating individual, to locate deliberation, 
as fundamentally a social activity.  
 
3.1 From Distance to Connectivity: The Deliberative System 
The definition of the systemic approach, follows the sequential model suggested by the Middle 
Ground Theory (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). The systemic turn defines the deliberative 
process as a set of distinguishable, although interdependent parts, that require not only 
differentiation, a functional division of labour, but also integration: namely relational 
interdependence. In short, they suggest the systemic approach attends to the emergence of 
“deliberative ecologies” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 4–7).  
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From this perspective, deliberative exercises could play different roles, and their evaluation 
could be advanced, but I am minded to also consider, “the value or disvalue of non-deliberative 
practices that have often been considered antithetical to deliberative democracy” (2012, 26). 
For example, we could identify tight institutional coupling, that precludes the self-corrective 
capacity of the system, or conversely, decoupling, avoiding cross-fertilization, along with 
expressions of either social or institutional domination and deep division (2012, 10–13, 22–24). 
But either of them is assessed by their contribution to the deliberative system because “two 
wrongs can make one right” (2012, 3).  
 
This conception of the deliberative system entails overcoming Habermas’ definition of 
deliberative arenas “as rings around the state” (2012, 9). The boundaries of the system are not 
given in advance, but differentiated around institutions, or issues at each case. Deliberative 
systems include binding decisions by the state, preparation activities, as well as informal talk 
related to those decisions, and formal or informal talk on other matters that fulfil criteria for 
inclusion; meaning, they are matters of common concern with a practical orientation.  
 
Therefore, the model sketched in the manifesto provides a working definition of deliberative 
systems, sites, or boundaries, in the context of which controversy on the appropriate location 
and function of deliberative mini-publics takes place. 
 
Following Fung (2003), I have defined mini-publics as artificial devices for improving the 
public sphere. I have also reviewed, following Dryzek, the positive contribution that this kind 
of ‘interactive forum’ can make regarding conflict transformation. But, Dryzek suggests 
distance from decision-making at the institutional level is required for these participatory 
devices to succeed, and I have raised several doubts about the appropriateness of such a 
requirement for public engagement.  
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Indeed, for example, Hendriks (Hendriks 2006, 493–95), and Parkinson (Parkinson 2012, 161–
62), identify Dryzek with Habermas as the central references of the macro deliberative 
approach. This model focuses on civil society and the public sphere, and deliberation “is called 
to play an unconstrained and even oppositional role against the state by engaging in acts of 
communication” (Hendriks 2006, 495). It is focused on macro-deliberation and restrains 
citizen’s capacity to influence decision-making at opinion formation (2006, 494). Indeed, 
deliberation among citizens takes place in the informal public sphere, and  
... the very fact that macro deliberation is based on less stringent communicative 
norms renders it a more inclusive version of deliberative democracy (2006, 495).  
The problem is that “they lack a clear account of how that contestation is translated into acts of 
governance” (Parkinson 2012, 161). 
 
Parkinson, on the contrary, quoting Papadopoulos (2012) recommends “coupling mini-publics 
and empowered decision-making sites: not so tight that the former become co-opted, not so 
loose that they are ignored” (Parkinson 2012, 157). In the concluding chapter of the collected 
edition on Deliberative Systems (2012), he underlines the contextual turn regarding mini-
publics as justified “not just in terms of effects on participants or the rationalisation of a 
particular decision making, but in terms of their connections with other institutions and with 
systems of governance more broadly” (2012, 170). In other words, “it is the impact they have 
– or fail to have – on binding collective decision what matter” (2012, 170).  
 
However, neither of them may be free from side-effects. Carolyn Hendriks, for example, 
underlines the fact that macro deliberation not only suffers from the difficulty to account for 
influence in policy making, but “the market-like functioning of ideas in the public domain 
makes macro deliberation more accessible to the loud, well-organised and well-resourced actors 
in civil society” (Hendriks 2006, 495). Conversely, micro-deliberation, in the form of mini-
publics “might also be resisted by actors in civil society, especially partisans, because they fear 
co-option and further marginalisation” (Hendriks 2006, 495). Therefore, neither mini-publics 
oriented to influence policymaking at the institutional level, nor macro deliberation oriented to 
opinion formation in the public sphere, are free from the compound risks of elite manipulation 
and political irrelevance.  
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Hendriks suggests testing whether indeed, two wrongs can make one good. She advanced an 
‘integrative approach’ (2006) that combines both, maintaining that “a more integrated system 
of public deliberation is best conceptualised as an activity occurring in overlapping discursive 
spheres – some structure, some loose, some mixed – each attracting different actors from civil 
society” (Hendriks 2006, 503). This model celebrates the ‘multiplicity of deliberative venues’, 
and “fosters connections between these venues” (2006, 499). In other words, it underlines 
agency, diversity, and interconnectivity and, in contrast to the two-track model, it overcomes 
the distinction between informal and formal public spheres and the corresponding division of 
their roles.  
 
Regarding the location of mini-publics then, the main difference between this interpretation of 
the sequential model and Dryzek’s account, is that instead of distance, it recommends coupling 
with institutional decision making. Awareness is focused not on the consequences of 
institutional coupling within mini-publics alone, but in the context of relations established 
between mini-publics and other sites and, in particular, institutional decision-making. Because, 
at the end, what matters is the impact they have on binding collective decisions. Coupling mini-
publics with decision-making does not mean it is free from the risk of elite manipulation, but 
the focus is placed on the interconnectivity between them. In other words, the possibility that 
empowering citizens in decision-making processes indeed countervails the risk of elite 
manipulation is not ruled out.  
 
 
3.2 Impact on Decision-Making: Function of Public Engagement 
 
Thinking about the role of deliberation, and more concretely mini-publics within the democratic 
system, Parkinson underscores the view that coupling deliberation at different sites with 
institutional decision making, brings about the reconsideration of the principal agent model of 
representation (Urbinati and Warren 2008). The underlying idea is simple. Participants in mini-
publics are not elected representatives, therefore, it is no clear on behalf of whom they will act 
within a representative democracy. 
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Parkinson suggests, on the contrary, it is the very idea of representation that needs to be 
reconsidered. According to him, representation is better conceived as ‘relationships of 
representation’ (Parkinson 2012, 163–64). This refers to an “ongoing relationship based on 
flexible constituencies rather than a fixed, positional relationship between principals and 
agents” (2012, 168). Thus, good deliberative systems are those “being richly representative 
ones, hitched to a combination of direct and indirect decision-making institutions like 
referendums, minidemoi, and elected assemblies where appropriate” (2012, 168). 
 
In short, the idea is that ‘politics as usual’ in contemporary representative democracies falls 
short to respond to specific challenges of contemporary complex societies. Therefore, 
enhancing the stock and diversity of decision making mechanisms does not replace but enhance 
the capacity of representative democracies. 
 
For example, instead of mini-publics, artificial devices aimed at enhancing public opinion, we 
might think on minidemoi (Bohman 2012, 85). Minidemoi, being mini-publics, can account for 
communicative and decisional status. Bohman defines communicative freedom as “the exercise 
of a communicative status, the status of being recognized as a member of a public” (2012, 84). 
However, to transform communicative freedom into communicative power, minidemoi require 
‘decisional status’ within an institution, thus being able to “place an item on the institutional 
agenda” or “influence decisions made about items on that agenda” (2012, 85). In short, 
minidemoi are mini-publics with decisional status. 
 
The contribution of minidemoi is defended by Bohman by means of creating ‘multi-
perspectival’ polities (Bohman 2006, 2007, 2012). Multi-perspectival polities are those in 
which the democratic process is defined as a mode of inquiry that seeks to consider not only 
social conditions, but also to “incorporate the various perspectives of relevant social actors in 
attempting to solve a problem” (Bohman 2006, 182). On this basis, the function of minidemoi 
in deliberative systems, links to enhancing their multi perspectivality because “[t]he lack of 
epistemic diversity may be procedural, as when there is insufficient diversity not just among 
deliberative participants, but also among the collective agents making various decisions” (2006, 
183).  
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Parkinson, for example, agrees with this idea. He argues that, the key criterion used to judge 
representative bodies (including not only ‘elected’ ones) in a deliberative system, “is that they 
are ‘grounded’ in the experience of those they represent” (Parkinson 2012, 169); meaning that 
the pool of perspectives is inclusive, and representatives themselves are diverse enough. 
However, he points an interesting side-effect. In short, by valuing all the availability of 
perspectives, with no attention to how they came about, the model overlooks that raw 
perspectives are, indeed, a fair representation of social inequalities.  
 
Bohman, for example, specifies that within a multi-perspectival polity, with a functioning 
democratic mode of inquiry, “participants need not be either neutral or impartial” because “both 
properly identify perspectives as the object of inclusion” (Bohman 2006, 182). He refers to 
Helen Longino and Iris Marion Young who suggest that citizens or social actors are not required 
to transform their perspectives, but enjoins the democratic system to include them, because 
diversity requires perspectives that are different in kind. 
 
However, according to Parkinson this systemic emphasis on the availability of perspectives 
proceeds as if perspectives were independent of the deliberative process. On the contrary, he 
suggests, “to maintain its deliberative capacity there should be a ‘default mode’ of reasonable, 
respectful discussion” (Parkinson 2012, 169). In short, if different decision-making bodies are 
empowered with decisiveness certain mechanisms should be defined for these decisions to be 
fair, equal, or free because in their absence decisions taken in this bodies will fairly represent 
already ruling social inequalities. 
 
Owen and Smith, for example, suggest that in every site, political talk is required to fulfil a 
‘deliberative minimum’ or stance; meaning “a relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual 
exchange of reasons as if to reaching a shared practical judgment” (2015, 228). This minimum 
is applied transversally at each site of the deliberative system, to test whether deliberation is 
practised or not. The assumption is not that other forms of communication do not play a role, 
but deliberation, indeed, and this minimum requires what is necessary for deliberation to be, at 
least, possible.  
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Therefore, instead of distance I suggest an integrative approach that will critically assess the 
connectedness between different sites of a deliberative system to assess whether, in the case of 
mini-publics, citizens do indeed have an influence on binding decisions. The function of 
decisiveness is to open up the decision-making process giving more voice to citizens and social 
actors in representative democracies. In other words, overcome the principal-agent scheme and 
think representation less as a delegation and more as a relationship. A relationship that presents 
different modes, or involves different agents, depending on the issue at stake or the kind of 
solution required.  
 
However, it will be naïve to think that these mini-bodies will no replicate inequalities so as they 
are in the wider public sphere. Moreover, if there is any criteria that defines in what terms those 
bodies are deliberative it could “result in judging a system as deliberative with little, or even 
nothing, in the way of actual democratic deliberation between citizens taking place” (2015, 
218). Yet, the other way around I have consistently reviewed the problematic status of 
normative standards that are defined universally, meaning they apply equally to public 
representatives and citizens. 
 
In this regard, the solution suggested by Parkinson is attentive to both points of the dilemma. 
Parkinson suggests a kind of proportional distribution of duties in the form of a ‘stepped 
pluralism’. In short, the idea is that a normative requirement is necessary to be able to define 
when deliberation is good enough at any site of the system, but “it becomes more legitimate to 
move away from deliberative norms the less one is treated with like regard” (Parkinson 2012, 
167). In other words, norms apply more strictly in the formal end of the public sphere, leaving 
the relatively powerless free to try by other means if they are treated unfairly; a privilege denied 
to the powerful at the other end of the public sphere. 
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3.3 From ‘Deliberation within’ to ‘Deliberation with Others’ 
The final step concerns the theoretical model of deliberative reasoning underneath Dryzek’s 
approximation to the systemic turn and Goodin and Niemeyer’s definition of the deliberating 
self. In short, if deliberation within is the model to conceive the operation of practical reason it 
is pointless to suggest the necessity of meeting others more closely. The risk of elite 
manipulation oversteps the potential virtues, for example, of institutional coupling so far as, at 
the end, there is no need to meet others. On the contrary, I suggest that, indeed, meeting other 
is a condition of possibility for deliberative reasoning. Moreover, I consider that Hélène 
Landemore’s definition of Democratic Reason (2013) provides a viable response to the 
question over why others are necessary. 
 
Landemore presents her proposal in opposition to the model of ‘deliberation within’ (Goodin 
2000; Goodin and Niemeyer 2003). She points to the deliberative intent for citizens to transition 
from the peripheral to the central routes towards attitude change. The peripheral route suggests 
that attitude change relies on cognitive shortcuts and intuitions, while the central route depends 
more on the careful weighing of positions and arguments. Goodin and Niemeyer highlight that 
there is nothing intrinsic to the central route that asks for deliberation with others. However, 
Landemore conversely suggests that,  
 
... while human beings do not need an actual collective deliberation to be able to 
reason properly, the fact that the normal conditions of reasoning are those where 
one naturally encounters a variety of points of view makes it more likely that 
individuals will use central routes when discussing with other than when reasoning 
alone (Landemore 2013, 136). 
The Argumentative Theory of reasoning proposed by Landemore, states that an “activity is 
deliberative to the extent that reasoning is used to gather and evaluate arguments for and against 
a given proposition” (2013, 127). Moreover, argument gathering requires not only information, 
but also argumentative interaction with real others. In other words, it is not sufficient for the 
virtual inclusion of other’s perspective in one’s mind using plain information, but necessary to 
be facing others and their arguments. From this perspective, the argument for deliberation 
within, seems problematic insofar as it will be acceptable, but in companion to actual 
deliberation with others. 
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As noted earlier, Goodin and Niemeyer ground their theoretical conclusion on the results of a 
citizens’ jury (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003). Hélène Landemore however, has underlined 
several questionable aspects regarding the validity of the experiment itself (Landemore 2013, 
132–35). For example, according to her, the design of the informational phase did indeed 
involve much deliberation with others, because invited witnesses talked and were interrogated 
by participants. Therefore, it seems to her that the first phase of the experiment did not fulfil all 
the requirements to be considered purely informational.  Moreover, her main argument suggests 
deliberation with others may be not only recommendable if feasible, but from a deliberative 
perspective, preferable to deliberation within. She summarises the contribution of an 
argumentative definition of deliberation as follows: 
To sum up, according to the new theory presented here, reasoning is an 
argumentative device. Its function is social: to find and evaluate arguments in a 
dialogic context. The key aspect of the argumentative theory of reasoning is that 
contrary to traditional classical models, which see reasoning as best deployed in the 
solitary confinement of one person’s mind, reasoning is here assumed to perform 
best when deployed to argue with other human beings. In other words, reasoning is 
supposed to yield an epistemic betterment of individual beliefs through the social 
route of argumentation rather than the individual route of private ratiocination 
(Landemore 2013, 130). 
First, instead of the search for truth, argumentation theory suggests that the function of 
reasoning is to find and evaluate reasons, that convince other people and evaluate their 
arguments in dialogic contexts (2013, 126). Second, the definition demands that both steps are 
necessary to find reasons, and to evaluate them. Indeed, each shape two different tasks, both 
necessary for deliberative argumentation. On the one hand, participants need to produce 
arguments to support their position but, on the other, they should also be capable of evaluating 
arguments raised by others in support of their own beliefs. Third, both processes are necessary, 
so that the evaluation of reasons raised by others cannot be made in the light of my necessity to 
support mine, and the solution for this risk (confirmation bias) is to consider that ‘normal’ 
conditions for deliberation are ‘social’ (2013, 127).  
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The most hitting thing about this argumentative turn is that it does not entail a rejection of the 
Habermasian foundations of deliberative democracy. Although theories of deliberative 
democracy ground their normative claims regarding discourse in Habermas’ Discourse Ethics 
(1990a), argumentation theory occupied a prominent place in his understanding of discourse 
and communication. Indeed, deliberation was defined as a model of rational argumentation and, 
in his words, “to it [argumentation theory] falls the task of reconstructing the formal-pragmatic 
presuppositions and conditions of an explicit rational behaviour” (Habermas 1989c, 1:2). 
Nevertheless, as Isabela Fairclough recently underlined, “neither political theorists nor 
discourse analysts seem to be aware of the way deliberation is theorised in argumentation 
theory, nor of how deliberative practice can be systematically evaluated as an argumentative 
activity” (I. Fairclough In Press)  
 
Indeed, deliberation holds a prominent place in current argumentation theory (I. Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2013; McBurney, Hitchcock, and Parsons 2007; van Eemeren 2013; Walton et al. 
2010). It is considered an argumentation ‘genre’, thus, a “socially ratified way of using language 
connected to a particular type of social activity” (N. Fairclough 1995, 14). The centrality of 
deliberation for argumentation in the political domain is justified, because “[p]olitics has to do 
primarily with decision for action on matters of common concern, and decisions are the 
outcome of deliberation” (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 236). The main type of reasoning 
of deliberation is practical reason, and it is defined as “considering alternative practical 
arguments, supporting different claims and examining and weighing considerations that support 
these alternatives” (2013, 50).  
 
Therefore, following Landemore, I leave aside discourse ethics and move one step back to the 
argumentation theory which preceded it. From this perspective, some of the basic tenets of 
Habermas’ model remain valid, but it is not necessary to stick to his moral and legal theory. 
Indeed, the universalization of principles regulating discourse as norms regulating action 
coordination, either for moral or legal norms is a step that grounds his moral and legal theory; 
the basis of which articulates his definition of deliberative democracy. But, argumentation 
theory provides tools for the analysis of argumentation. In other words, standards may ground 
empirical analysis and assess argumentation in the light of ideal templates, but they do not judge 
the appropriate moral or political behaviour of participants; this is left for normative theories 
of democratic politics and these theories can both reasonably and legitimately differ.  
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Landemore, explained this additional virtue of the argumentative turn, because  
... the claims made by the argumentative theory of reasoning are descriptive – that 
is, they can be true or false – but they have no implications in terms of what is 
morally right or wrong or in terms of the norms that ought to guide deliberators 
(Landemore 2013, 129).  
She does not deny the claims that this theory of reasoning is “compatible with many normative 
views of politics”, but she states that it “does not carry a normative agenda by itself” (2013, 
129). It is on this basis that this proposal provides the analytical rigour to ground the analysis 
of discourse in the light of, for example, the deliberative minimum. I bring about the normative 
agenda on the multiple bases established in this section, but the assumption for grounding the 
empirical analysis does not carry a normative agenda of its own 
 
4 Conclusions: Normative Baseline 
In general, the systemic turn retains the classic emphasis on deliberative functions as a 
cooperative effort aimed at seeking truth (an epistemic function), mutual respect and 
recognition (an ethical function), and inclusiveness (a democratic function). It is in the light of 
those normative requirements that systemic inadequacies are defined. Indeed, by guaranteeing 
security in the context of mutual respect, and an inclusive process of collective choice, “[t]he 
successful realisation of all three of these functions promotes the legitimacy of democratic 
decision making” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 12).  
 
From the discussion above I can specify those requirements to be fulfilled to different degrees 
at different levels and sites of the system and, for the particular case under analysis in this 
dissertation, I take the deliberative minimum to represent the normative baseline. 
 
The deliberative minimum requires at each site “a relation to others as equals engaged in the 
mutual exchange of reasons as if to reaching a shared practical judgment” (Owen and Smith 
2015, 228). This formulation could be interpreted as one which entails two compound 
requirements. “A relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual exchange of reasons”, 
which basically refers to ‘mutual respect’. On the other hand, the disposition to engage in this 
mutual exchange of reasons “as if to reaching a practical judgment” seems to resemble 
Parkinson’s concern about the loosening of ‘reasoning together’” (Parkinson 2012, 167).   
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Regarding the former, if we look at the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al. 2003), for 
example, mutual respect is specified as respect towards groups, respect towards demands under 
discussion, and respect to counter arguments. The importance of the last two is stressed because 
“[i]n particular, respect towards counterarguments is a necessary condition for the weighing of 
alternatives, which some view as an essential element in deliberation” (2003, 26). Moreover, 
current argumentation theory is concerned on this particular mode and defines, in line with this 
definition, that deliberation at a minimum requires “balancing each argument against a counter-
argument” (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 236).  
 
In sum, the normative baseline refers to ‘mutual respect’ as deliberation at minimum for each 
site of the system and entails participants engage in an exchange of reasons balancing 
arguments against counter-arguments. 
 
Regarding the latter, concerns on the loosening of ‘reasoning together’ basically underline the 
expectation that at some point deliberation leads towards social integration based on reason. 
Parkinson resumes this aspiration on the idea that “[p]olitical legitimacy involves not just doing 
things right, but doing the right things.” (2012, 158) Yet, Parkinson himself and Owen and 
Smith (2015, 226) suggest this aspiration should be calibrated differently in different sites of 
the system and both point to Archon Fung (2003, 2005). 
 
Fung suggests that we may be able to acknowledge that, despite Habermas’ contribution to 
reintroduce the common good, or rather the essential connection between individual liberties 
and collective rights,  
... as attractive as they are, the very revolutionary nature of these accounts renders 
them incomplete. In particular, they offer little guidance regarding the 
responsibilities of deliberative democrats in the decidedly non-ideal circumstances 
that characterise contemporary politics (Fung 2005, 398).  
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In short, as Fung plainly stated, the aim is to provide “an account of how it is possible to practice 
deliberative democracy in the face of inequality and hostility without being a political fool” 
(Fung 2005, 416). To assesses whether violations of ideal conditions occur at the institutional 
level, he defined an analytic scheme in the context of which, deviations from ideal deliberative 
behaviour on behalf of citizens might be allowed. The novelty of this approach is that when 
non-ideal conditions are in place, it permits the assessment of citizens deliberation and the 
contribution of mini-publics, to provide for “public accountability, social justice, effective 
governance, and popular mobilisation” (Fung 2003, 340).  
 
Therefore, the disposition towards agreement is considered in relation to the wider system and 
in the context of which deliberation is aimed at contributing. But takes into consideration actual 
conditions in which deliberation, specially citizen’s deliberation, takes place. 
 
The centrality of ‘mutual respect’ in the assessment of deliberation covers one among the three 
functions associated in the systemic turn to deliberative systems; the ethical function. The 
assumption is that not every site should fulfil all of them, ‘mutual respect’ reflects what is 
expected at minimum, but the other two aspects should also be taken into consideration, 
although at the system level. More specifically, the analysis should be attentive to the 
democratic and epistemic aspects.  
 
The democratic aspect of the systemic turn requires the system to be an inclusive political 
process regarding equality (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 12). The inclusion of multiple and plural 
‘voices, interests, concerns, and claims’ is not considered an ethical addendum, but “the central 
element of what makes deliberative democratic processes democratic” (2012, 12). Moreover, 
exclusion can only be justified “by all citizens, including the excluded” (2012, 12). In this 
regard, discussion underlined, however, inclusion should be accompanied by decisiveness, 
specially, in the case of complex diversity where the differentiation between sites for decision 
and space for deliberation is the problem. 
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Finally, the epistemic aspect of the systemic turn entails that the function of a deliberative 
system “is to produce preferences, opinions, and decisions that are the outcome of substantive 
and meaningful considerations of relevant reasons” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 11). Relevant 
considerations should be brought forth “from all corners, aired, discussed, and appropriately 
weighed” (2012, 11) Publicity is not necessary, but recommended, because deliberations 
involve issues of common concern, epistemically grounded preferences, or opinions, and 
“decisions must be informed by, and take into consideration, the preferences and opinions of 
fellow citizens” (2012, 11).  
 
All amount to reasons suggesting the epistemic adequacy of ‘listening to what others have to 
say’. In this regard, the model sketched above goes one step further. Hélène Landemore (2013) 
suggests deliberation also provides democratic decision-making with greater epistemic quality. 
As rightly noted by Parkinson (2012), empirical proof in this regard is problematic, however, 
in theory, the epistemic quality of decision-making processes that combine ‘deliberation with 
others’ and majority rule, is sustained by the fact that by involving more people the probability 
of greater ‘cognitive diversity’ increases and ‘cognitive diversity’ outperforms ability for 
collective problem solving (Landemore 2013, 89–117). In short, ‘the many are smarter than the 
few.’  
 
Moreover, ‘cognitive diversity’ refers to “the variety of mental tools that human beings use to 
solve problems or make predictions in the world” (2013, 89). They include perspectives, 
interpretations, heuristics, and predictive models. These resources are distributed all around the 
deliberative system, and what an inclusive deliberation provides, is the means to bring these 
resources together to a process of ‘deliberating with others.’ Therefore, it is better to have a 
group of cognitively diverse people than a group of people who think alike. In short, ‘the many 
are smarter than the few, no matter how diverse are many.”  
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Finally, Landemore adds that we are obliged to “notice that cognitive diversity is correlated 
with other forms of diversity, such as gender and ethnic diversity”, therefore, “the argument 
suggests that affirmative action and the use of quotas might be a good thing not just on fairness 
grounds, but also on epistemic reasons” (2013, 103). Therefore, the idea that cognitive diversity 
is the main asset of democratic decision making from an epistemic perspective provides added 
value to the compound requirements of inclusiveness and deliberation with others. Even taking 
a conservative stance towards the argument, we can advance, on these bases, the hypothesis 
that complex diversity, does not preclude but could enhance the epistemic capacity of 
deliberation among the many over the few. 
 
In sum, the normative baseline for the case-study requires deliberation to be inclusive and 
decisive, to be based on a mutually respectful exchange of arguments and counterarguments 
with others and prone to enhance the cognitive diversity involved in the decision-making 
process. 
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Chapter V 
Concrete Politics (IV): The Konpondu Initiative 
 
The deliberative exercise analysed in this dissertation is Konpondu. The Initiative for Citizens 
Participation in the Construction of Peace (CICR 2007, 2009) Together with several civil 
society organisations, it was held by the Basque Autonomous Government70 between 2007 and 
2009. Its aim was to foster citizen’s participation in the resolution of the Basque conflict. Over 
a period of almost two years, citizens expressed their opinions and discussed with peers, 
politicians, and experts on the opportunities, risks, and paths to follow. In total, the initiative 
provided support for participation in citizen’s forums held in 101 municipalities (153 forums), 
the diaspora (16), the university (6) and the youth council (6), as well as a web forum 
(www.konpondu.net) where more than 20,000 comments were collected and over 1,000.000 
hits documented.  
Several features make this initiative unique. It was initiated by the government, and therefore 
close to decision making. It was implemented in a very tense environment marked by 
heightened emotions, during a period of escalation in the aftermath of peace negotiations 
between 2005 and 2006 The political arena was one where communication was highly 
segmented and political dialogue was characterised by no communication among parties at all 
(Goikoetxea 2010). In a multilingual society, with a minority language (Basque) struggling for 
survival against the second most spoken language worldwide (Spanish), and in a multinational 
state with strong territorial tensions and all that implies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 Entities that participated the initiative: Presidency of the Basque Government, EUDEL (Association of Basque 
Municipalities), Parte-Hartuz (Research group at University of Basque Country), Lokarri (Citizens Network for Peace), 
Basque Youth Council, Emakunde (Women’s Institute) and the Direction for Public Participation of the Basque Government. 
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Nevertheless, the most challenging feature of this exercise was the political context in which it 
took place. At that time, the Basque Country was host to the last violent conflict within the EU, 
which, since the beginning of hostilities, had accounted for 1.430 casualties71, 3.993 military 
actions, 30.000 arrests, and 4009 officially documented alleged instances of torture in a small 
country that barely passes 3 million inhabitants72. Therefore, political debate in the Basque 
arena has been completely determined by a sequence of events that made a constructive 
approach almost impossible. In short, The Konpondu Initiative involved almost every feature 
that suggested it was bound to fail. However, it is for this reason that it provides an invaluable 
standpoint to analyse how deliberative initiatives stand up to the difficulties of a society coping 
with deep divisions, and where the fault lines are rooted in substantially different 
understandings of the relationship between identity, democracy, and the state in the context of 
a contemporary European liberal democracy. 
The documentation grounding this case study include the transcripts of 117 forums held in 66 
municipalities with 1170 participants, 773 evaluation sheets, methodological guides provided 
to practitioners, media recordings, leaflets and other materials produced to promote the 
initiative, as well as academic, operative, and executive summaries evaluating the process and 
its outcomes, among others73. The analysis will show, that the role of a deliberative exercise 
like The Konpondu Initiative, could create opportunities for constructive engagement in a 
situation far from ideal for deliberative dialogue. To that end, I present a compound analysis of 
the contextual circumstances, institutional design choices, and citizens discourses in The 
Konpondu Initiative.  
To begin, I will establish the analytical framework that structures the empirical analysis of The 
Konpondu Initiative. This section will specify how I am going to empirically implement the 
conceptual bases established in the previous chapter, as well as defining the main research 
question and hypothesis resulting from the precedent critical-conceptual analysis. 
Second, I critically assess the wider socio-political context, and the institutional design choices 
for the case of The Konpondu Initiative. This section, will determine the relationship between 
the concrete features of the site or communicative setting, the wider political process, and the 
outcomes of the initiative.  
                                                 
71 Sources: Ministry of Interior (http://www.interior.gob.es/) and Euskal Memoria (http://www.euskalmemoria.eus/eu/db) 
(Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
72 Source: Gaindegia (http://www.gaindegia.eus/) (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
73 A complete list is provided in Appendices. 
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Third, I present a discourse analysis of citizens’ deliberation, where I will apply the linguistic 
analysis to the study of deliberation as a genre. This methodological choice is unconventional, 
however, the material collected on The Konpondu Initiative is equally distinct from known 
previous deliberate experiments. Nonetheless, it allows for a compound analysis of contextual 
variables, institutional design choices, and deliberative discourse.  
 
1 Analytic Frame: Deliberation Genre 
As already noted, in argumentation theory, deliberation is an argumentation ‘genre’: “a socially 
ratified way of using language connected to a particular type of social activity” (N. Fairclough 
1995, 14). In the case of deliberation, the main type of reasoning is practical reason, and defines 
deliberation as “considering alternative practical arguments, supporting different claims and 
examining and weighing considerations that support these alternatives” (I. Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2013, 50). More concretely, at minimum deliberation requires “balancing each 
argument against a counter-argument” (2013, 236).  
In the light of this definition, the link between deliberative and argumentative definitions of 
deliberation at minimum, underlines the central role both assume for counter-arguments. While 
the crucial difference is that from the perspective of Argumentation Theory, this minimum does 
not provide an ethical principle of discourse, but a minimal requirement for the structure of 
argumentative discourse to be considered deliberation. However, to take deliberation as ‘genre’ 
entails three further assumptions: deliberation is a communicative practice, this communicative 
practice evolves through different stages, and these stages are determined by the general 
purpose of the communicative event under analysis. 
From the perspective of Argumentation Theory, deliberation is assessed and reconstructed in 
the light of an ideal model of ‘critical discussion’ (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 54; van 
Eemeren 2013). Critical discussion frames deliberation as a collective procedure of 
argumentation, thus, deliberation is detached from its reclusion in the deliberating individual 
(I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 34). Moreover, this ideal model is anchored in four meta-
theoretical principles: i) functionalization, ii) externalisation, iii) socialisation and 
iv) dialectification (van Eemeren 2010, 2:5).  
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First, argumentation is considered a complex of linguistic acts with a ‘communicative function’ 
in a discursive context. Second, instead of trying to grasp internal motives, the focus is placed 
on ‘public commitments’ participants undertake through speech acts, and what the 
consequences of those commitments are for the argumentative process. Third, argumentation 
always involves disagreement among ‘two or more inter-actants’ aimed at finding a reasonable 
solution. Finally, the study of argumentation is not merely a descriptive endeavour, but involves 
a normative dimension. Together, functionalization, externalisation, socialisation, and 
dialectification, define deliberation as a communicative practice. 
In addition to this, the procedure of critical discussion unfolds in a sequence of stages. The four 
stages analytically distinguished in the model of critical discussion correspond to 
... the different phases any argumentative discourse must pass through, albeit not 
necessarily explicitly, to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits (2010, 2:10). 
In the ideal model, for example, stages include: i) an initial disagreement (Confrontation); ii) 
the definition of standpoints at issue (Opening); iii) challenge/defence interactions 
(Argumentation) towards; and iv) the final result (Concluding) (2010, 2:10–11). 
These ideals serve two main aims: a) the analytical reconstruction of the process of 
argumentation and b) its critical evaluation. The crucial underlying idea, is the link 
argumentation theory establishes between genre related stages, and argumentative profiles. In 
short, each stage corresponds to a ‘dialectical profile’, and each ‘dialectical profiles’ assists the 
reconstruction of pragmatic moves whereby participants advance towards solutions to their 
differences; in our case using deliberative argumentation (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and 
Henkemans 2007). Therefore, deliberation is argumentation that unfolds in a series of stages 
that allow it to be analytically reconstructed, and against which deliberative dialogue can be 
critically evaluated.  
Finally, the reconstruction of argumentation transcends the level of logic – schemes and 
structures– not only using pragmatic moves – stages – but also carefully attending to different 
contextual levels (van Eemeren 2010, 2:17–18). Along with the linguistic context – micro-
context – attention is given to the specific properties of the setting, and situations where the 
reconstructed argument occurs – the meso-context – and the ‘genre’, or type of speech event of 
which this argument is part – macro-context – (van Eemeren 2016, 19).  
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In other words, argumentative speech acts are uttered in speech events – in this case The 
Konpondu Initiative – and considered instantiations of more general communicative practices 
– participatory deliberation. These practices are conventionalized in the form of communicative 
activity types – mini-publics – implementing different genres of communication activity – 
deliberation – for each domain of communication – in this case, political communication (van 
Eemeren 2010, 2:138–44). 
Indeed, it is by using the appropriate genre of communicative activity for example, that mini-
publics could serve the ‘institutional point’ or “exigency in response to which the activity type 
has come into being” (van Eemeren 2016, 9). In the case of deliberation genre, this purpose is 
specified by the socially ratified way of using language, with the institutional mission being 
that of “preserving the democratic political culture” (van Eemeren 2013, 19). 
At a minimum then, deliberation entails mutual respect that with regard to argumentation theory 
and deliberative democracy, underpins the central role played by counter-arguments. 
Nevertheless, instead of respect towards counter-arguments, argumentation theory underlines 
the use of counter-arguments to support or reject one’s claims, as expressed in the structure of 
argumentative discourse. To properly assess the discourse structure of argumentation demands 
a consideration of how argumentation overcomes the level of logic, and represents a 
communicative practice. This assumption requires argumentation to proceed through a 
sequence of stages that are aimed toward a general purpose, and both are given to each 
communicative event by ‘genre’. Therefore, the concept of genre becomes the crucial link 
connecting text, speech, and context.  
It is on this basis, that I will analyse whether The Konpondu Initiative provided an appropriate 
political ecology to enable movement toward more constructive engagement among 
participants. Constructive engagement is assessed in the light of the degree to which 
participants’ discourses achieved the deliberative minimum. I therefore test, whether contextual 
variables associated with the general purpose of The Konpondu Initiative, institutional 
determinants in the form of design choices or cultural profiles associated with the identity of 
the participants, actually influenced the deliberative behaviour of participants. 
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The main hypothesis is that the diverse identities involved, will enhance the deliberative 
structure of argumentation in citizens’ discursive interactions, and that the extent to which 
participants are capable of engaging in constructive dialogue, will depend largely on contextual 
variables, as well as the institutional design-choices of the concrete deliberative event in which 
deliberation takes place. In short, I will show, that the question of whether the many are smarter 
than the few, largely depends on the capacity of the deliberative system to provide, at each site, 
the means for different perspectives to recognise each other, and engage in a constructive 
argumentative exchange. To do this effectively, I will proceed in three steps.  
First, I will clarify the relationship between the initiative and the wider socio-political 
environment, in which it took place (the macro context). By illustrating the socio-political 
background of the initiative in the period between 2006 and 2009, I will be able to assess its 
contribution in the context of the wider political process which defined its shared purpose. 
Second, I will attend to the characteristics of the setting (the meso context). By moving forward 
to the analysis of the specific design choices, I will be able to determine how far The Konpondu 
Initiative contributed to its institutional goal, or its shared purpose. This step is necessary to 
reveal conventions, and with an understanding of these, define the structure of the 
communicative event. In other words, define the sequence of stages leading the event towards 
its shared purpose. 
The third step is to analyse the discourse structure of texts in the corpus (micro-context). This 
step is crucial, insofar as it is on the basis of this, that I will be able to test whether relational 
discourse structures of text, map onto the stages of deliberation genre, and whether they were 
affected by institutional design choices, or dependent on the linguistic identity of participants.  
Each of these features of the communicative event under analysis represents an indicator of, 
correspondingly, the macro-context (stages), meso-context (design-choices) and micro-context 
(language) of texts. Therefore, in the end, I will be able to test the main hypothesis of this 
dissertation using a compound analysis of deliberation as a structure of argumentation in 
context. 
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2 Macro-Context: The Basque Conflict 
The Konpondu Initiative tabled citizens a question, about a problem, with a seemingly 
intractable solution: peace in the Basque country. Beginning in the 1950s, in the context of 
Franco dictatorship, the violent conflict that characterised the region, survived the Spanish 
transition and became, for the time when The Konpondu Initiative took place, the last remaining 
violent conflict within the EU. Several attempts had been made to resolve the conflict over a 
long period. Historically, the negotiation process in Algiers (1989) between ETA and the 
Spanish Government, and the agreement of Lizarra-Garazi (1998), mark two important staging 
posts. Nevertheless, it is precisely just before, and closely after The Konpondu Initiative, that 
the sequence of proposals became especially prolific. 
Within a short time-span, the Christian-Democrat Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV) presented the 
so-called Ibarretxe Plan (2004), and the leftist nationalist movement (Abertzale Left) its 
proposals of Anaitasuna (2007) and Uztaritz (2007). More conflict resolution oriented 
proposals were the Anoeta Proposal (2004) or the Consultation Law (2008). Finally, unionist 
parties (PP and PSOE) met in the Agreement for the Liberties and against Terrorism (2000). 
All of these initiatives failed. 
The last attempt for official negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government took place. 
just before The Konpondu Initiative. In 2005, the Spanish President Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero (PSOE) asked the parliament for permission to open talks to ETA. This step was 
unprecedented, and marked the beginning of a dialogue that lasted for a very short time.  
A year later, two tables were constituted: one in Geneva sitting delegates of the Spanish 
Government and ETA, and another one in the village of Loiola, with representatives of Basque 
political parties. Official records account for the first meeting between ETA and the Spanish 
government in June 2006 (Whitfield 2014, 151). However, only three months later, on August, 
ETA released a statement suggesting that the peace process was at stake. In September, ETA 
and the Spanish Government met again in Geneva. The third meeting between them took place 
in October, this time in Oslo, and in a palpable atmosphere of crisis, marked by complaints 
from both parties about a bomb attack perpetrated by ETA in Madrid with the consequence of 
two civil casualties. 
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In the midst of this, Batasuna, the outlawed political party of the Abertzale Left, the Christian-
Democrat Nationalist Party (PNV) and the Basque branch of the Socialist Party (PSE), 
inaugurated their talks in Loiola. In between September and November, political parties met 12 
times aimed at finding a viable solution to the Basque conflict (Murua Uria 2014, 7). Indeed, 
they arrived close to an agreement, according to reports. However, in November the Loiola 
talks also broke down. 
According to experts that followed the course events closely, the failure of the Loiola talks, and 
the Geneva Negotiations had a devastating effect. In her recent book on the Basque conflict, 
Teresa Whitfield explained what occurred by quoting Irish Journalist Paddy Woodworth: “I 
had never seen such pessimism amongst those characterised by different ideologies as on this 
visit” (Whitfield 2014, 201). Indeed, the preparation and setting of this negotiation process took 
longer.  
By 2001, Jesus Egiguren, who became the elected president of the PSE in 2002, and the leader 
of the Abertzale Left, Arnaldo Otegi began to meet secretly. According to Imanol Murua, the 
content of those talks lead the former to publish an epilogue titled “Bases for a solution” 
(Egiguren 2003) in which he acknowledged a solution inspired by the Canadian Constitutional 
Court ruling on Quebec, might have been possible74 (Murua Uria 2014, 11–17). On the other 
side, this publication was followed by a change in position of Batasuna, and was formalised in 
the Anoeta Proposal (2004). In short, the Anoeta Proposal (2004), introduced the two-table 
scheme later implemented in peace talks. This methodology meant that, unlike previous 
attempts, the Abertzale Left assumed that political negotiations were to be conducted by 
political representatives. Thus, ETA and Government limited their roles to the discussion of the 
so-called consequences of the conflict; meaning, victims, arms-decommissioning, and political 
prisoners (Zabalo and Aiarza 2010, 35).  
 
 
 
                                                 
74 In short, if a qualified majority of the Basque people was willing to vote for independence Spanish authorities shall 
acknowledge this claim but this right was not innated to the Basque Country but the consequence of a democratic mandate. 
Ref to case docs 
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The fact that parties from both sides met according to the definition of the methodology 
represented a major step forward. Accordingly, the end of the peace process indicated the failure 
of a long walk that aimed to build up a democratic situation. In January 2007, in the aftermath 
of ETA’s bomb attack, the government declared the peace process was dead. Two further 
meetings took place in Geneva: first, between ETA and the Government, and later with the 
inclusion of the Abertzale Left and International observers. Nevertheless, talks failed. In June 
2007 ETA declared the end of the cease fire officially and resumed its armed campaign by 
killing two members of the Guardia Civil in Capbreton (France). 
This is the context in which The Konpondu Initiative took place. The political umbrella of The 
Konpondu Initiative was the Initiative for Citizens Participation in the Construction of Peace, 
presented in September 2006 in the Basque Parliament by Juan Jose Ibarretxe. Therefore, in 
parallel to peace talks among parties in Loiola, ETA and the Spanish government, began to 
blame each other for the lack of progress in the peace talks. The web page hosting online forums 
was launched the 19th January 2007, 20 days after ETA’s bomb attack in Madrid. Moreover, 
the Citizen’s Participation Plan, the institutional materialization of the initiative was 
announced in June 2007. Just after Geneva Talks broke down, the same month Arnaldo Otegi 
was imprisoned, and ETA declared the cease fire over (Whitfield 2014, 200).  
In practical terms, The Konpondu Initiative consisted of three channels, each providing citizens 
with different platforms to make their voice heard on the resolution of the Basque conflict. The 
first channel was officially opened on 19th January 200775. Konpondu.net was a platform 
whereby citizens had the opportunity to send their opinions, feelings, and proposals to political 
parties, while hosting institutions took the role of transmitting them. The second channel was 
more ambitious. It involved citizens’ forums in several municipalities all over the territory of 
the Basque Country and the diaspora. The initiative was launched in March 2007 in agreement 
with EUDEL, the Association of Basque Municipalities, and the University of the Basque 
Country (UPV-EHU). Finally, it also included a more informal track for civil society groups, 
stakeholders, and other peace organisations. 
 
                                                 
75Source: http://www.euskadi.eus/gobierno-
vasco/contenidos/noticia/inter_20070119_konpondu/es_int_konp/inter_20070119_konpondu.html (Consulted: 2017/06/17). 
  
201 
The initiative was valued as much as it was criticised76. The first source of mistrust came from 
other political parties, who blamed the initiative as incoherent due to the small role the PNV 
was playing in the peace process77. Indeed, according to Jorge de la Herran78, who was 
responsible for the firm that managed the web service, the initiative failed to gather more 
support, because of its strong connections with the Government. Nonetheless, as the report, 
written by experts from the Columbia University (CICR 2007, 2009) testifies, it was also valued 
as an innovative approach to both conflict resolution and citizens participation. Indeed, the 
initiative was part of a wider program, sponsored by the Lehendakari, and justified as an attempt 
to make the government an active agent for peace and resolution79. Ibarretxe presented his road 
map for peace in September 2007, and his speech began by referring to “the more than 50 
participation forums or more than million hits the Konpondu.net web page has” 
(VIII/68/20070928, 37). The roadmap consisted of several steps.  
The first was the offer of a political agreement to the Spanish Government to be achieved before 
June 2008. Second, he proposed a plenary in the Basque Parliament to ratify the agreement, 
and authorise a consultation to the Basque society. If there was no agreement, the plan included 
an ‘enabling’ consultation, to clarify the democratic mandate of Basque institutions. Finally, 
the plan included the consultation, dated the 25th of October 2008. The consultation would have 
asked citizens, first, “if they supported a solution to violence through dialogue if ETA had 
previously expressed its unequivocal intention to end violence” and “if Basque political parties 
should initiate negotiations to reach a democratic agreement on the right to decide” (Whitfield 
2014, 200).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 Source: http://www.agoranet.es/blog/la-participacion-ciudadana-sigue-siendo-una-asignatura-pendiente/ (Consulted: 2017-
08-13). 
77 According to Imanol Murua, the role of the PNV was reduced “to play the mandolin” aimed at getting Romeo and Julieta to 
kiss each other (Murua Uria 2014, 232). This quote refers to the explanation given by Josu Jon Imaz, former president of the 
PNV, of their role during Loiola Talks. 
78 Interview conducted in the course of this research (Bilbao, 2014-02-19). 
79 Source: http://www.legebiltzarra.eus/pdfdocs/publi/2/08/000038.pdf (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
  
202 
As planned, the project was passed by the Basque parliament on the 27th June 2008. The 
parliamentary vote was divided in two blocks. 34 members of parliament voted yes, including 
the three government parties (EAJ-PNV, EA80 and EB81) and the branches of the left 
nationalism (EHAK82 and Aralar83). On the other side, the 33 members of parliament of the two 
unionist parties (PP and PSE) rejected the initiative. Indeed, the Spanish government brought 
an action against the initiative to the Constitutional court the same day, and after deliberations, 
the court outlawed the plan in 11th September 2008 due to a violation of art. 149 of the Spanish 
Constitution. The article establishes that consultations are the exclusive competence of the 
State.  
Indeed, almost no debate on the initiative itself took place. The initiative was considered the 
second act of the Ibarretxe Plan (Castells 2003), a governmental initiative to reform the basic 
framework regulating Basque institutional self-government approved by the Basque Parliament 
in 2003 and discussed and rejected in the Spanish Parliament in 2005. Indeed, the debate 
between Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and Juan Jose Ibarretxe included exchanges that related 
back to the core of the controversy. In one moment during his intervention, Zapatero reclaimed 
from Ibarretxe reasonableness ‘because we have to be able to live together’ and Ibarretxe 
replied ‘to live together, we have to able first to decide whether we want to live together.’  
Ibarretxe lasted in government for several months after his initiative was rejected. Indeed, The 
Konpondu Initiative remained until January 2009 and closed its doors in parallel to the end of 
Ibarretxe’s legislature. For the first in the Basque Autonomous Community, a government led 
by a unionist party was constituted. Patxi Lopez was designed Lehendakari the 7th of May 2009. 
The Konpondu.net web page was shut down for the following 15 days84. Nevertheless, the peace 
process lasted, and civil society found its way through, with or without governmental support. 
 
 
                                                 
80 Splinter social-democratic party of the PNV created in 1986 (http://www.euskoalkartasuna.org/) nowadays is part of the 
coalition EHBildu. 
81 Basque branch of Spanish United Left until 2011, disappeared in 2014. Source: https://eu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ezker_Batua-
Berdeak (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
82 Basque Communist Party created in 2002. It took part in elections for the Basque Parliament for the first time in 2005 after 
the illegalisation of the platform Aukera Guztiak. The parliamentary group named Abertzale left. Source: 
https://eu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euskal_Herrialdeetako_Alderdi_Komunista (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
83 Splinter party of Batasuna created in 2001 (http://www.aralar.eus/) nowadays is part of the coalition EHBildu. 
84Source: http://paulrios.net/tag/konpondu/ (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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In the aftermath of the ceasefire, the Abertzale Left conducted an extensive debate that resulted 
in a resolution entitiled Zutik Euskal Herria (2010). Therein, it publicly announced its unilateral 
commitment to the campaign for independence, exclusively by civil and political means, 
thereby confirming their commitment to peace by undertaking, and calling for others to 
undertake, the so-called Mitchell Principles. Zutik Euskal Herria was followed up by a series 
of declarations and agreements at both national85 and international levels86, culminating a year 
later in Donostia for the “International Conference to promote the resolution of the conflict in 
the Basque Country”87 (2011). 
The Aiete Conference, chaired by Kofi Annan, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Jonathan Powell, 
and backed among others, by Jimmy Carter and George J. Mitchell, sat together with 
international personalities, representatives of Basque society, and, with the exception of the PP, 
all political parties from both sides of the border. The most important direct effect of the Aiete 
Conference was that on the 20th October 2011, ETA declared the definitive cessation of its 
armed activity. On the other side, the Spanish government refused to play any role in the 
process. Moreover, the narrative of the Spanish government (Powell 2014, 109–43; Whitfield 
2014, 265–86), led since 2011 by Mariano Rajoy, was that ETA had been defeated because of 
the effectiveness of the security forces and, moreover, the absence of a realistic expectative of 
a peace process.  
 
 
 
                                                 
85 At national level, different agents including political parties (EA, Alternatiba, Aralar, EB), labour unions (LAB, STEE-
EILAS…), social movements and civil society organizations gave this approach a positive reception endorsing the Gernika 
Agreement (2010). In the following years, this agreement was materialized in the institutional arena by several coalitions of 
forces (Bildu, Amaiur and EHBildu) that received a strong electoral support becoming in 2012 the second political force of the 
territory (%25), behind the PNV (34,61%). 
86 At international level, the Brussels Declaration (2010) became the reference. Several international personalities – Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, Mary Robinson, John Hume, Albert Reynolds, Frederick DeKlerk, the Nelson Mandela Foundation and 
Jonathan Powell – welcomed the “proposed steps and new public commitment of the Basque pro-independence (Abertzale 
Left) to ‘exclusively political and democratic’ means” considering that “this commitment can be a major step in ending the last 
remaining conflict in Europe.” 
87 The conference concluded with a comprehensive roadmap. The roadmap included 5 points calling upon ETA to “make a 
public declaration of the definitive cessation of all armed action”, upon the Spanish and French authorities to “welcome it and 
agree to talks” on the consequences of the conflict, urged for “major steps be taken to promote reconciliation, recognize, 
compensate and assist all victims”, suggested the appropriateness of addressing “other issues” that could contribute to a new 
era without conflict and, finally, the international personalities involved in the conference agreed to create a committee to 
follow up this recommendations (Aiete 2011). 
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In the immediate aftermath of the Aiete Declaration, Lokarri88 assumed the peace process in 
the Basque Country was at risk. Indeed, in its last annual report, Lokarri highlighted the risks 
that were perceived to menace the peace process. However, taking a constructive stance, a 
change was proposed in the extant paradigm based on two ideas (Lokarri 2014). First, civil 
society should play a leading role in the resolution process, representing the majoritarian will 
of Basque society in favour of a resolution process. Second, civil society should look for 
mechanisms with enough legitimacy to encourage new steps by political representatives 
towards lasting peace.  
In practice, this change of paradigm led to the organisation of the Basque Social Forum in 
March 2013. The forum was organised by several associations including Lokarri itself, 
Citizen’s Network for Peace, Bake Bidea, Ahotsak and several other associations supported by 
NGOs and International Organisations. More than 700 people took part, and a set of 
recommendations was released (Social Forum, 2013). Moreover, several similar initiatives took 
place in the following months to socialize its conclusions. 
Recommendations state the need for “an exercise of dialogue and reconciliation that establishes 
a solid basis for future coexistence through the wide-ranging and active participation of 
institutions, political parties and civil society”. It urges the design of a process to disarm ETA 
and dismantle its military structures. It reclaimed the “integration of prisoners and people on 
the run” and recommends the promotion of human rights “facilitating different ways of 
narrating and remembering what happened, encouraging self-criticism in every social and 
political sector and an honest exercise of recognition of the serious mistakes made.”  
According to Paul Rios, the outcome of this forum should not be underestimated. It provided a 
unique opportunity to bring together social sectors willing to cooperate in the peace process, 
and contributed to the search for new solutions and helped to “add legitimacy to an agenda for 
the Basque peace process, at least by ensuring the key issues for Basque society are represented 
in discussions” (Rios 2014, 43). Indeed, it facilitated a paradigm shift regarding conflict 
resolution in the Basque case.  
 
                                                 
88 Lokarri was a citizens’ network (https://eu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lokarri_(gizarte_mugimendua) that together with 
Conciliation Resources (http://www.c-r.org/)  and Berghof Foundation (http://www.berghof-foundation.org/)   hosted the Aiete 
Conference, and collaborated in the setting and development of The Konpondu Initiative. 
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Until then, elite negotiations characterised all attempts; the actors changed, but closed-doors 
ruled the talks. Yet, in the absence of closed-doors tracks, Rios summarised the proposal of the 
civil society as follows. In the face of radical disagreement between the two main parties 
involved, moving forward demands that the Spanish government must modify its prison 
policies, “not because ETA is asking for it, but because Basque society is calling for it.” At the 
other end of the equation, ETA must take steps towards disarmament, “not because the Spanish 
government is demanding it, but because Basque society needs it to eliminate any kind of 
threat” (Rios 2014, 41). Moreover, in the light of forthcoming events, it seems that finally, 
some, though not all, took notice. 
On the 8th of April 2017, an event took place in Baiona (North of the Basque Country), where 
ETA completed its disarmament process by releasing its stockpile of weapons to a civil society 
organisation named Les artisans de la Paix, and under the supervision of the International 
Verification Commission and representatives of the Vatican. This unexpected sequence of 
events leaves a scenario that, according to the New York Times, represented “the region’s best 
chance in decades for a durable peace”89 (The New York Times 2017/04/14). 
 
3 Meso-Context: Institutional Design-Choices and Outcomes 
To call deliberation a ‘genre’, infers that argumentation represents not only a theoretical 
construct, but also that it is a communicative practice. Therefore, analysis involves different 
levels. On one level, the macro-contextual dimension of political deliberation connects each 
communicative activity type with the wider political process. In this case, The Konpondu 
Initiative was designed to involve citizens in the resolution of the Basque conflict. More 
concretely, to  
... offer regular citizens the opportunity to participate in constructing peace in the 
Basque region and for their participation to contribute to progress in the peace 
process and normalisation (CICR 2009, 32).  
                                                 
89 The editorialist refers the reaction of the Spanish government and its commitment not to change a coma in its position. A 
reaction considered bizarre, for example, by Jonathan Powel, former chief of staff of Tony Blair and one of the endorsers of 
the Aiete Declaration, that declared in Financial Times: “[u]nlike any other government I am aware of in an analogous position, 
that administration went out of its way to put obstacles in front of Eta giving up its weapons.” (Financial Times 2017/04/09) 
Source: https://www.ft.com/content/d511c5c8-1bb3-11e7-a266-12672483791a (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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This shared purpose neatly fits with what is expected from communicative events instantiating 
the deliberation genre, namely the institutional mission of “preserving the democratic political 
culture” (van Eemeren 2013, 19). In this case, by bringing citizens into the equation. 
On another level, each speech event entails certain conventionalized norms associated with the 
concrete communication activity type, and resulting from its genre. In other words, as a 
communicative practice, deliberation is constrained by several institutional conventions 
associated with the particular activity types under study; in our case, deliberative mini-publics 
(van Eemeren 2013, 19). However, conventions serve as an analytical point of reference for the 
reconstruction and critical evaluation of argumentation in a communicative event, because 
argumentation never proceeds in ideal conditions. Therefore, this analytical reference point 
should be empirically grounded; carefully attending to the specific institutional conditions at 
each case (2010, 2:170–83).  
A widely-used model for the empirical description of generic features of communication 
activity types, defines six relevant questions. The location where communication takes place 
(Where). The generic purpose of the event (Why). The time in which it takes place (When). 
Who takes part (Who). What is being communicated (What) and how it was practically settled 
(How) (Yoshioka et al. 2001; Yates and Orlikowski 2002). Indeed this model (5W1H) already 
has been applied, in the analysis of genre features in e-democracy exercises (Johannessen 2012) 
and the European Citizen’s Initiative (Grönlund and Susha 2012). My choice here will follow 
the basic requirements of this model, but takes as a reference point a proposal concretely defined 
for the analysis of deliberative mini-publics90, and consistent with the conceptual tenets 
established in the previous chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
90
 Indeed, the parallel unfolding of concerns on context associated to the so-called fourth generation of deliberative democratic 
theory (Elstub 2010; Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016) lead some to conclude, that “argumentation research and political 
research in the traditions of deliberative theory of democracy converge in their steps from ideal theoretical models towards a 
systematic study of concrete contexts of argumentation.” (Lewiński and Mohammed 2015) Lewinskin and Mohammed stressed 
the contribution deliberative democratic theory could make to the contextual characterization of communication activity types 
instantiating genre of deliberation. 
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In particular, I will follow Owen and Smith (2015) and apply Archon Fung’s proposal to assess 
how far institutional conditions of particular sites and venues in the deliberative system, deviate 
from the ideal, with a special attention to the deliberative minimum. Archon Fung (2003, 2005) 
defines an analytical model to assess the relationship between institutional design-choices, 
contextual variables, and deliberative outcomes in response to the following questions: who 
participates, what is being discussed, how is the initiative designed, when it takes place and 
why (Fung 2003, 340–47). He also, considers the purpose and vision of the initiative, the level 
of empowerment, and the kind of connection from public space to state. Thus, the model could 
be considered an adaptation of the 5W1H model, for the specific case of deliberative mini-
publics.  
The description that follows is based on the information recovered from evaluation sheets 773 
participants filled in at the end of the initiative, supporting material provided to practitioners, 
executive summaries of the promoters, as well as reports written by experts, transcripts of 
parliamentary debates on the initiative, interviews, and several press reports. Together they 
provide a comprehensive overview of the initiative and permit cross-checking several of its 
features from different perspectives. 
 
3.1 Vision and Type 
First and foremost, deliberative mini-publics vary with regard to the vision they have of the 
exercise itself. Fung distinguished four models. Educative forums are aimed at providing 
citizens with conditions different to those in their daily lives. Therefore, citizens are given ideal 
conditions to “form, articulate and refine opinions about particular public issues through 
conversations with one another” (2003, 340). Advisory Participatory Panels, on the other hand, 
differ, because their aim is not to improve the quality of opinion, but to align public policies 
with participant’s preferences. Participatory Problem-Solving Collaboration imagines a 
continued relationship between political institutions and the public sphere, aimed at solving 
collective problems. Finally, Participatory Democratic Governance presents the most 
ambitious model, and envisions mini-publics incorporating citizens in institutional decision 
making. 
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In the case of The Konpondu Initiative, the dimensions and the different layers involved, 
suggested different visions were embraced. It simplifies matters to begin by discarding what it 
was not.  
It was not an exercise of Participatory Democratic Governance. In this type of deliberative 
exercise, citizens are incorporated into decision making, and that was absent in The Konpondu 
Initiative. This aspect was expressed by Ibarretxe addressing basic guidelines of the 
participation plan. He explained:  
My last contribution refers to the necessity of incorporating active participation of 
society during the process as a companion of the irreplaceable role of political 
parties (VIII/38/20060922, 29).  
The connection of this participatory process to decision-making was direct, inasmuch as the 
government itself was the main promotor of the initiative. But the division of roles within 
policy-making, between ‘irreplaceable actors’ and their ‘companion’, suggests a clear division 
of roles between citizens and elected representatives. 
The function of the initiative seems to rather bridge the gap between citizens and institutions, 
at least if we attend to the literality of the initiative. For example, it was explained in the 
promotional leaflet as a personal commitment of the Lehendakari “to collect all opinions 
received, elaborate a report of conclusions and deliver it directly to Basque Parliament and 
political parties to be taken into consideration” (Doc 1). Moreover, in this case, the initiative 
was part of a wider political process in which different devices enacted citizens’ participation 
in different roles. Shortly after in the same speech Ibarretxe stated:  
I am convinced we will reach peace and political normalisation if we are capable of 
making citizens feel this process as their own and actively engage in the search for 
a solution. The Basque society is who at the end will decide and, therefore, the real 
protagonist of its future (VIII/38/20060922, 29).  
The problem is, we cannot know whether he was speaking about the initiative itself, or the 
forthcoming consultation. However, being one or the other, the lecture over the motivation 
behind the initiative differs. 
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Having said that, certain aspects of it may have played a role associated with Advisory Panels. 
For example, the report was written by experts from the Centre for International Conflict 
Resolution at Columbia University (CICR).  The committee was formed by Andrea Bartoli, 
Harry Barnes, Mica Estrada-Hollenbeck and William Weisberg (CICR 2007, 5). Their roles 
extended well beyond the report itself. Moreover, members of this expert committee, for 
example, Prof. Dr Andrea Bartoli has long maintained a relationship both at the institutional 
level with the Basque Government, and particularly with Lehendakari Ibarretxe with whom 
nowadays she collaborates with in the context of different initiatives conducted in the Agirre 
Lehendakaria Center for Social and Political Studies (ALC).   
The web platform, however, was an attempt to establish a continued relationship between 
political institutions and the public sphere, as in the case of Participatory Problem-Solving 
Collaboration. It enabled a direct channel whereby not only citizens were able to reach 
politicians, but citizens could engage each other in discussion. In addition, their interactions 
were not only reported to politicians, but politicians directly responded to them. Nevertheless, 
as is common on social networks, it seems this virtual dialogue did not create too many 
constructive interactions. In conversation with the promoter of the web page, Jorge de la 
Herran,91 he explained that they decided to leave the space open, but the consequence was that 
it was dominated by some voices and little interaction in constructive terms.  
Finally, the fact that the initiative provided an unusual space for discussion, in an otherwise 
evasive environment, suggests citizens had conditions very different to those they usually 
encountered in their daily lives; contributed to the learning required for the establishment of 
more constructive interactions. For example, the report by Parte-Hartuz (EHU) on six 
University forums, underlined the contribution made by these meetings, because “the 
confrontation and political-ideological sectarianism are even higher in the university that in the 
Basque Society” (Doc 2, 3). In this case, forums might have played a role as Educative Forums, 
providing citizens with conditions hitherto absent, to enhance debate in the public sphere. 
Indeed, as the following sections will show, it seems this is the most prominent trait to feature 
in the vision, and type of deliberation, in The Konpondu Initiative. 
 
 
                                                 
91 Interview with Jorge de la Herran (Bilbao, 2014/02/19). 
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In sum, given that the initiative involved several different dynamics at several different levels, 
it is difficult to establish which was the vision of deliberation being played out univocally. 
However, aspects associated with different types do emerge, depending on the perspective 
taken for their consideration, or the concrete feature that is underlined. In municipal forums for 
example, the objective was to “offer regular citizens the opportunity to participate in 
constructing peace in the Basque region and for their participation to contribute to progress in 
the peace process and normalisation” (CICR 2009, 32). Therefore, we could suggest while the 
expressed aim is closer to Participatory Problem-Solving Collaboration, in practice the vision 
and type of deliberation relates more closely to Educative Forums.  
 
3.2 Participant Selection and Recruitment 
A second dimension to take into consideration is who takes part (2003, 342). In this regard, it 
is important to distinguish between voluntary self-selection; namely, the possibility for all to 
participate acknowledging that only some take part, and those that are specifically selected as 
say a representative sample. However, those implementing strategies to avoid bias, for 
example, rules over economic incentives or targeted recruitment, could be differentiated 
regarding their objective. First, mini-publics could be defined to mirror the profile of the 
general population. Second, there is the possibility for active recruitment; the selecting of 
citizens whose perspective is necessary for a fruitful debate. Finally, incentives could be 
provided to animate people that otherwise would choose not to take part. 
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In this regard, incentives were not used to recruit participants, and the initiative was designed 
as an open invitation to citizens. Therefore, the main mechanism of selection was self-selection. 
However, reports and conversations with organisers conducted during the research, revealed 
efforts to involve certain people to enhance the representativeness or diversity of the group. 
Indeed, this effort may be related to the challenging context in which the initiative took place. 
For example, in the mentioned report on the six University forums, it is said that “difficulties 
to find people – attending to criteria of pluralism established (mainly gender, age, social 
condition, and political ideology) – willing to take part were undoubted” (Doc 2, 6). In this 
case, the report refers to previous municipal forums92 also conducted by Parte-Hartuz as 
facilitators. However, in the case of the University forums they followed, they “found an 
important number of people that rejected our invitation, either due they had to work at the 
scheduled time or, unfortunately, because they did not want to take part in an initiative of this 
kind” (Doc 2, 6).  
Therefore, difficulties in guaranteeing diversity and sociological quotas, were encountered, and 
as the report makes clear, self-selection was combined with active recruitment to guarantee a 
certain balance of sociological profiles, as well as political pluralism.  
Another important aspect to clarify, is ‘who took part’ and ‘where it took place’? In the 
combination of different reports collected, I have been able to account for 153 forums, held in 
101 different municipalities93 from Araba (23), Bizkaia (51), Gipuzkoa (21) and Nafarroa (2). 
Therefore, regarding the territorial distribution of the initiative, it was balanced for the three 
territories of Basque Autonomous Community, but not in Navarre which seems reasonable 
insofar as it was an initiative of the government of the former.  
 
 
 
                                                 
92 In particular forums conducted in Amurrio, Azkoitia, Bermeo, Gautegiz-Arteaga, Gernika and Laudio. 
93 Abanto Zierbena, Agurain, Aia, Amorebieta-etxano, Amurrio, Aramaio, Arantza, Areatza (Villaro), Aretxabaleta, Arraia-
Maeztu, Arrankudiaga, Arratzu, Arrazua-Ibarrundia, Arrieta, Arrigorriaga, Artziniega, Asparrena, Azkoitia, Azpeitia, Bakio, 
Balmaseda, Barrika, Beasain, Bedia, Berantevilla, Bergara, Bermeo, Bernedo, Derio, Dima, Durango, Elantxobe, Elgeta, 
Elgoibar, Erandio, Ereño, Errigoiti, Forua, Galdakao, Gautegiz, Gernika, Getaria, Getxo, Gordexola, Gorliz, Gueñes, Harana, 
Hondarribia, Ibarrangelu, Ispaster, Iurreta, Kanpezu, Labastida, Lagran, Laguardia, Lantaron, Larrabetzu, Lazkao, Legazpi, 
Legorreta, Leioa, Lekeitio, Lemoa, Lemoiz, Lesaka, Leza, Lezama, Lezo, Llodio, Loiu, Maruri-Jatabe, Mundaka, Mungia, 
Muskiz, Mutriku, Nabarniz, Oñati, Ondarroa, Ordizia, Orduña, Orio, Orozko, Ortuella, Ribera alta, Santurtzi, Sestao, Sondika, 
Tolosa, Ugao, Urnieta, Urretxu, Valdegovia, Zaldibia, Zalduondo, Zalla, Zambrana, Zamudio, Zigoitia, Zizurkil, Zuia, Zumaia 
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Conversely, at the level of the municipalities involved, we find that the initiative took place 
mainly in small villages. Their populations were mostly fewer than 2,000 inhabitants (44) or 
between 2,000 and 10,000 (36) while only one municipality had more than 50,000 inhabitants 
involved; and many of the capitals took part. Finally, if we look at the level of municipalities 
regarding political pluralism, we find that only 1 out of 101 was ruled by a unionist party (PSE). 
Moreover, in 79 of them, the majority was from one of the parties in the Basque Government: 
EAJ-PNV (73), 5 (EA) and 1 (EB).  
 
 
 
 
 
At the level of participants, I recovered transcripts from 117 forums, and on the basis of those, 
at least 1305 persons took part, including 696 males, 532 females, and one transgender among 
which more groups were composed of mainly males (%59). The average age of participants 
was 49 years, which is higher than the average age in Basque society (42 in 201194). Indeed, 
both reports written by Columbia University experts underlined the lack of participation of 
young people (CICR 2007, 30), and this concern is also present in citizen’s evaluations95. 
                                                 
94 Source: Gaindegia-Datuak (http://www.datuak.net/) (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
95 In the next table is included under the heading of participation, but 23 respondents underlined the engagement of young 
people as a recommendation for future forums. 
8
4 5
1
1
73
8
ANV Aralar EA EB PSE PNV Others
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0
 >
 2
00
0
2
00
0 
> 
50
0
0
5
00
0 
> 
10
0
00
1
00
00
 >
 2
0
00
0
2
00
00
 >
 5
0
00
0
5
00
00
 >
 1
0
00
00
44
17
19
14
6
1
Graph 1: Municipalities by Governing Party and Population 
  
213 
Regarding the language of forums, most of them were conducted using both official languages 
in the territory (%53) while among those that were conducted only in one language, those 
exclusively Spanish (%33) outnumbered those in Basque (%10). 
Regarding participation at each forum, on average 11 people took part with at least 3 
participants, and with 24 at most. Participation reached its peak in April 2008 (260 participants) 
and as expected lower rates were recorded in summer time in 2007 and 2008. Finally, regarding 
occupational roles, only partial information was available. However, amongst those who 
responded, 14.2% were technical specialists, 26.5% were scientific or intellectual professionals. 
It is known that better educated people tend to be more prone to participate in this kind of events 
(Caluwaerts 2012). However, the percentage is rather high. This group is followed by 9.7% 
who were retired, 7.1% who identified as homemakers, 6% who were professionals in the 
service sector and 4.7%. from the first sector.  
Therefore, it can be safely asserted that the scale of the initiative was remarkable.  Self-selection 
seemed to be the dominant rule according to leaflets and official records, but reports from 
organisers signalled that targeted recruitment was used to ensure a certain sociological balance 
as well as ideological pluralism. Participant’s profiles however, seem balanced with regard to 
gender and language, the latter being given the initiative, replicates percentages in Basque 
society. The age rate is higher than average, and the occupational role reflects a certain bias 
towards the educated, but this seems to be common in this kind of initiatives. 
The most controversial aspect may be whether diversity in terms of ideological pluralism was 
achieved. As noted before, the reports suggest that an effort was made in this direction. But, for 
example, the political colour of Town Halls and the municipalities involved seems to suggest 
the opposite. 
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Participants were directly asked in the evaluation sheet: “Zure ustez, anitza izan al da foroa 
parte-hartzaileak eta entzun dituzun iritziak kontuan hartuta?96” (Doc 3) 69.7% of respondents 
(498 participants) replied the initiative was diverse enough and 20.1% responded negatively 
(144), while 9.8% responded they did not know (70) and three did not respond. Overall, results 
suggest most of the participants were satisfied with the level of inclusiveness achieved. Though, 
in response to the question “Zer hobetuko zenuke antolatu behar diren hurrengo udal-foroei 
begira?97” (Doc 3), concerns on diversity were amongst the most repeated ones along with 
greater participation and methodological recommendations. 
 
 
To conclude, the fact that the lack of diversity appeared in response to an open question, 
enhances the idea of a certain bias. Nonetheless, experts from the Columbia University would 
disagree, they concluded “[t]here was an ample evidence of ideological diversity in the sense 
that many participants emphasised what would usually be considered nationalist sentiments and 
others put forth sentiments usually associated with non-nationalist views.” (CICR 2007, 30) 
After reading the transcripts, my impression is ambivalent. On the one hand, different 
sensibilities were present and made their positions part of the discussion. However, on the other 
hand, it feels as if participants were mainly closer the Basque nationalist sphere. Yet, the Basque 
nationalist sphere is majoritarian in societal terms.  
                                                 
96 English Translation: Do you think this forum has been diverse considering participants and heard opinions? 
97 English Translation: What would you ameliorate for coming municipal-forums? 
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3.3 Subject and scope 
The third dimension attends to the subject and scope of deliberation, and interrogates the 
decision to take over the appropriate issue for discussion. In this dimension, choice affects the 
scope of debate, and the balance between a previous assessment on appropriate terms, and the 
capacity of discussion to lead the problem agenda. In The Konpondu Initiative the problem 
agenda for discussion was entirely determined by the wider political process; the participation 
plan of the Basque Government. In this sense, it is plausible to suppose that the most open 
aspect was the web platform, certainly insofar as citizens were free to comment and interact. 
Though, the general frame for debate was also previously defined: the Basque Conflict.  
In the case of forums, there are certain differences depending on the phases of the initiative, 
and this is reflected in the questionnaires (Doc 4; Doc 5). In the first phase, questionnaires 
guiding moderators were structured in two moments. In the first turn, citizens were called to 
respond to a general question over which initiatives they considered would benefit a new 
opportunity for peace. Ultimately, they were called to summarise the most interesting ideas they 
heard during the discussion. 
 
 
Question 1: “Egoera honetan, zein ekimenek lagun dezakete bakerako aukera berri bat 
sortzen?”98  
Question 2: “Txanda honetan, partaide bakoitzari beste partaideek egindako ekarpenetatik 3 
ideia interesgarrienak azpimarratzea eskatzen da.”99 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 English Translation: In the current situation, which initiatives could contribute to create a new opportunity for peace? 
99 English Translation: In this turn, we invite participants to underline 3 most interesting ideas from contributions made by 
other participants. 
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The second was more demanding because it required: first a reflexion on the opportunities and 
risks; second, to evaluate the potentialities, weaknesses, and doubts; and third, a closing round 
to reflect on the better ideas. Moreover, with regard to subject and scope, this change is 
meaningful because the scope of the debate was narrowed down. The second question specified 
the initiative to be discussed: the consultation. Therefore, it was no longer an open question. 
Moreover, citizens knew about its content from the beginning (Doc 6). Therefore, this initiative 
took the opposite approach of experiences reviewed in this dissertation, for example, the g1000 
(Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2014) were the issue agenda was defined by citizens themselves. 
 
Question 1: “Gaur egun bizi dugun egoeran zein arazo eta zein aukera ikusten dituzu bakea eta 
normalizazio politikoa lortzeko?”100 
Question 2: “Ados zaude herritarrak kontsultatuak izan daitezen bizi dugun egoera 
desblokeatzen laguntzeko?”101 
Question 3: Txanda honetan, partaide bakoitzari beste partaideek egindako ekarpenetatik 3 
ideia interesgarrienak azpimarratzea eskatzen da.102  
 
In the report written by Columbia University experts, they noted this change “appeared to 
induce a very different response type of response from participants, both in mood and content” 
(CICR 2009, 9). Regarding the former, they underline the emphasis on risk, before 
opportunities, for example, may have influenced so that discourses “exuded greater frustration 
and scepticism” (2009, 13). Regarding the latter, they underlined this method lead to 
“discussion that contained more layers, more overtly political discussion, and allowed for 
greater difference of opinion to the surface” (2009, 31).  
 
 
                                                 
100 English Translation: In nowadays situation what problems and opportunities do you see to reach peace and political 
normalization? 
101 English Translation: Do you agree that citizens are consulted to unlock the current situation? 
102 English Translation: In this turn, we invite participants to underline 3 most interesting ideas from contributions made by 
other participants. 
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I will return to this in the next section, but suffice to say they wrote of the consultation that: 
“[w]e applaud the organizers for asking about obstacles and opportunities for peace, or for 
asking about the Consulta, an important political topic of the day, by inducing analysis 
(opportunities, risks, doubts) rather than simply a yes or no response” (2009, 31). Moreover, in 
the section of recommendations, they suggest a more focused approach to “exploring the issue 
of self-determination more full” (2009, 35). However, just after, they suggest, it would be 
pertinent, given the change of mood perceived in reports, to step back to the methodology of 
the first phase. Therefore, roll back to less demanding questions. 
In sum, agenda setting took place without the participation of citizens, and the scope of the 
debate was narrowed down as the initiative advanced. In the second phase, the subject was more 
clearly defined in close relation to the wider political process, moreover, the changes affected 
citizens’ discussions. However, in the light of expert recommendations, it is not clear whether 
they were related to the issue under discussion or the structure of the event. 
 
3.4 Deliberative Mode 
The fourth dimension calls into question the expected outcome. As has been widely 
documented by empirical theory, citizens do not behave in the same manner if a consensus is 
expected, or the mini-public is geared to provide citizens with an opportunity to express their 
point of view. The first option resembles Type I models of deliberative democracy. The second 
is closer to Type II. The first type of mini-public follows a clear path through different stages, 
beginning with participant’s proposals, justification in favour or against, and finally, agreement 
on planning possible ways for implementation. The side effect of this model is that weak 
positions tends to be dismissed and controversial issues avoided for the sake of agreement.  
On the contrary, when no agreement is expected attention ought to be focused on opening the 
floor to different perspectives, and foster individual will formation to consider others. In this 
case, each phase seems to correspond to one model in the light of their structure. The first would 
be focused more on opening up the floor, while the second considers fostering discussion on 
the consultation law. However, in this regard, the methodological guide that was distributed to 
guide facilitators (Doc 6), specifies clear guidelines that contradict this differentiation.  
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In short, the main idea was that forums were conceived as a paradigm change from “vamos a 
hablar” (Let’s talk) to ‘vamos a escuchar’ (Let’s listen) (Doc 6, 5). The basic tenets underlying 
this ‘paradigm change’ are explained in a guide distributed among facilitators. They are 
specified as follows: 
 
Let’s Listen 
 
a. It is important the attitude face the encounter, we are all in the same boat, 
and we are going to continue to share it. 
b. We should analyse the attitude through which we observe the problem. We 
should avoid ‘us and them’ positions. Key is the attitude change. We should 
sit all on the same side of the table and understand we all need to solve the 
problem. 
c. We must think on the appropriate frame question: which is the problem and 
who is guilty? Alternatively, where is the solution and could we reach it 
together? 
d. To begin listening, we have respect certain principles: 
- All participants have something interesting to share 
- There a better solution than the one I take as unbeatable. 
- It is always possible to extract common elements with the most opposed 
positions to mine. 
- The other side always has part of the reason. 
- Dialogue, in ‘vamos a escuchar’ should be used to walk in other’s shoes 
- The aim is not just listening but advancing in the search for solutions 
- Every problem has a solution 
- How do we imagine this solution? Neither I win you lose nor I lose you lose 
are good options we should search for win-win solutions. 
 
Example 1: Methodology Guide 'Let's Listen’ (DOC 6) 
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Distributed for facilitators, the guide is almost an ‘ethical code’ for the initiative. Further 
procedural rules are specified, for example, interruption is not permitted, nor is contradicting 
other’s proposals. Respect towards the position of other is required. Indeed, the idea that 
critique of the other is not allowed, is repeated at least three times to specify the ideal model of 
‘vamos a escuchar’, the schedule of the meeting, and the role of the moderator.  
Regarding the outcome, the guide established “agreement is not aimed, therefore do not seek 
consensus among participants” (Doc 6, 7). Indeed, the fact that the last question asked 
participants to reflect and choose between other’s ideas, somehow contradicts this aim. Indeed, 
the requirement to underline those they considered the best, indicating agreement, or at least 
some kind of convergence was thus expected.  
However, it is clear that the main motivation of the initiative was not consensus, but to give 
participants the possibility to express themselves freely. Regarding the second phase, the 
conclusion is similar, but not so clear. The emphasis on active listening was the same, and they 
did not encourage consensus. However, the questionnaire was more demanding and less open-
ended. Therefore, citizens had less space to express their concerns, and they were more 
determined by the agenda set by the organisers. 
It would have been interesting to see if evaluation sheets in the first phase and second phases 
where different, and to what extent these differences were related to the methodology. 
However, there are no records from evaluations sheets of forums in the first phase. Regarding 
the second citizens evaluated the initiative (8.13/10) very positively, as well as the methodology 
(8.00/10) and the role of the moderator (8.55/10). Yet, if we look at their responses to the open-
ended question on what would they change, it is possible to be more specific about how it 
finally proceeded.  
Among those participants that commented on the methodology, the subject of discussion, the 
objective, or the method of the forum, only four participants underlined that they were 
unsatisfied with the initiative, blaming it for being “more of the same”, leaving them 
“indifferent” or simply recommending not to organise more forums. Most of them underlined 
four issues: the questions, previous information, the level of discussion, and the participation 
of politicians. Nonetheless, there is no clear position in either of them, although comments on 
the questions posed and the presence of politicians are especially dispersed.  
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Regarding the former, there is a bit of everything, including a demand for ‘more specific 
questions’, to ‘more common questions for the people’, or ‘fewer questions because it is a very 
intense session at these hours in the evening.’ Regarding the latter, it is almost the same; 
responses are contradictory with some participants asking for politicians to be present, to others 
complaining because they were. On the contrary, regarding the level of discussion there is some 
claim to ‘follow-up interviews, more familiar’, but mainly the absence of discussion is 
characterised by asking to ‘give priority to debate’, asking for ‘some debate’ or even some 
‘dialogue among participants.’  
Self-expression then, not consensus, was evidently the purpose, but significantly it was an 
articulation of different perspectives consistent with Type II deliberation. Indeed, stringent rules 
were applied to guarantee this outcome. In terms of design choices, this stringency seems to 
contradict for example, the introduction of a concrete question on the consultation, at least if 
the eliciting of different perspectives were the aim. Nonetheless, participants’ comments 
suggested that the objective was achieved, at least in the second phase, although experts 
underlined the point that the debate was more heated. Finally, in either case, participants were 
very satisfied with the overall result. 
 
3.5 Recurrence and Iteration 
Timing constitutes the fifth significant dimension. The frequency of mini-publics reveals how 
deeply engagement was sought for. However, contrary to what intuition suggests, timing should 
be designed with purpose. In other words, one-shot mini-publics may not be adequate at first 
sight, but neither is the recommendation to enlarge them with no clear purpose. They should 
conclude, allowing the contributions of citizens to lead to a trajectory, that in the end produces 
a tangible outcome. In this case, the initiative provided a long-term engagement platform. 
Nevertheless, this could be seen differently depending on the perspective we take.  
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If each different forum is considered by itself, in 72103 municipalities (71.3%) the initiative was 
a one-shot isolated event with no continuation. In 23104 (22.8%) two forums were organised, in 
Barrika, Gorliz, Iurreta and Mundaka there were 3 and, a separate mention for the case of 
Mungia where, according to reports, 18 forums took place. I have been able to recover 17 of 
them, and on the basis of these, a pilot exercise took place the 6th March 2007, followed by 17 
different forums between the 30th of September and 3rd of October 2008. They took place in 
several neighbourhoods, and two specific forums only with women. In total 231 people took 
part 95 females and 136 men in a village of 15.000 inhabitants. Most of them were bilingual 
(12) while the other 5 took place in Spanish and all of them followed the methodology of the 
first phase. The average age of those who filled the evaluation sheet (130), was similar in 
comparison to other forums (51) and, also, the evaluation of the initiative (8.45), the 
methodology (8.04) and the role of moderators (8.52). Indeed, asked whether they would be 
willing to repeat if called, 108 out of 130 responded positively, 2 rejected the offer, five 
hesitated and 14 did not respond. Regarding diversity 79 participants considered it was not 
diverse enough, therefore, a higher percentage (28.5%) than in the initiative (20.1%). 79 
considered it diverse enough (60.8%) and 14 (10.85) either did not respond, or replied they did 
not know. 
Nevertheless, Mungia was the exception to the rule. So, to explain the long-term approach of 
the initiative, focusing on the municipal level is not the adequate. On the contrary, to make 
sense of the length and intensity of the initiative, it should be assessed in the wider context. 
From this perspective, the process was highly iterative and the contributions sustained in time. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Agurain, Amorebieta-etxano, Aramaio, Arantza, Aretxabaleta, Arraia-Maeztu, Arratzu, Arrazua-Ibarrundia, Arrigorriaga, 
Artziniega, Asparrena, Azpeitia, Bakio, Beasain, Bedia, Berantevilla, Bergara, Bernedo, Derio, Dima, Elantxobe, Elgeta, 
Elgoibar, Erandio, Ereño, Errigoiti, Forua, Galdakao, Gautegiz, Gordexola, Gueñes, Harana, Ibarrangelu, Ispaster, Kanpezu, 
Labastida, Lagran, Laguardia, Lantaron, Larrabetzu, Lazkao, Legazpi, Legorreta, Lekeitio, Lemoa,, Lemoiz, Lesaka, Leza, 
Lezama, Lezo, Llodio, Loiu, Oñati, Ondarroa, Ordizia, Orduña, Orio, Ortuella, Ribera, alta, Santurtzi, Urnieta, Urretxu, 
Valdegovia, Zaldibia, Zalduondo, Zalla, Zambrana, Zamudio, Zigoitia, Zizurkil, Zuia, Zumaia 
104 Abanto Zierbena, Aia, Amurrio, Areatza (Villaro), Arrankudiaga, Arrieta, Azkoitia, Balmaseda, Bermeo, Durango, Gernika, 
Getaria, Hondarribia, Leioa, Maruri-Jatabe, Muskiz, Mutriku, Nabarniz, Orozko, Sestao, Sondika, Tolosa, Ugao. 
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In short, the relevant agenda for this initiative, and how it was designed regarding recurrence 
and iteration, seems to correlate with the Basque political agenda. Indeed, looked at differently, 
several effects of the Basque political agenda appear to be clear if the time sequence of the 
initiative as a whole is followed. Graph (3) shows the particular ecology of participation in the 
Initiative during the two years it lasted. As expected, low rates reach their peak in summer time 
in 2007 and 2008. However, it is remarkable the steady and low rate in the period between June 
2007 and January 2008. 
 
 
 
If this period is considered in the wider context it reveals much more. In June 2007 ETA 
declared the end of the cease-fire, on September 23, Ibarretxe presented his plan for popular 
consultation, in October, members of Batasuna were detained in, and in December, ETA killed 
two Guardia Civil officers in Capbreton. The previous armed attack perpetrated by ETA, and 
with with intended casualties, dated back to 2003. Therefore, it was what in the Conflict 
Resolution literature is named an ‘escalation period’. Yet, if we look at this sequence in Graph 
(3), between June 2007 and January 2008 very few, if any, forums took place. 
 
Graph 3: Number of total participants 2007-2009 
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Looked at differently, one can see that Ibarretxe presented his proposal for a consultation in the 
Basque Parliament the 28th September 2007, and except for Arrieta (9th October 2007), all the 
following forums included the question over the referendum. Until the 30th of September 2008, 
especially in Mungia, where the methodology of the first phase was recovered. Twenty days 
later the Spanish Constitutional court ruled out the Consultation Act approved by the Basque 
Parliament in June105 (ElPais, 2008/09/12).  
Two conclusions present themselves regarding recurrence and iteration. First, the initiative 
offered the possibility for a sustained, and iterative, effort as the case of Mungia demonstrates. 
Secondly however, the timeline for the initiative seems to be more related to the macro context 
of the initiative, as opposed to the meso context of each forum.  
 
3.6 Stakes 
The sixth variable refers to a very extended idea, already challenged in the conceptual 
discussion: the idea to be successful, deliberation ought to take place in cold settings. According 
to the theory, hot settings are characterised by fierce controversy so that deliberation only 
contributes to foster enclave deliberation (Sunstein 2002). When the debate is heated, positional 
politics takes the lead, and confrontation is exacerbated. Nevertheless, as Fung himself noticed, 
there is no clear evidence that this hypothesis holds in empirical terms. 
In this case, the stakes were high. An example of the challenge in this kind of context represents 
an initiative aimed at getting citizens to listen to each other, is the fact that elements of Basque 
society was openly invited not to participate. Indeed, both unionist parties openly rejected the 
initiative itself in Parliament. For example, two parliamentary questions were tabled 
questioning the scope of the initiative and its funding (VIII/102/20081010; 
VIII/103/20081017). Something similar happened in the public sphere. For example, one of the 
events that took place to promote the initiative was an encounter held on 12th May 2008, 
between cross party politicians and people taking part in different municipal forums. Different 
political parties were invited to take part. However, PP and PSE rejected the invitation arguing 
it was nothing more than “staging to the mayor glory of the Lehendakari” with the objective of 
“justifying” its political pretensions (ElCorreo, 2008/05/09). 
                                                 
105 Source: http://elpais.com/diario/2008/09/12/espana/1221170407_850215.html (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
  
224 
Therefore, even minor examples illustrate that the stakes were high, and high stakes represent 
a challenge for any initiative of this kind. In this case, high stakes did not intimidate thousands 
of citizens’ who mobilised to participate despite the charged atmosphere. However, as already 
noted, whether the initiative was ideologically plural is questionable. On grounds of 
sustainability, it is plausible to suggest that voters of either unionist party followed the example 
of their party leaders, and rejected the initiative completely. In this case, closeness to 
institutional making in combination with high-stakes have negative consequences in terms of 
inclusiveness 
 
3.7 Empowerment and Monitoring 
The final two aspects refer to empowerment and monitoring, and both are directly related to the 
role played by institutions play, and the extent they in turn allow mini-publics to operate. 
Empowerment needs no long explanation. It plainly refers to the influence that decisions taken 
in mini-publics have over actual decision making. Strong mini publics exercise authority while 
weak ones not (Bohman 2012, 86). However, this point should not be taken lightly insofar as 
empowering mini-publics is not free from contestation. A usual reservation about empowering 
mini-publics is that they are not representative. 
In this case, empowerment was intended, but the direction of travel is not clear: did the initiative 
empower citizens to take part in the political process? Or, conversely, were citizens directed to 
empower institutions in the political battle field? Indeed, given the relevant context for the 
initiative, it seemed to be more general than the context of each forum, it is difficult to figure 
out how citizens participating in insulated forums, taking place in different municipalities, may 
have had any option to influence the wider political debate. 
Regarding direct influence in policy-making, it cannot be known how far citizen influence 
extended as the initiative came from government. The fact that it died with the government 
indicates it had not much influence on other sensibilities. However, if we open the scope of the 
political to phenomenon outside of formal institutions and political parties the opposite may 
also be true.  
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According to Fung (2003), monitoring also refers to the mini-publics being taken into 
consideration, but in a different manner. Deliberation among citizens may also have the aim of 
influencing decision making by raising the interest of the public and influencing the debate by 
gaining attention. The problems attached to unpicking these kinds of long term and/or indirect 
effects in policy-making, have already been reviewed in previous chapters. Suffice to say, there 
is a strongly held view that there is no reliable way to identify them empirically. On the 
contrary, on the matters under discussion here, it has already been seen, that over the long term, 
several civil society organisations that took part in the initiative sustained their commitment 
and succeeded.  
Thus, at least in how far The Konpondu Initiative affected the facilitators and organisations 
involved, it appeared that these kind of participatory and deliberative exercises, were capable 
of empowering actors and events beyond the boundaries of initiative itself. 
 
3.8 Summary: Design-Choices and Outcomes 
The description of design choices, and outcomes, were aimed at grounding the assessment on 
how far the initiative came close to, or deviated from, ideal conditions. It is important for later 
stages in this investigation because regarding citizens participation “deviations from 
deliberative norms can be justified in terms of the deliberative democratic ideal given current 
non-ideal conditions” (Owen and Smith 2015, 226). In this sense, I have characterised The 
Konpondu Initiative in the light of different aspects relevant to understand the relation between 
the wider context and design choices of its different communicative activity types. In the table 
(2) below are summarised the main findings of this descriptive approximation to The Konpondu 
Initiative.  
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 Table 6 summarises the main outcomes of the initiative in the context of the different layers, 
identified by Fung as relevant for the institutional, or general purpose, to which any deliberative 
initiative intends to contribute. According to Fung, mini-public design choices do have an 
effect. In particular, design choices are intrinsically related to the character of participation and 
deliberation, information pooling and individual transformation, popular control and state 
capacity, as well as its political effects (Fung 2003, 353). Each layer is more or less closely 
related to specific design choices (see Table 4), and permits a compound assessment of design 
choices and outcomes in the light of which an empirically grounded definition of the purpose 
of the initiative, and the adequacy of design choices can be advanced.  
 
 
 
Design Choices 
A. Vision Simulate Ideal Conditions for Paradigm Change 
B. Recruitment Self-selection and Targeted 
C. Subject Fixed, focused on Political Institutional Agenda 
D. Mode Listening, No-Consensus 
E. Recurrence Iterative (Society), One-shot (Municipality) 
F. Stakes High 
G. Empowerment Low 
H. Monitoring Long-Term or Absent 
Table 2: Design-Choices of The Konpondu Initiative based on Fung (2003) 
Outcomes 
Character of Participation and 
Deliberation 
Democratic Skills Moderate 
Quantity High Popular Control and State Capacity 
Bias High Accountability Low 
Deliberative Quality ? Justice in Policy Low 
Information Pooling and Individual 
Transformation 
Efficacy in Policy Low 
Informing Officials Moderate Political Effects 
Informing Citizens Moderate Popular Mobilization High 
Table 3: Deliberative Outcomes of The Konpondu Initiative based on Fung (2003) 
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The nature of the participation and deliberation in The Konpondu Initiative, contributed to the 
inclusiveness of the political process, by moving thousands of citizens to deliberate. With 
regard to design choices, this contribution is relevant given that the high stakes (F), and the 
subject of discussion (C), was highly controversial. Nevertheless, although an effort was made 
regarding recruitment (B), to enhance the diversity of perspectives involved, the participants’ 
profile was biased presumably towards Basque nationalist positions.  
This bias renders the notion of choice questionable with regard to deliberative mode (D), the 
latter being closely related, according to Fung, to the overall deliberative quality of the 
initiative. In short, the deliberate choice to avoid critical interactions was justified by the 
paradigm change inspiring the initiative: namely from talking to listening. However, this choice 
makes little sense if participants share a basic normative premise. Indeed, it was clear in the 
second phase, that the more demanding rules of discussion led to more debate; although experts 
noted, that more talk came at the cost of more frustration, resulting in a trade-off regarding the 
combination of participation and bias in deliberative mode. 
Fung interpreted this trade-off as the enhancement of rational deliberation when the discussion 
is aimed at “fostering and clarifying individual preferences, for example, by arising conflicts 
and advocating conflicting principles” while “rendering participants less flexible and more self-
interested” (Fung 2003, 348). The comparison between phases seems to confirm this trade-off 
between rationality and reasonableness so far as the second phase is concerned: the advocacy 
of more conflicting principles resulted in less reasonable positions and more frustration. The 
questions of whether the debate became more rational or not, cannot be responded at this point. 
Fung suggests that it is possible to balance reasonableness and rationality if collective action 
depends on agreement and consent but in either phase of the initiative, this aim was promoted. 
A further aspect, which mini-publics are expected to contribute to, is information pooling and 
the promotion of democratic skills and socialisation. Regarding the former, it can run in two 
directions. When recurrence is high (E), and monitoring by public officials intensive (H), the 
initiative provides the means of informing officials, who as responsible agents for the public, 
have information on citizens’ preferences, values and beliefs that may be crucial. I consider 
outcomes in this respect moderate in The Konpondu Initiative, because although recurrence 
was high at the relevant context for the political process, the fact that at least a half of the 
political spectrum rejected it, challenges the idea that responsible agents had taken it as a 
valuable source of information for public policy design. 
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Alternatively, if we take the literality of the initiative seriously, we have to conclude that 
informing citizens was not the central aim. Rather, the initiative was geared to giving a voice 
to citizens in the policy making process. Indeed, citizen’s knowledge was considered relevant 
to overcome a deadlocked situation, and the deliberative mode (B) chosen to make different 
perspectives visible. Nevertheless, the fact that citizens were able to get access to politicians, 
for example on the website, question them as often as they liked (E), over an issue in which 
they had a high stake (F), suggests the initiative provided citizens with a valuable source of 
information. 
Finally, whether it contributed to the development of democratic aptitudes and socialisation 
skills, remains questionable. For instance, although the subject was of interest (B), and stakes 
high for them (F), “citizens are more likely to gain democratic skills and disposition where 
deliberations have tangible consequences for them” (Fung 2003, 350). In this regard, recurrence 
seems a crucial design choice but although at the level of the initiative as a whole, iteration was 
high, empowerment was low, and the impact of the outcome questionable. Conversely, at the 
level of municipalities, where another type of indirect effects may have played a positive role 
regarding tangible consequences in the lives of participants, most of the mini-publics were one-
shot exercises 
The third layer of interest refers popular control and state capacity. The subject of deliberation 
(C), as well as the level of empowerment (G), are crucial features for contribution to either the 
accountability, justice, or efficacy of policy. In short, mini-publics that focus on subjects with 
an accountability deficit, results in, “public opinion [that] differs substantially from official 
practice will be more likely to contribute to this function” (Fung 2003, 351). They contribute 
in terms of social justice by including those who are hitherto excluded, and can enhance 
efficiency, thus increasing the legitimacy of decisions taken, meaning that empowerment is a 
necessary consequence. 
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Table 4: Institutional Design Choices x Deliberative Outcomes (Fung, 2003) 
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In the case of Konpondu, these three dimensions are controversial. The subject is clearly one in 
which citizens had an interest, but given it was a government initiative and, according to reports, 
participants overwhelmingly supported government proposals, it cannot be seen to have 
enhanced accountability. By the same token, the extent to which the initiative made visible a 
weak position is not clear. Regarding design choices, recruitment (B), and mode (D), are 
considered relevant to assess the level of inclusion, but in this case, it has already been noted 
that recruitment efforts failed, to a certain extent, to involve those in weaker positions regarding 
the debate on the consultation law. 
If we look at this conclusion from the perspective of the efficacy of policy, the aim of gaining 
legitimacy makes sense with regard to companion to the subject chosen. The inclusion of a 
direct question, about a concrete political initiative of the Basque Government, could be 
understood as a means to enhance its legitimacy by making visible the popular support of an 
otherwise weak position; but not in the Basque political arena, a weak position in the Spanish 
political arena. 
Finally, deliberation in mini-publics is considered to contribute to the mobilisation of citizens 
outside them “especially when they are related to the more encompassing agendas of secondary 
associations or political actors” (Fung 2003, 352). True, in sympathy with concerns about elite 
manipulation, The Konpondu Initiative mainly responded to a political agenda established by 
the Basque government, and even more concretely, an initiative that was closely tied to the 
impulses of Lehendakari. Indeed, the initiative was born and died with him; having difficulties 
to gain support even in his political party.106 
However, the work of the deliberative activists and organisations in the backstage of The 
Konpondu Initiative remained. A straight line could almost be drawn following certain concrete 
names, beginning with Lokarri and ending in the Basque Social Forum. Thus, if we look to the 
process in the long term, it was successful regarding popular mobilisation, consequent upon the 
role that networks of civil society organisations, and international collaborators involved in the 
initiative, played.  
                                                 
106 For example, during the time when the initiative took place, the head of his party resigned due to irreconcilable differences 
regarding the consultation law promoted by Ibarretxe (Elpaís, 2007/09/13) and the newly elected president of PNV Iñigo 
Urkullu publicly acknowledged ‘difficulties’ in his relation to Ibarretxe with whom cohabitee in the same party required “acts 
of faith” (Gara, 2009/01/29). Sources: https://elpais.com/diario/2007/09/13/espana/1189634402_850215.html; 
http://gara.naiz.eus/paperezkoa/20090129/119014/es/Urkullu-Hay-dias-que-debo-hacer-actos-fe-para-seguir-unido-Ibarretxe 
(Consulted: 2017-08-13).  
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This effect is not measurable. It remains unknown on the basis that so far as it has proven 
impossible to establish these kinds of cause-effects relations. However, the sequence of events 
suggests, that at least The Konpondu Initiative was part of a wider and deeper turn that took 
place in the Basque Society, and was able to find an unexpectedly creative solution to a very 
complex problem. 
In sum, regarding the purpose of The Konpondu Initiative, on the one hand, if we take in 
isolation, design choices, and outcomes, we would have to conclude that it accomplished its 
objective of providing citizens with the opportunity to participate in the peace process and 
contribute to progress and normalisation. Numbers speak for themselves, certainly in terms of 
participants, the number of activities, or the diversity of venues. However, difficulties related 
to the closeness of government, and the harsh confrontations at the societal level, outperformed 
the capacity of the initiative to open up space for different political perspectives. It should not 
be ignored that half of the political spectrum rejected the initiative on grounds that were 
concerned with diversity and inclusiveness. Moreover, without another perspective to listen to, 
several design-choices were revealed to be meaningless. Therefore, in this case, a certain 
distance towards institutional decision making may have played a positive role; for example, 
by letting civil society organisations lead the process. 
On the other hand, it is questionable that the initiative fulfilled the requirement we have 
established for each site of the deliberative system, but at this point, this is a hypothesis. The 
Deliberative Minimum requires mutual respect, exchange of reasons, and disposition towards 
social integration. Inclusiveness holds the democratic dimension of the normative baseline, and 
diversity the epistemic dimension. However, both are related to the deliberative minimum so 
far as diversity and inclusion are necessary for argumentative deliberation. In other words, a 
constructive exchange of arguments requires different arguments. Nevertheless, I have already 
rejected the idea that conditions determine by themselves whether deliberation is practiced or 
not. Therefore, to determine whether a constructive exchange of argument took place, I need to 
analyse the argumentative exchange among participants. 
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4 Genre Analysis of Deliberative Argumentation 
The previous section concluded that The Konpondu Initiative fits loosely with what is expected 
from a communication activity type instantiating deliberation genre. It was also explained how 
far it deviated from ideal conditions. The consequences of closeness to institutional decision 
making and implementation in a hot setting, revealed a certain bias in the composition of the 
groups. This deviation cast doubts over several design-choices. However, overall, I have 
concluded that the initiative somehow made its point to “offer regular citizens the opportunity 
to participate in constructing peace in the Basque region and for their participation to contribute 
to progress in the peace process and normalisation” (CICR 2009, 32).  
Regarding the systemic approach, there is security in the suggestion, that in this case two 
wrongs, that is to say closeness to decision making and biased group composition, made one 
right; simply by moving thousands of citizens to discuss possible paths towards peace. 
Nevertheless, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the systemic analysis of deliberative 
initiatives should provide the means to assess, not only whether institutions and the initiative 
itself fits with the deliberative minimum, but whether this deliberative stance was achieved by 
participants at each concrete site of the system. 
My focus in this section, is the other side to the challenge: the analysis of deliberation in 
citizens’ discourses. The discursive analysis presented here, will show whether participants 
reflected a disposition to consider others’ arguments when establishing their own position 
regarding the issue at stake. In other words, whether the discourse structure of argumentation 
of participants in The Konpondu Initiative was approximate to the deliberative minimum. To 
respond to this adequately, the generic analysis of deliberation presented here involves three 
different tasks.  
First, I introduce the analytical framework that will explain the connection between context and 
design, and its implications for the forthcoming discursive analysis of deliberation. This step is 
necessary, as it is the analysis of deliberation as a genre, that text and context could be assessed 
together in the light of the same normative standard of argumentation. 
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Second, on this basis, I will specify how generic stages of The Konpondu Initiative were 
structured in response to its institutional or shared purpose. It is the first task for any generic 
analysis so far as genre determines the stages of discussion. Their empirical description allows 
assessing how far discourse has structured the approximate deliberative minimum, but also to 
recognise reasonable deviations from the rule. 
Third, I will proceed to the analysis of discourse using the relational discourse structure of texts 
in the corpus. I specify how the deliberative minimum is empirically assessed, the role it plays 
in the relational discourse structure of participants’ interventions, and what it tells us regarding 
the deliberative behaviour of participants. 
 
4.1 Deliberation as Genre 
Deliberation entails at minimum ‘mutual respect’; in this sense, argumentation theory and 
deliberative democracy underscore the central role played by counter-arguments. Nevertheless, 
instead of respect towards counter-arguments, argumentation theory underlines the use of 
counter-arguments to support or reject one’s claims as expressed in the structure of 
argumentative discourse. To properly assess the discourse structure of argumentation we should 
consider argumentation overcomes the level of logic and represents a communicative practice. 
This definition means that argumentation proceeds through a sequence of stages, is aimed at a 
general purpose, and both are given to each communicative event by ‘genre’. Therefore, the 
concept of genre becomes the crucial link connecting text or speech and context.  
For example, linguistic, and more concretely, lexical choices, were used by Isabella Fairclough 
to highlight the linguistic characteristics of deliberative discourse (I. Fairclough In Press). 
However, Taboada (2004) for example, suggests that genre is realised at the level of text, and 
determines the structural organisation of communicative interactions; while lexical-
grammatical choices are only indirectly influenced by genre. 
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Taboada provides a working definition of ‘genre’ as “primarily a structurally-determining 
characteristic of texts” (Taboada 2004, 25). A text pertains to a ‘genre’ because of staging, 
where staging is determined by the function of the text or speech in a situation. This function 
involves two different aspects: communicative purpose and social function. The 
communicative purpose defines the genre as goal oriented, and in line with the definition 
provided above, this goal is achieved through different steps or stages. Nonetheless, 
communicative interactions also have a social function, expressed by the fact that they are 
subjected to the satisfaction of social constraints.  
To illustrate, we may say that the communicative purpose of speech when visiting the doctor 
may be to get a diagnosis. To achieve this goal, we need to establish some kind of relationship 
with the doctor, commonly we may use cheap talk about the weather to precede the stages 
associated with our purpose. This stage may be labelled as Introduce. Then, we need to inform 
the doctor of our medical records and the symptoms we are experiencing. Therefore, we could 
label a stage of this communicative interaction Inform. We need to get the diagnosis, so another 
necessary step would be Request.  
According to Taboada, “[s]ocial and communicative purposes are woven together in the 
determination of the nature and order of the stages in any given text” (2004, 27). Therefore, 
following our example, an ideal template of conversations instantiating the genre of doctor-
patient communication will include several stages: Introduce when patient and doctor get to 
know each other, Inform when the patient informs the doctor of her symptoms and a Request 
when the patient requests and receives her diagnosis. 
Moreover, the structure of stages towards shared purpose of the genre is learned only through 
socialisation: it is more closely associated with the ‘context of culture’ than the ‘context of 
situation’. For example, if we follow the example on the medical consultation, if I refer to Us 
the meaning of Us can be given by the specific context of situation where this utterance 
occurred. Thus, I will be referring to someone that came with me to the doctor. However, 
according to Taboada’s operative definition, genre refers more closely to the context of culture. 
In the same example, If I am a foreigner I could mean to refer to certain differences regarding 
ways of doing things in the cultural context I belong (Us) in comparison to how things are done 
here. 
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Therefore, genre determines the stages of text or speech, “according to communicative and 
social purposes”, but “its influence on the language used is only indirect, mediated through 
register” (Taboada 2004, 27). Register107 refers to what happens (field), who talks (tenor), and 
the function of language (mode), in a specific communicative situation: the particular context 
in which the text or speech is being produced. The register is a level below genre, and influences 
lexico-grammatical choices. However, according to Taboada, the appropriate level of analysis 
of the linguistic characteristics of the genre is textual rather than lexico-grammatical. Genre 
analysis should focus on variations realised in the information structure (rhetorical relations), 
thematic structure (realisation and progression), and cohesive structure (chains), of text or 
speech within its social and communicative context.   
In sum, the discourse structure of the text or speech, is realised in some stages which are genre 
dependent and purposeful. Both shared purpose and generic stages belong to discourse 
communities, and they are learned through socialisation. Moreover, genre-related stages and 
purpose, both influence linguistic choices. But, while lexico-grammatical choices are more 
closely related to the ‘context of situation’, and expressed through register; the ‘context of 
culture’ is featured in structural patterns of discourse related to the genre of the communicative 
event.  
Therefore, in response to the research interest, this understanding of deliberation provides the 
means to analyse whether, for example, different linguistic communities share a common 
context of culture. If members of different linguistic communities conform, a discourse 
community, in the context of which a coherent expression of the shared purpose and stages of 
deliberation genre are enacted, their discourse structures will map similarly onto stages of the 
deliberative event. Similarly, if the hypothesis is right, and institutional design choices do affect 
the deliberative stance of participants more than their linguistic identity, then their discourse 
structures will map onto deliberative stages differently depending on design choices, for 
example, the composition of the group. 
 
                                                 
107 In short, register refers to what happens (field), who talks (tenor) and the function of language (mode). These three elements 
depend on the ‘context of situation’ where a text or utterance occurs and have realization through their corresponding meta-
functions in language: ideational, interpersonal and textual (Taboada 2004, 10–12). Hence, lexical-grammatical features of 
texts and the realization of the three meta-functions in language are more closely related to register than they are to genre. 
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The methodological assumption follows Taboada, and states that mapping discursive features 
of texts through generic stages – text prediction; will deliver the capacity to recognise –
contextual deduction – texts with similar characteristics, around the same genre. Therefore, 
with this baseline, variation in the discourse structure is a more significant factor, than the 
influence of different contextual and institutional variables to the deliberative stance 
participants take.  
Finally, stages. Group composition and language introduce three relevant levels of context in 
the analysis of text: stages refer to the genre or the macro-context of text, design choices refer 
to the setting, or the meso-context of text, and language refers to the author or the micro-context 
text. By choosing an indicator for each of these layers, research questions could be further 
specified as follows:  
 
a. Is the discourse structure related to generic stages of deliberative dialogue? 
b. Is the discourse structure related to design choices of the communicative event?  
c. Is the discourse structure related to the cultural community of the participant?  
 
For empirical purposes, the general hypothesis could be further specified as follows: generic 
stages, as well as design choices linking text to context, affect the discourse structure of texts 
instantiating deliberation genre more than the linguistic identity of participants. Moreover, 
design-choices enacting more diverse groups will positively affect the capacity of participants 
to take a deliberative stance. 
The discourse structure will be assessed in the light of a common normative standard: the 
deliberative minimum. This standard expresses the argumentation structure expected by 
citizens who take a deliberative stance; namely, the use of counter-arguments to support or 
reject their position on a claim. I will specify the discourse structural definition of the 
deliberative minimum later in this chapter.  For now, I already account for a methodological 
sequence allowing a compound analysis of the text in context, in the light of a rule of 
argumentation, communicated using the discourse structure whereby citizens expressed their 
position to each other.  
 
  
237 
4.2 Shared Purpose and Stages 
According to Taboada, genre analysis proceeds through several steps: i) Identification of 
segments or series of segments; ii) Definition of the social purpose and labelling of genre; iii) 
Functional labelling of stages; iv) Specification of obligatory and optional stages; v) Devise a 
structural formula; and vi) Analysis of the semantic and lexical-grammatical features for each 
stage (Taboada 2004, 32–33). For the sake of simplicity, the process could be summarised in 
two tasks: (i) finding a structural formula that will represent instances of a genre and (ii) 
analysing their linguistic characteristics.  
In this section, I proceed to the first general task of genre analysis: the definition of the structural 
formula. I will begin with the second step in the sequence: the definition of the social purpose 
and labelling of the genre, because the description for this task has already been accomplished 
in the previous section. In this case, I account for an ideal model that defines the shared purpose 
of deliberation genre, but also its empirical counterpart for the specific case of The Konpondu 
Initiative.  
As noted, deliberation genre accounts for the social purpose of preserving the democratic 
political culture of citizens (van Eemeren 2013, 19). In the case of The Konpondu Initiative, 
however, this general purpose was specified by means of a declared intent to “offer regular 
citizens the opportunity to participate in constructing peace in the Basque region and for their 
participation to make a contribution to progress in the peace process and normalisation” (CICR 
2009, 32).   
The impact of this shared purpose on the mini-publics was made clear in the previous section 
in the discussion on the paradigm change from ‘talking’ to ‘listening’. The central question to 
which citizens were called to respond was: “Egoera honetan, zein ekimenek lagun dezakete 
bakerako aukera berri bat sortzen?”108 The intention was about getting to know the opinion of 
participants about the peace process, their proposals to restore it, and moderators called to 
choose different perspectives to be expressed at the cost of critical interactions. 
 
 
                                                 
108 English Translation: In the current situation, which initiatives could contribute to create a new opportunity for peace? 
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The next task requires the identification of segments, or series’of segments, that conform to the 
macro structure of texts in the corpus, and their functional labelling. In this case, the model of 
critical discussion provides an ideal template, specifying different stages we should expect for 
a communication activity type aimed at fulfilling the shared purpose of deliberation. 
There are different models. A four stage model suggests deliberation proceeds as follows: i) an 
initial disagreement (Confrontation), ii) process evolves through the definition of standpoints 
at issue (Opening) and iii) the challenge/defence interactions (Argumentation) towards iv) its 
final result (Concluding) (van Eemeren 2010, 2:10–11). A bit more comprehensive approach 
to the specific case of deliberative dialogue includes 7 stages (McBurney, Hitchcock, and 
Parsons 2007, 6). Deliberative dialogue begins with an open question (Opening), followed by 
discussion on goals, constraints, and perspectives (Inform), next proposals are placed 
(Propose), jointly considered (Consider), accepted or rejected (Revise) and an option is 
recommended (Recommend) before deliberation dialogue is closed (Conclude). 
These ideal templates establish an analytical departure point, however van Eemeren suggests, 
that in the case of political deliberation, “communicative activity types are usually not fully 
conventionalized” (van Eemeren 2013, 18). Therefore, the analysis should be adapted using 
empirical description to their application in concrete cases. In the case of The Konpondu 
Initiative, rules structuring the event were stringently designed to implement the paradigm 
change suggested above, and this also affected the structure of the mini-public. Therefore, a 
first approximation to the macro structure of relevant stages structuring citizens’ discourses, 
can be made by differentiating between different turns at each phase of the deliberative 
initiative.  
The event was divided into three turns. After an introduction outlining the goals of the initiative 
and the content of the meeting (5 min), participants were called to introduce themselves in a 
short round (five min.). Next, the moderator posed the main question and gave participants ten 
minutes to think about their response, after which each participant, in turn presented her 
proposals to the plenary (sixty min). Following this turn, the participants had thirty minutes to 
talk, ask for further clarifications regarding other’s proposals, and a final round to summarise 
those contributions they found most interesting (forty min).  
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Reports are made to inform over the presentation round and the summarization exercise. 
Constrained by this structural organisation, texts reporting the contribution of each participant, 
include an open question posed by the moderator in response to which, citizens inform on their 
goals, constraints, and perspectives, or make concrete proposals. They end with a revision of 
the most interesting ideas presented by other participants, or their own. Therefore, we could 
expect the macro-structural template to include an Opening, followed by an either Inform or 
Propose stage and ending with a Revise stage.  
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the explicit denial of critical interactions in the first phase established in the 
methodological guide suggests we would expect texts to focus more closely on the Propose 
stage because participants were not invited to discuss their goals or constraints, but explicitly 
animated to present their position.  
On the contrary, the second phase presents a much more complex structure. In this phase, the 
first question invited participants to reflect on the risks and opportunities for peace and political 
normalisation. A second question is included, through which citizens are required to assess a 
concrete proposal; namely, the consultation. Citizens were also called to reflect on risk and 
possibilities, as well as their hesitations regarding this concrete proposal. Finally, they were 
asked to reflect on the most interesting contributions they heard during the exercise. 
Therefore, in addition to the identification of relevant series of segments and their labelling by 
means of turns, the macro-structural formula should be attentive to the question which they 
respond to.  
 
 
 
1st Phase 
 
(Opening) ^ Propose ^ Revise 
  
 
 
 Figure 1: Stages Phase I 
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In the second phase, along with an Opening stage, an Inform stage would be expected, because, 
unlike the first phase, citizens inform discussion by their perception of problems, and the 
possibilities that affect peace and political normalisation. Next, proposals are placed, but the 
Propose stage does not reflect citizens’ contributions because the moderator places the 
proposal. In response, participants assess risks, potentialities, and their reservations regarding 
the consultation. Therefore, we could expect a Consider stage. Finally, both phases have in 
common, the requirement that participants will Revise contributions, and reflect on the most 
interesting ones from their perspective. 
 
 
 
In any phase, a Recommend or Concluding stage is expected in so far as participants were not 
required to agree on a proposal. All stages are considered necessary so far as deliberative 
dialogue in The Konpondu Initiative, as shown in the guides distributed among practitioners, 
was highly regulated giving no choice to participants to deviate from the predefined structure 
of discussion.  
 
4.3 Relational Discourse Structure 
Once the structural formula has been defined, the next step, according to Taboada, requires the 
analysis of discourse structure to see if the patterns associated with each stage could be 
identified and, in this case, tested against the deliberative minimum. As already noted, Taboada 
suggests generic analysis should focus on variations realised at three different levels: the 
information structure (rhetorical relations), thematic structure (realisation and progression) and 
cohesive structure (chains) in relation to social and communicative context (Taboada 2004, 32).  
For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on a specific layer: the information structure of 
discourse.  
 
2nd Phase 
 
(Opening)     ^     Inform     ^     (Propose)     ^     Consider     ^     Revise 
  
 
 
 Figure 2: Stages Phase II 
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This structure is analysed using the relational discourse structure, or rhetorical structure, which 
is composed of coherence relations and analysed here following Rhetorical Structure Theory 
(William C. Mann and Thompson 1988). The methodology chosen fits well with the type of 
data collected, because the analysis of discourse in The Konpondu Initiative is corpus based. In 
other words, the empirical baseline of this research are texts written by participants in the course 
of their participation in deliberative mini-publics. 
 
4.3.1 Relational Discourse Structure and Argumentation 
RST is an approach which allows an analyst to describe coherence between text fragments 
combining three main concepts: elementary discourse units, recursive coherence relations and 
nuclearity (W. C. Mann andTaboada 2010). On the one hand, elementary discourse units 
(henceforth, EDU) are independent or adverbial clauses forming the basic unit around which 
texts are segmented. Recursive coherent relations on the other hand, define relations between 
text fragments relating to the effects they could have on the reader: a pragmatic or presentational 
relation and a semantic or subject matter relation. As relations are recursive, a coherence 
relation can be a text fragment of either relation. Finally, nuclearity is the importance of a text 
fragment within the relation.  
Guided by the text, the analyst can describe which fragments are more important in the 
coherence relation (nucleus or satellite function), and in relation to other fragments (central unit 
of the text). When fragments are equally important, the coherence relation is defined as multi 
nuclear or paratactic (LIST, CONTRAST, DISJUNCTION109, etc.). When one fragment is 
related to another that is less-important in the relation it is defined as nuclear or hypotactic 
(ELABORATION, JUSTIFY, PREPARATION, CONCESSION, SOLUTION-HOOD, 
CAUSE, RESULT).  
 
 
                                                 
109 From now onwards RST relations will be Capitalized.  
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For example, the text below110 (Example 2) is a part of a text written by a participant. The texts 
between brackets are segmented EDUs among which those in bold type represents the central 
unit of the text. The central unit is the main claim of the argument of the speaker or writer.  
 
 
 
Next, RST defines hierarchically the relations whereby an author or speaker is supposed to have 
had organised text or speech coherently to make it understandable for a hearer or reader. 
Coherence relations structure text segments around the central unit in hierarchical trees as the 
one shown below:  
 
In this example, the text was written in response to the first question in the first phase of the 
initiative. The participant was asked about the situation of the peace process and initiatives to 
restore peace. The RS-Tree informs about the hierarchical relationship between different 
segments and their relations by means of the writer aim to provide a coherent response to the 
question. 
 
                                                 
110 Figure 1 and 2 were created using rst package for Latex (Reitter 2006) 
Example 2: Text extracted from FIL50-1-4-EUS 
Figure 3: RS-Tree FIL50-1-4-EUS 
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The participant replied enumerating different steps of which the first is that [we first need to 
acknowledge there is not.]1B This segment is the central claim because it is the response to the 
question and it is the nucleus of a CONDITIONAL relation whose satellite establishes the 
conditioning situation [If the aim is to reach peace.]1A This span, or unit of segments linked by 
a relation, is the nucleus of a CAUSE relation at a higher level in the hierarchy of the RS-Tree. 
Its satellite is also annotated as a span, formed by two segments linked by a CIRCUMSTANCE 
relation. In this span, the satellite informs over the relevant interpretive context [And we cannot 
have it in the Basque Autonomous Community]1C to the situation expressed to explain why we 
do not have peace; [because we do not have the right to decide.]1D 
As this example shows, what RS-Trees provide, is information on the relational discourse 
structure of text from a pragmatic point of view. Analysis departs from text segments and builds 
up a hierarchical structure, or tree, interpreting how different segments relate to each other. It 
is a relational discourse structure because the baseline is relations between segments. Relations 
inform over the discourse structure of text assuming the text form a coherent unit. This 
coherence is intended to ensure that the message conveyed in the central unit is understandable 
for a listener or reader. However, they also have a rhetorical intent; in other words, the relation 
between units established through coherence relations, has an intended effect in the reader or 
listener. 
As already mentioned above, several scholars have considered RST an appropriate theoretical 
framework for the analysis of argumentation (M. Azar 1999; Green 2010; Peldszus and Stede 
2016; Biran and Rambow 2011). Azar (1999), for example, proposed RST as an alternative to 
the so-called ‘Toulmin Model’ (Toulmin 2003). The main reason given was “that argumentative 
text should be analysed first according to a general theory of text analysis” (M. Azar 1999, 
114). He looked at RST relations and structures, aimed at distinguishing between persuasive 
and explanatory texts. He used the satellite-nucleus distinction to identify arguments and 
conclusions for five types of relations: EVIDENCE (persuader), JUSTIFICATION (justifier), 
MOTIVATION (incentive) and ANTITHESIS/CONCESSION (persuader).  
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More recently, Peldzus and Stede have double annotated a corpus of argumentative micro-texts 
to identify correspondences between discourse structures – SDRT and RST– and argumentation 
schemes (Peldszus and Stede 2016; Stede et al. 2016). The ‘Postdam Corpus’ is composed of 
112 argumentative “micro texts” written in response to trigger questions, and aimed at getting 
argumentatively dense texts. Authors annotated the corpus in parallel seeking to test the 
translatability between different annotation schemes and formats. In this sense, their study is 
similar to that of Azar, although they took as a reference Freeman (2011) for the annotation of 
argumentation schemes, and following Green (2015), kept both annotation levels separate. 
They tested the complete set of RST relations and found remarkable parallelisms in 
argumentation schemes for REASON111 (Support) and CONCESSION (Undercut). 
Green (2010), on the contrary, followed Azar and selected Toulmin’s model as a reference for 
the annotation of argumentation schemes, and outlined a proposal (ArgRST) where data, and 
the claim of an argument, are represented as the satellite and nucleus of an RS-tree respectively. 
She also, specified that the argumentative hypothesis holds for satellite and nucleus of an 
EVIDENCE relation. She suggested, also, that Warrant or Backing could translate into RST as 
the satellite of a BACKGROUND relation where the nucleus is an EVIDENCE relation linking 
data and claim of the argumentation scheme.  
Another body of research suggests that a set of relations, instead of a concrete relation, could 
be used, for example, to differentiate between Argumentative/Explanatory and Descriptive 
relations in texts. Gruber and Huemer (2008), for example, identified a group of ten relations 
(CONCESSION, INTERPRETATION, RESULT, CONDITION, CONTRAST, JUSTIFY, 
CAUSE, PURPOSE and SOLUTIONHOOD112) that could be associated with more 
argumentative and explanatory texts in contrast to descriptive texts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 Their RST annotation follows Stede (2010) and relation names differ in some cases.  
112 They distinguish between volitional and non-volitional RESULT and CAUSE. I do not take this distinction into 
consideration following (Iruskieta et al. 2013). 
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On the other hand, Biran and Rambow (2011) suggest argumentative texts could be classified 
through the study of justification. Nonetheless, they consider justification to be wider than the 
JUSTIFICATION RST relation and suggest the appropriateness of using a set of RST relations 
(ANTITHESIS, CAUSE, CONCESSION, CONSEQUENCE, REASON, CONTRAST, 
EVIDENCE, PURPOSE, and RESULT). They chose indistinctively between subject-matter 
and presentational relations, suggesting the difference regarding the intended effect is not an 
appropriate criterion for distinguishing between argumentative and non-argumentative texts 
(2011, 371).  
Similar attempts use RS-Trees for the study of argumentation in combination with linguistic 
markers113 or evaluative expressions114 as well as for the study of argumentation in legal texts115 
or political debates116. Thus, there is enough evidence to suggest RS-Trees and coherence 
relations can inform on the argumentativeness of texts. Although, in the light of the findings no 
straight parallelism could be established, neither between concrete RST relations and 
argumentative relations, nor between argumentation schemes and relational discourse 
structures. Finally, research suggests that RS-Trees in combination, for example, with linguistic 
clues could provide promising means to bridge the gap117.  
                                                 
113 More in line with the suggested relation between argumentation and linguistic indicators or markers, several researchers 
have taken as model Marcu’s automatic identification of RST relations using connectives such as ‘but’ or ‘whereas’ (Marcu 
2000). The fact that almost a 70% of relations are, indeed, not signalled poses a severe challenge to this model (Taboada 2006). 
But, as suggested by (2002), considering signals as linguistic clues, rather than discourse markers, results remain sound, 
especially for intra-sentential rhetorical structure in the field of discourse analysis, though wider in scope of application in the 
field of argumentation analysis.  
114 Garcia Villalba and Saint-Dizier (2012) instead of focusing on those relations usually defined a priori as argumentative –
EVIDENCE, CONCESSION or MOTIVATION–, suggest that relations extract their argumentative force from their 
combination with evaluative expressions. In particular, on the bases of analysis conducted in the <TextCoop> platform (Saint-
Dizier 2012), they suggest that arguments are either composed by an evaluative expression (claim) combined with discourse 
structures such as JUSTIFICATION or ELABORATION or incorporated into the evaluative expression itself. Indeed, the 
combination of discourse structures and linguistic clues for the analysis of argumentation structures on the bases of discourse 
structures is widely supported for different genres (Feng and Hirst 2012; Teufel, Siddharthan, and Batchelor 2009).  
115 Moens and Palau (2007; 2009), for example, build RS-trees inspired on Marcu’s model to detect argumentative structures 
in legal texts. Departing from a reduced version of Walton’s (2008) argumentation schemes –only premises and conclusions–, 
they suggest argument structures –relations among different individual arguments– could be adequately represented as RST 
trees and detected using a manually generated context-free-grammar (CFC) involving, for example, lexical clues. And in a 
similar vein, (Cabrio, Tonelli, and Villata 2013) analysed how argumentation schemes fit into discourse relations, in this case, 
extracted from the Penn Discourse Treebank.  
116 Naderi and Hirst (2016) advocate for a more comprehensive framework for the analysis of argumentation in political speech 
combining discursive and argumentation structure analysis. They depart from previous work on the HILDA discourse parser 
(Hernault, Prendinger, and Ishizuka 2010) following basic tenets of RST, to segment text into EDUs improved using rich 
linguistic features. They apply their model to the detection of argumentative schemes by means of scheme specific features 
including keywords or conditional patters (Feng and Hirst 2012). On these bases, they propose to combine discourse structures 
with content analysis to get a better approximation to argumentation in political debates (Hirst et al. 2014; Naderi and Hirst 
2016).  
117 Promising steps have been done for the automatic RST analysis of texts written in Basque and Spanish (da Cunha et al. 
2012; Iruskieta and Zapirain 2015). And these tools could be very helpful to automatically detect certain argument components 
on the bases of the relational discourse structure of texts –for example, the central claim of argumentative texts (Iruskieta, 
Labaka, and Antonio 2016)–.  
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4.3.2 The Corpus 
The collection of the reports that constitute the core of this dissertation took several months and 
invaluable contributions from several people, and organisations, that took part in the 
initiative118. The corpus under analysis in this dissertation are transcripts of 117 forums held in 
66 municipalities with 1170 participants’ comments. Transcripts are far from ideal for the 
analysis of deliberative discourse. Many texts contain literal transcriptions, written by 
participants to assist their oral presentations in response to each of the questions posed by the 
moderator. In other words, texts provide a fixed snapshot of each of the stages of the discussion 
process from the perspective of participants.  
Once data gathering was concluded, the corpus was normalised following the usual guidelines 
to process text as data (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). First, twelve reports were excluded from 
the corpus, because they were not presented in the same structure as the remainder119. Secondly, 
I extracted texts from the original reports, separating each response to a question as a separate 
text unit. Finally, I gathered them in an Excel file and associated each text to its corresponding 
variables. The final data comprised a set of 4.187 plain texts, ordered by participants, questions, 
groups, language (group/participant), date, and town.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 I want to thank Aitziber Blanco and Paul Rios from Lokarri, Igor Ahedo and Asier Blas from Parte-Hartuz (UPV/EHU), 
William Weinsberg and Andrea Bartoli (CICR) and, especially, to Gorka Espiau and the Agirre Lehendakaria Center 
(http://agirrecenter.eus/) for the assistance provided to recollect the documentation of The Konpondu Initiative. 
119 Llodio, Amurrio, Leioa, Abanto-Zierbena, Ibaeta, Lemoiz, Barrika, Ugao, Zamudio, Loiu, Gernika and University forums. 
Language Texts Words 
Average Word/Text 
(Means / Median) 
    
Basque 1.195 35.545 29,744 / 24 
Spanish 2.992 109.162 36,484 / 28 
 
Total 4.187 144.707 34,561 / 27 
Table 5: Complete Data Set Description 
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The table above provides a general overview of the main figures of the corpus. At first sight, it 
looked as if I was looking at getting discourse structures, I might need to select a sub-corpus 
composed of those that passed a critical threshold regarding length, because some of them did 
not present any discourse structure at all. Moreover, a balanced corpus needed to be built 
regarding those variables considered relevant for research questions; in this case, the 
composition of the group, the stages of discussion, and the language of the author. On these 
bases, a sub-corpus of 200 texts was built. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The final corpus analysed in the following sections, is composed of 200 texts with an average 
length of 112 (Spanish), and 89 (Basque), words from linguistically homogeneous and 
heterogeneous group discussions, made during different stages of the deliberative dialogue that 
took place in the two phases. The size of the corpus may seem to be small in comparison to the 
original set, but it is more than double the size of other corpuses in comparable studies, such as 
for example, the corpus in the RST Basque Treebank (Iruskieta et al. 2013). Finally, I was 
unable to take into consideration material from the web platform Konpondu.net, that would 
otherwise have been interesting, because all comments collected in the web platform, several 
reports of concrete forums, video recordings of some forums, the responses of politicians to 
citizens, were all irretrievably lost the day the Konpondu.net platform was abruptly closed120.  
 
                                                 
120
 All information was gathered in the web page until due change in government in 2009 the new government decided to 
close the web page. In the context of the wider research project this study is located we have contacted all the entities that 
collaborated in this initiative to recover all the information available but unfortunately part of the information –most notably 
all comments collected in the online platform and video recording of 6 citizen’s forums – is lost for good. 
(http://www.diariovasco.com/20090609/mas-actualidad/politica/gobierno-vasco-clausura-pagina-200906091810.html 
(Consulted: 12-07-2016). 
Language Texts Words 
Average Word/Text 
(Mean / Median) 
    
Basque 100 8.900 89 / 86 
Spanish 100 11.166 112 / 112 
 
Total 200 20.066 100 / 101 
Table 6: Corpus Description 
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4.3.3 Methodology 
Two main motivations foster the analysis of argumentation using discourse structure following 
RST. First, as already underlined, several contemporary contributions to the linguistic analysis 
of argumentative discourse suggest “[a]rgumentation structures are closely related to discourse 
structures such as defined by Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST)” (Stab and Gurevych in press, 
1)121. The representation of discourse structures in text using their relational discourse structure 
is, allegedly, theory-independent. Thus, its application is open to interpretation using different 
theoretical frameworks (Taboada 2004, 106). It departs from a set of minimal assumptions to 
make possible a description of the structure of a text regarding coherence relations among text 
segments by the analyst interpretation (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010).  
Secondly, the decision for RST was also taken, because of the availability of already annotated 
relational discourse structures, in corpuses with texts and conversations of different genres and 
several languages, including Basque and Spanish (Iruskieta, Da Cunha, and Taboada 2015). In 
this case, the annotation, evaluation, and interpretation have been conducted in the context of 
the wider research project on the ‘RST Basque Treebank’ (Iruskieta et al. 2013), and in 
collaboration with the IXA research group of the University of the Basque Country (EHU). 
Indeed, the ‘Multilingual RST Treebank’ (Iruskieta, Da Cunha, and Taboada 2015) has already 
been used to show that the nucleus of a rhetorical tree, can be seen as the central claim of an 
argumentation scheme (Iruskieta, Labaka, and Antonio 2016). 
In what follows, I will describe on a step-by-step basis the path that was followed in the research 
process. The annotation of this Argumentative Basque-Spanish Treebank was performed 
following the standard methodology in RST (William C. Mann and Thompson 1988; W. C. 
Mann and Taboada 2010) and the reliability of the corpus was evaluated following a qualitative 
evaluation method in two steps.  
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 Indeed, along with Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) (William C. Mann and Thompson 1988), Penn Discourse Treebank 
(PDTB) (Miltsakaki et al. 2004) or Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) (Lascarides and Asher 2007) are 
referred as possible venues for the analysis of the discourse structure of argumentation (M. Azar 1999; Biran and Rambow 
2011; Cabrio, Tonelli, and Villata 2013; Green 2010; Gruber and Huemer 2008; Peldszus and Stede 2016).  
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4.3.3.1 Research Process 
Firstly, a novel annotator (A1) annotated part of the corpus in both languages with the RSTTool 
(O’Donnell 2000), following the standard way to annotate in RST: segmenting the text, and 
then building the RS-tree modularly and incrementally (Pardo, das Graças Volpe Nunes, and 
Rino 2004).   
Secondly, 20 texts (10 in Spanish and 10 in Basque) were annotated by an RST analyst (A2), 
following the same methodology.  
Thirdly, the RS-trees of A1 and A2 were compared in two ways, following a qualitative 
evaluation method proposed by Iruskieta et al. (2015) with the extended RST relations and 
comparing a set of collapsed RST relations.  
Fourthly, genre stages were further specified by means of relational discourse macro-structures, 
reviewing the corpus on a case by case basis, and ideal templates or macro-structures agreed 
for each stage by the two annotators. On that basis, the annotation of the corpus was recomposed 
and based on harmonised RS-trees. The annotation of relations was validated using RSTeval 
(Maziero and Pardo 2009)122. 
Fifthly, all the annotation data was automatically enriched morphosyntactically (lemmatized 
and POS-tagged) with Eustagger (Ezeiza et al. 1998) for Basque, and with FreeLing (Carreras 
et al. 2004) for Spanish. Annotation data was exported to a database and showed in a web-
service123 environment using tools developed by (Iruskieta et al. 2013). 
Finally, coherence relations were clustered in classes following (Benamara and Taboada 2015), 
texts classified by their relational discourse structure and data format for statistical analysis. 
                                                 
122 RSTeval can be tested at http://www.nilc.icmc.usp.br/rsteval/ (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
123 Database can be consulted here: http://ixa2.si.ehu.es/diskurtsoa/rstfilo/ (Consulted: 2017-08-13). 
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4.3.3.2 Discourse segmentation 
To explain the segmentation task, I use the text below (Example 3). This is a text from the 
Basque set of the corpus: 
a. Original text:  Espainiako alderdi nagusiek ez dute nahi ikusi geu geure artean ondo 
konpontzea. Elkarrizketa edukitzerakoan, norberaren "pretentsioak" apur bat bajatu behar dira, 
akordio txikiak lortzeko, eta gero akordio handietara heltzeko. Ondo dago herritarren artean 
foroak eta hitz egitea, baina politikoek (euskaldunak barne) ahalegin guztiak egiten dute, 
elkarrizketa erreal bat edukitzeko?124 
b. English Translation: Main Spanish political parties don’t want to see us make do well 
among ourselves. When having dialogue, each should lower her “ambitions”, to reach small 
agreements and, then, arrive at major ones. It is ok that citizens to talk to each other and forums, 
but politicians (including Basques) do everything they can to have a real dialogue? 
Example 3: FIL965-2-83-EUS 
                                                 
124 Each text has assigned an identification number informing over the ID number – language – group – question to which it 
responds to. In this manner, the online database will allow searching texts or groups of texts following each or a specific 
combination of these criteria to facilitate further analysis to potential users. 
See the segmentation in our database:  
http://ixa2.si.ehu.es/diskurtsoa/rstfilo/fitxategiko.php?kont=196&bilatzekoa=FIL965-2-83-EUS-A2.rs3 (Consulted: 2017-08-
20). 
Figure 4: Process Diagram 
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We manually segment the text into the Elementary Discourse Units (EDUs) which are 
independent sentences and adverbial clauses following (Iruskieta, Diaz de Ilarraza, and 
Lersundi 2015). In short, the units segmented at intra-sentence level were clauses containing a 
finite verb without syntactic subordination (2015, 11). 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Central Unit Detection 
Before, we have annotated the main topic of the text or the most important idea of the citizen. 
This EDU will be the central unit of the RS-tree in the following annotation task. In this case, 
we think that the most important sentence of the three that constitutes the Example 3 [1B] and 
if we put off all the adverbial clauses of this example, the main EDU is the one which is in bold 
type (Example 4). 
 
 
ED
U 
Manual segmentation (Basque) English translation 
1 
Espainiako alderdi nagusiek ez dute 
nahi ikusi geu geure artean ondo 
konpontzea. 
Main Spanish political parties don’t 
want to see us make do well among 
ourselves. 
2 Elkarrizketa edukitzerakoan, When having dialogue, 
3 
norberaren " pretentsioak " apur bat 
bajatu behar dira, 
each should lower her “ambitions”,  
4 akordio txikiak lortzeko, to reach small agreements  
5 eta gero akordio handietara heltzeko. and, then, arrive at major ones.  
6 
Ondo dago herritarren artean foroak 
eta hitz egitea, 
It is ok that citizens to talk to each 
other and forums, 
7 
baina politikoek (euskaldunak barne) 
ahalegin guztiak egiten dute, 
elkarrizketa erreal bat edukitzeko? 
but politicians (including basques) do 
everything they can to have a real 
dialogue? 
Table 7: Manual Segmentation FIL965-2-83-EUS 
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In this study, the Central Unit is important, because it represents the central claim of the 
participant in response to the corresponding question. The central unit has been considered to 
represent the Central Claim of the argumentation scheme in argumentative texts (Peldszus and 
Stede 2016). 
 
4.3.3.4 Annotation of RS-Trees  
Following basic conventions, I proceeded to the annotation of the RST-Tree. This included, 
first, linking segments with blind relations, in order to define the macro structure of the text; 
namely the relationship of segment groups about the CU. Second, to link up segments beginning 
from the lower level of the tree, following a bottom-up process (intra-sentential clauses, 
sentences, paragraphs, text). Third, and finally, labelling links with the specific coherence 
relation for each segment.  
The set of RST relations used for the annotation of the corpus follows the extended model 
proposed by (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010) as implemented in the ‘RST Basque TreeBank” 
(Iruskieta et al. 2013). In Table (9-10) for uni-nuclear relations, and Table (8) for paratactic 
relations, I provide an abbreviated description of the set of relations used to label coherence 
relations conforming to the relational discourse structure125.   
 
 
                                                 
125 A complete description could be consulted here: http://www.sfu.ca/rst/01intro/definitions.html (Consulted: 2017-07-10). 
Example 4: Segmentation and CU annotation of FIL965-2-83-EUS 
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The critical assumption for annotation is that texts are coherent units. This means that, “for 
every part of a coherent text, there is some function, some plausible reason for its presence, 
evident to readers” (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010). This function is established considering 
that between two text spans, one of them has a specific role which is relative to the other, and 
coherence relations label the functions.  
Coherence relations are defined in the light of constraints, either for Nucleus, Satellite, or both. 
Equally, they also define the intended effect of the writer (or speaker) on the reader (or hearer) 
(Iruskieta 2013, 19–22). For example, consider the example above (Example 4), the text has 
already been segmented and annotated to the Central Unit. Proceeding always from the bottom 
to the top of the RS-Tree linking segments through relations to later link spans to the Central 
Unit.  
This example, begins with [1C] and [1D], and both interpreted segments were linked by a multi-
nuclear SEQUENCE relation where the first span refers an item followed ‘then’126 by another 
item. This span was the satellite of a PURPOSE relation, and defines the intent behind the 
intended situation expressed in the nucleus [1B]. Finally, I annotated the span composed of 
[1B], [1C], [1D] as the nucleus of a CIRCUMSTANCE relation the satellite of which [1A] 
describes the interpretive situation for the Nucleus. The resulting RS-Tree is formalised as 
follows: 
                                                 
126 The use of discourse markers or signals is also common but considered complementary to relation labelling so far as between 
60 and 70% of relations are not signalled by markers like ‘then’ (Taboada 2006). 
Table 8: Multinuclear relations adapted from (W. C. Mann andTaboada 2010) following 
(Iruskieta 2013) 
MULTINUCLEAR RELATIONS 
 Span Other Span 
CONTRAST  one alternate  the other alternate  
JOINT  (unconstrained)  (unconstrained)  
CONJUNCTION an item a comparable item 
DISJUNCTION one alternative another alternative (not necessarily exclusive) 
LIST  an item  a next item  
SEQUENCE  an item  a next item  
RESTATEMENT (N-N) an item reformulation of the same item at same level 
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As noted before, relations are differentiated into uni-nuclear or multi-nuclear, depending on the 
relative importance of one segment or span towards the other, which it is linked to by coherence 
relations. Also, coherence relations are distinguished as Presentational Relations and Subject-
matter Relations. This distinction is because, in addition to constraints on the nucleus and 
satellite, each relation is distinguished by the effect a relation has on the reader (William C. 
Mann and Thompson 1988, 257). ‘Subject-matter relations’ are “those whose intended effect 
is that the reader recognises the relation in question”. ‘Presentational relations’ “are those 
whose intended effect is to increase some inclination in the reader, such as the desire to act or 
the degree of positive regard for, belief in, or acceptance of the nucleus” (William C. Mann and 
Thompson 1988, 257).  
This distinction will not be followed for the analysis of the Deliberative Minimum, because the 
interest here resides in the contraposition between argumentative and non-argumentative 
relational discourse structures, and I find the typology introduced by Benamara and Taboada 
(2015), more appropriate for that end. However, it is necessary to notice this rhetorical 
dimension of coherence relations, because the intended effect is taken into consideration in the 
annotation process. 
 
 
 
Example 5: RS-Tree of central span of FIL965-2-83-EUS 
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PRESENTATIONAL RELATIONS 
 Nucleus Satellite 
PREPARATION text to be presented text which prepares the reader to expect and 
interpret the text to be presented 
BACKGROUND  text whose understanding is being facilitated  text for facilitating understanding  
Enablement and Motivation 
ENABLEMENT  an action  information intended to aid the reader in 
performing an action  
MOTIVATION  an action  information intended to increase the reader’s 
desire to perform the action  
Evidence and Justify 
EVIDENCE  a claim  information intended to increase the reader’s 
belief in the claim  
JUSTIFY  text  information supporting the writer’s right to 
express the text  
Antithesis and Concession 
ANTITHESIS  ideas favoured by the author  ideas disfavoured by the author  
CONCESSION  situation affirmed by author  situation which is apparently inconsistent but 
also affirmed by author  
Restatement and Summary 
RESTATEMENT  a situation  a re-expression of the situation  
SUMMARY  text  a short summary of that text  
Table 9: Uni-nuclear presentational relations adapted from (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010) following (Iruskieta 2013) 
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SUBJECT MATTER RELATIONS 
 Nucleus Satellite 
ELABORATION  basic information  additional information  
MEANS an activity a method or instrument 
CIRCUMSTANCE text expressing the events or ideas occurring 
in the interpretive context 
an interpretive context of situation or time 
SOLUTION-HOOD  a situation or method supporting full or 
partial satisfaction of the need  
a question, request, problem, or other expressed need  
Conditional Subgroup 
CONDITION  action or situation whose occurrence results 
from the occurrence of the conditioning 
situation  
conditioning situation  
UNCONDITIONAL does not depend on S could affect N 
UNLESS none none 
OTHERWISE  action or situation whose occurrence results 
from the lack of occurrence of the 
conditioning situation  
conditioning situation  
Evaluation and Interpretation 
EVALUATION  a situation  an evaluative comment about the situation  
INTERPRETATION  a situation  an interpretation of the situation  
Cause Subgroup 
CAUSE  a situation  another situation which causes that one 
RESULT  a situation  another situation which is caused by that one 
PURPOSE  an intended situation  the intent behind the situation  
Table 10: Uni-nuclear subject matter relations adapted from (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010) following (Iruskieta 2013) 
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For example, following the original proposal by Mann and Thompson (1988) means 
CONCESSION relations are defined as follows with regard to constraints in Nucleus and 
Satellite as well as the intended effect on the reader: 
 
Relation name: CONCESSION 
Constraints on Nucleus: Writer has positive regard for the situation presented in N 
Constraints on Satellite: Writer is not claiming that the situation presented in S does not hold 
Constraints on N + S: Writer acknowledges a potential or apparent incompatibility between 
the situation presented in N and S; writer regards the situation presented in N and S compatible; 
recognising that the compatibility between the situation presented in N and S increases Reader’s 
positive regard for the situation in N 
Effect: Reader’s positive regard for the situation presented in N is increased. 
 
Example 6: Source (William C. Mann and Thompson 1988, 254–55) 
 
Now let me take another example from my corpus. The following text segment is part of a 
response given by a participant to the first question in the second phase. Therefore, the 
participant was asked about the problems and opportunities for peace and political 
normalisation127. The relational discourse structure of his reply is composed by a 
SOLUTIONHOOD relation whose satellite links to text spans with a Multinuclear LIST 
relation. The text below is Span 2.  
 
Example 7: Segmented text extracted from FIL1597_34_63_EUS 
                                                 
127 In nowadays situation what problems and opportunities do you see to reach peace and political normalization? 
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Following the stepwise methodology, first I segment the text into EDUs, and identify the 
Central Unit of this Span. This step should take into consideration the macro structure of the 
RS-Tree, as well as the question to which it responds. Indeed, if we take the text in isolation, 
the interpretation of the relations linking different EDUs might differ. For example, we could 
interpret that segments [1A] and [1B] are both a nucleus of a CONTRAST relation where both 
are given the same importance.  
However, if we look at the wider picture, as shown in Figure (2) below, this text is the nucleus 
of a multi nuclear LIST relation that, in the higher level of the hierarchy of the RS-Tree, is the 
satellite of a SOLUTIONHOOD relation. The text responds to a question on the problems and 
opportunities for peace and normalisation, and the participant first enumerates the problems, 
and then suggests a scenario in which those problems could be solved. Therefore, the participant 
lists the problems, or relevant situations, and on that basis, I interpreted that the function of 
[1A] was not at the same level to [1B] because it was [1B] the text segment expressing the 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
Example 8:  Reduced RS-Tree of FIL1597_34_63_EUS 
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Moreover, the participant, in my interpretation, conceded the compatibility of acknowledging 
that ‘ETA’s armed struggle will not bring peace.’1A with the fact that ‘however, to ETA and to 
its men and its women, no guarantee is given’1B in order to increase the reader’s positive regard 
for the situation presented in N, in this case [1B], which in the RS-Tree was the expression of 
a problem for peace and normalization. In other words, we interpreted [1A] as the satellite of a 
CONCESSION relation whose nucleus is [1B]. Indeed, the internal relational discourse 
structure of this span, enhanced this interpretation insofar as the participant refers to the 
PURPOSE of giving guarantees is to move ETA to give up armed struggle [1C] and achieve its 
political objectives by political means only [1D] and provide EVIDENCE with information 
intended to increase the reader’s belief in that claim [1E]. 
Two further remarks of note. First, it is considered that coherence relations express implicit 
communication. What I mean by this is that, relations carry communicative content and allow 
implicit communication to be revealed, thus contributing to the possibility of “reading between 
the lines” (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010). The example above, illustrates the central claim of 
the writer that ETA has no guarantees it will achieve its political ends by only political means. 
The implicit assumption of this assertion is that ETAs purpose is political, but what is debatable, 
reveals an implicit idea conveyed by the writer in this communication to the reader.  
Secondly, interpretation should be made carefully, insofar as the definition of relations, is 
grounded entirely on the interpretation of the analyst. Each definition in RST is embedded in a 
constraint formula as follows “It is plausible to the analyst that it was plausible to the author 
that…” (W. C. Mann and Taboada 2010). In short, analysis presumes that what it is plausible 
to the analyst as an observer, shall equally be plausible to the observer as a reader, consequently, 
it is plausible to think that this was the intent of the writer. 
 
4.3.3.5 Evaluation 
To evaluate the reliability of the annotation process, a part of the corpus was double annotated 
(A1 and A2) to measure the inter-annotator agreement of the RS-trees. Indeed, for this project 
has been evaluated the most difficult task of the rhetorical annotation, relation labelling.   
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To assess the reliability, the annotation of relations was evaluated following Iruskieta, Da 
Cunha, and Taboada (2015). First, the agreement for the labelling of relations in the complete 
set of twenty texts, was evaluated by comparing relations labelled by the two annotators. As 
shown in the contingency table below (Table 14), the level of disagreement was high. Only in 
30% of the cases, did both annotators label the same relation. At first sight, it seemed 
disagreement could only have been explained due to the ambiguity of the interpretation of 
several relations. Therefore some, whose differentiation was considered to give ambivalent 
results, but nevertheless pertained to the same subgroup of coherence relations were collapsed. 
For example, EVALUATION and INTERPRETATION or different relations within the 
CONDITIONAL subgroup.  
Nonetheless, even with a collapsed set of coherence relations, results remained low with an 
overall inter-annotator agreement of 46%. Lower rates of agreement were expected, given that 
the raw data was not from a scientific abstracts or journal articles; the kinds of texts that are 
well structured in comparison to those written by diverse groups of normal citizens. 
Nonetheless, results were far below what was expected, so a finer-grained analysis of the causes 
of disagreement were conducted.  
 
A1 A2 
Agreem. RST 
extended 
Agreem. collapsed 
RST 
CIRCUMSTANCE CIRCUMSTANCE 1 1 
ANTITHESIS CONTRAST 0 1 
PURPOSE PURPOSE 1 1 
SEQUENCE SEQUENCE 1 1 
CONCESSION CONCESSION 1 1 
PURPOSE PURPOSE 1 1 
SOLUTION HOOD - 0 0 
TOTAL 5/7 (%71.42) 6/7 (%85.71) 
Table 11: Inter annotator agreement description of A1 and A2 on FIL965-EUS-083-2 
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Relation labels: 1= Antithesis; 2= Background; 3= Cause; 4= Circumstance; 5= Concession; 6= Condition; 7= Conjunction; 8= Contrast; 9= Disjunction; 10= Elaboration; 11= Enablement; 12= 
Evaluation; 13= Evidence; 14= Interpretation; 15= Joint; 16= Justify; 17= List; 18= Means; 19= Motivation; 20= Otherwise; 21= Preparation; 22= Purpose; 23= Restatement; 24= Result; 25= 
Sequence; 26= Solution-hood; 27= Unconditional; 28= Unless
RELATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 Total general 
1        1  1                2 
2    1      1  1              3 
3   1           2        1    4 
4  3  3         1 1 1         1  10 
5    1 5   1  2                9 
6    1 1 2 1    1               6 
8 1         1       1         3 
9         1                 1 
10 1 1  1   2  2   1  1 1 2    1      13 
11         1                 1 
12    1 1       1     1 1   1 1    7 
13          1                1 
14     1   1    2  1 1  1         7 
15       1                   1 
16          1                1 
17   1  1  4 2 1      9  1   2      21 
18      1 1  1      1  1         5 
19          1                1 
21         2          1 1      4 
22      1      1     1   6      9 
23         4     1  1  1   2     9 
24        1          1    4    6 
25       3        1        1   5 
26         3 2  1   1     1 1   6  15 
27        1                 2 3 
28       1     1  1           1 4 
Total general 2 4 2 8 9 4 13 7 15 10 1 8 1 7 15 3 6 3 1 11 4 6 1 7 3 151 
Table 12: Contingency Table Interannotator Agreement 
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The analysis proceeded by reviewing each pair of RS-Trees (Figure 5) relation by relation for 
[FIL965-EUS-083-2], and annotating differences of interpretation by annotators A1 and A2 as 
shown in Table (15). In this case, although the two RS-Tree looks different, there is a similar 
interpretation of the text, but here the annotators are formalised in different ways to the trees. 
We explain grosso modo the different interpretations of both RS-trees from the top and left to 
the bottom and right below. 
 
A1 A2 Explanation 
ANTITHESIS AND 
SOLUTION-HOOD 
CONTRAST 
Agree in the discourse relation of a certain 
“opposition”, but disagree in segmentation, 
central unit and RST relation. 
CIRCUMSTANCE CIRCUMSTANCE 
A2 do not segment the adverbial clause of 
circumstance “elkarrizketa 
edukitzerakoan” 
PURPOSE PURPOSE Agree 
SEQUENCE SEQUENCE Agree 
CONCESSION CONCESSION 
Agree in the relation, but disagree in the 
nuclearity 
PURPOSE PURPOSE Agree 
      
      Table 13: Explanation of different interpretation by A1 and A2 of FIL965-EUS-083-2 
 
The level of agreement regarding nuclearity was high within text spans, but low regarding the 
macro structure of texts, and both annotators understood relations differently. Different 
interpretations were understandable in some cases due to the type of text under analysis. 
However, the level of agreement was too low. Therefore, regarding nuclearity at the higher 
level of the hierarchy of the RS-Tree, or macro structure of the text, I tried to identify common 
patterns for texts at the same stage; responding to the same question. Additionally, the novel 
annotator completed a training session with the expert annotator to harmonise their 
interpretation of coherence relations.  
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 1-5
 2-5
 3-5
 norberaren " 
 pretentsioak " apur 
 bat bajatu behar dira,
 --------------------------
 each should lower 
 her “ambitions”,
 Purpose
 akordio txikiak 
 lortzeko, 
 --------------------------
 to reach small 
 agreements
 Sequence
 Elkarrizketa 
 edukitzerakoan, 
 --------------------------
 When having 
 dialogue,
 Circumstance
 Espainiako alderdi 
 nagusiek ez dute nahi 
 ikusi geu geure artean
 ondo konpontzea. 
 -------------------------- 
 Main Spanish 
 political parties don’t 
 want see us make do 
 well among 
 ourselves.
 Anthitesis
 6-8
 Solution-hood
 7-8
 baina politikoek ( 
 euskaldunak barne ) 
 ahalegin guztiak 
 egiten dute, 
 --------------------------
 but politicians 
 (including basques) 
 do everything they 
 can
 elkarrizketa erreal bat
 edukitzeko? 
 --------------------------
 to have a real 
 dialogue?
 Purpose
 Ondo dago 
 herritarren artean 
 foroak eta hitz egitea,
 -------------------------- 
 It is ok that citizens 
 to talk to each other 
 and fora,
 Concession
 eta gero akordio 
 handietara heltzeko. 
 --------------------------
 and, then, arrive at 
 major ones.
 4-5
 1-8
Figure 5: Annotation of FIL965-EUS-083-2 by A1 (above) and A2 (below). 
 2-7
 5-7
 Ondo dago 
 herritarren artean 
 foroak eta hitz egitea,
 -------------------------- 
 It is ok that citizens 
 to talk to each other 
 and fora,
 6-7
 Concession
 baina politikoek ( 
 euskaldunak barne ) 
 ahalegin guztiak 
 egiten dute, 
 --------------------------
 but politicians 
 (including basques) 
 do everything they 
 can
 elkarrizketa erreal bat
 edukitzeko? 
 --------------------------
 to have a real 
 dialogue?
 Purpose
 2-4
 Circumstance
 Elkarrizketa 
 edukitzerakoan, 
 norberaren " 
 pretentsioak " apur 
 bat bajatu behar dira,
 --------------------------
 When having 
 dialogue, each 
 should lower her 
 “ambitions”,
 3-4
 Purpose
 eta gero akordio 
 handietara heltzeko. 
 --------------------------
 and, then, arrive at 
 major ones.
 Sequence
 akordio txikiak 
 lortzeko, 
 --------------------------
 to reach small 
 agreements
 1-7
 Contrast
 Espainiako alderdi 
 nagusiek ez dute nahi 
 ikusi geu geure artean
 ondo konpontzea. 
 -------------------------- 
 Main Spanish 
 political parties don’t 
 want see us make do 
 well among 
 ourselves.
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4.3.3.6 Macro-Structure and Stages 
Regarding macro-structures, it was found that there was a problem with some decisions taken 
to build the corpus. At the beginning, a decision was taken to differentiate different aspects of 
responses to the same question as different text units. For example, in the first stage of the 
second phase, participants were required to underline opportunities and difficulties for peace 
and normalisation. Reports were collated separately for both responses. Therefore, each text 
fragment was taken as a separate text unit. However, reviewing the annotation process, it was 
realised that, taken together, the Central Unit and structural organisation of the RS-Tree were 
identified more easily.  
In short, the question itself was constraining the structural organisation of responses by 
participants, but it was difficult to identify this structure, because responses had been divided 
into different text units. Therefore, both annotators agreed on a set of macro-structural templates 
for each stage of discussion, based mainly on what was expected from participants when 
attending to the question posed by the moderator. This procedure is usual in RST studies, for 
example, to harmonise the annotation of the Central Unit (Iruskieta 2013, 61–61). 
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Propose Stage (Phase I) 
 
At the Propose stage of the first phase, we 
found that in response to the question Egoera 
honetan, zein ekimenek lagun dezakete 
bakerako aukera berri bat sortzen?128 
proposals represented the central unit of texts 
that used to be preceded by elaboration 
relations like BACKGROUND and 
CIRCUMSTANCE and followed by either 
SUMMARY or RESTATEMENT relations or 
MEANS. In other words, participants framed 
their proposals and either explained how to 
advance towards them or summarised their 
contributions. 
 
Revise Stage (Phase I-II) 
 
 
At the Revise stage, there was any explicit 
question in any of both phases. Participants 
were called to express those ideas they found 
more interesting from other participants. 
Indeed, if we look at the results table we will 
see it is precisely at this stage were less quantity 
of relations were annotated. The most common 
structure in this stage was, therefore, a 
multinuclear relation either preceded by 
BACKGROUND or PREPARATION relation 
or followed by a SUMMARY or 
RESTATEMENT relation. 
                                                 
128 English Translation: In the current situation, which initiatives could contribute to create a new opportunity for peace? 
Figure 6: Macro structure Propose (Phase I) 
Figure 7: Macro Structure Revise (Phase I-II) 
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Inform Stage (Phase II) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the second phase, overall macro structures were more complex and varied. In the Inform 
stage participants were required to respond first to the following question: Gaur egun bizi dugun 
egoeran zein arazo eta zein aukera ikusten dituzu bakea eta normalizazio politikoa lortzeko?129 
As noted the question involved two aspects of the same question (problems and opportunities). 
According to our interpretation, participants mainly responded structuring their discourse 
around a SOLUTION-HOOD relation in which the satellite and the nucleus are multi nuclear 
LIST relations.  
 
Consider Stage (Phase II) 
The most difficult one to elucidate was the question in the Consider stage: Ados zaude 
herritarrak kontsultatuak izan daitezen bizi dugun egoera desblokeatzen laguntzeko?130 The 
question involves different mandates to respondents. On the one hand, the central unit of the 
macro structure is expected to be either a positive or negative response to the direct question 
posed on the consultation. On the other, there is a direct reference to the purpose of the 
consultation, and an invitation to differentiate between risks, possibilities, and doubts. 
Therefore, the same question poses three different tasks to the respondent. 
 
                                                 
129 English Translation: In nowadays situation what problems and opportunities do you see to reach peace and political 
normalization? 
130 English Translation: Do you agree that citizens are consulted to unlock the current situation? 
 
Figure 8: Macro Structure Inform (Phase II) 
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In response, participants tended to present risks that could have been overcome if the 
consultation was held. Next, they expressed their agreement or disagreement with the 
consultation, only to either concede some counter-arguments expressing their doubts or provide 
further information to support the appropriateness of their central claim.  
 
 
Therefore, this structure was formalised, using an OTHERWISE relation for which the Central 
Unit of the text is the Nucleus followed by either a JUSTIFICATION relations or 
CONCESSION relations. Nonetheless, it is interesting that here, this template matches with 
texts that respond positively to the main question posed, but not for those that respond 
negatively. Finally, the same macro structural templates were used to guide the annotation of 
texts written in both languages, so far as the questions were the same. 
 
4.3.3.7 Validity 
Finally, taking harmonised RS-trees as a departure point and after a training period for the novel 
annotator, both annotators (A1 and A2) re-annotated a sample set of six texts, which were 
measured with inter-coder agreement for the second task: the annotation of relations. The 
evaluation was made using the freely available online tool RSTeval (Maziero and Pardo 2009).  
 
 
 
 
Text Nuclearity Relation 
ID Matches Precision Matches Precision 
FIL102 47 of 49 0.959 43 of 49 0.877 
FIL196 51 of 51 1 50 of 51 0.980 
FIL1264 32 of 35 0.914 29 of 35 0.828 
FIL1713 61 of 61 1 56 of 61 0.918 
FIL2480 41 of 43 0.953 36 of 43 0.837 
FIL2517 35 of 41 0.853 31 of 41 0.756 
Table 14: Inter-coder agreement for relation labelling based on blind harmonised RS-Trees 
Figure 9: Macro Structure Consider (Phase II) 
  
268 
Results, in this case, are unexpectedly high, but it should be taken into consideration that first, 
they result from several months intensive work on the corpus by both annotators and secondly, 
that relation labelling was conducted on the basis of previously harmonised RS-trees. 
Therefore, these results reflect that at the end of the validation process, both annotators 
understand almost equally, that coherence relations where the critical point in validating this 
annotation as a baseline for further steps in the research process. 
 
4.3.3.8 Delivery 
All the annotation data presented in the previous section was automatically enriched 
morphosyntactically (lemmatized and POS-tagged) with Eustagger (Ezeiza et al. 1998) for 
Basque, and with FreeLing (Carreras et al. 2004) for Spanish as it is freely available for research 
purposes. To that end, all the annotation data was exported to a database and showed in a web-
service131 using tools developed in Iruskieta et al (2013).132  
 
4.3.3.9 Results 
Finally, I recomposed the corpus following criteria specified above, and re-annotated the set of 
200 texts. A summary of results is shown in Table (17) in comparison to the three other corpuses 
in the RST Basque TreeBank (Iruskieta et al. 2013). The main Corpus of the ‘RST Basque 
TreeBank’ (RBT, hereafter) is composed of 60 abstracts of three specialised domains: medicine 
(GMB), terminology (TERM) and science (ZTF). Two expert linguists annotated it, and it 
defines the gold standard for RST in the Basque language with 1355 EDUS’s and 1292 
annotated relations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 Database can be consulted here: http://ixa2.si.ehu.es/diskurtsoa/rstfilo/ (Consulted: 2017-08-20). 
132
 A paper with preliminary results on this corpus has been accepted for presentation and publishing in proceeding of the 6th 
Workshop “Recent advances in RST and Related Formalisms” to be held in Santiago de Compostela September 2017 titled, 
Imaz, O. and Iruskieta M., ‘Deliberation as genre: Mapping Argumentation Through Relational Discourse Structure.’ 
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The first difference in comparison to this corpus (hereafter, DELIB133) is that the texts are 
lengthier than the others. The RBT is composed of 60 texts that contain 15.566 words, while 
DELIB is composed of 200 texts that contain 20.066 words. by contrast, the RBT contains 
1.292 annotated relations and DELIB 2.524. Thus, texts in DELIB employ fewer words than 
texts in RBT for the same amount of coherence relations.  
looking at the typology of relations employed, there are no big differences between corpuses. 
Overall, more than a half of the annotated relations are Subject-Matter (DEU 54%, DSP 53%, 
TERM 52%, GMB 53%, ZTF 60%) and a quarter are Presentational-Relations (DEU 26%, DSP 
26%, TERM 24%, GMB 23%, ZTF 18%) and the other quarter Multinuclear relations (DEU 
20%, DSP 21%, TERM 25%, GMB 24%, ZTF 21%). It is interesting to note that not only are 
texts from different genres similar at this level, but also that texts from the same genre in 
different languages (DEU and DSP) are also similar. 
In the case of Subject Matter relations (Graph 4) different corpuses share ELABORATION as 
the most common coherence relation in this group and the corpus (ZTF 23%, TERM 21%, 
GMB 20%) although less prominently in DEU (13%) and DSP (10%). In the Graph below it 
can also be seen that CONDITIONAL subgroup relations are present in a smaller percentage 
than those in the CAUSAL subgroup, among which PURPOSE, is the one most represented 
(DEU 8%, DSP 8%, ZTF 10%, TERM 9%) excepting in TERM (2%). 
DEU and DSP slightly differ from the rest regarding INTERPRETATION (DEU 5%, DSP 4%) 
and EVALUATION (DEU 3%, DSP 3%) insofar as there are more coherence relations in this 
subgroup compared to others; except for INTERPRETATION relations in GMB (6%). On the 
contrary, DEU and DSP account for less MEANS relations (DEU 4%, DSP 3%) than GMB 
(9%) and ZTF (10%) but similar to TERM (3%). Finally, there is the considerably higher 
amount of CIRCUMSTANCE relations in DSP (10%) in comparison to the rest. Indeed, this is 
the most remarkable difference between the Spanish and Basque sets in DELIB. 
                                                 
133 Hereafter the entire corpus will be named DELIB, the Basque set DEU and the Spanish set DSP. 
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In the case of Presentational Relations, MOTIVATION, ENABLEMENT, EVIDENCE, 
RESTATEMENT, and SUMMARY are the least represented relations. However, there are 
differences regarding the most represented coherence relations if the DELIB corpus is 
compared to the rest. 
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Subject Matter Relations
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Graph 5: Presentational relations in the RBT 
Graph 4: Subject-Matter relations in the RBT 
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The most represented relation in DELIB is JUSTIFY (DEU 6%, DSP 5%), but 
PREPARATION is the most represented in ZTF (9%), TERM (7%), and GMB (10%). This 
presence of PREPARATION relations in ZTF, TERM, and GMB may be explained by the 
annotation of this corpuses which included the entire body of the documents with, for example, 
titles (Iruskieta, Diaz de Ilarraza, and Lersundi 2015, 6). However, something similar occurs, 
when looking at the second most represented relation that is BACKGROUND in ZTF (4%), 
TERM (7%), and GMB (6%) but CONCESSION in DEU (5%) and DSP (5%). 
Finally, in the case of multi nuclear relations, the most repeated overall relation is LIST (DEU 
12%, DSP 12%, ZTF 8%, TERM 6%, GMB 11%). Unlike in DELIB, the second most 
represented relation in the rest is SAME-UNIT (ZTF 7%, TERM 8%, GMB 4%). SAME-UNIT 
is a special kind of relation used to annotate a relation between two text segments, that conform 
one EDU, but has another EDU embedded in between and it sometimes considered as a non-
relation (Iruskieta, Da Cunha, and Taboada 2015, 40). 
 
 
Graph 6: Multinuclear relations in RBT 
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Table 15: Comparison of main figures at the RST Basque TreeBank 
RBT DEU % DSP % ZTF % TER % GMB % 
Presentational 349 26% 316 26% 102 18% 127 24% 57 23% 
Preparation 22 2% 36 3% 48 9% 38 7% 24 10% 
Background 46 3% 39 3% 23 4% 36 7% 16 6% 
Enablement 18 1% 11 1% 6 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Motivation 24 2% 30 2% 3 1% 0 0% 2 1% 
Evidence 18 1% 10 1% 3 1% 6 1% 2 1% 
Justify 83 6% 63 5% 4 1% 6 1% 4 2% 
Antithesis 34 3% 28 2% 2 0% 3 1% 0 0% 
Concession 70 5% 60 5% 9 2% 26 5% 5 2% 
Restatement 22 2% 24 2% 3 1% 7 1% 0 0% 
Summary 12 1% 15 1% 1 0% 5 1% 4 2% 
Subject 
matter 
707 54% 634 53% 334 60% 274 52% 131 53% 
Elaboration 175 13% 115 10% 125 23% 110 21% 51 20% 
Means 58 4% 36 3% 57 10% 14 3% 22 9% 
Circumstance 65 5% 111 9% 21 4% 26 5% 10 4% 
Solution-hood 32 2% 33 3% 3 1% 7 1% 0 0% 
Condition 39 3% 43 4% 6 1% 10 2% 4 2% 
Unconditional 12 1% 12 1% 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 
Unless 29 2% 26 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Otherwise 18 1% 18 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Evaluation 39 3% 34 3% 5 1% 6 1% 0 0% 
Interpretation 62 5% 49 4% 4 1% 9 2% 15 6% 
Cause 28 2% 15 1% 23 4% 27 5% 6 2% 
Result 43 3% 45 4% 32 6% 17 3% 18 7% 
Purpose 107 8% 97 8% 58 10% 47 9% 5 2% 
Multinuclear 263 20% 255 21% 117 21% 131 25% 61 24% 
Conjunction 45 3% 36 3% 16 3% 20 4% 11 4% 
Contrast 21 2% 26 2% 9 2% 20 4% 9 4% 
Disjunction 4 0% 10 1% 1 0% 1 0% 0 0% 
Joint 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
List 160 12% 145 12% 45 8% 30 6% 27 11% 
Same-unit 19 1% 27 2% 36 7% 45 8% 10 4% 
Sequence 13 1% 11 1% 10 2% 15 3% 4 2% 
TOTAL 1319 100% 1205 100% 553 100% 532 100% 249 100% 
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4.4 The Deliberative Minimum 
As explained earlier, there are reliable grounds to consider the relational discourse structure 
useful for the analysis of argumentation (Stab and Gurevych in press). Nevertheless, no direct 
correlation could be established, either between concrete argumentation schemes and relational 
discourse structures, or between argumentative relations and coherence relations (Peldszus and 
Stede 2013). This fact poses a challenge insofar as the purpose here is to assess the 
argumentativeness, and more concretely, evaluate the extent to which the participants could be 
considered to have taken a deliberative stance, in the light of the deliberative minimum, using 
the relational discourse structure of texts in the corpus. 
The methodological answer to this challenge is sustained in three steps. First, I follow Biran 
and Rambow (2011), and consider that rather than a particular RST coherence relation, it is a 
set of coherence relations that discloses the argumentativeness of the relational discourse 
structure of texts. Secondly, in order to differentiate argumentative and non-argumentative 
relations, I follow the classification model of Benamara and Taboada (2015), in which a specific 
class of relations differentiates argumentative coherence relations from non-argumentative 
coherence relations. Finally, following Gomez-Gonzalez and Taboada (2012), I take a concrete 
subclass of the Argumentation class relations to more accurately approximate the deliberative 
minimum.  
From the perspective of argumentation theory, the main type of reasoning in deliberative 
discourse is practical reason, and the argumentative scheme for practical reason defines 
deliberation by means of “considering alternative practical arguments, supporting different 
claims and examining and weighing considerations that support these alternatives” (I. 
Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 50). Moreover, at minimum, deliberation requires “balancing 
each argument against a counter-argument” (2013, 50). Indeed, it is the presence of argument 
and counter-argument which is the structural difference whereby practical reason can be 
considered to involve deliberation in a minimal sense (2013, 51).   
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From the perspective of deliberative democratic theory, the definition given by Owen and 
Smith, states that what is required to fulfil the deliberative minimum or deliberative stance is 
“a relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual exchange of reasons as if to reaching a 
shared practical judgment” (Owen and Smith 2015, 228). A central component of this minimum 
refers to a non-controversial normative standard in deliberative democratic theory; meaning, 
‘mutual respect’. Finally, ‘mutual respect’ is specified, for example, in the DQI in relation to 
different aspects among which “[i]n particular, respect towards counterarguments is a necessary 
condition for the weighing of alternatives, which some view as an essential element of 
deliberation” (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 26). 
On this basis, the set of coherence relations I will use to differentiate argumentative, and non-
argumentative relational discourse structures, could be further specified in relation to the 
deliberative minimum. This can be made significantly stronger, by focusing on those relations 
that signal the presence of an argument vs. counter-argument scheme. In this case, more 
generally the group of Argumentative-Opposition class relations are taken to indicate a more 
deliberative stance because, among other indicators (CONTRAST and ANTITHESIS) it 
includes CONCESSION relations that, according to Taboada and Gómez-González plays the 
role of a ‘vernacular argumentation’; in other words, it “fulfils the role of the classical thesis-
antithesis structure” (Taboada and Gómez-González 2012, 35).  
First, I explain the clustering process of relations following the taxonomy suggested by Taboada 
and Gómez-González. Secondly, results are analysed in relation to the different relevant 
variables for the research questions. Thirdly, to assess the robustness of findings in the previous 
task, I statically analyse the data set for each research question. In the final section, I summarize 
the main findings. 
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4.4.1 Clustering: Relation Class 
Benamara and Taboada suggest a taxonomy of coherence relations divided into four groups or 
classes: Temporal, Thematic, Structuring and Argumentative (Benamara and Taboada 2015, 
149–50). The Temporal class includes relations which set events regarding time. The Thematic 
class includes relations that “structure and organise information in the discourse” either 
“connecting utterances describing the same state of affairs” or “provide the framework for 
understanding the content of the situation described in the discourse segment” (2015, 150). 
Structuring class includes relations that organise text linguistically. Finally, the Argumentative 
class includes relations “used to advance an argument” (2015, 151). 
Thematic class and Argumentative class are further divided into several subclasses. On the one 
hand, the Thematic class includes Framing and Elaboration subclasses. Relations contained in 
the Framing subclass provide context to the content of the propositions that follow. The 
Elaboration sub class includes relations that connect utterances which describe the same state 
of affairs. Finally, the Argumentative class includes Causal and Argumentative subclasses. The 
Causal sub class includes causal and conditional relations, and the Argumentative sub class 
includes either justifications in Support of the central claim of the argument, or those 
contrasting it by Opposition.   
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The unified hierarchy of relation classes and coherence relations134 at each class is specified as 
follows (Benamara and Taboada 2015, 151):  
 
Class RST RELATIONS 
Temporal Class SEQUENCE 
Thematic Class  
         Elaboration Subclass ELABORATION, SUMMARY, RESTATEMENT, 
MEANS and PREPARATION135 
     Framing Subclass        BACKGROUND and CIRCUMSTANCE 
Structuring Class CONJUNCTION, DISJUNCTION, and LIST 
Argumentative Subclass  
  Causal Subclass  
Cause CAUSE, RESULT, CONDITIONAL group, and 
SOLUTION-HOOD 
Purpose PURPOSE 
Argumentative Subclass  
Support MOTIVATION, EVIDENCE, JUSTIFY, EVALUATION, 
INTERPRETATION, and ENABLEMENT 
Opposition CONTRAST, CONCESSION, and ANTITHESIS 
 
Table 16: Taxonomy of RST relations adapted from (Benamara and Taboada 2015) 
 
I have decided to take this taxonomy as a reference to classify relations in classes because of 
two reasons. First, it allows for a more efficient way to isolate argumentative coherence 
relations in a concrete class, that is also further divided by differentiating Opposition coherence 
relations; crucial from research questions. I have included several relations, and excluded 
others, from the original taxonomy, because I have applied the taxonomy in order to cluster 
only RST relations as defined in the ‘RST Basque Treebank’ (Iruskieta et al. 2013). Secondly, 
this taxonomy is designed to provide a common reference point to different annotation levels, 
and it is appropriate for my purposes, because the next step to be previewed in the analysis of 
this corpus, will be the annotation of discourse markers (Taboada and Das 2013). Discourse 
markers signal coherence relations and are widely used as linguistic clues in, for example, the 
identification of argumentation profiles (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Henkemans 2007). 
                                                 
134 JOINT and UNION were excluded from clustering and, therefore, not considered for analysis and interpretation. 
135 Relations in ITALICS are those added by us to the original taxonomy. 
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Finally, results have been organized taking into consideration different layers relevant from the 
perspective of research questions. In short, I want to see how different variables linking text to 
context, affect the relational discourse structure of texts in the corpus. Therefore, results of 
clustering have been segmented according to the cultural background of the participant 
(language) the micro-context of text, institutional design choices (group composition) the meso-
context of text and generic variables (stages), and the macro-context of text. 
 
4.4.2 Results 
In tables 23, 24, 25 and 26, the main results are summarized regarding count and percentage of 
relations by group composition, language, and stage of discussion. The use of argumentative or 
non-argumentative relation classes, in general, is skewed towards argumentative relation class 
in Spanish (578 non-arg. / 600 arg.) and in Basque (622 non-arg. / 677 arg.). Indeed, this 
difference is rather small regarding their relative weight in the total amount of relations. 
However, this balance is broken if their use in different phases of the initiative is accounted for. 
In the first phase, Structuring, Elaboration, and Framing class relations dominate in Basque 
(288/221), and Spanish (236/173) sets, while in the second phase the obverse happens in Basque 
(334/456) and Spanish (343/427). 
 
 
 
DSP Heterogeneous Homogeneous 
Class Propose Revise Propose Revise 
Structuring 31 21.2% 15 20.0% 28 21.1% 14 25.9% 
Elaboration 38 26.0% 24 32.0% 29 21.8% 11 20.4% 
Framing 15 10.3% 5 6.7% 16 12.0% 9 16.7% 
Causal 13 8.9% 8 10.7% 16 12.0% 6 11.1% 
Purpose 11 7.5% 5 6.7% 11 8.3% 3 5.6% 
Support 25 17.1% 8 10.7% 25 18.8% 4 7.4% 
Opposition 13 8.9% 10 13.3% 8 6.0% 7 13.0% 
TOTAL 146 100% 75 100% 133 100% 54 100% 
Table 17: Relation Class per Group Composition and Stage in the Spanish set (Phase I) 
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DEU Heterogeneous Homogeneous 
Class Propose Revise Propose Revise 
Structuring 34 18.1% 15 17.2% 32 19.3% 19 27.9% 
Elaboration 47 25.0% 21 24.1% 45 27.1% 23 33.8% 
Framing 23 12.2% 11 12.6% 14 8.4% 4 5.9% 
Causal 26 13.8% 5 5.7% 16 9.6% 4 5.9% 
Purpose 12 6.4% 11 12.6% 19 11.4% 7 10.3% 
Support 29 15.4% 14 16.1% 28 16.9% 4 5.9% 
Opposition 17 9.0% 10 11.5% 12 7.2% 7 10.3% 
TOTAL 188 100% 87 100% 166 100% 68 100% 
Table 18: Relation Class per Group Composition and Stage in the Basque set (Phase I) 
 
Regarding concrete relation classes, something similar occurs with the ordering from most to 
least used. In the first phase, there is a systematic pattern according to which, the most repeated 
class is Elaboration in both languages, followed by Structuring class relations and one of the 
argumentation class relations (Support or Opposition). In contrast, the second phase revealed 
that there are different orderings, not only if we compare both languages, but also between 
different stages or group compositions within each linguistic set. 
Thus, the numbers suggest both languages make a similar use of relation classes at this level, 
although remarkable differences emerge if we compare different phases. Regarding 
argumentation and non-argumentation class relations, it seems the second phase motivated the 
use of argumentatively denser structures. In terms of relation classes, the first phase is more 
conventional insofar as a clear pattern structures discourses for both languages at any stage of 
discussion, while in the second phase discourse structures are more diverse; not only between 
languages, but even within each linguistic set at different stages of discussion. 
A focus on stages, revealed that the difference between phases of The Konpondu Initiative 
regarding the use of argumentative and non-argumentative relations classes, is present in both 
languages: 173 argumentative relations versus 236 non-argumentative relations in the first 
phase for texts written in Spanish, and 231 argumentative relations and 289 non-argumentative 
relations in the texts written in Basque. While in the second phase the number of non-
argumentative relations in the Spanish set (353) is lower than argumentative ones (426) and the 
same happens in the Basque set (334 non-arg. / 466 arg.). Although the difference is more 
pronounced in the Basque set than in the Spanish one. 
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Within the first phase, weight regarding the density of relational discourse structures, is focused 
on the Propose stage when given for any language and group composition the number of 
relations doubles that in the Revise stage. The main relation class among non-argumentative 
relation classes is Elaboration, while within the Argumentation class the most used one is 
Support followed by either of two relations in the Causal subclass (Causal or Purpose).  
Within the second phase, the picture is much more complex. In any of the stages of the second 
phase, a clear pattern could be identified. If comparison is made stage by stage, the only 
common trend is that Argumentation class relations out number non-argumentative class 
relations. There is an exception in Spanish texts written by heterogeneous groups where the 
Causal relation class is the most used, but the same does not happen in the Basque set where a 
different relation class dominates each stage. Another exception is that in texts written in both 
languages, in heterogeneous groups the Causal relation class is the most used, but the same 
does not happen in the homogeneous groups. 
Finally, regarding group composition in the second phase, it can be seen that in heterogeneous 
groups both in Spanish (240 arg. / 160 non-arg.) and Basque (287 arg. / 196 non-arg.) 
argumentative relations outnumber non-argumentative ones in homogeneous groups in both 
languages (Spanish, 187 arg. / 183 non-arg. and Basque, 178 arg. / 138 non-arg.). In addition, 
this difference is more pronounced in Basque texts than in Spanish ones. On the contrary, in 
the first phase, there is no remarkable difference. Non-argumentative class relations out number 
argumentative ones in heterogeneous as well as homogeneous groups in both languages. 
In terms of different stages and group composition, the Consider stage provides the more 
pronounced difference in the comparison between argumentation and non-argumentative class 
relations; with the exception of Spanish texts produced in homogeneous groups. The Consider 
stage tends to be denser overall, except for texts in Basque produced in heterogeneous groups. 
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DSP Heterogeneous Homogenous 
Class Inform Consider Revise Inform Consider Revise 
Structuring 23 16.4% 26 14.5% 8 9.9% 24 16.9% 23 14.6% 10 14.3% 
Elaboration 20 14.3% 24 13.4% 10 12.3% 22 15.5% 32 20.3% 16 22.9% 
Framing 15 10.7% 19 10.6% 15 18.5% 19 13.4% 23 14.6% 14 20.0% 
Causal 28 20.0% 39 21.8% 17 21.0% 29 20.4% 28 17.7% 8 11.4% 
Purpose 17 12.1% 14 7.8% 8 9.9% 14 9.9% 7 4.4% 7 10.0% 
Support 28 20.0% 30 16.8% 14 17.3% 25 17.6% 31 19.6% 7 10.0% 
Opposition 9 6.4% 27 15.1% 9 11.1% 9 6.3% 14 8.9% 8 11.4% 
TOTAL 140 100% 179 100% 81 100% 142 100% 158 100% 70 100% 
Table 19: Relation Class per Stage and Group Composition in the Spanish Set (Phase II) 
 
DEU Heterogeneous Homogenous 
Class Inform Consider Revise Inform Consider Revise 
Structuring 28 13.4% 28 16.8% 15 13.9% 22 17.9% 15 13.6% 14 19.2% 
Elaboration 49 23.4% 20 12.0% 20 18.5% 28 22.8% 19 17.3% 17 23.3% 
Framing 19 9.1% 12 7.2% 5 4.6% 10 8.1% 8 7.3% 5 6.8% 
Causal 39 18.7% 45 26.9% 11 10.2% 22 17.9% 23 20.9% 10 13.7% 
Purpose 15 7.2% 10 6.0% 7 6.5% 9 7.3% 13 11.8% 4 5.5% 
Support 47 22.5% 34 20.4% 34 31.5% 22 17.9% 21 19.1% 11 15.1% 
Opposition 12 5.7% 18 10.8% 16 14.8% 10 8.1% 11 10.0% 12 16.4% 
TOTAL 209 100% 167 100% 108 100% 123 100% 110 100% 73 100% 
Table 20: Relation Class per Stage and Group Composition in the Basque Set (Phase I) 
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4.4.3 Statistical Analysis 
The general overview on raw numbers reveals first, that there is no remarkable difference 
between both languages, although differences emerge in the second phase. Nevertheless, it 
seems these effects are associated with strong differences regarding the relational discourse 
structure of texts between phases. This could be interpreted as meaning stages do have a strong 
effect on discourse relational structures of texts. However, this effect seems to diminish if 
differences between stages within the same phase are considered. Finally, group composition 
does influence the relational discourse structure, but it is more clearly reflected in the second 
phase than in the first one. 
In the final section of this case study, I will show whether or not these provisional findingscan 
be considered statistically significant. The taxonomy of relations allows me to identify 
differences and similarities regarding relational discourse structure using the presence or 
absence of relations within the argumentative relation class. To make the classification more 
informative, I have reordered relation classes from less argumentative to more argumentative, 
based on previous studies of the relationship between the relational discourse structures and the 
argumentative discourse structures mentioned above.  
The sequence begins with Structuring class relations136. These relations organise texts 
linguistically. Therefore, they are less informative in comparison to others regarding 
argumentation. Next, I have relocated the two subclasses of the Thematic class. Relations 
included in this class are taken to signal descriptive texts (Gruber and Huemer 2008, 344). 
Nonetheless, given that Green (2010), for example, included BACKGROUND for the analysis 
of argumentation schemes, I have ordered subclasses beginning with Elaboration subclass 
followed by Framing subclass.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 I have included in this class SEQUENCE coherence relations because the number of relations annotated is very small in 
comparison to other relation classes. 
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Finally, the Argumentation class comes last, and its subclasses have been reordered beginning 
with the Causal subclass and ending with the Argumentative-Opposition subclass. Purpose has 
been considered more argumentative because Causal relations tend to be used with explanatory 
purposes. Finally, within the Argumentation subclass priority has been given to the Opposition 
subclass due to the central role the family of Opposition relations plays for argumentation and, 
more particularly, the special role of CONCESSION (Taboada and Gómez-González 2012, 20–
22).  
The assumption I justifiably make, is that the closer the relational discourse structure of the text 
is to the Argumentative-Opposition relation subclass, the closer the text is to the argumentative 
structure expected by texts in which participants took a deliberative stance. They are therefore, 
balanced arguments against counter-arguments to support their claims. This general assumption 
defines my dependent variable, and it is specified using an ordered sequence of relation classes.  
I test the odds for each relation annotated in the corpus to fall under each class, against the odds 
for this relation to fall closer to the Argumentative-Opposition subclass in relation to each 
category of each independent variable: the language of the participant (Basque/Spanish), 
institutional design choices (Group Composition) and generic variables (Stages). I expect that 
macro-contextual variables (Stages) and meso-contextual variables (Group Composition) affect 
more the Argumentativeness of the relational discourse structure than the linguistic identity of 
participants (Language). 
In other words, in line with the main hypothesis of this dissertation, I expect the deliberative 
stance of participants to be more influenced by conventions associated with the genre of the 
deliberative event, and the concrete design choices regarding the composition of the group in 
which they participated, than their linguistic identity. A positive response to this hypothesis 
demands that members of different linguistic communities are part of the same discourse 
community, and their behaviour as a member of this discourse community, depends on the 
concrete features of the deliberative event in which they participated. Moreover, if conditions 
are in place, the linguistic diversity of the group enhances the disposition of participants to take 
a deliberative stance. 
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The model to test the research question statistically is a logistic regression. A logistic regression 
is used to predict a dependent variable given one or more independent variables. It allows me 
to analyse whether independent variables have a statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable, in this case, the relation class. Therefore, I will implement this procedure to test 
whether language, group composition and stage of discussion have a significant effect on the 
relational discourse structure of texts in the corpus. 
 
4.4.4 Reliability 
The first step in performing an ordinal logistic regression, is to test whether my data set fulfils 
its assumptions. The first two assumptions depend on research design and in this case, I have 
(i) an ordinal dependent variable and (ii) three categorical independent variables. Therefore, 
first, two assumptions are met. The third and fourth assumptions entail: (i) there should be no 
multicollinearity and (ii) we should have proportional odds. 
First, multicollinearity entails two or more independent variables are highly correlated with 
each other which makes it difficult to establish which one contributes to the explanation of the 
dependent variable. In our case, Tolerance coefficients show independent variables are not 
affected by multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
Collinerarity Tolerance VIF 
Heterogeneous 0.995 1.005 
Spanish 0.989 1.011 
Propose I 0.462 2.165 
Revise I 0.609 1.643 
Inform II 0.467 2.143 
Consider II 0.465 2.150 
a Dependent Variable: class 
 
Table 21: Tolerance Coefficients of Independent Variables 
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The second assumption regards proportional odds. It is assumed that each independent variable 
has an identical effect at each cumulative split of the ordinal variable. A full likelihood ratio 
test was performed, comparing the fit of the proportional odds to a model with varying location 
parameters, and the assumption was not met χ2 (30) = 86.755, p < 0.001. Nevertheless, this test 
tends to flag violations of the assumption of proportional odds, especially with large data sets. 
Therefore, I compared odd ratios, and as the estimated parameters in Table (24) below suggests, 
odd ratios are similar for each dichotomized cumulative category of the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
Exp (B) CAT1 CAT2 CAT3 CAT4 CAT5 CAT6 
Heterogeneous 0.865 0.829 0.811 0.865 0.820 0.868 
Propose I 1.484 1.629 1.529 1.409 1.514 1.818 
Revise I 1.730 2.022 1.863 1.516 1.729 1.153 
Inform II 1.138 1.096 1.022 1.285 1.402 2.250 
Consider II 1.066 0.892 0.831 1.163 1.143 1.217 
Spanish 1.014 0.899 1.074 1.093 1.112 1.006 
Constant 0.178 0.578 0.888 1.486 2.129 6.905 
Table 22: Estimated parameters for each category of the dependent variable 
 
 
Therefore, I can conclude assumptions are fulfilled to perform an ordinal logistic regression. 
The final model statistically significantly predicts the dependent variable over and above the 
intercept only model, x2 (6) = 40.896, p<0.001. However, the size of the effect the model 
explains is small (Nagelkerke R2 = 1,7%). The small number of independent variables could 
explain this result so far, since only the variation explained by group composition, language 
and stage of discussion is accounted for. It would be interesting to add other variables. But the 
data collected does not allow it. It was a real exercise in a challenging context, so any direct 
relation could be established at the level of participants between, for example, socio-
demographic variables and texts.  
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4.4.5 Results 
Overall results of the Tests of Model Effects suggest that the stage of discussion (Wald χ2(4) = 
34.887, p < 0.001) and the composition of the group (Wald χ2(1) = 6.085, p = 0.014) have a 
statistically significant effect on the prediction of whether participants use of argumentative 
relation class is thought to be higher. While language (Wald χ2(1) = 0.174, p = 0.677) does not 
suggest a statistically significant effect regarding the use of more argumentation relation class.  
In other words, whether participants tend to behave more argumentatively, is related to the 
composition of the group, but not to the language of the participant. Therefore, it is more 
relevant whether participants meet the other linguistic group or not, rather than the language 
they speak. Having said that, the most significant aspect is the stage of discussion. Indeed, as 
stated in the beginning of this chapter, stages are genre related aspects of discourse, and in 
theory, they are related to the discourse structure of texts. 
Looking a bit more in detail, the odds of finding more argumentative discourse relational 
structures in text depending on the stage of discussion, there are statistically significant effects  
identified for the probability of participants using less argumentative relation classes in the 
Propose stage, 0.639 (95% CI, 0.506 to 0.807) times that of Revise stage in the second phase 
(a statistically significant effect, Wald χ2(1) = 14.105, p < 0.001); and in the Revise stage in the 
first phase 0.558 (95% CI, 0.506 to 0.807) times that of Revise stage in the second phase (a 
statistically significant effect, Wald χ2(1) = 16.739, p < 0.001). 
In other words, when regarding stages, significant results point to the difference between both 
phases rather than stages in the same phase. The reference category here is the concluding round 
at the second phase, and at any stage in the first phase, where results indicate almost a half 
lower probability for more argumentative relation classes.  
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Table 23: Parameter Estimates Ordinal Regression for Category of Independent Variables Group Composition, Stage and Language 
 
 
Model: (Threshold), gcomp, question, lang 
Dependent Variable: class 
a Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b Fixed at the displayed value
Parameter B Std. 
Error 
95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Threshold Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
Threshold (Cl1) -1.751 0.1180 -1.982 -1.520 220.157 1 0.000 0.174 0.138 0.219 
Threshold (Cl2) -0.653 0.1126 -0.873 -0.432 33.624 1 0.000 0.521 0.417 0.649 
Threshold (Cl3) -0.213 0.1119 -0.432 0.006 3.622 1 0.057 0.808 0.649 1.006 
Threshold (Cl4) 0.446 0.1122 0.226 0.666 15.830 1 0.000 1.563 1.254 1.947 
Threshold (Cl5) 0.832 0.1132 0.610 1.054 54.002 1 0.000 2.297 1.840 2.868 
Threshold (Cl6) 2.104 0.1238 1.861 2.347 288.808 1 0.000 8.200 6.433 10.453 
Heterogeneous 0.176 0.0713 0.036 0.316 6.085 1 0.014 1.192 1.037 1.371 
Homogenous 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Propose I -0.448 0.1193 -0.682 -0.214 14.105 1 0.000 0.639 0.506 0.807 
Revise I -0.583 0.1425 -0.862 -0.304 16.739 1 0.000 0.558 0.422 0.738 
Inform II -0.211 0.1196 -0.445 0.024 3.106 1 0.078 0.810 0.641 1.024 
Consider II -0.023 0.1197 -0.258 0.212 0.037 1 0.847 0.977 0.773 1.236 
Revise II 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
Spanish -0.030 0.0711 -0.169 0.110 0.174 1 0.677 0.971 0.845 1.116 
Basque 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
(Scale) 1b          
Nagelkerke R2 = 1.7%, χ2 (6) = 40.896, p<.001 
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Finally, the odds of participants in heterogeneous groups using more argumentative relation 
classes was 1.192 (95% CI, 1.037 to 1.371) times that of participants in homogeneous groups 
(a statistically significant effect, χ2(1) = 6.085, p = 0.014). While the odds of participants in the 
Spanish speaking community using more argumentative relation classes, was 0.677 (95% CI, 
1.037 to 1.371), therefore lower than that of participants from the Basque speaking community; 
this result however, is not statistically significant (χ2(1) = 0.174, p = 0.677). 
In other words, the composition of the group is a more reliable predictor of the argumentative 
behaviour of participants, than their membership of one, or the other, linguistic community. 
This result is coherent with previous research in the field of deliberative democratic theory 
(Caluwaerts 2012), and it is interesting in the context of this dissertation, because it confirms 
the main hypothesis. The diversity of the group, in this case the linguistic diversity of the group, 
has a positive effect on the disposition of citizens participating in a deliberative mini-public to 
take a deliberative stance.  
Finally, results of the ordinal regression show the odds in relation to each independent variable 
to use more argumentative relation classes. In other words, if statistical significance points to 
the probability of the relational discourse structure of texts to score higher in relation to the 
ordinal scale of argumentativeness, then we have established among relations classes with 
Argumentative-Opposition at the higher level and Structuring at the lower level. But, based on 
this data it cannot be known where this effect occurs, so it could be that these significant effects 
point to more probability for Framing than Elaboration. 
To specify the effect of the independent variables at each relation class, and concretely isolate 
the effect in relation to the relation class I have associated with a properly deliberative stance, 
meaning the Argumentative-Opposition subclass, I need to perform a different type of analysis. 
A Multinomial Logistic Regression will inform whether each of the independent variables 
predicts, in our case, if a relation will be classified at each concrete category of our outcome or 
dependent variable. In other words, this kind of analysis permits me to assess to what extent 
the composition of the group predicts, in relation to the three predictors in the model (stage, 
group composition, and language), whether a relation will be classified under the class 
Argumentative-Opposition in contrast to a reference category of the dependent variable.  
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In this model, I chose the Structuring class relation as reference category because this relation 
class involves coherence relations used to structure the linguistic content and, therefore, they 
are not very informative to our research interest. In addition, the last category of each 
independent variable is chosen as reference category for each predictor.  
Overall the model predicts, statistically significantly, the dependent variable over and above 
the intercept only model, χ2 (36) = 127.787, p<0.001. Indeed, the size of the effect the model 
explains is considerably higher than in the logistic regression (Nagelkerke R2 = 5,1%). 
Looking class by class, in relation to the stages, the model confirms what we know from the 
logistic regression, but allows me to locate the effect in relation to concrete relation classes. 
The reference category of the independent variable is the final round in the second phase 
(Revise II). Overall, whether a relation class will be other than the reference category, is 
significantly predicted for Argumentation class relations in either stage at the first phase. In 
Table (26) I compare final stages at both phases. This comparison is interesting because the 
question was the same and, is therefore, the macro-structural template of the relational 
discourse structure.  
 
Parameter Estimates 95% CI for Exp. (B) 
Class Stage B(SE) Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) Lower B. Upper B. 
Elaboration Revise I -0.067 0.256 0.794 0.935 0.566 1.546 
 Revise II 0 . . . . . 
Framing Revise I -0.590 0.312 0.059 0.555 0.301 1.023 
 Revise II 0 . . . . . 
Cause Revise I -0.989 0.320 0.002 0.372 0.199 0.697 
 Revise II 0 . . . . . 
Purpose Revise I -0.294 0.338 0.385 0.746 0.385 1.445 
 Revise II 0 . . . . . 
Support Revise I -1.084 0.293 0.000 0.338 0.190 0.600 
 Revise II 0 . . . . . 
Opposition Revise I -0.576 0.298 0.053 0.562 0.313 1.008 
 Revise II 0 . . . . . 
Nagelkerke R2 = 5.1%, χ2 (36) =127.79, p < .001 
Table 24: Parameter Estimates Multinomial Logistic Regression for each Category of 
Relation class per Stage 
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The odds ratio tells that participants are less likely use argumentative relations in the first phase, 
tangibly less than half time Cause relations (0.372 (95% CI, 0.199 to 0.697)) and Support 
relations (0.328 (95% CI, 0.190 to 0.600)). Nonetheless, this effect is not significantly 
predicted if we look at Purpose (b = -0.294, Wald χ2 (1) = 0.755, p = 0.385) and Opposition (b 
= -0.576, Wald χ2 (1) = 3.735, p = 0.053); although the latter is almost significant indicating 
the participants in the Revise I are also less likely use Opposition relations (0.562 (96% CI, 
0.313 to 1.008). 
Therefore, regarding stages, the structural organization of the mini-public has significant 
consequences for the disposition of participants to use arguments. Moreover, the more 
demanding the structure of the event, the more argumentative the discourses of participants. 
This effect is significant of Support and Cause relation classes that include coherence relations 
like CAUSE, RESULT or EVIDENCE and JUSTIFICATION, correspondingly. But, this 
result is not significant for the Argumentative-Opposition class. Although, in the latter case it 
is almost significant, and the odds are half that of the Revise stage in the first phase. 
 
 
Parameter Estimates 95% CI for Exp. (B) 
  B(SE) Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) Lower B  Upper B  
Elaboration Heterog. 0.010 0.132 0.937 1.010 0.781 1.308 
 Homog. 0 . . . . . 
Framing Heterog. 0.047 0.158 0.768 1.048 0.768 1.429 
 Homog. 0 . . . . . 
Cause Heterog. 0.244 0.143 0.087 1.277 0.965 1.689 
 Homog. 0 . . . . . 
Purpose Heterog. 0.049 0.171 0.774 1.050 0.751 1.470 
 Homog. 0 . . . . . 
Support Heterog. 0.277 0.138 0.045 1.319 1.006 1.730 
 Homog. 0 . . . . . 
Opposition Heterog. 0.250 0.164 0.128 1.284 0.930 1.773 
 Homog. 0 . . . . . 
Nagelkerke R2 = 5.1%, χ2 (36) =127.79, p < .001 
Table 25: Parameter Estimates Multinomial Logistic Regression for each Category of 
Relation Class per Group Composition 
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Regarding group composition overall the odds ratios indicate heterogeneous groups are slightly 
more likely to use Argumentation class relations, while they are almost equal for Elaboration 
class relations. Results suggest, however, that the composition of the group only significantly 
predicts this effect for Support relations (b = 0.277, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.005, p = 0.045) with a 
change in the odds ratio of more than a unit (1.315 (95% CI, 1.006 to 1.730). Nonetheless, the 
prediction is more significant of Cause (b = 0.244, Wald χ2 (1) = 2.926, p = 0.087) and 
Opposition (b = 0.250, Wald χ2 (1) = 2.314, p = 0.128), than any of the Elaboration relation 
classes. 
Therefore, the discourse of participants in linguistically diverse groups, is more likely to be 
argumentative than those of participants in linguistically homogeneous groups. This suggests 
that facing the out-group does foster a more argumentative stance on behalf of participants. 
Nevertheless, as noted in relation to stages, this argumentative stance is not reflected in terms 
of the disposition of participants to use the thesis-antithesis structure of argumentation, insofar 
as results are not significant for this class. 
Finally, the most interesting result affects the predictive capacity of the language of 
participants. IN this respect, it worth recalling that the logistic regression revealed the odds for 
a given relation to be more argumentative, depending on whether the text was written in Basque 
or Spanish. In this case, the language had no significant effect on the argumentativeness of the 
discourse of the participant. On the contrary, if we look for this effect category by category of 
the independent variable, we see that language significantly predicts the use of Framing 
relation class (b = 0.391, Wald χ2 (1) = 5.999, p = 0.014). In Table (28) I summarize the 
Parameter Estimates for each category of dependent variable per the language of the 
participant.  
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Parameter Estimates 95% CI for Exp. (B) 
  B(SE) Std. Error Sig. Exp(B) Lower B. Upper B. 
Elaboration Spanish -0.139 0.132 0.295 1.099 0.671 1.128 
 Basque 0 . . . . . 
Framing Spanish 0.391 0.159 0.014 1.478 1.081 2.020 
 Basque 0 . . . . . 
Cause Spanish 0.009 0.142 0.951 1.009 0.763 1.333 
 Basque 0 . . . . . 
Purpose Spanish -0.004 0.172 0.983 0.996 0.712 1.394 
 Basque 0 . . . . . 
Support Spanish -0.125 0.138 0.364 0.882 0.673 1.156 
 Basque 0 . . . . . 
Opposition Spanish -0.016 0.163 0.920 0.984 0.010 1.355 
 Basque 0 . . . . . 
Nagelkerke R2 = 5.1%, χ2 (36) =127.79, p < .001 
Table 26: Parameter Estimates Multinomial Logistic Regression for each Category of 
Relation Class per Language of Participant 
 
Results are almost equal, and non-statistically significant, at each category of the dependent 
variable, except for Framing. The odds that a Spanish speaking participant more likely uses 
Framing are 1.478 (95% CI, 1.081 to 2.020) times that of a Basque speaking participant. This 
relation class involves coherence relations BACKGROUND and CIRCUMSTANCE that 
indicates a more narrative stance of Spanish speaking participants’ in comparison with Basque 
speaking ones. 
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4.5 Summary 
The analysis in its different steps suggests that among the three variables introduced (Stages, 
Group Composition, and Language) the Stage of discussion has a more significant effect on 
the disposition of participants to take a deliberative stance. The significance of this result is 
enhanced by results in different steps of the analysis process. For example, it has been shown 
that the balance between Argumentation relation classes and non-argumentative relation 
classes shifts between phases. In the first phase, non-argumentative relations outnumber 
argumentative relations in both linguistic communities, and in heterogeneous as well as 
homogenous groups, while the opposite happens in the second phase. Moreover, I have already 
noted that in terms of relation classes and their ordering, the discourse structures in the second 
phase were less conventional than in the first, where clearer patterns seemed to structure 
citizens’ discourses.  
An obvious objection to this conclusion is likely to be that it is equally obvious that the 
questions were different at each stage, so it seems reasonable that responses had different 
relational discourse structures. However, the comparison between the two final stages in both 
phases clarifies this ambivalence of the model. In the Revise stage of either phase, the same 
question was made to participants, but the ordinal logistic regression shows that the odds for 
participants using more argumentative relation classes in the Revise I, was half that of 
participants in Revise II, and the result was statistically significant (p < 0.001). However, in the 
light of the Deliberative Minimum, the multinomial regression has shown that this effect was 
more significant for Cause and Support relation classes than for Argumentative-Opposition, so 
that relational discourse structure was indeed more argumentative, but not more deliberative. 
Finally, the results are interesting because they indicate that the more demanding the structure 
of the event, the more argumentative the stance of participants is likely to be. This result is 
even more interesting, if the discussion on the appropriateness of the change in the 
methodology is taken into consideration. As noted before, Columbia experts reported that the 
mood and content of the transcripts shifted in the second phase, and their recommendation was 
on the appropriateness to roll back to the original methodology. But, in the light of these results 
my recommendation would be the opposite insofar as discourse structures were generally more 
argumentative and diverse in the second phase. Further, in the light of citizen’s comments in 
the evaluation sheets, their level of satisfaction was very high, and significantly they reclaim 
more room for debate. 
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Regarding the composition of the group, overall results suggests facing the out-group fostered 
more argumentation than meeting the family. Linguistically heterogeneous groups used more 
Argumentation relation classes than homogeneous ones, and the odds were statistically 
significantly higher (p = 0.014). Moreover, raw numbers showed that this effect was focused 
on the second phase, so it seems that the effect of stage is enhanced by the composition of the 
group. However, the multinomial regression shows that in terms of group composition, the 
effect is also limited to coherence relations of the Support class.  
In this class, we find RST coherence relations as MOTIVATION, EVIDENCE, JUSTIFY, 
EVALUATION, INTERPRETATION, or ENABLEMENT. Except for EVALUATION and 
INTERPRETATION all the rest are Presentational relations and therefore involve an intended 
effect on the hearer, linked to the main claim, and therefore entails action aimed at a response. 
From the perspective of Argumentation Theory, especially the use of EVIDENCE or 
MOTIVATION, this reflects practical reason is operating, but again they do not fulfil the 
requirement of involving a thesis-antithesis structure, therefore do not signal a deliberative 
stance in the light of our minimum. 
Finally, according to the results, it seems that members of both linguistic communities indeed 
form part of the same discourse community, and share equally the context of culture. Therefore, 
the language of the speaker does not have an influence in the discourse structure of participants. 
We have seen common patterns for both languages regarding the effect of stages and group 
composition; except for the use of Framing class by Spanish speaking participants. The 
multinomial regression reveals that in this class, the language of the participant significantly 
predicts the outcome, and the odds are higher for Spanish speaking participants to use this class 
than for Basque speaking participants.  
In this relation class, my taxonomy included BACKGROUND and CIRCUMSTANCE 
coherence relations. Indeed, BACKGROUND is considered by some of the papers reviewed 
as an indicator of argumentation. Although, in my taxonomy it was differentiated and classified 
as an Elaboration relation class, that indicated a more narrative stance on behalf of the 
participant. However, results of the first classification comparing DELIB to the other corpuses 
in the RBT, had already signalled an unusual presence of CIRCUMSTANCE coherence 
relations (Table 17) in the Spanish set. This may indicate that besides similarities in terms of 
general patterns, both linguistic communities differ in some respects.  
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A final note regarding group composition and language. I have assumed in both, that language 
is a good indicator of different discourse communities in the Basque Country. Either 
considering language to be relevant for the comparison between members of both linguistic 
groups, or considering language relevant as an element differentiating the composition of a 
group. Indeed, I will return to this point in the next chapter, but previous analysis conducted 
on the same corpus, albeit focusing on the semantic content of citizens’ discourses, suggest 
that members of both linguistic communities frame their understanding of crucial concepts as 
‘violence’ or ‘democracy’ differently (Otegi et al. 2017). This is interesting as it would indicate 
that having different worldviews does not necessarily indicate a difference in terms of the 
capacity, or the disposition of citizens, to take an argumentative stance. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
Three questions have structured the analysis in this chapter. The first considered the influence 
of deliberative mini-publics, and of mini-publics generally, in the wider context of the 
deliberative system. The theoretical discussion underlined that both the location and function 
of the mini-public were problematic, and required a compound analysis of each site in its 
context. In the first section, it was shown that in the case of The Konpondu Initiative, closeness 
to decision-making acted in concert with a not very friendly environment, against its capacity 
to involve members of different political sensibilities. In this case, as noted by Dryzek and 
against my critique, closeness to decision-making had a negative effect that could have been 
easily overcome if civil society actors involved, had for example, taken the initiative. Indeed, 
as it transpired after the initiative with great success.  
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The second aspect of interest was concrete design choices and their relation to deliberative 
outcomes. In this case, as Fung suggested, the analysis showed that the compound analysis of 
design-choices and outcomes require each initiative to be locate in its specific context. It was 
thus necessary to assess the appropriateness of the deliberative mood, or understand the vision 
underlying the context. Moreover, I have identified several trade-offs. The intention to 
encourage a paradigm shift from talking to others, to listening to others, made sense 
considering the conditions for public debate in the Basque Country at that time. Indeed, it seems 
this intention explains most of the decisions taken for the implementation of the initiative, 
including the stringent rules to preclude discussion. However, they were revealed to be 
misplaced given the actual profile of participants in the initiative. 
Finally, both layers met in the analysis of citizens’ discourses, and in this case the central 
question was the effect of division lines, in relation to design choices, or features associated 
with genre and the more general context of culture. In this case, I have seen that members of 
both linguistic communities react in a similar manner to either design choices or generic stages 
in their discursive stance. In other words, to predict the argumentative behaviour of 
participant’s, genre features and design choices are more significant than language. 
With regard to design choices, participants understanding of their role in the event, as reflected 
in their disposition to engage in an argumentative exchange of reasons, do not depend on their 
language, but on the setting in which dialogue takes place. Indeed, contrary to what the theory 
predicts, the linguistic diversity of the group had a positive effect in the argumentative stance 
of citizens. On the other hand, with regard to stages, it is pertinent to recall that they reflect the 
structural design of the event with conventions that were aimed to fulfil the shared purpose of 
the initiative, and to learn in the context of a discourse community. In this case, the similarities 
between both linguistic communities, suggested they similarly understood their role on behalf 
of the shared purpose of the initiative. In other words, they did their job. 
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Therefore, the main conclusion is that the initiative was capable of responding to its purpose, 
namely that of opening up a space for citizens to express their opinion, and make a contribution 
to peace and normalization. On a more systemic level, it contributed to enhancing the diversity 
of perspectives involved in the peace process, in contrast, to the profoundly elitist designs of 
previous attempts at conflict resolution. Its close connection to the initiative of the 
Lehendakari, does however cast doubt over its capacity to fulfil the deliberative minimum 
established as a normative reference point for each site of the system. In short, to engage in 
mutual exchange of reasons with others over an issue of controversy, others are necessary. 
Thus, the initiative fulfilled its shared purpose, albeit without meeting the deliberative 
minimum. 
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Chapter VI 
From Discourse Ethics to the Theory of Argumentation 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have thoroughly reviewed the main conceptual knots in the field of 
deliberative democratic theory. Particular emphasis was placed on the role it is called to play 
in the controversial relationship between identity and democracy. The main virtue of the 
deliberative approach is that it seeks to take both seriously. What this means, in my view, is 
that there is an explicit intention to take citizens seriously. Moreover, the clear set of standards 
it demands has the added value of providing a structure for discussion, and reliable grounds for 
empirical research. The analysis of The Konpondu Initiative, applied the main conclusions that 
I drew from the conceptual debate, to a problematic and time limited case-study. As noted in 
the introduction, the initiative featured all ingredients that might be expected to lead to failure. 
However, this provided an invaluable perspective, to rigorously analyse the role that 
deliberation played in a society coping with a deep social and political divide - a society where 
division lines were structured along strongly opposing identities, and in the context of a modern 
constitutional liberal democracy.  
However, the main virtue of combining conceptual thinking and empirical analysis, is that it 
keeps debate ongoing. One case does not settle the appropriateness of a theory, but provides 
relevant additional flavour to the discussion. In this case, the analysis of The Konpondu 
Initiative provided several interesting insights regarding the extant theoretical debates. 
Therefore, this concluding chapter, returns to the conceptual debate and reconsiders some of 
my positions in the light of what I have learnt from the case-study, and suggests possible ways 
forward for future research. 
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1 So, what? 
The conceptual discussion concluded with a set of basic tenets, in the light of which, I designed 
the case-study. In short, the structure of the debate linked two relevant dimensions: normative 
standards and the sequence of deliberation as a process. In the former, the systemic approach 
retains basic democratic, ethic, and the epistemic normative standards of deliberative 
democracy. The democratic requirement is linked to inclusiveness, the epistemic to grounding 
reasons and opinions and the ethic, to mutual respect. With regard to the latter, I concluded that 
the sequential approach of the middle ground theory was the most appropriateness analytical 
dimension. I employed this sequential approach using the basic framework of the systemic turn. 
This framework assumes that the evaluation of deliberation takes place at the level of the 
system, ensuring that normative requirements are allowed to be fulfilled to different degrees, in 
different sites of the system.  
Considering both dimensions of the systemic turn at once, I specified that inclusiveness should 
entail decisiveness, thus grounding reasons entails deliberation with others, and mutual respect 
demands the use of counter arguments to support one’s claims. 
I structured the approximation to the case-study, taking mini-publics as the main unit of 
analysis, and at this level, the normative framework is defined around a minimum requirement. 
Deliberation at minimum is thus defined as mutual respect, and the disposition to act as if to 
reach a shared practical judgment. This minimum applied to each site of the system, although 
the powerless end of the public sphere could deviate from this ideal, but not the powerful one. 
However, I detached mutual respect from its translation regarding discourse ethics, and moved 
one step back towards the theory of argumentation. The idea was that instead of measuring 
whether conditions were met for a mutual exchange of reasons, we should attend to the use of 
counter-arguments in the exchange of reasons. The normative ideal retains its function as 
empirical guidance for analysis, and provided a standard against which actual practices were 
critically assessed, but their evaluation regarding whether it was good or bad, is left for moral 
and democratic theories and, as I said, at this level, we can reasonably disagree. 
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In the case of The Konpondu Initiative, results showed that citizens’ discourses met the 
deliberative minimum according to my definition. The comparison with other corpuses revealed 
differences that affected presentational relations and, more importantly, CONCESSION, 
JUSTIFICATION, and ANTITHESIS. These three are Argumentative relations according to 
the taxonomy, and in particular, ANTITHESIS and CONCESSION, are classified as 
Argumentative-Opposition class relations. In other words, they represent the materialisation of 
the thesis-antithesis structure, thus indicators of the Deliberative Minimum. Therefore, it could 
be concluded, that the corpus fits with what is expected from discourse in a communicative 
event instantiating the genre of deliberation. 
Against this background, I analysed how different aspects, relevant to empirically grounding 
the ideal model do, or do not, affect the deliberative behaviour of citizens. In particular, stages, 
or the stepwise organisation of the communicative event, design, or the composition of the 
group in which deliberative dialogue took place, and finally, language, or the linguistic 
community of the participant. Indeed, I think the case-study grounds the appropriateness of the 
analysis of deliberation as a genre. 
Genre entails discourse as a conventional communicative practice, learned in the context of a 
discourse community, and aimed at a purpose. It is a conventional communicative practice, 
because each genre carries with it conventions in the form of institutional conditions that 
structure the site and constraint debate. Conventions are learned in the context of a discourse 
community, so members of the same discourse community share their understanding of them, 
to follow or strive. Moreover, conventions and the structure of the debate, for example, stages, 
direct the progressive unfolding of deliberative dialogues towards its shared purpose. In the 
ideal model, deliberation aims at preserving the democratic political culture. Therefore, stages 
unfold with the intention of providing a viable path towards the resolution of controversies by 
a mutual exchange of arguments based on practical reason.  
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In this regard, the second conclusion is that the structure of the event, or stages of discussion, 
and the composition of the group, are more relevant than the languages of the speakers to predict 
the argumentativeness of discourses. Regarding stages, the comparison between both phases 
leads undoubtedly to this conclusions at every step of the analysis. In other words, the way the 
event was structured had a significant effect on citizen’s discourses and the more demanding 
the structure of the event was, the more argumentative the discourse of participants became. On 
the composition of the groups, heterogeneous groups were more argumentative than 
homogenous groups. Moreover, the lack of remarkable differences between both linguistic sets, 
except for Framing in the Spanish set, suggests participants held a common understanding of 
the shared purpose and their duties. In other words, they belonged to the same discourse 
community.  
Yet, on whether these variables influenced the disposition to the take a deliberative stance, the 
results are less clear. Results do show that stages, and the composition of the group, have an 
effect, but not in the disposition of participants to take a deliberative stance. Both have positive 
effects with regard to the argumentativeness of discourse, but not relative to the deliberative 
minimum. In the case of stages, this could be related to the fact that the event was indeed 
structured to avoid critical interactions. In other words, the empirical materialisation of 
conventions in the form of institutional constraints, was aimed at precluding discussion and to 
focus on listening to what others had to say. Conversely, with regard to group composition it 
could be related to the problematic definition of the ‘other’ in this case, in the sense that I have 
concluded that the identity of ‘other’, was at least questionable. Let me explain this bit more in 
detail. 
Regarding the former, shared purposes, as well as stages, define an ideal model that should be 
grounded empirically at the level of each case. In The Konpondu Initiative, it was seen that the 
shared purpose was opening space for citizens to take part and contribute towards peace and 
normalisation, and the institutional conventions underlined the centrality of listening to others 
instead of talking to others. Stages and, more specifically, phases, had a positive impact on the 
prediction of relation classes like Argumentative-Cause and Argumentative-Support, but not 
Argumentative Opposition. Thus, institutional conventions fostered the argumentativeness of 
participants, but not their disposition to take a deliberative stance. Indeed, the fact that the 
corpus is defined by relations like, for example, CONCESSION suggests participants even 
strived against conventions to engage others by means of arguments and counterarguments.  
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Regarding the latter, the fact that the composition of the group had no direct impact on the 
deliberative stance of citizens, can be associated with the problematic status of the ‘other’ in 
The Konpondu Initiative. The choice of language as a relevant category of analysis for identity 
was a controversial one. Specifically, because language is not necessarily an adequate indicator 
to denote division lines in the Basque case, at least not if it was aimed at enacting conflict along 
those lines. Moreover, in the course of the case-study, I have underlined that it is plausible to 
conclude that the initiative mainly involved participants with a Basque nationalist sensibility. 
Therefore, with regard to the central issue at stake, it cannot be discerned that the relevant other, 
namely those who disagree with the consultation, were present, and in addition, the question of 
the relevant other to whom participants engaged in argumentation, remains an open question.  
One possibility is that participants indeed played ideal roles. Another, more plausible 
suggestion, is that the language of the participant is relevant to the features of identity in the 
Basque Country, but different for identities within the nationalist sphere. It is a reasonable 
hypothesis so far as the phenomenon of Basque nationalism is complex and multidimensional 
(Zabalo 1998; Zabalo, Soto, and Mateos 2012). Nevertheless, results suggested a positive 
correlation between linguistic diversity and the argumentative stance of citizens. Groups 
involving participants belonging to different linguistic communities were more argumentative 
than linguistically homogeneous ones. This finding builds on previous research (Caluwaerts 
2012; Luskin et al. 2014), against the idea that facing the outgroup enhances ‘enclave 
deliberation’, thus precluding efforts for a constructive exchange of reasons.  
Moreover, results provide interesting insights regarding the epistemic normative baseline of the 
systemic turn. At this level, theoretical debate concluded with the suggestion that the 
appropriateness of the paradigm be changed from ‘deliberation within’ to ‘deliberation with 
others’. The critical asset of the deliberative mode of argumentation is that the epistemic quality 
of decisions taken depends on an actual exchange of arguments with others. Moreover, the 
hypothesis suggests a positive correlation between cognitive diversity and epistemic quality. 
Results are coherent with the hypothesis, because the linguistic diversity of the group had a 
positive effect in the argumentativeness of participants. Therefore, if reasoning with others is 
the standard of democratic reasons, and cognitive diversity its main asset, we could conclude 
that the second half of the central hypothesis holds; namely, that the many are smarter than the 
few, no matter how diverse are the many.  
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Hélène Landemore, in her book Democratic Reason (2013), consistently sustained the 
plausibility of the first half of the hypothesis. Moreover, I sincerely doubt there is any way to 
provide empirical proof outside the burdens of theoretical speculation, about what is 
epistemically better. If the assumption holds, and the many are smarter than the few, 
linguistically diverse groups will outperform homogenous groups because their interactions are 
more argumentative than in homogenous groups; but we cannot go further. Though, in this case, 
the unfolding of events provides something of a commonsensical indicator that something like 
that indeed happened. The fact that several elite-driven attempts to conflict resolution failed, 
while the only one in which citizens took the lead and played an important role succeeded, 
suggests that, in this case, the many have been smarter than the few. 
Nonetheless, the question of who is the other remains, and on the basis of the above, we cannot 
resolve the question over why the composition of the group does not reveal a similar impact on 
those structures that entail a thesis-antithesis scheme? One exploratory option is that the 
structure of the communicative event overruled the composition of the group. Indeed, the 
statistical significance of stages was greater than the statistical significance of group 
composition. However, at this point, this is a hypothesis. Nevertheless, on these bases, the 
epistemic layer is not compromised, so far as we could argue it would be even better to have 
the unionist side. Yet, the hypothesis of the linguistic other within the Basque nationalist sphere, 
does compromise the democratic normative baseline of the systemic turn in the case of The 
Konpondu Initiative. 
At the level of participants, there is no point. As I noted in the concluding section, in the light 
of results, participants did their job. The appropriate level affects the location and function of 
the initiative in the wider political process from a systemic perspective. In this case, theoretical 
debate concluded with the suggestion that coupling with decision-making at the institutional 
level, instead of decoupling as a default position was preferred. However, we have seen that the 
initiative did not benefit from its closeness to decision making at the institutional level. The 
relationship of the initiative with the roadmap for peace by the Lehendakari, meant Ibarretxe 
may have had a positive effect regarding inclusiveness, by giving citizens a place to take part. 
However, it is not clear how participation impacted upon decision-making. In other words, 
location is close, but decisiveness is unclear, thus there is room left open to speculate over elite 
manipulation, or at least the use of the initiative to reinforce one's partisan position. 
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Now, the systemic turn allows deviations and trade-offs, and even antithetical practices. The 
rule is flexible, as the idea of ‘stepped pluralism’ suggests. Moreover, trade-offs are reasonable 
if unreasonable conditions require them. In this case, the lack of inclusiveness may serve the 
visualisation of hidden perspectives even at the cost of democratic requirements. In other words, 
democratic inclusiveness is sacrificed at the level of each site, to make visible hidden 
perspectives at the system level, so that what is lost at one level is gained at the other. 
Nevertheless, at the level of the initiative, this argument is questionable because it was a 
governmental initiative.  
Konpondu was part of a wider road map ending in a consultation. Therefore, organisers 
supported the consultation. Moreover, this position was at that time, as it is nowadays largely a 
majoritarian one in Basque society. Therefore, the initiative did not make visible the weaker 
end, but the majoritarian one. Finally, this absence calls into question whether the initiative met 
the basic requirement for each site of the deliberative system: the deliberative minimum. In the 
final section of the case study, I concluded that participants did their job, notwithstanding that 
the initiative itself did not meet the deliberative minimum. In other words, the initiative entailed 
‘a mutual exchange of reasons’ but it is not clear ‘as if to reaching a shared practical judgment’ 
and clearly not with those directly affected. 
This conclusion is the outcome of critical analysis in the light of the normative ideal I have 
chosen. Now, does it say something about the actual contribution of The Konpondu Initiative 
in the Basque case? The question is tricky, and as I have already argued, argumentation theory 
does not respond. So, I asked an expert about it.  
At the beginning of this research, I met several people that were directly implicated in the 
initiative to get a general idea. Among them, was Prof. Andrea Bartoli one of the Columbia 
experts that assisted the Basque Government in the organisation of the initiative, and wrote the 
reports that have I referred to in this dissertation. The original plan was to interview several 
personalities, but for several reasons, I did not follow this path either. It now lives in a small 
corner of my computer for future research. Thus, I recorded only one interview. However, I 
asked him specifically about this ambivalent aspect of the initiative, and this was his reply. The 
interview took place in Bilbo the 31st of May 2014. I transcribe the entire response:  
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“I think it was definitively… real dynamics. It is difficult to say if it was a loss or a 
gain. It was a loss in the sense that the original plan of having people representing 
the Partido Popular, the Socialist, you know… a much larger spectrum did not 
necessarily come out. So, you have this more, the stronger conversation among 
Basque nationalists. But, exactly because of this shift of responsibility from a 
blaming game, all is some else’s responsibility, to this assumption of 
responsibilities, I found that was actually very promising. Because, as I said at the 
beginning, this is, I think, what explain ETA’s decision not to continue on a violent 
campaign. That is to say, there is a shift of agency from we need to solve this 
problem because this problem is created by Madrid, this problem is created by the 
politicians, this problem is created by someone else… to we can do something about 
this problem that can actually change, independently of Madrid, independently of 
the politicians and so on. So curiously, I think that there is a reposition which is 
going to be interesting, again, you know for what is going to happen in the next 5-
10 years, but it could be that what you saw actually, in those conversations is that 
there were citizens group that were actually deciding to be the advangarde of a new 
political arrangement, that could strengthen the nationalist coalition, as such, not 
against Madrid, not against the Partido Popular, not against the Socialist Party, but 
simply as a self-recognized, self-autonomous decision-making body in which they 
say ok, you do whatever you want to do, but we want to do whatever we want to 
do. So, there is a sort of [cooling] of responsibilities, or re-enacting political… 
agency… which I think is playing out in current… you know… voting trends and 
so on… so the interesting thing is that… you can’t force anybody to participate and 
you cannot force anybody to feel threatened by political participation. So, if you 
believe that having a glass of wine is a sin you will have hard time convincing her 
or him to drink a glass of wine. So, if participating is the equivalent of betraying … 
or or… you know… or making a statement that… well political participation is the 
reverse of what you think it is… Because you know you are [throwing] a party as a 
way to have a good time and people look at you and think you are a drunker and a 
sinner and a terrible person because you are doing this terrible thing that you 
shouldn’t do. So, there is a problem I think on mutual construction. So, what is 
happening when you have political participation… do you have intentional 
exclusionary policy of nationalist excluding the others, and making impossible for 
anybody else to really participate or you have a process of self-exclusion so that I 
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don´t even want to participate in this conversation because I am actually getting my 
legitimacy my authority from Madrid and from other sources of power… So, I don´t 
really want to go into those places because those places are treacherous, and 
difficult, and problematic and so on. And this is why you have the split. I think that 
this is why it is so important to actually maintain high level of institutional integrity 
of the Basque institutions and this is why political representation of any party is so 
crucial. Because, either you reduce dramatically the Basque society to only 
nationalist and then you say anybody else doesn’t belong or you say, you know, 
this is irrelevant the only think that counts is what is really recognized and so on, 
and honestly neither of the two work. In the current status, what you need to have 
is a respectful public institutional space that is strong enough to say: well all these 
instances actually exist all these instances actually can talk and in a curious way 
because of political culture elsewhere I would imagine, but this is me, really being 
an observer, is that political participation will be much more consistent, familiar to, 
welcome by a Basque Nationalist experience than the entire Basque Country. The 
entire Basque Country in a way requires an institutional level where you have more 
formal ways of participating, more defined spaces that are less prone to this 
discursive, fluid, engaged, vibrant way of participating that many other finds 
threatening and problematic and no safe enough. That’s my two sense you know 
that’s why I still hope the king will go to Gernika” (Andrea Bartoli, 2014/05/31). 
Professor Andrea Bartoli introduced several interesting points during our discussion. First, he 
confirms the impression that debate mainly took place within the Basque nationalist sphere. 
However, he hesitates whether this was a gain or a loss. The reason behind this, is that he found 
a positive shift in the agency in this sphere from a blaming game to one of taking responsibility 
towards a different end. Indeed, he links the path of what were then forthcoming events, to a 
more general trend of which the initiative may have been part, and in which Basque citizens 
decided to become the avant-garde. Second, he relocates the problem of the absence of the 
unionist side as not regarding exclusion but self-exclusion, suggesting this is related to the fact 
that in the Basque case, different sources and levels of authority interact. Finally, he suggests 
both should be compatible in the Basque public sphere, but each has its own way. The unionist 
sphere requires more informal tracks, and the King visiting Gernika while the ‘Basque’ sphere 
is more fluid, vibrant, and less formal or more familiar.  
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Regarding the previous discussion, Bartoli suggests that rather than a case of exclusion, 
absences in The Konpondu Initiative could be more likely taken as a case of self-exclusion. The 
ideal model entails exclusion is only acceptable if accepted by the excluded, but it says nothing 
about self-exclusion. Should we assume they accepted not to be part of? Indeed, this situation 
brings into light an interesting line of research: the role of those that do not take part. However, 
in our cases, does the absence of the unionist side outweigh the exercise of those that took part?  
The second aspect underlined by Bartoli affects the risk of elite manipulation, because he 
renders questionable whether the position of the Basque Government at that time represented 
the powerful end of the public sphere. Indeed, I have criticised institutional coupling in this 
case, on the basis that the level of impact citizens’ participation had in decision-making was 
questionable. The tricky point here, is that the impact that the Government’s initiative had, is 
equally questionable. The consultation did not take place because the Constitutional Court 
outlawed it. This aspect at least brackets the democratic gap regarding inclusiveness. In the 
wider Spanish public sphere however, it was a way of making visible a hidden perspective, and 
to contribute to enriching the pool of perspectives.  
Nonetheless, this does not change the evaluation regarding the democratic minimum. The 
initiative was part of a wider plan in which the consultation was included on the agenda in the 
case of agreement with State authorities, and the case of disagreement, with state authorities. 
Whatever the case may have been, it represented an attempt to engage in the mutual exchange 
of reasons, but not as if to reach a shared practical judgment. Therefore, in the light of the 
existing analysis, I think it is fair to conclude that the initiative did not fulfil the requirements 
to be labelled deliberation even at minimum, and is closer to the agonistic model. Yet, does it 
say nothing at all of its democratic character? Moreover, if not, what is the role of normative 
standards? The avid reader will have already realised that we are exactly at the point where this 
dissertation began: Should I be polite or not?  
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Attending to the second requirement of the deliberative minimum, what is at stake is the 
disposition of participants to reach a point where agreement is possible. In other words, the 
function of deliberation for social integration. In the case of The Konpondu Initiative, this 
possibility is not closed, but does not rule action. It is problematic from a deliberative 
perspective because the validity of a claim is sustained by the requirement that ‘all possibly 
affected’ could agree, as participants in rational discourses. This is the Discourse Principle and 
applies universally. Therefore, both sides should accomplish. The reason for this is that its 
justification is a rule of argumentation that it is a necessary presupposition of communicative 
action if aimed at mutual understanding. In other words, if we do not assume that all affected 
can accept the consequences, and side effects, of a controversial norm – Universalization 
Principle – there is no point of discussion over the rationality or the reasonableness of 
argumentation.  
The problem in this case, and more generally in the case of complex diversity, is that this formal 
presupposition is assumed for the institutions of the law of a modern constitutional liberal 
democracy, while it regulates what all the rest, including the Basque Government, actually 
ought to do. Put in simple terms, whether the Basque government assumes, or not, the side 
effects and consequences of the controversial law that establishes the unity of the Spanish State, 
does not rule out the rationality and reasonableness of the position of the Spanish Government 
on this issue. While the Basque Government should regulate its actions as if this requirement 
was fulfilled by the system of rights in the core of the Spanish constitutionalism, and if it does 
not, its position is no longer justifiable.  
This is the necessary condition for deliberative argumentation. It can be better or worse, and 
more successfully reached in particular sites of the system, but it is what deliberation is all 
about. What I hesitate to suggest, is not whether this criterion is used to differentiate 
deliberation from, for example, conversation, or agonistic controversy. I even do not question 
that deliberation provides the means for outcomes to be more legitimate. My point is that I find 
it questionable whether this requirement could be grounded on a formal presupposition. In other 
words, the critical appropriation of the decision-making process by citizens should reach the 
end of the justificatory chain, and this requires opening up the definition of (D), but this time 
from the perspective of the Theory of Argumentation. 
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2 Back to Habermas’ Theory of Argumentation 
Habermas explained his Theory of Argumentation in his introduction to the Theory of 
Communicative Action (1989c) and linked it to the definition of communicative reason 
(Habermas 1989c, 1:1–23). First and foremost, communicative reason is differentiated from 
practical reason, in that it is not able to provide a blueprint for a normative theory grounding 
action. Its habitat is the linguistic telos whereby citizens interact, and their forms of life are 
structured, but it is not a direct source of prescriptions on the rationality of actions. It provides 
a guide to reconstruct the network of discourses whereby action coordination is possible: the 
capacity of citizens to coordinate their actions by communication aimed at mutual 
understanding.  
This theoretical approach rests on the idea that rationality does not refer as much to holding 
knowledge, as it does to the ways whereby acting, and speaking subjects, acquire and make use 
of it (1989c, 1:8–10). In this sense, either expressing a belief or performing a goal directed 
action, subjects make use of knowledge that is fallible, and therefore, is open to criticism by 
certain implicit assumptions. Those assumptions are not contingent, but conceptually necessary 
and subsequently involve, in the case of speaking and acting, claims that are open to criticism, 
and susceptible of being supported by reasons. Therefore, the rationality of an expression could 
be considered a function of the internal relation between the semantic content of expressions –
conditions of validity – and the reasons for the truth of a statement or effectiveness of an action. 
Indeed, Habermas’ model of communicative reason intends to accommodate a truth oriented 
realist approach, within a hermeneutical appropriation of the world-making character of 
language through communication. According to him the problem with the compatibility of both 
views only stands when 
... one tries, as usual in the empiricist research traditions, to separate the cognitive-
instrumental rationality based on the monological employment of descriptive 
knowledge from communicative rationality (1989c, 1:14). 
True, communication does reflect multiple forms of making worlds within each linguistic 
community, but also commonly means to open to other’s worlds and reach a mutual 
understanding over something in the objective world.  
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On the one hand, Habermas claims that understanding entails that interlocutors can transcend 
the margins of their corresponding horizons of meaning and look to each other, as well as 
themselves. Therefore, a ‘superior point of view’ is made available as a ‘formal anticipation’ 
(2003a, 57). The language of this superior point of view results from each worldview opposing 
others, and progressively decentring its particular perspective on behalf individuals involved in 
dialogic interactions with others. With this decentring, the progressive expansion of each 
horizon of meaning occurs, resulting in different worldviews increasingly overlapping. 
Moreover, this cognitive dynamic, underpinned by the practice of reaching mutual 
understanding, sustains a sort of intercultural dialogue useful for correcting and overcoming 
prejudices through reciprocal learning. In other words, standard interpretations result from 
dialogical interactions and their rationality is justified on pragmatic grounds because, “[w]e 
learn from the world by learning from each other” (2003a, 59). 
On the other hand,  
... [t]hey have to take up this point of view, however, with regard to the same objects 
about which they want to reach a mutual understanding (2003a, 57).  
Thus, not only is a language that overcomes the burdens of different linguistic communities are 
necessary, but also for its members to be capable of understanding over something in the world, 
the supposition that this world is for them, the same is also necessary. If the meaning, or relation 
to a world or state of affairs, of a sentence, is the expression of its truth conditions, then 
understanding it demands knowing the conditions for a sentence to be true. Knowledge of truth 
conditions entails knowledge on “the reasons that explain why they obtain if they do” (2003a, 
70–71).  
Finally, the outcome of taking mutual understanding over something in the world as the guiding 
thread for rationality, entails that the rationality of linguistic expressions and behaviour relies 
on social cooperation, meaning, the capacity of several subjects to coordinate their interventions 
in the world through communication (1989c, 1:10–14). Social cooperation is a dynamic process 
that evolves, and permits, on the basis of openness to criticism and grounding, learning from 
each other and the world. Thus, according to Habermas, along with openness to criticism, by 
claims to validity, and the capacity to support claims by reasons, another demarcation criteria 
for rational behaviour is learning (1989c, 1:18–22).  
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Indeed, this reflective attitude marks a crucial distinction in Habermas developmental 
conception of modern rationalisation, because it allows differentiating between a normatively 
ascribed agreement, conventionally grounded, tied to pre-modern worldviews, and a 
communicatively achieved understanding, proper of emancipated societies (1989c, 1:66–74).  
Thus, a communicatively achieved understanding rests on agreement based on reasons and the 
rationality of participants determined by their obligation to provide reasons for their 
expressions; in other words, enter into rational argumentation. Although openness to criticism 
and grounding point to the possibility of argumentation learning processes rely on 
argumentation, they depend on the reflective attitude of a participant willing to learn from 
mistakes in the light of reasons raised by others137. Moreover, if learning constitutes 
demarcation criteria for rational behaviour, and it is based on citizen’s capacity to support and 
react for and against claims with reasons, argumentation becomes a necessary means, and the 
study of argumentation becomes the study of the rationality of expressions and behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Communicative action is differentiated from action oriented to success in that the former entails participants adopt an 
attitude oriented to reaching understanding. Action oriented to success could be instrumental due course of following technical 
rules or aimed at efficiency or strategic when is considered under aspects of following rules of rational choice and intended to 
influence decision by a rational opponent (1989c, 1:285). On the contrary, communicative action speaks of participants holding 
pre-theoretical knowledge on the proper conduct of processes to reach an agreement with others communicatively that meet 
conditions of rationally motivated assent (1989c, 1:287). The latter entails shared convictions, not given conventions, by 
participants and disallow agreement by force so that speech acts succeed if others accepts the offer done by taking a ‘yes or 
no’ position on a validity claim that, being open to criticism, should base decisions on grounds or reasons. This distinction 
allows Habermas avoiding a dichotomy between rational action considered instrumental or strategic, but anyhow aimed at 
success, and traditions where no rationality operates rather than taken for granted conventions. 
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The relevance of a theory of argumentation is justified on the basis that, “it falls the task of 
reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions of an explicit rational 
behaviour” (1989c, 1:2). Moreover, Habermas claims that “rational reconstructions can claim 
to be describing universals” (Habermas 1990d, 32). Regarding his theory of language, he steps 
on the analytic tradition following the cognitive turn Michael Dummett gave to truth-
conditional semantics138 (Habermas 1989c, 1:276, 315–19). The underlying idea is that rational 
standards are neither universal in a context of tradition shared by author and interpreter, nor 
when determined by an external objectivity in the light of which, a final decision could be made. 
Their objectivity is asserted due to the process of argumentation itself: being true is 
distinguished from taking something to be true, using universal rules of argumentation giving 
warranty over a speaker being taken to be true by a hearer. 
Moreover, following Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics, he defends “the 
commensurability of different linguistic worldviews by means of pragmatic universals” (2003a, 
73–76). These pragmatic universals do not constitute, qua Kant139, conditions for possible 
objects of experience, but the a priori of argumentation; the infrastructure necessary for 
communication and interaction. It is different, because it is concerned by reflection on validity, 
using pragmatic conditions allowing discursive redemption. Indeed, those pragmatic conditions 
for the discursive redemption of claims to validity, represent the reference point, in the light of 
which the better could be identified on rational bases that remain impartial, and apply 
universally despite acknowledging the plurality of worldviews due to contemporary social 
complexity.  
 
 
                                                 
138 Dummett starts, according to Habermas, distinguishing the conditions a sentence should satisfy to be true and the knowledge 
a speaker has on them when asserting the truth of a sentence. And concludes acknowledging that in most cases knowing the 
truth conditions of sentences is problematic. The example, Habermas brings about, are sentences with reference, for example, 
to past events that are not directly verifiable by any speaker at present. On these bases, understanding the meaning of a statement 
cannot require the validation of a set of particular truth conditions but that “we are capable of recognizing grounds through 
which the claim that is truth conditions are satisfied could be redeemed” (1989c, 1:317). In other words, to understand an 
assertion means to know a speaker has good grounds to warrant that conditions for the truth of a statement are satisfied.  
139 According to Habermas, Immanuel Kant represents the central figure of this project and he defined the theory of justification 
underneath on the bases of certain transcendental conditions that, making experience possible, made available for philosophical 
thinking justified knowledge (Habermas 1990c). Modelled on success of modern science, his theory of knowledge was aimed 
at making compatible the emancipation of rationality from previous and comprehensive sources of normativity, as religious or 
metaphysical worldviews, and the desired project of rational unity. But, endowing philosophy with a privileged access to a 
priori transcendental conditions of possible objects of experience Kant located it “as the highest court of appeal vis-à-vis the 
sciences and culture as whole” (1990c, 3).  
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Moreover, Habermas defends those conditions as ‘rationally testable’. However, while in the 
case of communicative action, this warranty that conditions for engagement hold is settled 
conventionally; but within the modern world there are cases in which the lifeworld cannot 
provide such warranties. Indeed, there is a special type of validity claims, where the question 
is not for example, whether an intersubjectively recognised norm of action holds for a particular 
claim. In the case of ‘higher-level validity claims’, the validity claim under dispute transcends 
local or professional boundaries, because it is the validity of the norm itself what is under 
dispute (1989c, 1:40). At this stage, I am moving from the realm of communicative action, to 
rational discourse and argumentation as the final court of appeal to rational behaviour and 
expression.  
At this level, different value spheres and their forms of argumentation enter into play, but no 
conventional rule is available that is intersubjectively recognised from within all of them. In 
other words, universal validity claims cannot be settled conventionally using the binding force 
associated with intersubjectively recognised norms, because no such context is available from 
a universal point of view. Indeed, only the truth of a proposition, the rightness of a norm, and 
the well-formedness of an expression, are by their very nature universal validity claims. They 
apply to every claim to validity raised by a speaker, and are redeemed under the assumption 
certain conditions hold. But, in this case, hypothetically:  
... participants have to start from the (often counterfactual) presupposition that the 
conditions for an ideal speech situation are satisfied [and] suppose that a rationally 
motivated agreement could in principle be achieved (1989c, 1:42).  
Both, an ideal speech situation, and the possibility of the rationally motivated agreement, are 
necessary presuppositions for the discursive redemption of universal claims to validity. Their 
virtue, is that they provide a rationally testable set of conditions to demarcate rational 
discourses, in the light of pragmatic presuppositions independent from contextual or accidental 
factors. Indeed, Habermas found a suitable model of argumentation in Steven Toulmin’s 
proposal on The Uses of Argument (Toulmin [1958]2003), but underlined that “his mistake lies 
in not clearly separating conventional claims, which are context dependent, from universal 
validity claims” (1989c, 1:36).  
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Toulmin departs from a logically oriented approximation to the study of validity conditions, to 
focus on the form of arguments whereby claims are supported. Accounting for practical 
arguments that do not fit within the logical scheme of premises, followed by conclusions he 
advanced in a basic model, known as the ‘Toulmin Model’. Argumentation starts with a claim 
(conclusion), in support of which reasons (grounds), are provided based on evidence (backing), 
and linked by rules of inference, principles and the like (warrants) (Toulmin 2003, 87–135). 
This approximation to argumentation ensures that Toulmin departs from the level of abstraction 
of logic in connection with the construction of individual arguments and their relations.  
In Toulmin’s view, the logical structure, or form of argument, indeed does provide an analytical 
standard informing on the formal validity of arguments. Although,  
... to call such an argument formally valid say only something about the manner in 
which it has been phrased, and it tells us nothing about the reasons for its validity 
(2003, 132) ... 
...if working with substantive arguments to talk about their validity, or justification, refers to 
reasons mobilised in support of a claim that finds no reliable grounds regarding analytic 
adequacy. Reasons cannot be demarcated about their acceptability, justification, or validity 
without reference to the context in which an argument was raised. More concretely, standards 
for the evaluation of substantive arguments are field dependent, and the only measure that is 
not, is the force with which an argument approximates the standard of the field in which it was 
used (2003, 36–40). 
Therefore, Toulmin provides a standard for argumentation. common in logical form to all its 
expressions, but rejects validity or justification can be demarcated in the light of it. Both are 
field-dependent standards that make no sense without reference to their particular contexts of 
action and associated rational enterprises. Indeed, as noted by Habermas, to account for the 
plurality of validity claims, Toulmin proceeds from the baseline of logic towards differentiation 
regarding patterns of organisation, and functionally differentiated contexts of action (Habermas 
1989c, 1:33). The problem is, according to Habermas, that demarcating the differentiation 
between forms of argumentation in relation to different contexts and their internal logics, the 
binding force of discourse based on the redemption of universal claims to validity gets lost. 
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On the contrary, Habermas defends that all arguments share the same basic form of 
argumentation, subordinating differentiation to “the end of developing intersubjective 
convictions by the better argument” (Habermas 1989a, 1:33). Their commonality is no longer 
limited to the logical structure of the argument, nor is their differentiation associated to 
accidental or external factors. Different forms of argumentation depend on the universal claim 
to validity thematised140 and they share in common that their rationality is assessed by the 
possibility that it may be redeemed. In this view, an appropriate model of argumentation 
requires overcoming the burdens of logic and pushing the logic of argument further into the 
domains of dialectic and rhetoric (Habermas 1989c, 1:35). Indeed, at no one of these analytical 
levels alone can “the very idea intrinsic to argumentative speech be adequately developed” 
(1989c, 1:26). Argumentation theory needs to account for all of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 According to Habermas, from a universal pragmatic point of view the meaning of linguistic expressions can be ‘categorically 
distinguished’ depending on whether they serve “sentences that take a representational function”, “serve to establish 
interpersonal relations or express intentions” or “the function of expression” (1979d, 50). But, the analysis of meaning in 
reference to the contribution different types of speech acts, performed at different levels of communication, make to pragmatic 
functions of language, nonetheless, requires a reconstruction of basic typologies of speech act theory and basic modes of 
language use. Regarding the latter, the division between illocutionary and locutionary acts does not hold for the differentiation 
between performative and constative modes of language. But, Habermas suggests its initial intend could remain reworking this 
differentiation in terms of the two levels of communication of language use. Although both modes of speech cohabit in every 
speech act one could be thematised over the other stressing the validity bases of its performative component while only 
mentioning its propositional content or the other way around. And these different ways of thematisation of speech acts reflect 
different modes of language use:  the interactive use of language thematises relational aspects and the cognitive use 
propositional content.  
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Habermas, in line with the classical canon, distinguishes between three analytical aspects 
delimiting disciplinary burdens of rhetoric, dialectic and logic: Rhetorics is concerned with 
argumentation as a process, Dialectics with procedural aspects or rules and the focus of Logic 
is on the product, or the form of arguments and their relations. On the one hand, as a process 
argumentation builds on a form of communication that, although do not sufficiently 
approximate ideal conditions – stated as pragmatic presuppositions in the model of the ‘ideal 
speech situation’– should still require symmetrical conditions whereby all force except that of 
the better argument is excluded. From this perspective, argumentation is considered a reflective 
continuation of communicative action by other means, the structure of which reflects an intent 
to convince a universal audience on behalf of the speaker. On the other hand, as a procedure 
argumentation demands certain rules whereby a cooperative division of labour is made with 
participants thematizing a problematic validity claim, taking a hypothetical attitude and testing 
with reason, and only with reason, whether their claims stand up to scrutiny or not. Therefore, 
argumentation as a procedure is shaped by special rules, and rules are aimed at promoting a 
ritualised competition for the better argument and rationally motivated agreement. Finally, as 
product argumentation is aimed at producing cogent arguments capable of motivating others to 
engage using a set of intrinsic properties reflecting the argument is not, for example, 
contradictory.  
In short, we would say that rational argumentation requires the production of cogent arguments, 
respecting procedural rules of engagement, aimed at rational agreement, and overcoming 
conventional processes by taking into account all relevant points of view equally by intending 
to convince a universal audience. Logic, dialectic, and rhetoric then, provide a comprehensive 
analytic framework to approach the rationality of argumentation. However, validity, or 
justification, comes to hand only on behalf of a participant in rational discourses, not an external 
observer. Indeed, Habermas grounds his definition of the rationality operating in morality, law 
or democracy, on a reconstruction of the network of discourses whereby the validity of norms 
of action is recognised in the context of the public debate through which modern societies 
intended to understand themselves.  
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The problem, is that once settled, the outcomes of this reconstructive effort rule actual 
participants in the democratic decision-making process as counterfactual presuppositions 
demarcating what is reasonable and what is rational. On the contrary, we could retain the basic 
intuition that politics is about deliberation, and deliberation is basically about finding rational 
solutions to reasonable controversies through argumentation. Nonetheless, without having to 
constraint deliberators to act as if conditions were in place, and intending to convince a 
universal audience. At this point, I find it good enough if deliberations advance to the extent 
that actual conditions are in place, and taking into account those that sit just in front of us.  
The case-study applies this basic criterion to the analysis of The Konpondu Initiative, but in 
practice, the implication of the suggested transition backwards from Discourse Ethics to the 
Theory of Argumentation, extends well beyond the particular case and empirical analysis. 
Moreover, although grounding Habermas’ suggestion to take into consideration the three 
canonical levels of argumentation, in this case relations are to real conditions and audiences 
instead of counterfactual idealizations, which opens promising lines for future research. 
 
3 Out of the Box (I): The Primacy of Dialectics 
The idea that deliberation is an argumentation genre, draws on the theory of argumentation 
advanced by the pragma-dialectical school (van Eemeren 2010, 2013), and its appropriation by 
critical discourse analysis (N. Fairclough 1995; I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 2013; I. 
Fairclough In Press). The original aim was to move from discussing how deliberation can be 
cooperative and conflictual, to the critical analysis and evaluation of deliberative practice. They 
provide an account of the genre of political deliberation  
... which emphasises its adversarial character, but also show how it feeds into 
cooperative decision-making within institutional practices that are designed for this 
purpose (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 21). 
Therefore, the evaluation mode is contextualised at each institutional setting, linked to its goals, 
and to the variety of constraints that affect the course of deliberative interactions. 
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First, the kind of questions in which they are interested, are the ones that connect reasoning to 
action in response to a question over what to do. In this sense, practical reason is different to 
theoretical reason, but not regarding its context (specialised domains versus lay persons) or its 
content (mundane versus technical knowledge). It is different regarding its purpose and nature 
of the conclusion (2013, 36). Practical reason functions to decide the right course of action, as 
opposed to truth, and its conclusion is normative, not descriptive. On the basis of this, the kind 
of arguments it mobilises are plausible ones (2013, 37). Equally, inductive arguments are 
sustained on the probability that conclusion follows from premises, and deductive arguments 
entail premises are necessary, and together are sufficient, to support the claim. Plausible 
arguments are appropriate “where a tentative conclusion needs to be drawn, in conditions of 
uncertainty and incomplete knowledge” (2013, 39). Therefore, its conclusions are in principle 
defensible, and so is the practical reason. 
Second, the structure of practical arguments follows Walton (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 
2008; Walton et al. 2010), but suggests a different interpretation of Goals and Circumstances 
relevant to take a decision over the course of action, and suggests that possible negative 
consequences also have their role (2013, 42).  
In short, the basic structure of practical reason involves a motivational premise (what I want), 
a cognitive-instrumental premise (how can I get what I want), and the practical judgment as a 
conclusion (what I should do). This basic scheme is further specified, depending on whether it 
is merely instrumental, or involves normative values. According to Fairclough, if values are 
involved, it is misleading to consider goals what the agent desires, because human beings have 
goals they do not personally desire, they even act against current desires. Therefore, they 
redefine the goal premise as “future, a possible state of affairs, that the agent envisages, 
compatible with his concerns (as expressed in the value premise)” (2013, 42). These concerns 
can be his actual desires, or what he thinks he ought to do.  
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Moreover, agents operate because actions have multiple consequences, some intended and 
other unintended, and compromising goals at different degrees. The idea here is that agents act 
according to a hierarchy of values and goals, in the light of which some consequences might 
be acceptable, and others not. Indeed, different sources of normativity might operate at the same 
time. A claim can be made  
... against the background of a moral order (informed by shared moral values or by 
universalizable rules of conduct), an institutional order (generated by laws or rules), 
against a background of other values (kindness, generosity) or simply in view of 
what your actual desires and preferences are (2013, 44).  
Therefore, according to Fairclough and Fairclough, the fact that these reasons objectively exist 
in the social world, makes them also valid reasons from the perspective of practical reasons 
and they are included in the circumstantial premise as social or institutional facts. 
The scheme differs considerably from Habermas baseline, insofar as in Toulmin’s scheme we 
account basically for claims that need to be grounded on reasons and backed by evidence, 
leading towards conclusions warranted by rules of inference, principles, and the like. Recalling 
that according to him, the level logic entails non-contradiction, while the burden of proof falls 
into argumentation as procedure and process in which the better argument should rule. It rules 
as a consequence of presuppositions of the possibility of a rationally motivated agreement and 
under conditions for an ideal speech situation. In short, presuppositions warrant the possibility 
to redeem claims to validity, not their actual redemption.  
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On the contrary, according to the scheme suggested by Fairclough and Fairclough, we have 
already, in the structure of practical reason, actual states of affairs or relevant circumstances as 
social or institutional facts. In addition, plausible future states of affairs, and their possible 
negative consequences, in this case linked by a hierarchy of different normative concerns by 
which an agent rationally decides what he ought, or ought not do. Moreover, “agents do not 
move from premises to a claim for action that is allegedly supported or justified by those 
premises. There is always a gap (2013, 49). It is rational to provisionally accept the outcome of 
a practical argument “if it survives our critical attempts to refute it by imagining what 
considerations would count against it” (2013, 49). Indeed, this is what deliberation is about 
“considering alternative practical arguments, supporting different claims and examining and 
weighing considerations that support these alternative claims” (2013, 50). Minimally, 
“balancing each argument against a counter-argument” (2013, 50). 
This is the theoretical context in which my definition of deliberation as a genre, and the 
identification of counter-arguments as what is expected from deliberators at minimum, was 
located. However, in the case study, I have described the argumentativeness and closeness to 
the deliberative minimum regarding relational discourse structures, and normatively assessed 
the initiative at the system level informed by deliberative democratic theory. In other words, 
both levels have been kept separate. The reasons for this decision was my methodological 
choice. The methodological approach, allowed a broad approximation to this structure, but as I 
noted RST is a reliable approximation to argumentation, despite previous research which 
suggests direct correlations between coherence relations and links between different parts of an 
argumentation scheme or between relational discourse structures and argumentation structures 
are not reliable. 
However, I have also underlined the limits of this kind of normative evaluation to conclude 
whether the analysis was informative over the contribution of The Konpondu Initiative in 
democratic terms. Sequencing the stages of deliberation about the unfolding of argumentation 
schemes and moves, in other words, argumentative profiles (van Eemeren 2016), it is possible 
to assess the initiative critically. The ideal model of critical discussion provides a normative 
reference, but from the perspective of argumentation, not a theory of morality, democracy, or 
law.  
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To bridge the gap between relational discourse structures and argumentation structures, other 
empirical studies recommend double annotation of the same corpus (Green 2010; Peldszus and 
Stede 2013, 2016; Stede et al. 2016). Indeed, in the case of discourse analysis of argumentation, 
a more linguistically oriented annotation of Discourse Relational Devices (Taboada 2006; 
Taboada and Das 2013) meets halfway with the extensive work conducted on the use of 
Argumentative Indicators (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Henkemans 2007; Tseronis 2011) 
allowing the identification of relevant schemes, structures and moves.  
According to van Eemeren and the Pragma-dialectical School, certain lexical indicators mark 
argumentation stages and schemes within them (van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Henkemans 
2007). They provide a very flexible definition so that indicators neither fall necessarily under a 
concrete category (names, verbs) nor could be considered in isolation, but in the context of the 
argumentative exchange among interlocutors (van Eemeren et al. 2007). By contrast, Assimakis 
Tseronis, suggested a more grounded approximation to indicators as markers (Tseronis 2011). 
Markers in this sense, are not narrowly conceived as connectives – because, otherwise and the 
like – but as a wide variety of signals, including connectives, but also lexical clues, 
characteristic expressions, and even syntactic structures and other linguistic formats.  
Therefore, enriching the annotation of relational discourse structures in the DELIB corpus using 
Discourse Relational Devices, and analysing them as Argumentation Markers provides a viable 
route for bridging the gap between relational discourse structures and argumentation profiles; 
meaning schemes and moves. The benefits of this kind of analysis are that the evaluation of 
argumentation could cross the line from critical description to normative evaluation in the light 
of the ideal model of critical discussion. 
The argumentation theory underneath retains Habermas’ critique to Toulmin and suggests the 
three canonical levels argumentation are complementary for the analysis of argumentative 
deliberation (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 52), but endows the dialectical level with 
primacy in the normative evaluation of argumentative discourse (2013, 64). The analysis of 
argumentation attends, from a logical perspective to rational persuasiveness, from a dialectical 
perspective to dialectical reasonableness, and from a rhetorical perspective to effectiveness 
(2013, 52–59). The normative evaluation subordinates rhetorics to dialectics and, following the 
pragma-dialectical model, evaluates deliberation to the extent to which it represents “a 
reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion” (2013, 63); where reasonable means 
“following a dialectical procedure of systemic critical testing” (2013, 63). 
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Rational persuasiveness is an epistemic concept. It is weaker than truth and according to its 
logic, a good argument is acceptable, relevant, and sufficient. Acceptable, concerns the 
relationship between premises and the audience, and is weaker notion than truth; it does not 
aspire to be independent of peoples’ beliefs. Relevance rejects arguments that are not relevant 
as fallacious, for example, ad hominem arguments. Finally, to reject the claim it is not sufficient 
that the argument is not good. Indeed, there is always the possibility for a bad argument to 
include a claim that is true. Therefore, to reject a conclusion, it is necessary to provide a 
rationally persuasive counter-argument. 
Dialectical reasonableness refers to the procedure of argumentation whereby a critical 
rationalist conception of reasonableness critically tests the acceptability of a standpoint. In other 
words, “the function of argument is essentially critical, not concerned with justification” (2013, 
53). However, the pragma-dialectical approach is a normative theory that takes an external 
analytical perspective. In short, as already explained, the ideal model of critical discussion 
entails a purpose in the search for which deliberative dialogues evolve in a series of steps or 
stages. Each stage is associated with certain dialectical moves so that unreasonable, or 
fallacious arguments, are those that obstruct the procedure to proceed towards its goal.  
Nonetheless, this ideal should be empirically grounded at the level of each case so that what is 
reasonable partially depends on the institutional context, because it would be unreasonable to 
hold participants responsible “for failing to achieve outcomes that cannot be achieved” (2013, 
54). Indeed, whether a reasonable resolution of differences might be achieved depends on 
conditions. Conditions concern participants and the socio-political context, insofar as the model 
requires, 
... participants actually to solve disagreement they have appropriate attitudes and 
competencies, and the social, political context should enable participants to claim 
their rights and responsibilities, for instance, give them the power and freedom to 
question and challenge arguments (2013, 54). 
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Finally, Fairclough and Fairclough provide a domain based definition of rhetorical 
effectiveness. In their model, both dimensions, dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical 
effectiveness, account for the balance between the commitment of parties to solve a 
disagreement in a reasonable way, “but also, hopefully, in their favour” (2013, 57). It is domain 
specific, because rhetoric becomes free from negative consequences, if it is associated with 
deliberation and reasonable disagreement. The idea is that there might be the case when a 
reasonable solution is available, and rhetoric is used to obstruct that resolution. On the contrary, 
in the context of reasonable disagreement, rhetoric provides the means to follow the discussion 
when more than one opinion is legitimately possible. In this case adapting to the beliefs and 
opinions of the audience provides an advantage, for example, in mobilising support. But this 
advantage is not considered antithetical to the ends of deliberative argumentation. 
Taken together, this analytical definition of the different levels of argumentation, leaves the 
normative evaluation of argumentation procedures in the hands of only one question. To rebut 
a claim, requires asking whether the action proposed will have negative consequences that will 
undermine the stated goal. They distinguish between defeating an argument “by which we 
understand that attempting to show the argument is invalid”, and rebutting an argument. The 
former attends to the argument and different alternatives are available based on their goodness. 
I have already mentioned the possibility of defeating an argument as fallacious at the rhetorical 
level without compromising the validity of its conclusions. The latter, on the contrary, meaning 
to rebut the central premise of an argument, or its claim requires,  
... showing that the argument’s conclusion is false (unacceptable) by indicating the 
existence of a rationally persuasive argument (a counter-argument) whose claim is 
the denial of the original claim (i.e. the agent should not do the action) (2013, 64).  
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For example, imagine the argument of the Lehendakari Ibarretxe to organise The Konpondu 
Initiative is as follows. The central claim is that we ought to involve citizens in the peace 
process. The value premise is that citizens’ participation is the core value of democratic 
regimes. The circumstantial premise is that elite-driven negotiations have failed, and there is 
no avenue to make their voice heard in the peace process. The goal premise is a future state of 
affairs in which the Basque conflict is resolved. The means ends premise here would be that 
political participation enhances democracy and counteracts conflict dynamics. The arguments 
premise could be defeated for example, by showing that there are other routes to make citizens 
voice heard. However, to rebut the claim, a counter-argument should be rationally persuasive 
in defending making peoples voice heard will compromise the goal, namely, the resolution of 
the Basque conflict. 
The final step for this model is to explain how it is that good arguments ground actions, given 
that the function of arguments in this model is essentially critical. In this case, Fairclough and 
Fairclough look at the social ontology of Searle (Searle 2010). According to them, Searle 
describes a distinctive feature of social reality as our capacity to impose functions on peoples 
and objects that do not belong to them by their nature. To perform assigned functions, the status 
of the object or person to which a function has been assigned, needs to be collectively 
recognised. The institutional reality, for example, comes into being in the form of declarations, 
texts, or constitutions, that have deontic powers, meaning that they carry obligations and duties.  
Moreover, “declarations are those speech acts that create the very reality they represent” (I. 
Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 73). The status functions of these declarations carry deontic 
powers, that once recognised, provide us with reasons for action that are independent of our 
inclinations and desires. Therefore, it is the recognition of such reasons that may lead to the 
formation of a desire to observe their binding force, “but desire derives from the reason we 
recognise, and not vice-versa” (Searle 2010:131, cited in I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 
73). In other words, the problem is not that we do not desire to accept the binding force of a 
given declaration, but that we do not collectively recognise its status. 
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Recently they have suggested the appropriateness of combining the analysis of argumentation 
with Cultural Political Economy (CPE) (Jessop 2007; Sum and Jessop 2013). CPE claims that 
“economic and political systems, relations, practices are socially constructed and that there is a 
cultural dimension to their social construction: discourse.” (I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 
5). Especially in times of crisis, CPE focuses on ‘imaginaries’, future states of affairs which 
social agents intend to advance in the form of discourse for their materialisation. Therefore, 
argumentation theory combines with cultural political economy to provide a comprehensive 
account over the processes whereby some imaginaries and strategies succeed and come into 
being as social institutions, while others do not. 
This latter feature of the model, is interesting insofar as it is not simply institutional facts that 
are introduced to the very core of the argumentation scheme of practical reason, therefore 
problematizing the status of institutions in the context of deliberative argumentation. Moreover, 
it provides the means to further the critical analysis of discourse to its cultural, political, and 
economic context. 
 
4 Out of the Box (II): The Primacy of Rhetoric 
A further interesting way forward underlines the level of rhetoric and intends to develop the 
social psychological approach to argumentation presented by Landemore (2013, 123–44). 
Indeed, there is a dynamic discussion from the perspective of deliberative democratic theory 
on the role of rhetoric (Abizadeh 2007; Chambers 2009; Dryzek 2010; Garsten 2011; Lyon 
2013). The suggestion in this case, is to advance in the rhetorical characterisation of 
deliberation, and I find it especially interesting to deal with the challenge mass democracies 
represent for the model of deliberation, so far as the requirement I established about having to 
argue with real others seems difficult to meet in practice. 
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Abizadeh, for example, takes up the compound challenge of pluralism and social integration 
that has been a feature of the reasoning throughout this dissertation, albeit from a different point 
of view (Abizadeh 2007). His argument is that Habermas’ project of reconciling social 
integration and political rule with freedom fails, precisely because his discourse-ethical theory 
of politics lacks a motivational force. Indeed, he takes up the argument against constitutional 
patriotism, usually associated with nationalism and republicanism, stating that constitutional 
patriotism is too thin to provide the affective identity capable of inspiring shared solidarity. In 
his words, these models “are too rational, too abstract, too universal, too rootless to be able to 
anchor the passion in a motivationally efficacious identity” (2007, 449). The solution he 
proposes, seeks to overcome the philosophy/rhetoric binaries between reason/passion, 
abstract/concrete, or universal/particular. In other words, it gives the art of persuasion a place 
in practical reason to restore its motivational force to discourse ethics. 
I have taken a different stance towards the same issue, primarily because I disagree that the 
problem of complex diversity could be faced regarding affects, motivations, and so on. In this 
case, what is at stake is how to coordinate in the language of law, two opposed, but equally 
democratic, mandates that share the basics of the moral point of view, but legitimately disagree 
on its implementation in a particular system of rights. In this case, the differentiation made by 
Habermas between discourses of application and justification, misses the point so far as (unlike 
in moral controversies) in legal controversies, those that apply the law and those that make the 
law, are personally and institutionally distinct. Moreover, one side of the controversy makes 
the law, and the other side should comply, therefore, letting the powerless end with a dilemma: 
what comes first democracy or law? But, unable to respond to both on an equal footing. 
Nonetheless, Abizadeh makes a point that I think could be compatible with my account. For 
example, if we take Searle’s notion of status as a departure point, I have argued that the problem 
is not the absence of desire to accomplish with duties. The binding effect of the institutions of 
law is neutralised, not because of a lack of desire, rather it is the lack of a collective recognition 
of the reasons that provide the declaration with its deontic powers, or status. Searle’s argument 
is that desire derives from reasons we recognise, not the other way around. However, there is a 
gap to explain how it is that reasons provide recognition to the status of certain social 
institutions while not to others.  
 
  
327 
At the structural level, the suggestion made by Fairclough and Fairclough was that analysis 
should account in parallel for cultural, political, and economic aspects (CPE), whereby some 
‘imaginaries’ are materialised and others are not. Therefore, it is plausible to think that the 
recognition of the status of collective imaginaries involves different kinds of reasons too. The 
deliberative interpretation of this tenet in Argumentation Theory is presented by Abizadeh as 
the inclusion of persuasion in the operation of practical reason. Indeed, this is the default 
position in Argumentation Theory. The difference is that Abizadeh suggests we will be able to 
retain the distinction between strategic and communicative discourse without equating the 
former with persuasion and the latter with reason.  
Fairclough and Fairclough, in contrast, specify strategy is an important part of political action 
(I. Fairclough and Fairclough 2013, 24). Political strategies involve a future state of affairs to 
be achieved using action, and proceed from the actual situation. However, they are formulated 
in discourse and conceived as ‘imaginaries’, but “’strategy’ is a category within theories of 
action, not within theories of discourse” (2013, 24). It is an important concept, and a category 
in political theory and theories of political economy, but the distinction between the strategic 
and communicative negates the point of talking about discourse. On the contrary, Abizadeh 
suggests this distinction could be maintained about different kinds of persuasion, in particular, 
“we can distinguish between persuasion that is, and persuasion that is not, subordinated to the 
latter’s given the end of reaching understanding” (Abizadeh 2007, 466).  
The logic is similar to that of the sequential approach, if not now, then maybe later or in another 
site of the system, and at this point, I am not capable of elaborating a robust argument on the 
role of rhetoric. But as the initial position, I cannot see on what basis, displacing in time and 
space the ruling of social integration, solves the controversial status of the norm in the case of 
complex diversity. However, regarding mutual understanding, the pragma-dialectical approach 
provides a similar interpretation, although in this instance, through the subordination of rhetoric 
to the dialectic purpose of finding a reasonable solution to controversy; yet, with one condition 
and one important exception. The condition is that disagreement is reasonable if there is no 
alternative course that will make argumentation advance towards its shared purpose, meaning 
solving controversy, and this evaluation takes place over the socio-political circumstances in 
which deliberative argumentation takes place. Therefore, the exception, if there is no rationally 
persuasive alternative, or appropriate conditions are absent, is that the room is left open for a 
reasonable disagreement lasting in time among equally legitimate positions. 
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Besides philosophical dilemmas, concerns about the appropriate kind of rhetoric for 
deliberation, tend to structure debate among scholars, and is interlaced with concerns about the 
unavoidability of the scenery of an orator speaking to an audience in contemporary mass 
democracies.  
Chambers (2009), for example, locates the dilemma in the relation between plebiscitary 
rhetorics and mass democracies. In short, plebiscitary rhetorics is not blamed because it 
mobilises passions instead of reasons, but due to its unavoidability and compound risk of elite 
manipulation. If the hearer is not entitled to make the speaker discursively accountable, the risk 
that the speaker does not take into account the perspective of her audience, brings about a 
fundamental asymmetry difficult to sustain from the perspective of deliberative democratic 
theory. She suggests the possibility of a deliberative rhetoric where a deliberative interaction 
can be established between orator and audience “even when the audience does not have the 
immediate possibility of responding and calling the speaker to account” (2009, 345).  
Dryzek, on the other hand, suggests a systemic test given the limitation of a categorical 
differentiation between ‘bridging and bonding’ rhetoric (Dryzek 2010). Bridging rhetoric is a 
kind of rhetoric that associates people with different social characteristics. Bonding rhetoric, 
on the contrary,  
... is the kind generally feared by democrats, because it is likely to deepen division 
with outgroups, to invoke dangerous emotions, to mobilise passions, to move 
groups to extremes (2010, 328).  
According to him, this categorical typology is limited, because it takes division lines in societies 
as well defined, problematic, and persistent, while in the absence of such division lines “it is 
not clear exactly what is being bridged” (2010, 331). On the contrary, the systemic test 
evaluates the extent to which rhetoric contributes to the building of the deliberative system. In 
this way, it could also identify situations where bridging rhetoric, for example, is used to co-
opt and neutralise subaltern counter-publics.  
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Garsten (2009, 2011), by contrast, locates the burden of proof not in rhetoric, but in the political 
system. After an extensive review of this debate in the field of deliberative democracy, he 
suggests that  
... the difficulty of encouraging rhetoric may be linked to the distinctive structure 
of modern representative government itself, to the fact that it puts ordinary citizens 
in the role of an audience tasked with watching and judging political rule from the 
outside rather than doing it for themselves (2011, 44). 
In Saving Persuasion (2009) Garsten, rather than defending the virtues of rhetoric, rejects the 
opposite conviction; public reason is not “a bottom-up development” originating in coffee-
shops and “broadening into a “public sphere”, but  
... a top-down story in which the notion of public reason is invented by political 
philosophers seeking to quell religious, political controversy by subjecting debate 
to an authoritative standard (2009, 177).  
Moreover, the argument could be labelled as ‘rhetoric against rhetoric’, in so far as either a 
political system is fully deliberative, that is implausible, or representative democracies cannot 
avoid the rhetorical moment of citizens being persuaded by authorities to accept their judgment 
at the moment for example, in which they are ruled. According to Garsten, rhetoric is part of 
politics whether we like it or not. What the denial of persuasion in deliberative democratic 
theory, entails are a denial of citizen’s capacity to make use of it.   
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On the contrary, according to him, rejecting the role of persuasion in the name of rational 
agreement, or impartiality, instead of countervailing disengagement, fuels dogmatism. 
Regarding citizens “part of the solution should involve an effort to engage more directly with 
them and their views” (2009, 185), as they are not as they should be. To that end, deliberation 
should be detached from the logic of a discourse of justification, and stop asking citizens to 
substitute their private judgments, for ones that emerge from an authoritative public point of 
view. Deliberation should “adopt a more intuitive or direct view of what makes a decision 
deliberative” (2009, 191). He suggests a general definition of deliberation as a ‘considered 
response’ that attends situated judgment and deliberative partiality (2009, 192). Effective 
deliberation may take advantage of tacit knowledge that each citizen has from her experience, 
but deliberation should not place itself, in a standpoint that denies the importance of these 
attachments (2009, 194). Finally, he assumes rhetoric does not immunise against demagogy so 
far as demagogy cannot be avoided (2009, 200). The solution, in this case, is not about citizens 
but the dispersion of authoritative bodies so that they will respond more adequately to 
situationally grounded perspectives.  
In sum, deliberative concerns on rhetoric are linked to the unavoidable role of persuasion in 
mass democracies. The challenge is the position of the other in the orator-audience scenery and 
the mechanisms allowing the demarcation when this communication may be labelled 
deliberative. Chambers and Dryzek, suggest different demarcation criteria that permit good or 
bad rhetoric to be distinguished, while Garsten and Abizadeh, suggest that what has to be 
redefined is the deliberative ideal. However, once again, the perspective shifts if we consider 
the relationship between deliberation and rhetoric from the perspective of Argumentation 
Theory. 
Regarding the relationship between audience and orator, Michael Billig (1996), suggests for 
example that, “the image of the powerful orator playing masterfully with the emotion of the 
helpless crowd is a myth” (1996, 225). The line of argumentation underlying this statement is 
sustained as follows.  
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First, according to Billig, a persuasive orator needs to identify with her audience to effectively 
convey her argument. But this does not imply that the orator should align her position to those 
of the audience. Even to change the existing opinion, or prejudices, some degree of 
identification is needed because, “some of their (an audience’s) opinions are needed to support 
the fulcrum by which he would move other opinions” (1996, 224). Billig refers to several 
experimental set-ups where, for example, a Marxist minority takes a critical stance towards the 
liberal pacifism of the majority of the group. In the exercise, the minority finds it is more 
persuasive, and shows a certain flexibility and respect towards pacifist (not liberal) values to 
defend its position, rather than denying the other’s position as ‘bourgeois sentimentality.’ 
Second, this adaptation to the audience entails the oratory of the speaker informs, not only about 
the orator, but also about the audience. Moreover, “[s]ince the orator and the audience are linked 
together, oratory must be seen as an irreducibly social activity” (1996, 226). It entails at 
minimum that they share common argumentative forms because “the speaker must use shape 
of arguments which are recognisable to the audience” (1996, 226). Moreover, the oratory of the 
speaker not only shares argumentative forms with the audience, but “it also comprises a 
common content” (1996, 226). To identify with their audiences, communal links between 
audience and orator are emphasised 
 ... foremost amongst which are shared values and beliefs, [so that] ... [t]he orator, 
in identifying with the beliefs of the audience, will be treating the audience as a 
community bound together by shared opinions (1996, 226). 
Therefore, it is proper of rhetorical persuasion to establish a link with the audience in so far as 
it is necessary for an orator’s speech to be effective. In any case, the orator-audience scenery 
does not only inform about the speaker, but also its audience. More interestingly, it informs on 
the relationship established between a speaker and her audience, in their particular rhetorical 
context. With this commonsensical assumption, the image of the proactive orator facing a 
passive audience becomes at least, questionable. Moreover, this link is established at two levels: 
the form and the content of argumentation. Therefore, this basic idea provides an attractive 
departure point to respond to the challenge of the plurality of venues, whereby contemporary 
democracies define the relationship between citizens, and for example representatives, or even 
themselves. Let me exemplify this idea taking as baseline the content of argumentation. 
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According to Billig, shared places where orator and audience meet each other reflect common-
places commonly used by orators, because they are commonly held by their audience, and 
common-places that inform over the sense of a particular community (1996, 230). He makes 
two important remarks. First, common-places inform over particular communities because 
“[e]ach community possesses its own common-sense, expressed in common-place, but 
nevertheless potent, symbols” (1996, 231). Thus, common-sense should be understood 
anthropologically and not in an unrestricted manner. Second, the anthropological common-
sense should not be understood in an absolute sense because, “each audience will no doubt 
imagine its own common-sense to exemplify le bon sense” (1996, 233). Let me explain the 
argument underlying this second remark in more detail. 
An orator knows the different common-places of different audiences so that, in principle, we 
might think her way of thinking is flexible regarding the kind of arguments, and set of common-
places she could mobilise, depending on the audience to which she wants to identify to be 
persuasive. The other side of the coin, in this case, is that “one would expect the audience to be 
characterized by one-sided prejudices” (1996, 233). However, this differentiation between an 
orator with argumentative skills not reciprocated in the audience, is only part of the story 
according to Billig, “[i]t omits the paradox, which arises when one considers not the argument 
which might arise between communities, but within one community.” (1996, 233) The clearest 
example of this is two parties trying to identify with the same audience, with both appealing to 
the common-sense of the same community, but arguing in oppositional ways.  
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This paradox underlines that “the common-sense of an audience is not unitary, but is composed 
of contrary aspects” (1996, 234). Contrary aspects of the common sense “are deeply embedded 
in the vocabulary of the language itself”, and the linguistic aspect illustrates “how inherently 
contrary common-sense is”, because “[t]he mere possession of these words means that we can 
take either side in the dilemmas and controversies which chance our way.” (1996, 237) These 
terms are close to each other so that “in particular instances, reasonable or reasoned arguments 
can be made for preferring one term to its rhetorical contrary” and this should not be considered 
“a failure of efficient mental organization” (1996, 237). On the contrary,  
[i]t is because of this proximity between the undefined borders of opposites, that 
common-sense can provide us with dilemmas to think and argue about; and only if 
there are such dilemmas and deliberation141, rather than the smooth and unthinking 
categorization of all worldly particulars, can our discourse bear a moral quality 
(1996, 238).  
For example, in collaboration with the IXA Group (UPV-EHU), I conducted a small experiment 
to test ANALHITZA142 (Otegi et al. 2017) a tool for linguistic analysis. I analysed the semantic 
frames of participants about different aspects of the same question, and different key concepts. 
We selected a sample of 40 texts (20 in Basque and 20 in Spanish), with a similar length (more 
than 300 characters), written in a similar date (April 2008), and responding to the same 
question. In the current situation which difficulties and opportunities do you see for peace and 
political normalization? I looked for most repeated words regarding Difficulties and 
Opportunities at each linguistic set. Table (29), reports the frequency lists of words from 
responses of citizens including the ten most repeated words.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
141 Emphasis added. 
142 The tool can be tested also for English language texts here: http://ixa2.si.ehu.es/clarink/analhitza.php?lang=en (Consulted: 
2017-08-14). 
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Difficulties Opportunities 
Basque Spanish Basque Spanish 
Alderdi 
Politiko 
ETA 
Bake 
Lortu 
Arazo 
Herritar 
Jarrera 
Biolentzia 
Euskal 
Politico 
Partido 
Violencia 
Ir 
Dificultad 
Sociedad 
Tener 
Existir 
Poder 
Parte 
Bake 
Aukera 
Herri 
Gizarte 
Euskal 
Eman 
Ikusi 
Nahi 
Bide 
Herritar 
Vez 
Oportunidad 
Tener 
Politico 
Cada 
Creer 
Querer 
Poder 
Politica 
Decir 
Table 27: Frequency Lists 
 
Regarding differences, in the Basque set and difficulties column, we find words like ‘ETA’, 
‘bake’ (‘peace’), ‘Euskal’ (‘Basque’), ‘herritar’ (‘citizens’), ‘jarrera’ (‘attitude’) absent in the 
Spanish list. The other way around we find words in the Spanish set absent in the Basque set 
like ‘sociedad’ (‘society’), ‘tener’ (‘to have’), ‘existir’ (‘exist’) or ‘poder’ (‘power’). Moreover, 
we can speculate on these differences. For example, while Basque speaking participants include 
references to ‘attitude’ the Spanish set refers to ‘existence’, the Basque set to ‘Basque’ ‘citizen’ 
and the Spanish set to ‘society’; or the counterintuitive example of ‘ETA’ being mentioned only 
in the Basque set.  
Regarding similarities, both linguistic communities included ‘alderdi’/’partido’ (‘parties’), 
‘politiko’/’politico’ (‘political’) and ‘biolentzia’/’violencia’ (‘violence’) in the difficulties list, 
and ‘aukera’/’oportunidad’ (‘opportunity’) and ‘nahi’/’querer’ (‘want’) in the opportunities list. 
In short, members of both linguistic communities were clear that the problem involved political 
parties and violence, and they wanted an opportunity for peace and normalisation. Therefore, 
both ideas and their linguistic expressions, represent common-places for the participants in The 
Konpondu Initiative.  
From a classical deliberative point of view, those will be the focus of our attention, but 
according to Billig, the interesting point is that those common places are the locus of 
deliberative controversy within the shared common sense of this particular community. 
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For example, common place regarding difficulties for peace and normalization is ‘violence’. 
We used Network Text Analysis (Carley 1997) to extract co-occurrence networks and 
compared resulting semantic maps around the concept of ‘violence’ (Graph 7). Results revealed 
several remarkable differences in their meaning of ‘violence’. While, in the Basque set violence 
is linked with words like ‘ETA’, ‘politiko’ (‘political’) or ‘politika’ (‘politics’), ‘pentsatu’ 
(‘think’) or ‘gatazka’ (‘conflict’). In the Spanish set violence is linked to words like ‘verdadero’ 
(‘true’), ‘nunca’ (‘never’), ‘existir’ (‘exist’) or ‘asesinato’ (‘killing’).   
 
 
In Billig’s terms, violence is a common place used by participants because they consider this 
common-place, was also held by their audiences (other participants). Looking at the differences 
in the ways different linguistic communities semantically framed the common-place violence 
we get a more reliable picture of the controversies that feeding deliberation around 
commonsensical assumptions in the Basque community.  
The interesting shift is that in this case, the content of orator’s speeches informs on the 
interactions between them and their audiences, over the controversial nature of the common-
place ‘violence’, in this particular community. Moreover, the moral value of this controversy 
is not within the capacity of the deliberative process to neutralise. It is not on what they have 
in common; meaning, the common-place that violence is a difficulty, it is the other way around; 
the moral value of common-places is that they provide a point of reference for different 
perspectives within the same community to meet each other, but the virtue of common-places 
is that they provide means for controversy and deliberative thinking to take place.  
 
Graph 7: Co-occurrence maps for ‘violence’ in the Spanish and Basque sets 
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It is interesting to my case, because together with the analysis of argumentative moves, 
schemes, and structures, it provides an elegant way to articulate the analysis of the form of 
argumentation with the substantive content.  
 
5 Out of the Box (III): Identity and Deliberation 
The altered perspective of argumentation theory conveys a Copernican turn to understand the 
controversial relationship between identity and democracy, but more specifically between 
complex diversity and deliberation. The opening paragraph of this dissertation recalled an 
experience in a London pub where I contemplated the question: where am I from? The taken-
for-granted sequence of events led me, and my casual friend, into a stalemate of mutual 
categorization. Either with ‘us’ or against ‘me’. Indeed, according to Billig, categorization is a 
central cognitive feature of human beings. The need to name others is essential, at least if we 
are to locate ourselves in a world that moves too fast, and it is too complex.  
Throughout this thesis, I have settled the departure point of Habermas’ categorization of 
collective identities to be either civic or ethnic. However, I have also noted that things change, 
they change with abandon, and no one is to blame. Moreover, categorization is also permeated 
by the ‘spirit of contradiction’ that permits me, or my friend, to reject categorization (Billig 
1996, 160). Indeed, according to Billig, the reverse move of categorization comes when we 
intend to place a particular stimulus in a general category, because we are forced to consider 
this particular stimulus through what it makes it different. This particularization reverses 
categorization because of the simple reason that a particular case never fits completely with a 
given category, and this very fact makes the category itself questionable in the light of each 
particular case. 
Moreover, “humans, through their use of language, possess that most important capability 
which makes rhetoric possible: the ability to negate” (1996, 165). It is thanks to this ability to 
negate that we are not left to assume ourselves as individuals filled up with stereotyped 
prejudices. In other words,  
[c]ategorization does not provide the basis for thinking in a simple sense. The 
automatic application of categories is the negation of thinking, in that it is a 
thoughtless process (Billig 1996, 170). 
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On the contrary, thinking starts when we begin to alternate from how to categorise a 
particularization to which categorization to particularise. In other words, reflection proceeds 
from when we begin to wonder whether or not Catalonia is a nation, and then to continue asking 
ourselves what being a nation really means in the light of the Catalan nation. According to 
Billig, both processes are inseparable and open-ended. Of course, any controversy could find a 
temporal settlement. This is what a constitution is: a temporary settlement of controversy over 
who constitutes the people. However, insofar as a final word is always sought, it only serves to 
refresh interest, restore momentum, foster new criticism, and require further justification. 
Therefore, categories are means, not ends. They are aimed at new criticism pushing towards 
further justification. Moreover, the opposite is thoughtless. And the same goes for constitutions. 
Regarding categories, Billig suggests, they could be considered, rather, as meta models or 
‘essentially contested concepts’ (1996, 177). William E. Connolly, for example, explained that 
essentially contested concepts in politics are elusive with regard clear-cut ontological 
demarcations because they “involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their 
users” (Connolly 1983, 10). They are internally complex and contestable ‘cluster concepts’ 
(1983, 12–22) and “contests over the correct use of partly shared appraisal concepts” could be 
considered themselves “an intrinsic part of politics” (1983, 39). In short, if we think identity is 
an essentially contested concept, foreclosing it means we are compelled not to consider identity 
in the same way as equality, freedom, rights… In other words, there is politics; and there is 
what is left; it is what I am, how I feel, what I like… but this is my identity, which is mine and 
politically meaningless. 
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Yet, it becomes politically meaningful as soon as I make it part of the controversy in a political 
context, because it is the social context of argumentation that defines the meaning of an 
argument. In other words, when I place my identity in the context of political controversy to 
negate a certain categorization, it becomes politically meaningful and worthy from a 
deliberative perspective. It does so, because my argument does not speak about me, it is a claim 
raised against a counterargument. For example, in the introduction I quoted Laura Mintegi 
stating that if there is going to be a ‘Basque way’ then it is either no longer ‘Basque’, or it is no 
longer a ‘way’. The argumentative context of this claim is, according to Billig, unavoidable, 
and it is around it that we can understand the meaning of her assertion. She was introducing a 
book on Basque independence and her argument, and that of the book, was that if the Basque 
Country is going to be independent, it has to think less about how to be Basque, and more about 
how, or what for, the wish to become a country consists in. But it says nothing about how Laura 
Mintegi feels, or lives, her Basqueness. 
Moreover, not only does context define meaning, but it also settles the reasonableness of the 
course of argumentation. The endless nature of these kind of disputes, means that in cases where 
two arguments oppose, “both are seen as equally reasonable; we will choose, but not on the 
falsity or irrationality of the one or the other” (Billig 1996, 124). An official decision can 
foreclose neither dispute in so far as it will entail the negation of thinking, indeed, it is not the 
agreement underlying the majority position that either frames discussion, or, even less, defines 
the justifiability or reasonableness of the positions in dispute (1996, 238–52). The 
deliberativeness of an argument is not settled then, by using the capacity of some to be 
recognised in their claims as a matter of public concern by all. Neither is it settled in the name 
of law. It is the opposite. It is the challenge what matters, because the challenge transforms 
unquestionable facts into controversial beliefs and forces the need for further justification.  
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This simple idea changes the terms of debate significantly in comparison to the Habermasian 
conception of deliberative justification. Billig places justification and critique as essential 
features of argumentative deliberation, but to create momentum; meaning, to bring shifts or 
drifts from conversation to argumentation, 
... [a]ll that is necessary is for one conversationalist to criticise another’s platitude 
about the world, and for that other to offer a justification (1996, 117).  
In other words, critique is the engine of deliberative justification, rather than justification being 
the source of legitimacy for critique. Moreover, every justification refers to a context of 
argumentation because, “contesting, contradictory parties provide the necessary social context 
of argumentation, whereas a neutral audience is an optional extra” (1996, 120). It is not that my 
claim is justifiable, rational, or reasonable because it passes one test or another. What matters 
is whether it makes me enter the discussion with at least one person. It is the capacity to foster 
others to further justification that defines its worth.  
Therefore, context defines meaning and reasonableness and the final playing field is no longer 
a universal audience but the one sitting in front of us, the one which challenges our most deeply 
held assumptions. Indeed, Billig defends argumentation as a universal capacity of human 
beings, but not in spite of their differences, but because of them (1996, 141).  
Thinking is thus defined as a dialogic process, a means by which we learn by questioning 
ourselves, by taking the position of others and imagining variant possible futures, and the 
considering desirability of outcomes. It could be seen as occurring in the domain of the isolated 
individual, but 
... [i]t is in the electric kindling of life in two minds… there sometimes arise 
glimpses, and shy revelations of affinity, suggestion, relation, analogy, that could 
not have been approached through any avenue of methodical study (De Quincey 
cited in Billig 1996, 146). 
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If thinking requires others constraints, there are no rules aside from the rules that must be agreed 
as part of the process, and that the outcome is not defined in such a way as to limit the open-
endedness of the process. The fact that both parties always seek to have the final word reveals 
an intent to convince others, and the reality that this intent takes the form of arguments to reveal 
reason, mediates this intent. However, permission is no longer needed insofar as critique opens 
the door and the objective is not agreement necessarily, but more argumentation. Indeed, 
Billig’s image of deliberation is not one where all voices seek to be similar and stay ‘happily 
silent’ (1996, 16). On the contrary, it is more one of ‘chatter and discussion’, in which ‘any 
accord which is reached is to be breached’. Moreover, dialogue is a process that moves forward 
‘creatively and endlessly’, in different contexts, and with different others each defining the 
argumentative context, the meaning of the argument, its form and its worth.  
Thus, regarding me my friend in the pub; with politeness, I reserve the right to conclude it is 
up to me. I can avoid discussion, assume a situational identity, and have a nice conversation 
about the weather as an Australian. I can also change my strategy and take a Spanish stance if, 
for example, another Basque joins our conversation, just to challenge what is taken-for-granted 
about me, and move forwards towards an interesting discussion on what is ‘us’. Or I could place 
myself in Catalan shoes, if a Spaniard takes the floor and joins my British friend to discuss the 
Scottish case. However, if deliberative argumentation is going to occur I need to have the 
capacity to critically stand, or reject what others think I should be. Or I evolve.   
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ANEX A: Post-evaluation test 
Elkarrizketarako udal-foroak balioztatzeko galdetegia 
Cuestionario de evaluación de los Foros municipales de diálogo 
 
 
1.   Balioztatu ekimen hau 1etik 10 era (1 ez da batere positiboa eta 10 oso positiboa da) 
Valorar de 1 a 10 esta iniciativa (siendo 1 nada positiva y 10 muy positiva) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Zergatik?/¿Por qué? 
 
  
 
2.   Balioztatu 1etik 10 era erabilitako metodologia (1 ez da batere positiboa eta 10 oso positiboa da).  
Valorar de 1 a 10 la metodología utilizada (siendo 1 nada positiva y 10 muy positiva).  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Zergatik?/¿Por qué?  
 
  
3. Balioztatu 1etik 10 era foroaren dinamizatzaileak egindako lana  (1 ez da batere positiboa eta 10 oso 
positiboa da) 
Valorar de 1 a 10 el trabajo realizado por la/el dinamizador del foro (siendo 1 nada positiva y 10 muy 
positiva).  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Zergatik?/¿Por qué?  
 
  
4. Zure ustez, anitza izan al da foroa parte-hartzaileak eta entzun dituzun iritziak kontuan hartuta?  
¿Consideras que el foro ha sido plural en cuanto a los participantes y a las opiniones que has 
escuchado?  
 
Bai/sí                      Ez/no                 ez daki-ez du erantzuten/ no sabe-no contesta 
 
 
5.  Zer hobetuko zenuke antolatu behar diren hurrengo udal-foroei begira?  
¿Qué mejorarías de cara a los próximos foros municipales que se van a organizar? 
 
  
6.   Zer-nolako gogoz etorri zinen eta zer-nolakoaz zoaz? 
¿Con que ánimo has venido al foro y con que ánimo te vas? 
 
  
7.   Beste bilera bat antolatuko balitz, parte hartzeko prest egongo zinake? 
¿En el caso de que se organizara otra reunión, estarías intersada/o en participar? 
  
Parte-hartzailearen datu orokorrak/Datos generales de la persona participante: 
 
Sexua/sexo:   Adina/edad:   Lanbidea/profesión: 
 
Parte-hartze alorrak udalerrian: elkartea, taldea, erakundea . . . /Ambitos de participación en el 
municipio:  
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ANEX B: Persons Contacted  
 
 
 
Name Affiliation 
Gorka Espiau Agirre Lehendakaria Center (ALC) 
Amaia Agirre Agirre Lehendakaria Center (ALC) 
Aitziber Blanco Lokarri 
Asier Blas Parte-Hartuz (UPV/EHU) 
Izaro Gorostidi Parte-Hartuz (UPV/EHU) 
Iñaki Barcena Parte-Hartuz (UPV/EHU) 
Igor Ahedo Parte-Hartuz (UPV/EHU) 
Jokin Olaizola Basque Government 
Jorge de la Herran AGORA 
Andrea Bartoli Columbia International Centre for Conflict Resolution (CICR) 
William Weisberg Columbia International Centre for Conflict Resolution (CICR) 
Armando Geller Scensei - Basque Peace Process Scenarios (BPPS) 
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ANEX C: Recovered Documentation 
 
 
 
 
 
Document Type Number Reference 
Transcripts Municipal Forums 117 DOC 4-5 
Transcripts Diaspora Forum 1  
Transcripts University Forums 3  
Post-evaluations questionnaires 773 DOC 3 
Methodological guide 1 DOC 6 
Report Parte-Hartuz 1 DOC 2 
Report Agora 1  
Report CICR 2  
Explanation of the Roadmap 5  
Presentation of the Konpondu Initiative (draft) 2  
Posts at konpondu.net 39  
Compilation Responses to citizens by Ibarretxe 1  
Thank you letters 67  
Invitation letters 1  
Promotional Leaflet 1  DOC 1 
Promotional videos with citizens 43  
Promotional videos by organisers 9  
Promotional audios 10  
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